TABLE 4-1 Panel Studies Reviewed
|Study||Legal Status||Intensity of Use||Use of an Instrument||Results: Signa and Significanceb of Point Estimates|
|Berk (2005)||N||Y||N||All possible results|
|Cohen-Cole et al. (2009)||Y||Y||Y||All possible results|
|Donohue and Wolfers (2005, 2009)||Y||Y||Y||All possible results|
|Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006)||Y||Y||N||–**|
|Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003)c||Y||Y||Y||–**; and –NS|
|Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003)||N||Y||N||–**; –NS; and +NS|
|Kovandzic, Vieraitis, and Boots (2009)||Y||Y||N||–NS; +NS|
|Mocan and Gittings (2003)||Y||Y||N||–**; and –NS|
|Mocan and Gittings (2010)||N||Y||N||–**; and –NS|
|Zimmerman (2004)||N||Y||Y||–*; and –NS|
aSign of the estimated coefficients: –, the estimated effect of capital sanctions on homicide is negative, indicating a deterrent effect; +, the estimated effect of capital sanctions on homicide is positive, indicating a brutalization effect.
bStatistical significance levels: NS, no statistical significance at p = 0.05; *, p < 0.05; **, p < 0.01.
cDezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) estimate 55 different panel data regression models. In 49 of the models, the estimated effect of capital sanctions on homicide is negative and statistically significant; in 4, the estimates are negative and insignificant; and in 2, the estimates are positive and insignificant.