The committee’s recommended structure for Army RCWM organization and authority is shown in Figure S-4, which incorporates the recommended program executive organization with the civilian SES or military general officer-level RCWM program executive reporting to the ASA(IE&E); the RCWM OIPT under the direction of the RCWM program executive; the tasking authority of the RCWM program executive; and the realignment of NSCMP under the USACE. The fgure also delineates the lines of command, tasking authority, and coordination among the various elements of the program.
The history of the stockpile and non-stockpile programs demonstrates that regulatory concerns and a failure to involve the public can significantly delay implementation and increase costs. Much of the regulatory experience gained in the implementation of the stockpile and non-stockpile programs can be utilized in the remediation of buried CWM to increase the effiectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory process. As discussed in Chapter 3, remediations must be done under appropriate federal and state environmental regulations and in compliance with the CWC. These regulations, principally the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), along with existing Army Military Munitions Response Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (MMRP RI/FS) Guidance, govern the recovery of buried CWM. This guidance recommends following the Army’s Technical Project Planning process prior to the commencement of feld activities.
The committee identified several regulatory issues, including (1) a need for regulatory flexibility, expedited approaches, and risk reduction activities where minimal but sufficient data are available to enable selection of a cleanup technology, (2) consideration of unique circumstances presented by the recovery of buried chemical warfare materiel at active operational ranges, (3) management of remediation wastes using corrective action management units (CAMUs), (4) the need to store hazardous wastes for longer than 90 days under a RCRA corrective action, and (5) identifying regulatory approval mechanisms for the use of explosive destruction technologies to destroy RCWM.
The committee also noted the importance of public participation in Army policy decisions regarding RCWM remediation. Public involvement is embedded in both RCRA and CERCLA, in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), and in DOD and Army regulations and policies. For the remediation project at Spring Valley in Washington, D.C., for example, partnering and planning were shown to be key to minimizing unnecessary delay and costs. Findings and recommendations related to regulatory issues and public involvement can be found in Chapter 3.
CASE STUDY: REDSTONE ARSENAL
During the course of this study, the committee was made aware of the existence of what is arguably the largest and most complex RCWM site in the United States (in terms of the quantity and variety of materiel, regulatory issues, and existing use)—namely, Redstone Arsenal (RSA) in Hunts-ville, Alabama. RSA provides an excellent example of a site where, to paraphrase the committee’s Statement of Task, supporting technologies and operational procedures may not be sufficient, targeted research and development may be needed, and coordination among existing organizations involved in RCWM remediation may need to be improved. The committee used RSA as a case study to illustrate the technological and operational challenges and community relations issues that the Army will face in remediating large CWM sites. Findings and recommendations concerning the application of regulatory issues to the special case of RSA may be found in Chapter 5.