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3
Industrial Production and Use of
MIC at Bayer CropScience
The statement of task calls for an examination of the use and storage of methyl
isocyanate (MIC) at the Bayer CropScience facility in Institute, West Virginia. This
chapter provides an overview of the history of the plant, with a particular focus on
processes relating to MIC and the pesticides it is used to synthesize. Alternative
methods of producing these materials are presented in Chapter 5.
HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITE
The 460-acre, multitenant Institute Manufacturing Industrial Park is located
9 miles west of Charleston, West Virginia. The facility is on the Kanawha River
to the south, abuts Route 25 and Interstate 64 to the north, and the West Virginia
State University to the east. Transportation to and from the site is provided by
barge, rail (located adjacent to the river), and truck.
West Virginia State University is the oldest extant institution in the immedi -
ate vicinity. Established in 1891 as a land grant college, the university enrolls
3,145 students on a 91-acre campus adjacent to the Institute industrial park (U.S.
News, 2010). (See Figure 3.1)
Originally home to the Wertz Field Airport, the site was converted to a
synthetic rubber production plant by the U.S. Government Defense Corporation
during World War II. Originally designed, built, and managed by the Carbide
and Carbon Chemicals Corporation (a subsidiary of Union Carbide) and the
U.S. Rubber Company, the facility has had a number of owners. Union Carbide
Corporation (UCC) purchased the chemical manufacturing operations plant in
1947, which it used to produce a variety of chemicals including butanol, olefins,
plasticizers, and acetic acid. The plant also produced some fungicides, although
43
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44 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
FIGURE 3.1 Google™ Earth satellite images of the facility at Institute, West Virginia
and the surrounding area (accessed April 14, 2012). (a) The region around Institute, West
Virginia (b) the Bayer CropScience facility and local area.
SOURCE: Google Earth satellite image: ©Google 2012.
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45
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND USE OF MIC AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
this was initially a small portion of the plant’s operations. In the 1960s, UCC
expanded operations, including construction of facilities to produce carbamates
and to allow for production of new synthetic intermediates for other companies
(Woomer, 2000). Rhône-Poulenc purchased UCC’s agricultural division, including
the Institute site, in 1986. In 2000, Aventis (formed by a merger of Rhône-Poulenc
and AgrEvo) took over management of the facility. Finally, Bayer CropScience
acquired the facility in 2002 (CSB, 2011). Bayer CropScience is a global provider
of insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides. Independently operated within Bayer,
AG, Bayer CropScience is headquartered in Germany. The company employs
about 20,700 workers in over 120 countries (Bayer CropScience, 2011c). The U.S.
headquarters are in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina.
In 2008, the facility hosted seven tenants. Bayer CropScience owned and
operated 9 of the 16 production units on the site. Two production units, owned
by Adisseo and FMC Corporation, were also operated by Bayer. The remaining
units were owned and operated by Dow Chemical, Catalyst Refiners, Reagent
Chemical, and Praxair, respectively. Bayer employed approximately 85 percent
of the 645 workers employed at the facility (CSB, 2011).
HISTORY OF CARBAMATE INSECTICIDE MANUFACTURING
The focus of production at the Bayer plant in 2008 was on carbamate pes -
ticides, which have been shown to be effective against a variety of pests. The
general structure of carbamate pesticides is R1NHCOOR2, where R represents
alkyl or aryl groups. The facility in Institute manufactured a number of different
carbamates over the years. The processes for manufacturing these materials have
changed over time, some of which have implications for process safety. What
follows here is a description of some of the major changes at the facility, and
Appendix B contains a detailed timeline of modifications. The major carbamate
products are summarized in Table 3.1.
Carbamate pesticide production in Institute began in the 1960s with carbaryl.
Carbaryl is a broad-spectrum pesticide and is used in a variety of commercial
and residential settings for control of pests such as beetles, crickets, fleas, ticks,
and moths (U.S. EPA, 2004). Production of MIC also began during that decade,
although at that time it was only manufactured for use at other facilities and for
sale to other companies rather than for use onsite. That changed in 1976 with
the production of aldicarb in Institute. Aldicarb had previously been produced in
Woodbine, Georgia, and although final formulation and packaging of the material
continued at that site, synthesis of the pesticide was moved to Institute. While
sharing basic carbamate chemistry with carbaryl, for reasons that are discussed
in Chapter 5, production of aldicarb was carried out by a chemical pathway using
phosgene and MIC. Aldicarb is primarily used to control nematodes and sucking
insects in crops such as cotton, beans, and peanuts (U.S. EPA, 2010). The method
for production of carbaryl was changed in 1978 from one that used naphthyl -
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46 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
TABLE 3.1 Trade Names and Structures of Pesticides Manufactured at the
Bayer CropScience Facility
Pesticide Trade Name Structure
Carbaryl Sevin
Aldicarb Temik
Thiodicarb Larvin, CropStar
Carbofuran Furadan
Carbosulfan Marshal
Methomyl CH3
O NH
S N CH3
CH3 O
chloroformate (NCF) as a starting material to one that used MIC. That year also
saw the startup of a second, larger MIC unit to provide for the growing demand
for aldicarb and changes to carbaryl production.1 In the early 1980s, carbamate
1 At that time, the facility shipped MIC around the world to customers in France, India, Brazil,
and the United States, and to accommodate international demand, Union Carbide built a MIC unit in
Bhopal in the late 1970s, with startup in 1980.
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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND USE OF MIC AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
insecticide manufacturing was expanded to include methomyl (an intermediate
feedstock sold internationally) and thiodicarb (an agricultural insecticide and
ovicide used against cotton bollworms and budworms made from methomyl)
(U.S. EPA, 1998), both of which required MIC for production.
The MIC and phosgene production units, along with the units that were used to
manufacture aldicarb and carbaryl, were all co-located in the East Carbamoylation
Complex (ECC). Production units for methomyl and thiodicarb were located in
the West Carbamoylation Complex (WCC). The ECC and WCC are highlighted
in Figure 3.2. Liquid MIC was stored in underground refrigerated pressure vessels
in the ECC where it was manufactured. It was later used as a chemical feedstock
there or at the WCC to which it was transferred at night and stored for later use.
On December 3, 1984, in response to the release in Bhopal, the MIC facility
in Institute was shut down for several months while Union Carbide installed
$5 million worth of safety equipment and enhancements (Los Angeles Times,
1985), which included increased MIC destruction capacity.
However, the Institute site itself suffered an accident on August 11, 1985,
FIGURE 3.2 The Bayer CropScience facility. The circle on the left marks the methomyl
production unit, where the aboveground storage tank was located, in the West Carbamo -
ylation Complex. The circle on the right marks the methyl isocyanate production unit in
the East Carbamoylation Complex.
SOURCE: Smythe, 2011.
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48 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
when 4,000 pounds of aldicarb oxime and methylene chloride were released,
resulting in 136 people being sent to 5 local hospitals. No fatalities were reported,
though 29 individuals were held for observation for one or more days (Houston
Chronicle, 1985; Baron et al., 1988).
Following Bhopal, shipments of MIC from Institute to U.S. customers were
curtailed. Two of these customers were FMC, a manufacturer of the carba-
mate pesticides carbofuran and carbosulfan and DuPont. In 1986, FMC built
production units for carbosulfan and carbofuran in the WCC (Woomer, 2000).
DuPont developed a process for manufacturing MIC as a feedstock that was
almost instantaneously reacted into final product, thereby eliminating the need
to purchase or store MIC. That same year, 1986, Rhône-Poulenc bought Union
Carbide’s Agricultural Products Division.
In 1993 a $50 million Institute modification project carried out various
changes to the facility related to MIC, phosgene, and chlorine safety (Ward,
1994). As part of that project, MIC capacity was reduced by more than 80 percent
to 22 million pounds per year. This change was largely justified as a consequence
of DuPont and other customers no longer requiring the product, which had previ -
ously been stored in batches of 240,000 pounds. Additional details about these
changes can be found in Chapter 5.
In 1999, Rhône-Poulenc purchased the carbofuran and carbosulfan manu -
facturing facilities owned by FMC and established the Carbamate Excellence
Center at Institute, and a new carbamate process, the oxamyl process, was added.
In December of that year, Rhône-Poulenc SA merged with Hoechst AG to form
Aventis. The Institute site became the largest site in North America for Aventis
CropScience (Woomer, 2000). In 2001, EPA performed a series of inspections at
the facility and identified a set of violations of environmental laws (EPA, 2009).
Also in 2001, the facility was purchased by Bayer, thus moving the Institute plant
to its current ownership, Bayer CropScience. As the legal successor to Aventis,
Bayer settled with EPA regarding the 2001 violations in February 2009 with an
agreement to pay a $112,500 penalty and to spend over $900,000 on supplemen -
tal environmental projects. As part of the settlement, Bayer CropScience neither
admitted nor denied the allegations.
By 2008 the Institute plant was the only facility in the United States that
manufactured, stored, and consumed large quantities of MIC. Liquid MIC
was stored in underground refrigerated pressure vessels in the ECC, where it was
manufactured before being used—either as a chemical feedstock there or at the
WCC to which it was transferred at night and additionally stored. Each pressure
vessel was insulated and had double-wall construction, with leak detection in
the annulus between the inner and outer wall. The transfer from the ECC to the
WCC occurred through a 2,500-foot, insulated, aboveground piping system to an
aboveground “day tank” located on the southwest corner of the WCC. The stain-
less steel tank, with a maximum capacity of 6,700 gallons, held approximately
37,000 pounds of MIC at its normal 75 percent operating capacity. A number of
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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND USE OF MIC AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
safety features were incorporated into the day-tank design. The tank was filled
once per day, and the pipes connecting the ECC to the WCC were purged after
the transfer. The MIC was chilled, with methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) used as
the chiller fluid because, unlike the water-ethylene glycol mixtures typically used
in chillers, MIBK does not react with MIC and therefore poses less risk in case
of a chiller leak. Fire suppressants were installed to prevent thermal reactions.
Air monitors were in place to detect MIC leaks. Finally, the tank and top piping
connections were surrounded with a blast blanket to prevent debris from striking
the tank and to provide a thermal shield in case of fire (CSB, 2011).
Each of the pesticides being manufactured onsite at Institute used different
production processes: aldicarb was produced in a batch reactor, carbaryl in a
continuous fixed-bed reactor, methomyl in a continuous plug flow reactor, and
carbofuran used a solventless process. All of these processes were designed to use
liquid MIC. The pesticides had different seasonal patterns of production, and there
was considerable variation in the facility’s MIC consumption over time—between
5,000 and 100,000 pounds per day over the course of their history. To regulate car-
bamate production and minimize startup/shutdown issues for MIC production, the
facility maintained an inventory of up to 200,000 pounds of MIC—approximately
10 days of normal production or 3 days of high production (Martin, 2011).
On August 28, 2008, an uncontrolled chemical reaction inside a methomyl
unit residue treater in the WCC caused the vessel to explode violently, causing
the deaths of two employees. See the next chapter section (History of Emergency
Preparedness and Accidents) for more information. As a result of the accident and
the damage to the WCC, production of methomyl, MIC, and the carbamate-based
pesticides ceased, pending investigation and evaluation of the production unit.
In March 2009, EPA made a decision to ban the use of carbofuran pesticides
(74 Fed.Reg.11,551 [2009]) leading to the decision by Bayer CropScience to stop
production at Institute of all but two of the carbamate pesticides: aldicarb and
carbaryl. Dropping the other products led to substantial reductions in the need
for MIC, and so 2009 MIC production was only 9 million pounds, with planned
2010 production of 11.5 million pounds (Martin, 2011).
In August 2009, Bayer announced a $25 million investment program “for
further enhancing operational safety” (Bayer CropScience, 2009) at the facility,
and as part of this program, the carbamate pesticide production would cease in
the WCC approximately a year after the announcement. This would remove the
need for the aboveground storage tank and for the transfer of MIC from the ECC
to the WCC. Production would be limited to aldicarb and carbaryl, both of which
were produced in the ECC.
As part of the modification plan the decision was made to reduce by 80 per-
cent the maximum amount of MIC being kept in storage on the Institute site,
with additional passive and active safety systems on MIC production to mini-
mize risks. Additional details will be provided in Chapter 5, but briefly, the
MIC-production changes included building a new storage unit for the MIC with
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50 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
underground tanks; incorporation of a steam-ammonia curtain in the building’s
perimeter to assist in controlling leaks, should they occur; and other passive and
active safety controls.
In 2010 Bayer reached an agreement with EPA to voluntarily cancel its
registration of aldicarb, with production of the pesticide to end in 2014 and
distribution and sales to end in 2016 (EPA, 2010; Ward, 2010). Citing this agree-
ment and global restructuring of its parent company, on January 11, 2011 Bayer
announced that “the production of certain carbamates is no longer economically
viable.” (Bayer CropScience, 2011b) The company’s intention at that time was to
continue to make modifications to the MIC plant at Institute; restart manufactur-
ing of aldicarb, carbaryl, and the intermediate materials required for their produc-
tion, including MIC; and continue manufacturing those materials until mid-2012.
In February 2011 a group of Kanawha Valley residents filed suit to stop
Bayer CropScience from restarting its production of MIC at the Institute plant
until EPA and OSHA completed comprehensive plant inspections. A prelimi -
nary injunction was granted, halting Bayer’s planned restart of MIC production
(Ward, 2011). On March 18, 2011, Bayer CropScience announced that it would
not restart the production of MIC. In a press release, the company stated that,
“uncertainty over delays has led the company to the conclusion that a restart of
production can no longer be expected in time for the 2011 growing season.” In
light of this decision, the company said it would proceed with decommission -
ing the MIC and carbamate production units at Institute, as well as closing the
Woodbine facility, which had continued to finalize the aldicarb formulation and
packaging since 1976 (Bayer CropScience, 2011a).
HISTORY OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND ACCIDENTS
The Kanawha River Valley is the home of an extensive network of chemical
and other manufacturing facilities and represents one of the highest concentra -
tions of such industries in the United States. In 1954, these industries established
the Kanawha Valley Emergency Planning Committee (KVEPC) following an
explosion of an acrolein tank car. An explosion of an ethylene oxide distillation
column in 1955 damaged parts of the Institute facility and led to a major safety
review by the management (Woomer, 2000). After that, such safety reviews were
conducted internally to the plant and its management until the Bhopal accident.
Following Bhopal, public concern in the Kanawha Valley about chemical acci-
dents increased, and with passage of the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA, see Chapter 2), the Kanawha/Putnam Local Emer-
gency Planning Committee (KPEPC) was established in 1987 (KPEPC, 2011).
At the same time, local public concern about MIC led to the establishment of the
organization People Concerned About MIC (PCMIC, 2011).
In 1992, the KPEPC initiated the Kanawha Valley Hazard Assessment Project,
which examined “worst-case” scenarios for all chemical plants in the valley. The
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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND USE OF MIC AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
compilation of scenarios were presented during a June 3-4, 1994 workshop held
in Charleston, West Virginia under the title “Safety Street: Managing Our Risk
Together (Worst Case Scenario Presentations).” This was the first time such an
activity had been held in the area, and according to the organizers, it was well
received by the community (OECD, 1997). The materials identified a release
from the MIC unit as one of worst-case scenarios associated with the Rhône-
Poulenc-owned facility; the other two noted chemicals associated with the facility
were phosgene and chlorine, the latter being used in the production of phosgene.
The risk management plan from Rhône-Poulenc identified the worst case as the
full release of 253,600 pounds of MIC from the ECC belowground storage tank.
According to the analysis, such a release would exceed ERPG-2 (emergency
response planning guidelines) levels out to a distance of 28 miles (at concentra -
tion of 0.5 ppm) and ERPG-3 levels out to a distance of 9 miles (5 ppm) (Fortun,
2001, pp. 66-67). ERPG-2 levels indicate the “maximum airborne concentration
below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to
1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or serious health effects or
symptoms which could impair an individual’s ability to take protective action” 2,
while ERPG-3 levels indicate the “maximum airborne concentration below which
it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour with -
out experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects”.3 This constitutes
the largest scenario vulnerability zone of any chemical used in the valley at the
ERPG-2 level and nearly largest vulnerability zone at the ERPG-3 level.
At the time of the 1992 analysis, Rhône-Poulenc had just completed a 1.5-
year study called Project Michelle (1989-1990) (as cited in Ward, 1994) which
focused on improving the safety of thee MIC processes, including considering
whether to put a “bubble” over the entire MIC unit to contain any leaks. Rhône-
Poulenc had numerous active (and some passive) systems in place to reduce the
risk associated with the MIC unit. These included:
1. Process design. An emergency dump tank for safe transfer of MIC from
a leaking vessel, a scrubber to destroy MIC in the storage tank, a flare tower to
destroy MIC from process vents, backup control room instruments, automatic
MIC isolation valves to stop leaks, diking and spill collection sumps, a fire deluge
system, MIC leak detection alarms, safety relief valves to protect vessels from
overpressure, a diesel generator for backup power, sealless pumps for managing
liquid MIC, fire protection for pipe rack transfer lines, and an independent nitro -
gen supply to prevent cross contamination.
2. Equipment design. A double-walled underground storage tank, special
pressure vessels, blast material protection for the aboveground MIC storage
2 AIHA Definition
3 AIHA Definition
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52 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
facilities, stainless steel construction, barriers to protect pipelines over roads,
and double-walled pipelines with leak detection analyzers on critical transfer
lines.
3. Safety reviews and procedures. Process hazard analysis completed
every 5 years, ongoing safety reviews for design changes, operational reviews
completed for all process changes, and safety review teams that included safety
experts, engineers, union operators, and union maintenance personnel. It also
established procedures and training inspection, emergency response and incident
investigation systems (Fortun, 2001, p. 67).
Between 1989 and 1993, although the facility had no EPA-reportable releases
(threshold of 10 pounds), it did report 13 leaks of between 1 and 10 pounds,
and 30 leaks of less than 1 pound to the local emergency authorities. In 1993,
Rhône-Poulenc was fined by OSHA for alleged safety violations that occurred
during a non-MIC-related explosion and fire within the methomyl manufacturing
unit, which was located near the aboveground MIC storage unit. The incident
claimed the life of one plant worker and injured two others. OSHA investigators
concluded that the company tried to boost pesticide production without regard
for safety (Ward, 1994). The Institute Community Liaison Committee (CLC)
commissioned a review of the incident investigation by PrimaTech, Inc. in 1993
(PrimaTech, Inc., 1993).
This incident caused considerable concern within the community, and the
president of West Virginia State College,4 Hazo Carter, wrote to the plant man-
ager stating,
As president of West Virginia State College, I am quite concerned about the
safety of the more than 5,000 students, faculty, staff, and community residents
due to recent accidents and frequent spills at the Institute Rhône-Poulenc plant.
I was especially concerned to read that a tank holding 30,000 pounds of methyl
isocyanate [MIC] gas was within 250 feet of the explosion and fire. The severity
of this situation makes it imperative that every precaution be taken to prevent
accidents from happening and that immediate notification be given to us if such
accidents should occur in the future. (Carter, 1993)
In December 1994, following that explosion, Rhône-Poulenc completed
the Institute Modification Project, involving $50 million in improvements.
These improvements included: moving the phosgene unit closer to the MIC
process to reduce the distance phosgene has to travel in pipes; adding a new
cooling system for MIC tanks, using chloroform, rather than water-based brine;
adding redundant warning systems to detect leaks and to monitor pressure,
4 West Virginia State College became West Virginia State University in 2004.
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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND USE OF MIC AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
temperature, and possible water-contamination at concentrations as low as
2 ppm; upgrading the scrubber and flare systems; and adding another backup
generator (Ward, 1994).
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) report on
the 2008 incident states that,
[t]he five-year accident history for the RMP-regulated chemicals reports an acci-
dent that released approximately 15 pounds of phosgene (October 1999), another
that released less than 1 pound of chlorine (May 2000), and a third that released
approximately 3,000 pounds of liquid chloroform (August 2001). Each resulted
in one or more worker exposures, and the phosgene release prompted a shelter-in
place-alert. However, the company reports none of the releases involved offsite
consequences (CSB, 2011).
Following its acquisition of the Institute facility from Aventis CropScience,
Bayer CropScience completed 20 projects to enhance process safety and eco -
nomic competitiveness, with particular attention paid to the phosgene and MIC
units. These changes included a new, downsized phosgene unit, reductions in
pipeline capacity in chlorine lines, downsizing the MIC unit to match lower
demands (since inventory of MIC required for production was reduced by 80 per-
cent since mid-1980s), modernizing equipment and instrumentation to safeguard
the purity of the components used in the MIC process, additional emergency
neutralization processes, and updated transfer processes.
2008 Accident in Methomyl Facility
As described in an earlier section, the production requirements and schedules
varied for the different pesticides manufactured at the plant, and the methomyl
process (located in the WCC) was only operated periodically in response to sea -
sonal demand for the product. These gaps in the production schedule provided
opportunities to perform repairs and system upgrades. In 2008, Bayer upgraded
the methomyl control system and replaced the residue treater with a stainless steel
tank during one of these downtimes. The process was restarted in August, with
operations personnel, engineering staff, and contractors working around the clock
to complete system upgrades. Dwindling supplies of methomyl and an increase
in demand for thiodicarb created pressure to restart the operation (CSB, 2011).
On August 28, 2008, amid startup procedures, an explosion occurred, result -
ing in the deaths of two plant operators and considerable damage to the WCC.
A full investigation of the incident was performed by the CSB and the results
of that investigation reported in 2011. An overview of key events and findings
from that report is provided here.
The upgrades on the methomyl control system were significant, and as a con-
sequence, the restart procedures were not routine. At the time of the startup, criti -
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54 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
cal procedures had not been completed. In particular, process computer system
engineers had not verified the functionality of all process controls and instruments
in the new control system, and changes to standard operating procedures that
were needed because of changes to system controls had not yet been finalized.
In addition, the staff struggled with significant problems as they attempted to
bring each subsystem online, including a missing valve on a solvent line, non-
operational heat tracing on a process line, a broken stem on a vapor condenser
water cooling system valve, and many problems tuning control loops and calibrat-
ing instruments for the newly installed computer control system. These problems
were further complicated by the operators’ lack of familiarity with new methomyl
work station functions and changes to some process variables (CSB, 2011).
The explosion originated in the new residue treater in the methomyl produc -
tion unit. The methomyl was synthesized in solvent through a series of steps. In
the final stage, the solvated methomyl was transferred to a crystallizer, where an
“anti-solvent” was added to cause the product to precipitate. The solid methomyl
was then separated from the solvent via centrifugation. The remaining liquid,
consisting of solvent, residual methomyl, and other compounds resulting from
the synthesis, was transferred to a “flasher,” where the solvent was separated
from the other materials and recycled in the production process. After separa -
tion of the solvent, the remaining material (residual solvent, up to 22 percent
methomyl, and impurities) was transferred to the residue treater. The role of the
residue treater was to decompose the remaining methomyl in this liquid to a
concentration of no more than 0.5 percent. At that point, this flammable liquid
could then be burned for fuel within the facility.
By August 28, methomyl production had begun, although the residue treater
had not yet been brought online. There were multiple issues with the production
startup that operators were endeavoring to fix, one of which was that the system
was depleting solvent faster than expected. This created a need to get the solvent
recovery system on line as quickly as possible to replenish the solvent. Because
the last stage in the solvent recovery process was the residue treater, that system
also needed to be brought online. When beginning the startup of the recovery
system, operators failed to prefill the residue treater to the minimum operating
level and to heat the liquid to the minimum operating temperature before adding
the methomyl. Decomposition of methomyl is an exothermic reaction, therefore
it was necessary for safe operation of the system to control of temperature and
solvent levels. A control system was designed to prevent addition of methomyl
until the solvent was at minimum volume and temperature, but the operators
bypassed the safety devices during the startup. In addition, samples taken from
the liquid coming from the crystallizer indicated that methomyl concentrations
were as much as eight times greater than the specified operating limit, the staff did
not have time to review the laboratory results and were unaware of the problem
(CSB, 2011).
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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND USE OF MIC AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
At 10:25 PM, the residue treater high-pressure alarm sounded, and in
response, a control board operator directed two outside operators to check the
vent system of the residue treater. Eight minutes later, the vessel exploded and
initiated a fire that burned for 4 hours. The explosion killed both operators who
were sent to inspect the unit; two other workers onsite and six firefighters were
treated for possible toxic chemical exposure at a local hospital.
The Kanawha-Putnam County Emergency Management Director advised
more than 40,000 residents, including the resident students at the West Virginia
State University directly adjacent to the facility, to shelter-in-place for more
than 3 hours (Huntington News Net., 2011). During the emergency, the Bayer
CropScience emergency response organization failed to provide timely and accu -
rate information about the incident. In part this was because, continuous air
monitors located in and around the production units to detect MIC leaks had mal-
functioned in May, causing spurious alarms. The system had not been repaired
and restarted even though the MIC storage tank had been refilled. In addition,
fence-line monitors were inadequately designed and located for detecting MIC
releases (CSB, 2011).
Emergency Response After 2008
In the wake of the accident, the emergency response systems in place at the
facility and in the surrounding area were examined, and a number of recommen-
dations were made by CSB in the areas of communication and planning. The
report also noted efforts by local emergency responders (Metro 9-1-1), KPEPC,
and Bayer to improve communication between the three groups in the event of an
emergency. These efforts included direct telephone lines installed from the facil -
ity to Metro 9-1-1 headquarters, development of a method for e-mailing residents
in case of a release, increasing call center capacity, and introducing a 15-minute
rule for calling an advisory shelter-in-place if an event has been reported but no
additional information is available from the facility. Conversations with Matthew
Blackwood and Larry Zuspan, representatives from KPEPC in 2011 and testi -
mony provided by Chief Joseph Crawford before Congress in 2009 confirmed
that changes to emergency response have been made since the 2008 explosion.
CSB also advised modifying KPEPC’s Basic Plan and/or the Functional Annex
16, Chemical HazMat Response, to ensure clear delineation of onsite and offsite
authority in case of an incident. The relevant changes within the two documents
were adopted by KPEPC in May 2011.
In February 2009, as part of a settlement with EPA to resolve issues identi -
fied in 2001 at the facility, Bayer agreed to support the following activities as part
of supplemental environmental projects (CIC, 2009):
• Funding for a breathing air system for the Kanawha Valley Emergency
Preparedness Training Center;
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56 USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE
• Equipment for the St. Albans, Jefferson and Institute fire departments;
• Training courses for Kanawha Valley emergency responders; and
• Enhancements for emission dispersion modeling programs for the Metro
9-1-1 center.
Note that informal feedback was received after the public meeting in Institute,
West Virginia from a local volunteer firefighter. He expressed concern about
availability of emergency equipment in all jurisdictions in the Kanawha Valley.
This question was later raised to KPEPC representatives, who stated that they had
no knowledge of any particular concern but that efforts were underway to acquire
equipment for local fire departments. It is beyond the scope of this study to look
further into this question, but asking local personnel for additional input may aid
in identification of any gaps in coverage or, if no such gaps are apparent, assist
in dissemination of information about available resources.
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