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Appendix D Policy Context of Inherently Safer Processes This appendix is an expansion of the discussion of the external policy con- text contained in Chapter 7. The purpose of this appendix is not to endorse any regulation or policy. Rather it is to provide a brief overview of the policy context in which inherently safer process assessments exist today. U.S. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Envi- ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) are the two main federal government bodies that administer regulations that potentially mandate, or encourage, inherently safer processes. Of these, OSHA is more relevant inside the plant because of its concern with the immediate safety of workers, whereas EPA regulations focus more on potential ramifications to more general environmental health and safety (Fallon et al., 2007; Malloy, 2008). Occupational Safety and Health Administration The OSHA process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals standard (29 CFR § 1910.119) requires companies handling listed hazardous chemicals to conduct a process hazard analysis (PHA), and develop a safety plan in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.119 (see also Fallon et al., 2007). It is there - fore potentially an institutional vehicle for the development of inherently safer processes in hazard planning at OSHA-supervised facilities, although it does not necessarily mandate such an approach. 179

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180 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE Within the process safety management standard, section 1910.119(c) man - dates employee participation in the elaboration of safety plans. The section states: “Employers shall consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and development of process hazards analyses and on the development of the other elements of process safety management in this standard.” (29 CFR 1910.119 c) Despite this language the extent and methods of employee consultation are not described in the regulation. Buttressing employee participation in hazard manage- ment could be an effective organizational strategy for implementing inherently safer design in facilities with high risk for hazardous events, and warrants further research. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) EPA policy has considered the possibility of inherently safer processes at least since the early 2000s, but measures regarding chemical accident prevention have tended to focus on prior planning and “inspection and to corrective and pre - ventive maintenance” (Ashford and Zwetsloot, 1999). Therefore, the concept of safety planning is far from new, but the far-reaching ramifications of inherently safer processes appear to require a greater degree of planning and technological investment than do traditional safety strategies that tend to be “failsafe” rather than “foolproof” (Ashford and Zwetsloot, 1999). The difficulties of implementing inherently safer design can be observed in the EPA Risk Management Program (RMP) (EPA, 2001), which is still intention- ally more oriented to risk management than risk prevention (Malloy, 2008), and as a policy matter does not mandate inherently safer processes. Nevertheless, companies dealing with hazardous chemicals must develop accident prevention plans during hazard emergency response planning, but this policy does not exten- sively involve stakeholders outside of firms (CCPS, 2009). Other pertinent regulations and laws include the Pollution Prevention Act (PPA), (which is not primarily directed at accidents) (Ashford and Caldhart, 2010), and the Department of Homeland Security’s Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS) (Malloy, 2008). The post-September 11 approach is particularly amenable to inherently safer design (CCPS, 2009), because the unpredictable nature of terrorist attacks may create challenges for traditional assessments based on internal production risks. However, regulatory bodies have tended to conclude that inherently safer design shifts rather than pre - vents risks (Malloy, 2008). This is an important critique that warrants further research, because of the possibility that inherently safer technology may lead to the reallocating of risk to other areas of the production process (Hendershot, 2010).

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181 APPENDIX D EUROPEAN SAFETY REGULATIONS Renewed European Policy for Chemicals The European Union’s Renewed European Policy for Chemicals (REACH) 2007 amendments (EC, 2006) require a registry system for hazardous chemicals, based on the “principle of substitution” (Garcia-Serna et al., 2007). Although REACH is primarily concerned with chemical toxicity, it also contains hazard prevention components. REACH is being gradually phased in, and technical sup- port on risk reduction is available Initially the REACH program was supervised by the European Chemicals Bureau (ECB) (Garcia-Serna et al., 2007), but in 2008 ECB was superseded by the European Chemicals Agency, which now runs a central database and registra - tion procedure. The program, is aimed at both producers and downstream users, and will mandate the progressive substitution of the most dangerous chemicals within a much larger system of registration. The crux of how REACH works in the case of dangerous chemicals is as follows: Substances with properties of very high concern will be made subject to authorization; the Agency will publish a list containing such candidate sub- stances. Applicants will have to demonstrate that risks associated with uses of these substances are adequately controlled or that the socioeconomic benefits of their use outweigh the risks. Applicants must also analyze whether there are safer suitable alternative substances or technologies. If there are, they must pre - pare substitution plans, if not, they should provide information on research and development activities, if appropriate. The Commission may amend or withdraw any authorization on review if suitable substitutes become available (EC, 2007). Seveso and Seveso II In the EU, the Seveso Directive (96/82/EC) revised the framework directive on Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, and for the first time promoted inherently safer processes as the recommended strategy for plant safety reports (Ashford and Zwetsloot, 1999; Zwetsloot and Ashford, 2003). In the late 1990s reforms were made, titled Seveso II (most recently updated in 2005). Seveso II is more directly oriented toward inherently safer processes than is the case for similar regulations in the United States. Under Seveso II, an operator must present a conceptual model for avoid- ing hazardous incidents, as well as documentation supporting the effective - ness of the safety plan (SFK, 2001). A more detailed comparison and examination of Seveso II’s mechanics is outside the scope of this appendix but Seveso II should be a priority for future research. It is also worth mentioning that Seveso II has important land use ramifica - tions. The different models of adoption of its directives in different EU member

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182 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE countries could provide interesting case studies for comparison (Basta et al., 2008). A preliminary review has found some evidence that European land use regulations are more explicitly oriented to creating frameworks for safer siting (Landucci et al., 2008). While further research into their details is required, two noteworthy examples are: a) “Decreto Ministeriale 9 Maggio 2001, Suppl. Ord. G. U. n.138 del 10/06/01, Requisiti minimi di sicurezza in materia di pianificazione urbanistica e territoriale per zone interessate da stabilimenti a rischio di incidente rilevante.” (Landucci et al., 2008) b) “Major Accident Commission, Technical Committee for Plant Safety (SFK/TAA Germany), Guidance SFK/TAA-GS-1, Recommendations for separation distances between establishments under major accidents ordinance and areas requiring protection within the framework of land use-planning (in German), Bonn (D), 2005” (Landucci et al., 2008) These regulations, and other similar ones, are potentially helpful illustrations of how local and county governments within the EU comply with Seveso II. For example, France employs a consequences-based approach, focusing on damages thresholds, whereas the Netherlands and the United Kingdom regulate on the basis of a risk-based approach, using “calculated risk indexes” (Cozzani et al., 2006).1 The former of these two methods tends to be more conservative, and prioritizes the reduction of inventories of hazardous materials. Therefore, although risk assessment can provide a starting point for analysis, a conse- quences-based approach may be more amenable to the creation of inherently safer land-use policies related to the siting of hazardous facilities (Cozzani et al., 2006). What is particularly different about the European approach, when compared with the U.S. approach, is the fluidity of the integration of land-use policy into safety policy. Example: United Kingdom The United Kingdom is involved in various policies to promote safer design. Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) Policy and Guidance on Reducing Risks as Low as Reasonably Practicable in Design (HSE, 2003). It is a national level approach to assess safety management at the workplaces. This policy uses lan - guage suggesting an approach favoring inherent safety. However, more definite conclusions will require further research and comparison with OSHA regulations in the United States. 1 The U.S. Chemical Facility Anti-TerrorismStandards (72 Fed. Regist. 17688 [2007])) also uses risk-based performance safety.

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183 APPENDIX D The UK also has a system of hazard prevention regulation in line with Seveso II, such as the Installation Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations (NIHHS), Control of Major Accidents Hazards Regulation (COMAH), the Planning Act 1990, and the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 1992 (Basta et al., 2008). Therefore, not only does the UK currently undertake workplace safety regulations that potentially promote inherently safer processes, but land-use plan- ning also interfaces with hazard planning (Basta et al., 2008). Coordination for these planning processes occurs under the auspices of the HSE, which takes a risk-oriented approach to chemical releases, but consequences-oriented approach to energy sector related risks (Basta et al., 2008). U.S. STATE REGULATIONS New Jersey New Jersey claims to be the first state to have implemented anti-terrorism and inherently safer process design into chemical plant regulation (Politicker NJ 2005), and the NJ Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act Program is well discussed in current literature (see, e.g., CCPS, 2009). At present there are two primary pieces of legislation under which inherently safer systems and technology are regulated in the state: the New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Act (NJ OHSP, 2001) and the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) (NJ DEP, 2009; Fallon et al., 2007). New Jersey has the oldest and most developed toxic hazard regulation system in the United States, and its concept of inherently safer processes now extends to all registered facilities. TCPA was first passed in 1986, but only took force in 1988, and it now regulates all facilities using more than 10,000 pounds of listed hazardous substances per year (Fallon et al., 2007). The Bhopal accident inspired the first iteration of the TCPA, and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks led state officials to explore expansion the program to include concepts approximating inherently safer process requirements (CCPS, 2009). TCPA is overseen by the New Jersey Bureau of Release Prevention. Facili- ties must submit an offsite consequences report to the Bureau, while the State Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force2 oversees those regulations related to DSPA (Fallon et al., 2007). Using the CCPS’ framework, New Jersey established a concept of inherent safety based on reducing hazardous chemical stocks, find - ing less hazardous substitutes, using hazardous materials in their least dangerous form possible, and designing equipment with aims at eliminating equipment and human error (TCPA as cited in Fallon et al., 2007). The Task Force oversaw the important task of developing sector-specific industry best practices in conjunction with leading facilities. Now, TCPA facilities must, under a 2005 New Jersey executive order, comply with the Task Force’s 2 Overseen by the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (OHSP).

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184 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE best practices (Fallon et al., 2007).3 For TCPA facilities, compliance involves conducting a review, and produces a reviewable assessment, of the viability of implementing inherently safer strategies and technology during mandatory vul - nerability assessments related to antiterrorism regulations (CCPS, 2009). This review was a 120-day process and only led to 19 percent of facilities finding new measures, and less than half made no new recommendations. However, CCPS notes that the existing hazard reduction framework had been in place since the 1985 introduction of the TCPA, and many facilities may have already incorpo- rated most practicable inherently safer policies. In sum, inherent safety reviews must be undertaken in all TCPA-regulated processes, and also in the case of vulnerability assessments under New Jersey state security requirements. In terms of creating an institutional environment to facilitate compliance, various consultants are now engaged in providing services to companies regulated under the New Jersey regulations, including, for example, Accu-Tech (2011) and Chilworth (2011). Moreover, New Jersey keeps data and plans prepared under the TSPA and DSPA confidential and privileged (P.L. 1963, c. 73 (C.47:1A-1 et seq; CCPS, 2009). This policy decision stems from a desire to create trust between facilities and regulators. Under the antiterrorism executive order, the New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force submitted an inherently safer technol- ogy (IST) checklist to facilities hosting hazardous processes, which is one method recommended by Amyotte et al. (2007). Those authors also recommended policies based upon carefully designed guidewords—such as minimize, substitute, moder- ate, and simplify—that can be incorporated into hazard management planning to improve compliance with checklists. The idea behind checklists and guidewords is standardizing the concepts of inherent safety within the culture of facilities design and process management. On that note, one benefit of the longevity of New Jersey’s program is the potential to examine its effectiveness at standardizing the culture of inherent safety, which may prove necessary in creating programs to encourage more wide spread adoption of inherently safer design and technology. California Contra Costa County Contra Costa’s legislation4 (County Ordinance Chapter 450-8) provides an additional layer of regulation for facilities that are already under California Acci - dental Release Prevention (CalARP) and EPA supervision (CCPS, 2009). The Contra Costa Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) dates from 1998 after a series 3 However, under DSPA the number of reporting facilities is much greater, and over 800 facilities had to provide special vulnerabilities assessments (Fallon et al., 2007). 4 The Industrial Safety Ordinance has also been adopted by the City of Richmond, which is in Contra Costa County.

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185 APPENDIX D of incidents spurred resident concern (Malloy, 2008). Like New Jersey, Contra Costa is also home to a national-level concentration of chemical plants, which brought heightened safety scrutiny, along with the need to protect the economic base the plants provide. These facilities must submit their safety plans to the county and show, through supporting documentation, that they have “to the greatest extent feasible” implemented safer systems (Malloy, 2008 and County Ordinance Chapter 450- 8.016(d)(3)). Under the Contra Costa Program Guidance document, determina - tions that inherently safer options are not feasible are more strictly scrutinized than in New Jersey. For a facility not to implement an inherently safer process requires conflict with the law, a financial analysis demonstrating economic infea - sibility, or an analysis based upon generally accepted engineering principles that risk will increase (Malloy, 2008). This requires weighing the circumstances, and in practice is designed to elicit proof that facilities have identified and acted to minimize hazard. However, at early stages of the Contra Costa program, efforts were limited by a lack of guidance as to expectations and best practices regard- ing inherently safer systems. CCPS has identified the publication of guidelines as important in fostering reasonable expectations about feasibility (CCPS, 2009). The Contra Costa County program is also much smaller than the New Jersey program, including only nine facilities (seven in the county and two in the City of Richmond): “two Air Products facilities (within the Shell Refinery and the Tesoro Refinery), ConocoPhillips Rodeo Refinery, Air Liquide-Rodeo Hydrogen Plant, General Chemical West’s Bay Point Works, Shell Oil Martinez Refinery and Tesoro Golden Eagle Refinery. The City of Richmond’s Industrial Safety Ordinance (Municipal Code Chapter 6.43, RISO) is almost identical (except for the 2006 amendment) to the County’s Industrial Safety Ordinance. The two facilities located in Richmond that are subject to this ordinance include: Chevron Richmond Refinery and General Chemical West’s Richmond Works” (Contra Costa Health Services, 2011a). Another important difference between the New Jersey initiative and that in Contra Costa is that the CalARP Program Guidance Document5 (compliance plan document) is administered by the Contra Costa Health Services Department, and not a security-oriented or industry-oriented regulator. However, the program’s key elements are very similar to New Jersey’s and include a 5-year incident his- tory, an offsite consequence analysis, process hazard analysis, 3-year compliance audits,6 emergency response planning, and a risk management plan (Contra Costa Health Services, 1998). Newer elements of the program include more focus on “human factors,” including safety culture assessments and security vulnerability analysis (Contra 5 http://cchealth.org/groups/hazmat/california_accidental_release_prevention_guidance_document. php. 6 The county is currently in its fourth round of audits.

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186 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE Costa Health Services, 2011b). County administrators claim that major accidents and releases have declined at a steady rate since the ISO’s implementation in 2000.7 It should be noted that in the Contra Costa and New Jersey programs, lim - ited public access to information about the facilities creates barriers to rigorous external evaluation of their performance (Malloy, 2008; CCPS, 2009). Beyond Contra Costa County, other California policies do appear to be rel - evant to inherently safer concepts. These include the Cal/EPA Green Chemistry Initiative, the California Accidental Release Prevention Program (CARPP), and the Silicon Valley Toxic Gas Ordinance. Green Chemistry California Assembly Bill 1879 directs the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) to create a system for reducing, substituting, and in some cases banning chemicals of concern (Heartney and Norris, 2008). A “Green Ribbon Science Panel” has been established to advise the California Green Chemistry Initiative (CA DTSC, 2011), which will include a Toxics Information Clearing House. This is a more stringent pollution reduction program than the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), because it gives state regulators the ability to target specific chemicals, and design management and reduction processes for them throughout their lifecycle, including the “design, manufacturing, and distri - bution processes.” (CA DTSC, 2008a,b) This legislation is primarily concerned with exposure. California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program The CalARP Program requires risk management plans for facilities, as well as assessments of seismic risks, but does not explicitly mandate inherently safer design. It is a program similar to EPA’s Risk Management Program, although stricter and more detailed. One notable difference is the emphasis on stake - holder involvement in the planning process (Sawyer, 2010; Contra Costa Health Services, 2012). On the subject of worker involvement, the regulation requires training and information on safety management planning. However, this process is not central to the regulations, although, the programs administrators do include the following language in a document titled “Agency Guidance”: Never forget about who’s actually running the plant: it’s the “hourly” workers. As CalARP Program regulators, we’re typically only interacting with plant manage - 7 The graphs provided do not include four major chemical accidents or releases (MCAR), which occurred in November 2010 but produced limited effects to the community, nor do they include transportation-related events. This is an important gap in the data, given arguments that reducing onsite storage risk may increase transportation-related risks.

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187 APPENDIX D ment, engineers, and “salaried” RMP/PSM staff. In theory, these people know how their plant operates and ultimately make decisions on process changes. In reality, it’s the hourly workers who really know the nuances of the operation, and can be invaluable in foreseeing the effects of any proposed modifications. This is one area of the Prevention Program where both the plant manager and the youngest apprentice should be regarded on the same level. Make sure that the plant manager and the hourly workers are both somehow included in this em- ployee participation plan. Don’t forget about contractors too, although if there’s going to be some major change, chances are that contractors are going to be involved as part of the mix at the management level anyway.8 (CA OES, 2005). Santa Clara County Toxic Gas Ordinance In Silicon Valley, Santa Clara County has implemented a Toxic Gas Ordi - nance to control dangerous conditions related to toxic gases. The ordinance dates from 1990 (Stanford University, 2009). This is a targeted program within the semi-conductor industry. SELECTED INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has produced A Flex- ible Framework for Addressing Chemical Accident Prevention and Preparedness (UNEP, 2009). Discussing the role of stakeholders, UNEP specifically mentions that one role of industrial management is to promote inherently safer processes. The UN’s direct role in managing chemical accident hazard is minimal, but it does have the capability of promoting common practices and discourse in a glob - ally consolidating industry. Therefore, implementation of inherently safer produc- tion within globally fluid supply chains could be aided by the UN framework. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has pro - duced a detailed set of guidelines (OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Acci - dent Prevention, Preparedness, and Response) for developing hazard management planning, and safety procedures in the relevant industries of its member countries. Although the document is not organized around the concept of inherent safety, it does state that: “Public authorities should encourage industry to take measures to improve safety, for example by utilizing the principles of inherently safer technol- 8See California Regulations: http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/PDF/CalARP%20 Guidance%201-31-05/$file/CalARPGuid1-05.pdf.

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188 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE ogy.” (OECD, 2003) Furthermore, the OECD recommends the establishment of safety performance indicator (SPI) programs. What distinguishes the OECD program from others is its extensive and detailed discussion of risk and hazard identification between facilities and stake - holder groups, including workers, the general public, and management. It is also noteworthy that the guidelines involve stakeholders in the assessment of accept - able community risks in the production process. International Labor Organization (ILO) Guidelines The International Labor Organization (ILO) has developed a set of workplace safety guidelines, incorporating a Plan Do Check Act (PDCA) system (SFK, 2001). What distinguishes the ILO model is a focus on employee participation in the creation of health and safety management systems (ILO, 2001). Further research could compare the ILO guidelines with actual practices at chemical plants in the United States. GENERAL COMMENTS Barriers include the perception that inherent safety is impractical or costly, the lack of institutional infrastructure and frameworks for evaluating inherently safer processes, and a lack of standards and guidance measures for existing opera- tions (CCPS, 2009). In order to prove more effective than existing practices, inherently safer programs must be distinguished from mitigation focused on “engineered safety” (device-centered) and “procedural safety” (behaviorally-centered) (Amyotte et al., 2007). Moreover the literature focuses on the benefits of beginning the plan - ning process as early as possible in the production lifecycle (Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, 2002).9 Current programs, such as those found in New Jersey and Contra Costa County, include broad mandates which might be improved through focusing efforts for improvements on more discrete elements of the production and tech- nology development process. Given that some studies have found that nearly 45 percent of incident causation is attributable to process and equipment integrity and process knowledge failures (Amyotte et al., 2007), these could be crucial phases of process to focus efforts for promoting inherent safety. 9 Malloy (2008) notes that some industry groups (DHS and American Chemical Council) criticize the concept of inherent safety because of its vagueness, arguing that it could lead to arbitrary penalties and results that actually increase facility risk.

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189 APPENDIX D REFERENCES AcuTech. 2011. Inherently Safer Technology (IST). AcuTech, Alexandria, VA [online]. Available: http://www.acutech-consulting.com/images/file/AcuTech%20IST%20Flyer.pdf. Accessed: Oct 11, 2011. Amyotte, P. R., A. U. Goraya, D. C. Hendershot, and F. I. Khan. 2007. Incorporation of inherent safety principles in process safety management. Process Saf. Prog. 26(4):333-346. Ashford, N. A., and C. C. Caldhart. 2010. Government regulation of environmental and occupa - tional health and safety in the United States and the European Union. Pp. 640-663 in Occu- pational and Environmental Health: Recognizing and Preventing Disease and Injury, 6th Ed., B. S. Levy, D. H. Wegman, S. L. Baron, and R. K. Sokas, eds. New York: Oxford University Press [online]. Available: http://18.7.29.232/bitstream/handle/1721.1/55358/Chapter-30%20_ GovRegOfEnvl%26OccH_9Feb10.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed: Sept. 29, 2011. Ashford, N. A., and G. Zwetsloot. 1999. Encouraging inherently safer production in European firms: A report for the field. J. Hazard. Mater. 73(1-3):123-144. Basta, C., M. Christou, M. Struckl, and B. Ale. 2008. Translating the Risk of Major Accidents into Opportune Safety Distances from Dangerous Establishments: Recent Developments of the Eu- ropean Regulation as Deriving from Selected National Practices. Presentation at the PSAM08 International Congress, May 18-23, 2008, Hong Kong [online]. Available: http://www.delft cluster.nl/website/files//PSAM9_0421_paper.pdf. Accessed: Sept. 30, 2011. CA DTSC (California Department of Toxic Substances Control). 2008a. California Green Chem- istry Initiative, Final Report [online]. Available: http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/ PollutionPrevention/ GreenChemistryInitiative/upload/GREEN_Chem.pdf. Accessed: Sept. 30, 2011. CA DTSC. 2008b. California Green Chemistry Initiative: Frequently Asked Questions. [online]. Available: http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/PollutionPrevention/GreenChemistryInitiative/ upload/FAQs_ greenchem.pdf. Accessed: Oct. 6, 2011. CA DTSC. 2011. Green Ribbon Science Panel Overview [online]. Available: http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/ PollutionPrevention/GreenChemistryInitiative/GreenRibbon.cfm. Accessed: Oct. 6, 2011. CA OES (California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services). 2005. California Accidental Release Prevention (CAlARP) Program: Administrative Agency Guidance [online]. Available: http:// www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/PDF/ CalARP%20Guidance%201-31-05/$file/ CalARPGuid1-05.pdf. Accessed: Oct. 5, 2011. CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety). 2009. Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach, 2nd Ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Chilworth. 2011. Chilworth Global, Princeton, NJ [online]. Available: http://www.chilworth.com/ consulting_team.cfm. Accessed: Oct. 11, 2011. Contra Costa Health Services. 1998. CalARP Program Guidance Document, July 1, 1998 [on- line]. Available: http://cchealth.org/groups/hazmat/california_accidental_release_ prevention_ guidance_document.php. Accessed: Oct 6, 2011. Contra Costa Health Services. 2011a. Industrial Safety Ordinance [online]. Available: http://cchealth. org/groups/hazmat/industrial_safety_ordinance.php. Accessed: Oct. 6, 2011. Contra Costa Health Services. 2011b. Industrial Safety Ordinance: Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report, January 25, 2011 [online]. Available: http://cchealth.org/groups/hazmat/pdf/ iso/iso_report_2010.pdf. Accessed: Sept. 30, 2011. Contra Costa Health Services. 2012. Risk Management Program, CalARP and ISO Differences [on- line]. Available: http://cchealth.org/groups/hazmat/differences_rmp_calarp_iso.php. Accessed: Oct. 6, 2011. Cozzani, V., R. Bandini, C. Basta, and M. D. Christou. 2006. Application of land-use planning criteria for the control of major accident hazards: A case-study. J. Hazard. Mater. 136(2):170-180.

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190 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE EC (European Commission). 2006. Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Direc - tives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC [online]. Available: http://eur-lex. europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006R1907:en:NOT. Accessed: Oct. 3, 2011. EC. 2007. REACH in Brief. European Commission Environment Directorate General, October 2007 [online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ chemicals/reach/pdf/2007_02_reach_in_ brief.pdf. Accessed Oct. 4, 2011. EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). 2001. Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide. NRT 1. National Response Team, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. July 2001 [online]. Available: http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/ cleanNRT10_12_distiller_complete. pdf. Accessed: Oct. 3, 2011. Fallon, R., D. M. Keller, M. Lenkowsky, T. C. Lung, R. Mosquea, E. Olsen, V. Remoquillo, and P. C. Steele. 2007. Chemical Security in New Jersey: An Overview of Planning, Information Shar- ing, and Response, June 11, 2007. Maxwell School of Syracuse Universitty [online]. Available: http://insct.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/insct/uploadedfiles/PDFs/Chemical%20Security%20in%20 New%20Jersey.pdf. Accessed: Oct. 3, 2011. Garcia-Serna, J., L. Perez-Barrigon, and M. J. Cocero. 2007. New trends for design towards sustain- sustain- ability in chemical engineering: Green engineering. Chem. Eng. J. 135(1-3):7-30. Heartney, M. T., and T. H. Norris. 2008. Update 1: California Enacts Sweeping “Green Chemistry” Laws. Client Advisory, October 2008. Arnold & Porter, LLP [online]. Available: http://www. martindale.com/environmental-law/article_Arnold-Porter-LLP_531198.htm. Accessed: Sept. 29, 2011. Hendershot, D. C. 2010. A summary of inherently safer technology. Process Saf. Prog. 29(4):389-392. HSE (Health and Safety Executive). 2003. Policy and Guidance on Reducing Risks as Low as Reason- ably Practicable in Design. Health and Safety Executive, UK [online]. Available: http://www. hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarp3.htm. Accessed: Oct. 6, 2011. ILO (International Labor Organization). 2001. Background. Chapter 1 in Guidelines on Occupa- tional Safety and Health Management Systems. ILO-OSH 2001. SafeWork/ILO, Geneva [on- line]. Available: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---safework/ documents/publication/wcms_110496.pdf. Accessed: Oct. 3, 2011. Landucci, G., A. Tugnoli, C. Nicolella, and V. Cozzani. Assessment of inherently safer technologies for hydrogen production. Proceedings of the 5th International Seminar on Fire and Explosion Hazards, Edinburgh, UK, 23-27 April 2007. Edited by D. Drysdale, D. Bradley, V. Molkov and R. Carvel. Published by the School of Engineering and Electronics, University of Edinburgh, 2008. ISBN: 978-0-9557497-2-8. Pp. 138-148. Available: http://www.see.ed.ac.uk/feh5/pdfs/ FEH_pdf_pp138.pdf Malloy, T. 2008. Of natmats, terrorists, and toxics: Regulatory adaptation in a changing world. J. Environ. Law Policy 26(1):93-127. Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center. 2002. White Paper: Challenges in Implementing Inherent Safety Principles in New and Existing Chemical Processes. Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas Engineering Experiment Station, Texas A & M University System, College Sta - tion, TX [online]. Available: http://pscfiles.tamu.edu/library/center-publications/white-papers- and-position-statements/whitepaper_inherentsafety1.pdf. Accessed: Oct. 3, 2011. NJ DEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection). 2009. Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) Program [online]. Available: http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/. Accessed: Oct. 11, 2011.

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