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OCR for page 3
1
Introduction and Background
T
his report is a summary of a joint symposium held on June 8-10, 2011,
by the National Research Council (NRC) of the U.S. National Acad-
emies and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) on progress, chal-
lenges, and opportunities for converting United States and Russian Federation
(R.F.) research reactors1 from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched
uranium (LEU) fuel.2,3 This symposium was organized in response to a 2010
request from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Secu-
rity Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
NNSA requested that a symposium be organized and a subsequent
summary document be produced to address:
• Recent progress on conversion of research reactors, with a focus
on U.S.- and R.F.-origin4 reactors;
1 In this report, the term “research reactors” is defined to include research, test, and training
reactors, including critical and subcritical assemblies.
2 By international agreement, HEU is defined as uranium enriched to a concentration of
20 percent uranium-235 or greater, whereas LEU is defined to be uranium enriched to a
concentration of less than 20 percent uranium-235.
3 This symposium focused on HEU-fueled reactors; however, some research reactors are also
fueled with plutonium. The challenges of managing plutonium-fueled reactors—which will
need to be accomplished through materials protection, control, and accounting measures—are
mentioned in this report but were not the focus of this symposium.
4 The terms “origin,” “supplied,” and “designed” are used interchangeably in this report
to describe reactors that were developed by the United States and Russia for both domestic
and third-country use.
3
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4 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
• Lessons learned for overcoming conversion challenges, increasing
the effectiveness of research reactor use, and enabling new reactor missions;
• Future research reactor conversion plans, challenges, and opportu-
nities; and
• Actions that could be taken by U.S. and Russian organizations to
promote conversion.
The statement of task for the project is included as Appendix C.
The preparation of the symposium agenda and the production of this
summary report were carried out by a committee of U.S. experts appointed
by the National Academies and a committee of Russian experts appointed
by the Russian Academy of Sciences. Biographical sketches of the commit-
tee members are provided in Appendix B. These organizing committees met
jointly three times over the course of the project: First, in November 2010
to plan the symposium; second, in June 2011 to hold the symposium; and
third, in September 2011 to finalize the symposium report. The agenda for
the symposium is provided in Appendix A, along with a list of briefings
presented at the November 2010 meeting.
NNSA and the NRC agreed that the symposium would not produce
consensus findings or conclusions but would instead be used to encourage
discussion among U.S. and Russian participants. For this reason, this sym-
posium summary does not contain findings, conclusions, or recommenda-
tions and does not represent a consensus of symposium participants.5 This
report represents a summary record of the briefings and discussions that
occurred during the symposium. Although the U.S. and Russian organiz-
ing committees are responsible for the content of this report, any views
contained in the report are not necessarily those of these committees, the
National Academies, or the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The remainder of the chapter provides background information on pro-
liferation risks associated with civilian use of HEU; basic operating principles
and terminology associated with research reactors; and potential impacts of
reducing HEU use in research reactors. Much of the content of this discus-
sion is drawn from symposium briefings (Adelfang, 2011; Arkhangelsky,
2011; D’Agostino, 2011; Dragunov, 2011; Matos, 2011; Roglans, 2011a).
Additionally, some basic concepts and definitions were added for the benefit
of non-expert readers.
5
Important statements of opinion are attributed to individual workshop participants where
appropriate, but no attempt has been made to attribute statements of fact.
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5
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
PROLIFERATION AND CIVILIAN TRADE IN HEU
The availability of HEU—particularly in the civilian sector—is a sig-
nificant proliferation and security concern. In 2001, the U.S. National
Research Council stated in its report, Making the Nation Safer, that “(t)he
primary impediment that prevents countries or technically competent ter-
rorist groups from developing nuclear weapons is the [lack of] availabil-
ity of special nuclear material (SNM),6 especially HEU” (NRC, 2001).
The availability of HEU in the civilian sector—as opposed to the military
sector—is of particular concern, because resources may not be available or
used to protect the material adequately during storage or transport.
If HEU is available, either stolen or purchased, it is plausible that a
nuclear weapon could be built by either a state or a non-state actor.7 The
technical barriers to constructing such a weapon are not impassably high.
As Pablo Adelfang of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
noted during the symposium (Adelfang, 2011), individuals with a basic
knowledge of physics and machining could build a functioning bomb from
stolen HEU. This is largely because HEU is only weakly radioactive—mak-
ing it relatively easy to handle—and because such a device would not re-
quire explosive testing to be assured of some yield.
In the civilian sector, HEU is primarily used to fuel research reactors
and produce radioisotopes for use in medical procedures. The stockpiles of
HEU held for these purposes and others are significant. At the end of 2003,
the estimated global stockpile of HEU (both civilian and military) was
around 1,900 metric tons. Although the vast majority of this HEU is under
military control, about 175 metric tons is civilian HEU (ISIS, 2005). This
quantity of HEU is sufficient to fabricate about 3,500 nuclear weapons.8
The vast majority of this civilian HEU is located in the United States (124
metric tons) and in Russia (15-30 metric tons) (ISIS, 2005).
The potential proliferation risk associated with the use of HEU-fueled
research reactors—the focus of the symposium and this summary report—
arises from the need to transport and store both unirradiated and irradi-
6 “The term ‘special nuclear material’ means plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope
233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material that the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission
… determines to be special nuclear material.” (42 U.S.C. § 2014)
7 Although LEU could, in principle, be enriched and converted into HEU for use in building
a nuclear weapon, this process would require a significant technical infrastructure, and the
mass of LEU required would be very large. The international community could track an effort
to enrich LEU more effectively than one involving the theft of HEU.
8 Assuming 50 kilograms of HEU per explosive device. This may be a conservative as-
sumption. The IAEA defines the siqnificant quantitity of HEU to be 25 kilograms. Significant
quantity is defined as “the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility
of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded” (IAEA, 2001).
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6 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
ated9 HEU fuel. This fuel must be protected at all times and is potentially
vulnerable to theft while in transit, including across national borders.
Proliferation risk exists even in nuclear weapons states.
It is possible to replace HEU in many civilian applications with LEU,
which is considered to have a lower proliferation risk because it is not suit-
able for use in a nuclear device. Such replacements are possible using cur-
rent technologies or technologies that are under development. For example,
in 2009, the NRC found that the HEU targets used for the large-scale pro-
duction of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 could be replaced by LEU
targets (NRC, 2009). Similarly, many existing research reactors can operate
using LEU fuel rather than HEU fuel (see Chapters 2 and 3 of this report).
In fact, as discussed elsewhere in this report, many reactors have been suc-
cessfully converted from HEU to LEU fuel, and many other conversions
are under way. The continuation of this trend could significantly reduce the
proliferation risk associated with the civilian trade in HEU.
As will be discussed in the next section, 40 percent of the world’s op-
erating research reactors are located in the United States and Russia, and
nearly all of the world’s research reactors are fueled with either U.S.- or
R.F.-origin fuel. For these reasons among others, the United States and
Russia combined have significant influence on the nature and extent of the
worldwide trade in civilian HEU.
RESEARCH REACTORS
Following U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace
speech to the United Nations (Eisenhower, 1953), the U.S. and Russia
exported research reactors to about 40 countries. At present, the IAEA
lists 254 operational research reactors in 55 countries (Adelfang, 2011; see
Figure 1-1). According to the IAEA, 75 civilian research reactors (excluding
defense and icebreaker reactors) are currently operating using HEU fuel (see
Figure 1-2). Nearly all HEU-fueled research reactors are supplied with HEU
of U.S. or Russian origin, with the exception of a very few that are supplied
with Chinese-origin HEU. About 25 percent of all research reactors are
located in developing countries, including Bangladesh, Algeria, Colombia,
Ghana, Jamaica, Libya, Thailand, and Vietnam.10
Civilian research reactors are used for a wide variety of missions, for
example, to perform research in a broad range of scientific and engineer-
9
Much research reactor used fuel is not considered to be “self-protecting” (formally defined
as producing a dose rate greater than 100 rad per hour at 1 meter in air) because of its low
radioactivity. However, irradiated fuel from virtually all of the high-performance reactors
mentioned in this report would be considered to be self-protecting, as would irradiated fuel
from commercial power reactors, for a period following removal from the reactor.
10 www-naweb.iaea.org/napc/physics/ACTIVITIES/Research_Reactors_Worldwide.htm.
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7
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Decommissioned
Shut Down 202 211
Planned 2
Under Construction
3
Total =
672 Research Reactors
Operational 254
FIGURE 1-1 Research reactors of the world. More than 670 research reactors
have been constructed. At present, fewer than half (254 reactors) are operational.
SOURCE: Adelfang (2011).
Shut Down Before
Defence Reactors Conversion 19
and Icebreakers
Converted to LEU
Operating with HEU
and Shutdown 12
50
Fully Converted to
LEU and Operational
40
Operational Reactors Partially Converted
Running on HEU 75 and Operational 6
FIGURE 1-2 HEU-fueled research reactors of the world. At present, 75 civilian
research reactors are operated using HEU fuel; the remainder have been converted
to LEU fuel and/or shut down. SOURCE: Adelfang (2011); data as of 2009.
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8 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
ing disciplines, including research related to nuclear engineering, nuclear
physics and chemistry, materials science, and biology. In addition, research
reactors have become indispensible for the production of medical isotopes
for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures and are also used for industrial
purposes such as silicon doping.
Research reactors’ key missions require them to be designed differ-
ently from commercial power reactors. Most notably, research reactors are
typically designed to produce higher thermal neutron fluxes at much lower
thermal outputs than power reactors. Most research reactors are also physi-
cally much smaller than power reactors (typically having core volumes of
less than a cubic meter versus tens of cubic meters) and require far less fuel
(typically a few kilograms versus thousands of kilograms).
Research reactors have a broad range of designs in terms of power
levels, moderators,11 fuel types, and cooling systems, among other design
features. In many cases, these reactors are one-of-a-kind or few-of-a-kind,
complicating efforts to convert them to LEU fuel. For illustrative purposes,
one common broad category of research reactor—the pool- or tank-type
water-moderated reactor—is described in the following paragraphs. A
broad range of other designs exist, including fast research reactors, which
require no moderator and use plutonium as fuel, and “homogeneous reac-
tors,” in which the reactor core is a solution of dissolved uranium salts
contained in a tank.
Pool-type or tank-type research reactors (see Figure 1-3) comprise a
cluster of fuel assemblies and control rods12 in a pool or tank of water,
which serves as both a moderator and a coolant.13 The core is often sur-
rounded by graphite, beryllium, or heavy water (the “reflector”) that is
used to slow down (moderate) neutrons and reflect them into the core to
maximize the neutron flux. The core and reflector typically contain empty
channels for irradiation of targets and test materials, and some reactors are
designed with apertures in their pool or tank walls through which neutron
beams can be accessed. Figures showing the core configurations for a num-
ber of different research reactors can be found in Chapters 2 and 3.
Fuel assemblies (also referred to as “fuel elements”) contain the ura-
nium fuel that powers the reactor. A fuel assembly is comprised of indi-
vidual fuel plates, tubes, or rods, the latter of which is also referred to as
11A moderator is a material used to slow down neutrons (i.e., reduce their kinetic energies),
which increases the probability of fission when the neutrons are captured by uranium nuclei.
Light materials such as water and graphite are commonly used as moderators.
12 Control rods contain materials (e.g., boron) that absorb neutrons; they are used to control
fission rates in the reactor fuel and hence the power levels in the reactor.
13 Tank-type research reactors are similar to pool-type reactors in overall design, but they
typically operate at higher power densities, requiring higher coolant flows and pressures,
making it necessary to separate the coolant from the remainder of the pool contents.
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9
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
FIGURE 1-3 Pool-type research reactor. This photo shows the core of the Ford
Figure 1-3.eps
Nuclear Reactor at the University of Michigan, the first reactor converted to use
LEU fuel under the U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors pro-
bitmap
gram. The conversion was completed in 1984. The reactor was shut down in 2003
and subsequently decommissioned. SOURCE: Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project.
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10 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
“pins.” Each fuel plate or tube consists of the uranium fuel itself (the “fuel
meat”) sealed in a “cladding” most typically constructed of aluminum.
The number of fuel plates or tubes in an individual fuel assembly can vary
widely. For example, a Russian MIR.M1 fuel assembly contains four tubes,
whereas the outer fuel assembly of the U.S. High Flux Isotope Reactor
contains 369 plates. An illustration of a Russian IRT-4M fuel assembly is
shown in Figure 1-4.
Plate-type and TRIGA pin-type fuel is most commonly used in pool-
and tank-type research reactors of U.S. origin, whereas tubular or pin-type
fuel is used in Russian-origin reactors. Different fuel production methods—
rolling in the United States and extrusion in Russia—are used as well.
RESEARCH REACTOR CONVERSION
The United States and the Russian Federation have had active efforts
to convert research reactors from HEU fuel to LEU fuel for more than 30
years. The history of these conversion efforts is outlined in the following
section, followed by a brief discussion of the current state of research reac-
tor conversion efforts in both countries.
History of Research Reactor Conversion Efforts
The first U.S.- and Soviet-supplied research reactors, which were con-
structed beginning in the 1950s, were designed to operate on LEU fuel.
During the 1960s and 1970s, power upgrades14 in U.S.-supplied reactors
required increased uranium-235 element loadings to reduce fuel consump-
tion and contain fuel fabrication costs. HEU fuel enriched to 93 percent
uranium-235 became standard in these reactors. During the same time
period, power upgrades in Soviet-supplied research reactors also required
increased uranium-235 element loadings; HEU fuel enriched to 80 to 90
percent uranium-235 became standard in these reactors (Arkhangelsky,
2011).
However, in the 1970s, concerns in both the United States and Soviet
Union about potential links between the civilian trade in HEU and nuclear
proliferation began to increase following a nuclear weapons test in India,
unsafeguarded nuclear activities in other countries, and growing terror-
ist activities around the world. In 1978, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) established the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reac-
tors (RERTR) program to develop technologies to minimize and eventually
14 Power upgrades of U.S.- and Soviet-supplied research reactors were undertaken to in-
crease neutron fluxes in experimental positions.
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11
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
FIGURE 1-4 Illustrations of the Russian IRT-4M fuel assembly. A partial cutaway
of a complete fuel assembly is shown on the left. A cutaway view of the fuel assem-
bly (right top) reveals the individual fuel tubes; a cross-section of the fuel assembly
Figure 1-4.eps
bitmap
(bottom right) shows the nested tubes. SOURCE: Cherepnin (2011).
eliminate the civilian use of highly enriched uranium.15 At present, all of
DOE’s HEU elimination efforts for civilian research and test reactors16 are
15 More information about this program can be found at www.rertr.anl.gov.
16 Research, test, and training reactors that have military or national security missions are
outside the scope of DOE’s conversion program.
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12 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
currently being carried out under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(GTRI), into which RERTR was absorbed in May 2004.17
Also around 1978, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Atomic Energy initiated
a similar program, the Russian Program of Reducing of Enrichment in
Research Reactors (RPRERR), to reduce the enrichment of fuel for re-
search reactors in its client states from 80-90 percent enriched uranium
to 36 percent enriched uranium. At this time, the U.S.S.R. began work on
high-density LEU research reactor fuels for use in foreign research reactors
operating with Soviet fuel (Arkhangelsky, 2011). However, there was no
contact or collaboration between these U.S. and Soviet conversion pro-
grams until 1993.
The first formal contact to discuss collaboration on research reactor
conversions took place in Moscow in March 1993. At that meeting it was
decided to initiate a contract between Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)
and the Dollezhal Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Tech-
nologies (NIKIET) on conversion studies and fuel development. Following
these interactions, the Russian program began to develop fuel with a less
than 20 percent enrichment based on uranium dioxide fuel for the conver-
sion of foreign research reactors.18
Significant progress has been made to convert HEU-fueled research
and test reactors around the world. As of June 2011, a total of 74 research
reactors have been converted from HEU fuel to LEU fuel or shut down
since 1978. Of these, 35 have been converted or shut down since 2004,
including seven U.S. domestic conversions; 18 foreign conversions; and 10
domestic and foreign shutdowns prior to conversion (Chamberlin, 2010;
Roglans, 2011b).
At present, the United States and Russia are cooperating on the conver-
sion of U.S.- and Russian-designed reactors in other countries. The February
2005 Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir
V. Putin on nuclear security cooperation affirmed this cooperation:
The United States and Russia will continue to work jointly to develop
low-enriched uranium fuel for use in any U.S.- and Russian-design research
reactors in third countries now using high-enriched uranium fuel, and to
return fresh and spent high-enriched uranium from U.S.- and Russian-
design research reactors in third countries. (Bush-Putin, 2005)
17 DOE and GTRI assist reactor operators to perform feasibility studies and safety analyses
required for regulatory approval to convert and procure LEU replacement fuels. GTRI also
funds work to develop and qualify higher-density uranium-molybdenum (UMo) LEU fuel to
convert high-performance research reactors (see Chapter 2).
18 In 1996 the Bochvar All-Russian Research Institute of Inorganic Materials (VNIINM)
became the lead Russian institute under the contract with ANL.
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13
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This cooperation was reaffirmed and expanded by U.S. President Barack
Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in a July 2009 joint state-
ment (Obama-Medvedev, 2009). To implement the Obama-Medvedev Joint
Statement, Rosatom Director General Sergey Kiriyenko and DOE Deputy
Secretary Daniel Poneman signed an agreement during their December 6-7,
2010, meeting to begin studies to determine the technical feasibility and
economic impact of converting six HEU-fueled research reactors in Russia
(Arkhangelsky, 2011; D’Agostino, 2011).
Current Conversion Status of U.S. and Russian Research Reactors
There were 34 civilian research reactors in operation in the United
States in 2011 (Table 1-1)19 As of June 2011, all but 8 of these reactors had
been converted to LEU fuel. Two of these 8 reactors20 appear to be convert-
ible using current-type LEU fuels. DOE is completing studies to confirm
the feasibility of converting these reactors using current-type LEU fuels.
Additional research will be required to more fully develop the capability to
fabricate these LEU fuels.
However, the following six reactors (including one critical assembly21)
comprise what DOE refers to as “high-performance” reactors that pose
many challenges for conversion, as discussed in more detail in Chapters 2
and 3:
• Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Laboratory
• The ATRC critical assembly associated with the ATR
• High-Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee
• Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) in Cambridge
• Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) in Columbia
• National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) at the National
Institute of Standards and Technology in Germantown, Maryland
New high-density LEU fuels are now under development to convert these
reactors (Roglans, 2011a). These fuel development efforts are described in
Chapter 2.
19 These reactors are regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the U.S.
Department of Energy.
20 The NTR General Electric Reactor in California and the Idaho National Laboratory’s
TREAT reactor (Roglans, 2011b).
21 A critical assembly contains sufficient fissionable and moderator material to sustain a
fission chain reaction at a low (close to zero) level. It is designed so that fissionable and
moderator materials can be easily rearranged in various geometries to mock up different
reactor designs.
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14 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
TABLE 1-1 Civilian Research Reactors in Operation in the United States
in 2011
Peak Steady-State
Institution, Thermal Power Thermal Flux Date of
(n/cm2-s)
Reactor Location (kW) Commission
1.0 × 1013
AFRRI,a
AFRI TRIGA* 1,000 1/1/1962
Bethesda, MD
2.5 × 108
AGN-201* Idaho State 0.005 1/1/1967
Univ.,
Pocatello
2.5 × 108
AGN-201* Univ. of New 0.005 10/1/1966
Mexico,
Albuquerque
2.0 × 108
AGN-201* Texas A&M 0.005 1/1/1957
Univ., College
Station
3.0 × 1013
ARRR* Aerotest, San 250 7/9/1964
Ramon, CA
8.5 × 1014
ATR Idaho 250,000 7/2/1967
National
Laboratory,
Idaho Falls
5.0 × 1012
DOW Dow 300 7/6/1967
TRIGA* Chemical,
Midland, MI
3.0 × 1013
USGS,b
GSTR* 1,000 2/26/1969
Denver, CO
2.5 × 1015
ORNL,c Oak
HFIR 85,000 8/1/1965
Ridge, TN
1.0 × 1013
KSU TRIGA Kansas 250 10/16/1962
MK II* State Univ.,
Manhattan
7.0 × 1013
MITR-II Mass. Inst. of 6,000 7/21/1958
Technology,
Cambridge,
MA
6.0 × 1014
MURR Univ. of 10,000 10/13/1966
Missouri,
Columbia
3.0 × 1012
MUTR* Univ. of 250 12/1/1960
Maryland,
College Park
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15
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
TABLE 1-1 Continued
Peak Steady-State
Institution, Thermal Power Thermal Flux Date of
(n/cm2-s)
Reactor Location (kW) Commission
4.0 × 1014
NIST,d
NBSR 20,000 12/7/1967
Gaithersburg,
MD
2.0 × 1013
NSCR* Texas A&M 1,000 1/1/1962
Univ., College
Station
2.5 × 1012
NTR General GE, Sunol, CA 100 11/15/1957
Electric
1.5 × 1013
OSURR* Ohio State 500 3/16/1961
Univ.,
Columbus
1.0 × 1013
OSTR* Oregon State 1,100 3/8/1967
Univ., Covallis
3.3 × 1013
PSBR* Penn State, 1,000 8/15/1955
University
Park
1.1 × 1013
PULSTAR* North 1,000 1/1/1972
Carolina State
Univ., Raleigh
2.1 × 1010
PUR-1* Purdue 1 1/1/1962
Univ., West
Lafayette, IN
2.0 × 1013
RINSC* Rhode Island 2,000 7/28/1964
Atomic Energy
Commission,
Narrangansett
1.0 × 1013
RRF* Reed College, 250 7/2/1968
Portland, OR
5.0 × 1012
TREAT Idaho 250 10/12/1977
National
Laboratory,
Idaho Falls
2.0 × 1012
TRIGA Univ. Univ. of 100 12/6/1958
of AZ* Arizona,
Tucson
4.5 × 1012
TRIGA Univ. University 100 10/25/1975
UT* of Utah, Salt
Lake City
continued
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16 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
TABLE 1-1 Continued
Peak Steady-State
Institution, Thermal Power Thermal Flux Date of
(n/cm2-s)
Reactor Location (kW) Commission
2.7 × 1013
TRIGA II* Univ. of Texas, 1,100 3/12/1992
Austin
3.0 × 1013
UC Davis* Univ. of 2,000 1/20/1990
California,
Davis
5.0 × 1012
UCI* Univ. of 250 11/25/1969
California,
Irvine
2.0 × 1012
UFTR* Univ. of 100 5/28/1959
Florida,
Gainesville
1.4 × 1013
UMLR* Univ. of Mass., 1,000 1/2/1975
Lowell
2.0 × 1012
UMRR* Univ. of 200 12/11/1961
Missouri,
Rolla
3.2 × 1013
UWNR* Univ. of 1,000 3/26/1961
Wisconsin,
Madison
7.0 × 1012
WSUR* Washington 1,000 3/13/1961
State Univ.,
Pullman
NOTES:
*Currently operating with LEU fuel.
a Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute.
b U.S. Geological Survey.
c Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
d National Institute of Standards and Technology.
There were 24 operating research reactors, 30 critical assemblies, and
12 subcritical assemblies in the Russian Federation in 2011 (Bezzubtsev,
2011; see Figure 2-10 in Chapter 2).22 Basic information on currently
operating Russian research reactors is given in Table 1-2. Several civil-
ian reactors pose substantive technical challenges to conversion, such as
reactors using fuel pins consisting of UO2 dispersed in a copper-beryllium
matrix with stainless steel cladding designed to operate at significantly
higher fuel temperatures than most research reactors.
22 Not including naval or other defense-related reactors.
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17
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
TABLE 1-2 Russian Research Reactors in Operation in 2011
Peak Steady-State
Institution, Thermal Power Thermal Flux Date of
(n/cm2-s)
Reactor Location (kW) Commission
4.0 × 1011
Argus Kurchatov, 20 12/1/1981
Moscow
2.0 × 1014
RIAR,a
BOR-60 60,000 12/1/1969
Dmitrovgrad
6.0 × 109
F-1 Kurchatov, 24 12/25/1946
Moscow
9.0 × 1011
Gamma Kurchatov, 125 1/4/1982
Moscow
2.2 × 1010
Hydra Kurchatov, 10 1/1/1972
Moscow
1.0 × 1013
JINR,b Dunba
IBR-2M 20,000 11/30/1977
Pulsed R
2.5 × 1010
IGRIK Minatom, 30 12/15/1975
Chelyabinsk
1.5 × 1014
IR-8 Kurchatov, 8,000 8/12/1981
Moscow
1.7 × 1012
NIKIET,c
IR-50 50 2/20/1961
Moscow
4.8 × 1013
MEPhI,d
IRT 2,500 5/26/1967
Moscow
1.1 × 1014
IRT-T Tomsk 6,000 7/22/1967
Polytechnic
Institute
8.0 × 1013
IRV-2M Res. Inst. 4,000 1/1/1974
of Scientific
Instruments,
Lytkarino
5.0 × 1014
IVV-2M Inst. of Nuclear 15,000 4/22/1966
Mat., Zarechny
5.0 × 1014
MIR.M1 RIAR, 100,000 12/26/1966
Dmitrovgrad
8.4 × 1012
OP-M Kurchatov, 300 12/1/1989
Moscow
4.0 × 1015
PIK Petersburg 100,000 Under
Nuclear Physics construction
Institute
continued
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18 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
TABLE 1-2 Continued
Peak Steady-State
Institution, Thermal Power Thermal Flux Date of
(n/cm2-s)
Reactor Location (kW) Commission
2.2 × 1014
RBT-6 RIAR, 6,000 1/10/1975
Dmitrovgrad
1.6 × 1013
RBT-10/2 RIAR, 7,000 11/24/1983
Dmitrovgrad
5.0 × 1015
SM-3 RIAR, 100,000 1/10/1961
Dmitrovgrad
U-3 Krylov 50 12/13/1964
Shipbuilding
Research
Institute, St.
Petersburg
YAGUAR Minatom, 10 6/29/1990
Chelyabinsk
1.5 × 1014
WWR-M Petersburg 18,000 12/29/1959
Nuclear Physics
Institute
1.0 × 1014
WWR-TS Karpov, 15,000 11/4/1964
Obninsk
Note: This table does not include critical assemblies.
a Research Institute for Atomic Reactors.
b Joint Institute for Nuclear Research.
c Dollezhal Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies.
d Moscow Engineering Physics Institute.
SOURCE: IAEA (2011).
REPORT ROADMAP
The symposium featured a range of briefings from R.F., U.S., and in-
ternational experts on policy, science, and engineering issues relevant to the
conversion of research reactors from HEU fuel to LEU fuel. These briefings
were organized into several sessions, reflected in the four chapters of this
report:
• Chapter 1 (this chapter) provides the context for this study and
introductory material from the symposium;
• Chapter 2 addresses challenges associated with conversion as well
as potential solutions;
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19
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
• Chapter 3 addresses the challenges and successes associated with
converting eight specific U.S. and Russian reactors; and
• Chapter 4 addresses future research directions and opportunities,
including opportunities for further interaction between the U.S. and Russia
on research reactor conversion.
REFERENCES
Adelfang, P. 2011. Reduction of Commercial Traffic in HEU. Presentation to the Research
Reactor Conversion Symposium. June 8.
Arkhangelsky, N.V. 2011. Problems of the Research Reactors Conversion from HEU to LEU:
History and Perspectives. Presentation to the Research Reactor Conversion Symposium.
June 8.
Bezzubtsev, V. 2011. Regulating Safe Operation of Russian Research Reactors. Presentation
to the Research Reactor Conversion Symposium. June 9.
Bush-Putin. 2005. Joint Statement on Nuclear Security. October. Available at moscow.
usembassy.gov/transcripts_photo_bio/joint-statement-by-president-george-w.-bush-and-
president-vladimir-v.-putin-on-nuclear-security-cooperation-bratislava-february-24-2005.
Chamberlin, J. 2010. Global Threat Reduction Initiative: Reactor Conversion Program. Pre-
sentation to the Research Reactor Conversion Committee. November 29.
Cherepnin, Yu. 2011. Experience of Resolving the Problems Rising in Conversion of Research
Reactors. Presentation to the Research Reactor Conversion Symposium. June 9.
D’Agostino, T. 2011. Remarks on HEU Minimization. Presentation to the Research Reactor
Conversion Symposium. June 8.
Dragunov, Y.G. 2011. Types, Problems and Conversion Potential of Reactors Produced in
Russia. Presentation to the Research Reactor Conversion Symposium. June 8.
Eisenhower, D. 1953. Atoms for Peace Speech to United Nations. Available at www.iaea.org/
About/history_speech.html
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 2001. IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition.
International Nuclear Verification Series No. 3, Vienna, Austria, International Atomic
Energy Agency. Available at www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/
NVS3_prn.pdf.
IAEA. 2011. Database of World Research Reactors. nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB.
ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security). 2005. Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive
Material. Available at isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/global-stocks-of-nuclear-explosive-
materials/17.
Matos, J. 2011. Experience with Solutions to Conversion Challenges for U.S.-Supplied Re-
search Reactors. Presentation to the Research Reactor Conversion Symposium. June 8.
NRC (National Research Council). 2001. Making the Nation Safer. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
NRC. 2009. Medical Isotope Production without Highly Enriched Uranium. Washington, DC:
The National Academies Press.
Obama-Medvedev. 2009. Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation. July 6. Available at www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-
United-States-of-America-and-President-Dmitry-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-
on-Nuclear-Cooperation/.
Roglans, J. 2011a. Maintaining Performance and Missions. Presentation to the Research Reac-
tor Conversion Symposium. June 9.
Roglans, J. 2011b. Private communication with committee members on research reactor
inventories, September 2.
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