fully inform the NBAF operators of the risks in order to optimize plans and procedures. Such relevant resources for key information include DHS’s National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases’s Regional Biocontainment Laboratories and National Biocontainment Laboratories, the Department of Defense’s U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other publicly and privately funded containment laboratories. Operators, scientists, biosafety officers, and response personnel from those facilities could offer significant insight into threats and hazards, lessons learned, crisis communication, and operations concerns to more fully inform those for the NBAF. Similarly, Riley County uses a hazard vulnerability analysis tool, which provides the best overarching view of the threats judged to pose the greatest risks to the county because of their probability of occurring, various vulnerabilities that exist in the area, and the consequences to people, property, the environment, and other assets (Patrick Collins, Riley County Emergency Management, personal communication, February 17, 2012). That may be instructive for the NBAF risk management and emergency planning process. The uSSRA indicates that these three critical areas will be addressed in the future when the NBAF begins construction and when it is closer to being operational. This raises the possibility that risks that needed to have been considered were never actually considered or modeled as part of the current risk assessment and which might be uncovered or recognized in the future.
NRC (National Research Council). 2010. Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security’s Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.