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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel (2012)

Chapter: 6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development

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Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×

6

The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development

The organizational and technical approach taken to date by the Army in recovering, assessing, processing, transporting, storing, and destroying recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) has been effective, although some problem areas have been identified by those involved in the process—for example, at Camp Sibert, in Alabama, determination of RCWM fill required a “significant amount of equipment” and was a “lengthy process,” destruction operations were “costly,” and waste management and disposal were “difficult.”1

For sites at which large numbers of items—in the tens to hundreds of thousands—must be processed and where the destruction of more than a few each day may be required, existing procedures and technologies may be inadequate. An example is Redstone Arsenal (RSA), where there are 17 sites requiring interim measures and source removal2 in over 20,000 linear feet of burial trenches3 and where up to 1 million potentially contaminated items could be found,4 as described in Chapter 5.

Similar quantities of buried CWM may exist at Deseret Chemical Depot, in Utah, and elsewhere. Existing analytical and assessment methods and destruction technologies such as digital radiography and computed tomography (DRCT), portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy (PINS), Raman spectroscopy, the explosive destruction system (EDS), and explosive destruction technologies (EDTs) may not be able to keep up with the requirements at a large burial site if tens or hundreds of items are recovered each day.

Existing administrative procedures, organizational responsibilities, lines of reporting, and sources of funding may also not be sufficient to cope with the magnitude of this problem. One estimate of the scope of the RCWM effort at RSA alone was that initial cost projections were in the $1 billion to $3 billion range and that it was expected to take up to 15 years to complete the remediation.5

Similarly, existing destruction hardware may not have the capacity to destroy the required number of items. The highest throughput rates per 10-hr day reported to an earlier committee for a representative small and commonly recovered item, a 4.2-in. mortar round, were 40 per day in a TDC TC-60, 36 per day in a detonation of ammunition in a vacuum integrated chamber (DAVINCH) DV-65, and 120 per day in a Dynasafe static detonation chamber (SDC) SDC 2000 (NRC, 2006). More recently, the SDC 1200 in Anniston, Alabama, achieved a processing rate of 100 4.2-in. mortar rounds per 10-hr day.6 Throughput, however, may not be an issue since multiple EDT or EDS units can be used if need be.

Of some significance is whether the CWM to be recovered are buried or are above ground in, for example, open trenches. If the former, they must be located, unearthed, and their content assessed, preferably while still in the ground but otherwise following placement in a container, monitoring, and storage. These items are expected to be in a more deteriorated condition than those that have been above ground in open disposal pits or trenches. Potentially agent-contaminated soil must also be assessed and disposed of.

If the CWM items are above ground, as is the case with open disposal pits, processing can proceed more rapidly

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1Karl E. Blankenship, Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) Project Manager, Mobile District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Remediation of Contaminated Soil at Camp Sibert, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 3, 2011.

2Terry de la Paz, Chief, Installation Restoration Branch, Environmental Management Division, RSA, Alabama, “Remediation of Buried CWM at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” U.S. Army, Presentation to the committee on November 2, 2011.

3Steven A. Cobb, Chief, Governmental Hazardous Waste Branch, Land Division, Department of Environmental Management (ADEM), “Remediation of Buried CWM in Alabama: The State Regulator’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 2, 2011.

4William R. Brankowitz, Senior Chemical Engineer, Science Applications International Corporation, “Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project Redstone Arsenal (RSA) Interim Historical Report,” presentation to the committee on January 18, 2012.

5Ibid.

6Harley Heaton, Vice President-Research, UXB International, to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, personal correspondence on March 16, 2012.

Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×

since the subsurface location, excavation, and soil treatment steps are not needed.

For sealed munitions, it is expected that DRCT (X-ray) and PINS will be used to determine the quantity of fill and the chemical content of the munition. For munitions that have been previously opened and burned or otherwise treated, as well as for potentially contaminated scrap metal, it is expected that agent monitors will be used to determine whether further treatment is required. Finally, it is expected that recovered items for which no agent is detected will be disposed of in accordance with environmental regulations.

It is not possible know in advance the processing needs for every RCWM at every site. Therefore, the committee cannot recommend site-specific treatment options. It can only identify and recommend general needs for modifications to the supporting technologies listed in the second bullet item of the statement of task. The committee hopes that these modifications will enable the supporting technologies to better meet the Army’s needs at RCWM sites, based on the very limited information about the quantities and characteristics of the CWM at these sites.

Also, it may well be that modifications to existing technologies—for example, a more accurate PINS, a faster EDS, or more easily transported EDTs—may be necessary but not sufficient to meet the Army’s needs, especially at the large burial sites, where hundreds of thousands of potentially contaminated items will have to be assessed and treated and where existing procedures, while effective, may prove to be too slow or cumbersome for the quantities involved. It is possible that at these sites, it will be necessary to design and construct facilities where recovered items, whether found in burial pits or in the open, can be efficiently assessed for agent content and remaining contamination and treated accordingly.

The existing approach has been effective in disposing of small quantities of RCWM, and processing rates and urgency in identification of fill have not been an issue. For example, at the Pine Bluff Explosive Destruction System (PBEDS) facility in Arkansas, between June 2006 and April 2010, two EDS units destroyed 1,225 4.2-in. mortar rounds and Second World War–era German Traktor rockets (an average processing rate of nearly 27 munitions per month). For those sites containing tens to hundreds of thousands of potentially chemically contaminated items, processing at this rate may not be sufficient. For these sites, new technology capabilities may well be required. Technology research that could lead to the development of such capabilities is described below, and technology-related findings and recommendations are provided.

TECHNOLOGIES WITH NO TARGETED R&D RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 6-1. The committee finds that the following technologies are sufficiently developed and identifies no research and development needs for them:

•  Other organizations have large R&D programs under way in geophysical detection. The best policy for NSCMP is to simply track developments in these programs.

•  Personal protective equipment.

•  Conventional excavation equipment.

•  CWM storage (interim holding facilities, igloos, bunkers).

•  Vapor containment facilities and filtering techniques.

•  Single Chemical agent identification set Access and Neutralization System (SCANS).

•  Digital radiography and computed tomography.

•  The CH2M HILL transportable detonation chamber (TDC).

•  The DAVINCH.

•  The explosive destruction system (EDS).

•  Secondary waste storage and disposal.

TECHNOLOGIES WITH TARGETED R&D NEEDS

Robotic Excavation Equipment

As discussed in the section on robotic excavation equipment in Chapter 4, robotic technology has continued to grow in versatility and reliability. To reduce risk to workers, its use in the remediation of buried chemical materiel should be investigated and developed.

Finding 6-2. The committee believes that existing robotic systems are capable of accessing and removing buried CWM, resulting in improved safety.

Recommendation 6-1. The Army should demonstrate that robotic systems can be reliably utilized to access and remove buried chemical warfare materiel, and, where applicable, it should use them.

CWM Packaging and Transportation

As described in Chapter 4, the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) is developing a universal munitions storage container. It is fabricated from high-density polyethylene, and its use will allow the destruction of overpacked munitions in the EDS without removing them from the overpack.

Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×

Finding 6-3. Existing overpacks for the EDS may require removal and additional handling of the contained munition prior to destruction.

Recommendation 6-2. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel Project should complete the development and testing of a universal munitions storage container.

Assessment of Recovered Munitions

Before RCWM can be destroyed, an assessment must be carried out on each item to determine the nature of the contained agent and energetics. The noninvasive analytical method used for this purpose is PINS, which is described in Chapter 4. While PINS is an essential tool in the assessment of recovered munitions, it is not totally reliable. For example, during the destruction of 71 recovered munitions at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii in 2008, a 75-mm projectile was mistakenly identified as containing phosgene but actually contained chloropicrin (NRC, 2009a). Another example is at the Spring Valley remediation effort, where, sometime in 2002 or 2003, three munitions were incorrectly identified as containing diphenylcyanoarsine when they actually contained arsine.7

When destroying munitions in an EDS or by another EDT, it is important to know the TNT-equivalent net explosive weight in order to assess the type and quantity of contained energetics.8 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) project manager at Spring Valley expressed his belief that some of the munitions processed as “explosively configured” at Spring Valley did not, in fact, contain explosives.9 Processing a munition as explosively configured places additional stress on the operators.10 The Spring Valley project manager said that PINS “was not very good” at identifying explosives in recovered munitions and that a better method was needed for this purpose—particularly for small amounts—owing to low sensitivity for nitrogen, a key element in explosive materials.11

After conducting the PINS analysis for fill and explosive content, the Materiel Assessment Review Board (MARB) reviews all available information for each RCWM and presents its assessment. The procedure is complicated and lengthy, and the Camp Sibert project manager said that the results “are often qualified to the extent that regulators cannot be satisfied that an item is, or is not, RCWM, thus limiting the disposal options.”12 The manager also commented that a better tool is needed to determine whether a munition is CWM or not.

The NSCMP has R&D projects under way to address some of these PINS-related issues. These R&D efforts are aimed at generating more definitive analytical results and lowering the detection limit, plus replacing the radioactive neutron source with a neutron generator to facilitate transportation of the PINS equipment.

Finding 6-4. Improvements are needed in the portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy (PINS) data processing to provide more definitive information for the identification of chemical fills in recovered munitions.

Recommendation 6-3. Research and development should continue on the processing of data from portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy to provide more definitive information for the identification of chemical fills in recovered munitions.

As explained in Chapter 4, mixed results were obtained at Camp Sibert when using the Miniature Chemical Agent Monitoring System (MINICAMS) for air monitoring in the area of a detected subsurface object as the object was being investigated and removed. It is expected that a similar experience will be encountered during other remediation efforts. The problems encountered were as follows:

•  As part of the MINICAMS calibration procedure, a midday challenge was used. This procedure can delay field operations a few hours.

•  The MINICAMS is a relatively fragile system, not intended to be moved around on a remediation site, resulting in a significant amount of downtime. A more rugged system is needed.

•  In certain parts of Camp Sibert, the presence of trichloroethylene interfered with determination of mustard by MINICAMS.

Finding 6-5a. The MINICAMS is a fragile system, not sufficiently robust to be moved from site to site. This lengthens downtime.

Finding 6-5b. A more rugged and portable system for near-real-time air monitoring is needed to reduce downtime.

Fewer than 100 munitions have been assessed at Spring Valley and Camp Sibert. Future large remediation projects—for

image

7Dan G. Noble, Project Manager, Spring Valley Baltimore District, USACE, personal correspondence to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, February 3, 2012.

8Dan G. Noble, Project Manager, Spring Valley Baltimore District, USACE, “History of the American University Experiment Station,” presentation to the committee on November 2, 2011.

9Dan G. Noble, Project Manager, Spring Valley Baltimore District, USACE, personal correspondence to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, February 3, 2012.

10Karl E. Blankenship, FUDS Project Manager, Mobile District, USACE, “Remediation of Contaminated Soil at Camp Sibert, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 3, 2011.

11Dan G. Noble, Project Manager, Spring Valley Baltimore District, USACE, “History of the American University Experiment Station,” presentation to the committee on November 2, 2011.

12Karl E. Blankenship, FUDS Project Manager, Mobile District, USACE, “Remediation of Contaminated Soil at Camp Sibert, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 3, 2011.

Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×

example, RSA—might entail assessing tens or hundreds of thousands of munitions or opened munitions that might still contain small amounts of agent and energetics. As discussed above, the PINS/DRCT/MARB assessment approach has both problems and limitations. If the approach is applied to the assessment of tens or hundreds of thousands of munitions, it may be unable to generate assessment opinions in a sufficiently timely fashion, and the assessment results may not be sufficiently definitive and accurate to guarantee the safety of those who operate the treatment equipment. This issue needs to be addressed before munitions remediation is begun at RSA or at other large burial sites.

Finding 6-6. When dealing with tens or hundreds of thousands of munitions or opened munition bodies that contain agent and energetics, the current PINS/DRCT/MARB approach may not be able to carry out its assessments in a sufficiently timely fashion, and the results may not be sufficiently accurate to guarantee the safety of treatment equipment operators.

Recommendation 6-4. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project should recommend modifications to the current PINS/DRCT/MARB assessment approach or adopt an alternative approach that will function more quickly and with more definitive and more accurate results when tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of munitions are to be assessed at a single site.

DESTRUCTION OF CONTAMINATED RCWM

As noted in Chapter 5, RCWM can be placed into three broad categories: agent contaminated and still containing energetic components such as fuzes and bursters; agent contaminated but not containing energetics; and agent non-contaminated and suitable for unrestricted release. In the text below, technology options and possible R&D needs are described for RCWM in the first two categories. There are no technology needs for the third category, and items in that category can be sent off-site for recycling or, if they contain a listed waste, sent to a hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF) for management in accordance with the state’s hazardous waste disposal regulations.

Destruction of RCWM That Contains Energetics

Some of the RCWM to be destroyed will still contain energetic components. For most of these items, existing EDTs are expected to be adequate. (There are exceptions; see “Processing of Unusual Items at Redstone Arsenal” in Chapter 5.) Possible developmental needs for these technologies are described below.

Explosive Destruction System

The EDS has been very effective in destroying munitions where the processing rate has not been a key factor and where the munitions were well characterized—that is, the net explosive weight and chemical fill to be treated were known. These conditions may not prevail, however, when processing RCWM where small quantities of residual agent might exist that are not easily identified by PINS. To increase the capabilities of the EDS, the Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel (PMNSCM) is carrying out a product development program with two key elements:

•  Steam injection. Injection of steam into the EDS vessel is to be tested. Its expected advantages are twofold: (1) faster heating than is now obtained by heating with external band heaters only and (2) less liquid waste. This will reduce the 1-hr, 15-min needed to heat the rinse water from 60°C to 100°C, which originally took from 1315 until 1430 on Day 1. Steam injection is being installed and tested on the EDS-2 test fixture mentioned above. Testing with live agent was planned for 2012.

•  Universal reagent. Research has been begun on the identification of a reagent that will be effective for all agents. Testing of 10 reagents on mustard and GD (soman) agents has begun, with results pending.

Dynasafe SDC 1200

The committee judges that the Dynasafe technology is a viable approach to processing large numbers—tens or hundreds of thousands—of burned and open chemical munition bodies that might contain residual agent or energetics. In fact, this technology may be an optimal approach, especially if a munition destruction process is also needed at a large burial site such as RSA to destroy intact munitions. A Dynasafe static detonation chamber (SDC) system could then process both types, easily shifting back and forth between intact munitions that contain energetics and previously opened munition bodies that do not. The SDC is the only one of the four technologies that produces scrap metal that is suitable for release for unrestricted use (formerly “5X”).

As described in Chapter 4, many problems were encountered when the SDC 1200 was operating on chemical munitions at the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF), and work was begun on correcting these problems. This effort was continuing as this report was being written, with conventional munitions of necessity being employed since Anniston no longer has any chemical munitions. The continued effort has been designated as a throughput, reliability, availability, and maintainability (TRAM) study. The committee believes that this study is well planned and will increase both the throughput rate and the reliability of the process. Dynasafe, the vendor, is involved in the effort

Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×

and is incorporating the design improvements developed at Anniston into future units. As also noted in Chapter 4, since the SDC for Anniston was manufactured, Dynasafe has enlarged the thermal oxidizer for its SDC 1200s.13 This will allow better control of excess oxygen and hence more reliable combustion of CO.

Finding 6-7. Dynasafe has enlarged the thermal oxidizer in its standard SDC 1200 design. Installation of this larger oxidizer is expected to aid in controlling excess oxygen and hence result in more complete and consistent combustion of CO.

Recommendation 6-5. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project should investigate the benefits of the larger thermal oxidizer now used in Dynasafe’s standard SDC 1200. If, as expected, the larger oxidizer aids in controlling excess oxygen, leading to the more complete and consistent combustion of carbon monoxide, the project should consider replacing the current thermal oxidizer with the larger oxidizer.

The committee, however, continues to be concerned about the performance of the spray dryer used at the ANCDF. The vendor of the SDC 1200 claimed that the spray dryer would minimize the formation of dioxins (polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins) and furans (polychlorinated dibenzofurans) as the hot gases exiting the thermal oxidizer were cooled in the dryer (NRC, 2010b). Dioxins and furans are highly toxic materials. Because they accumulate in the human body, they are of great concern to the public. Emissions of dioxins and furans are regulated by the state of Alabama (NRC, 2010b) and other regulatory authorities. Since the SDC system was started up, it has become clear that the spray dryer does not prevent the formation of dioxins and furans, and the activated carbon adsorbers in the off-gas treatment system must be depended on to capture the dioxins and furans formed there. Also, the solids formed in the spray dryer sometimes accumulate on its interior walls. Eliminating the spray dryer and using a heat exchanger to cool the hot gases from the detonation chamber, as is done in the CH2M HILL TDC process, might improve the reliability of the process. The existing activated carbon adsorbers would continue to capture the dioxins and furans formed as the off-gas from the thermal oxidizer is cooled. The committee notes that neither the CH2M HILL TDC nor the DAVINCH system employs a rapid quench to minimize the formation of dioxins and furans, instead relying on activated carbon adsorbers to capture the dioxins and furans that are formed. However, the larger Dynasafe system installed at Munster, Germany, does employ a venturi quench for that purpose. Elimination of the spray dryer would result in generation of a liquid waste stream, the spent scrubber solution. If this is a problem, the use of dry lime scrubbing, as done in the CH2M HILL TDC, could be considered.

Finding 6-8. The SDC spray dryer does not prevent the formation of dioxins and furans, and solids sometimes accumulate on the interior walls of the dryer.

Recommendation 6-6. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project should evaluate the costs and benefits of improving the reliability of the Dynasafe static detonation chamber system by replacing the spray dryer with a water-cooled heat exchanger and continuing to rely on activated carbon adsorbers to capture the dioxins and furans formed as off-gas from the thermal oxidizer is cooled. If disposal of liquid waste (i.e., spent scrubber solution) becomes a problem, the Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel should consider replacing the caustic scrubbers with a dry lime injection system.

Finding 6-9. The ongoing development program for the Dynasafe SDC 1200 system at the ANCDF is well justified and well planned. It is expected to increase the reliability of the process. The throughput rate of the process, already high, is also expected to increase.

Recommendation 6-7. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project should continue its efforts to improve throughput and reliability of the Dynasafe static detonation chamber system.

The Kobe Steel DAVINCH and the CH2M HILL Transportable Detonation Chamber

The DAVINCH and the TDC are similar in that they both use external donor charges to access munition bodies and destroy agent fill. Both technologies have been extensivly used to destroy chemical munitions, and both have been modified by their respective developers in light of this experience. Consequently, the committee has not identified any key R&D needs that could make these technologies more suitable for processing intact RCWM that still contains an agent fill. The primary solid waste produced by both technologies is scrap metal from munition bodies that has been decontaminated to ≤1VSL but not to a more stringent level that would allow the scrap metal to be released for unrestricted use. Additional development work on both technologies could be carried out to allow this to happen.

For the DAVINCH, the need for R&D to make it more suitable for RCWM destruction will depend on site-specific requirements. For example, if the DAVINCH is used to destroy RCWM, a reduction in the quantity of donor and shaped charges could reduce both costs and risks associated with explosives handling. For larger and heavier munitions, it takes a long time to manually load the munition into the DAVINCH vessel, and use of robotic equipment, as practiced in Japan,

image

13Harley Heaton, Vice President-Research, UXB International, personal correspondence to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, March 16, 2012.

Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×

could reduce the loading time and any safety issues associated with manual handling of the overpacked munitions.

Both the DAVINCH and the CH2M HILL TDC system have suitable air pollution control systems and are already designed to withstand detonations of energetics. Although both technologies use donor explosives to access the munition bodies and destroy the agent fill, it may be possible to use only enough donor charges to access the munition cavities (as is the case with the EDS) and to then use an external source of hot gas to destroy the agent rather than using the donor charge to do this. This could alleviate safety concerns associated with the handling of energetics and would reduce stresses on the containment vessels associated with the detonations. An approach of this nature was once used to eliminate residual agent from the TDC (NRC, 2006).

Processing of Nonenergetic RCWM

Some of the RCWM at large burial sites will not contain energetics such as bursters and fuzes but may still contain detectable quantities of agent. This materiel includes previously opened and drained munition bodies, scrap metal, and former production plant equipment, as is expected to be found at RSA, for example. Rather than destroying residual agent using donor charges in explosive containment vessels such as the TDC or the DAVINCH, other options exist. These include, but are not limited to, the following:

•  Processing through high-temperature furnaces similar to the Blue Grass metal parts treater or the Pueblo metal treatment unit or the metal parts furnaces used at the now-closed U.S. chemical munition incineration facilities. In all cases, the systems would need to be gas tight and have appropriate air pollution control trains.

•  Processing through a commercial transportable hazardous waste incinerator with a rotary kiln. These systems are gas-tight and are equipped with suitable air pollution control systems.

•  Processing through a car bottom furnace. Such furnaces feature cars (carts) on which the munitions would be loaded that can be rolled on rails into and out of the furnace. A car bottom furnace used for the munition body application would need to be of gas-tight construction and have an air pollution control train for discharge of the off-gases.

•  Treating with decontamination solution and then analyzing the headspace. This is repeated until the headspace concentration is below the VSL. The decontaminated waste can then be shipped off-site for recycling.14

•  Using the Dynasafe SDC 1200 as noted above. The SDC 1200 relies on heat to destroy agent in munitions still containing an agent fill, whether explosively configured or not. It can also be used to destroy residual quantities of agent in previously opened and treated munitions and to treat contaminated scrap metal, assuming that the metal can fit into the SDC loading chambers.

Finding 6-10. A program to investigate technologies such as the SDC that can process burned and opened munition bodies that might still contain residual agent and energetics is justified.

Recommendation 6-8. NSCMP should evaluate the Dynasafe static detonation chamber for its ability to destroy recovered chemical warfare materiel, including burned and previously opened munition bodies that still contain detectable traces of agent and agent-contaminated scrap metal. This evaluation should include possible modifications to the SDC feed system, changes in the residence time in the SDC chamber, and changes to its off-gas treatment system.

Recommendation 6-9. If a Dynasafe static detonation chamber is not available for destroying agent in recovered open munition bodies, or is needed full time for the destruction of intact munitions, the Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel should evaluate available alternatives for decontaminating non-energetic recovered chemical warfare materiel.

Finding 6-11. Many items that are expected to be found at Redstone Arsenal are anticipated to contain agent or to be agent-contaminated. At the same time, they will be too large to be fed to available or commonly used decontamination technologies.

Recommendation 6-10. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project should begin preparations for treatment of unusually large agent-contaminated or agent-filled items at Redstone Arsenal.

Soil and sludge contaminated with agent, degradation products from agent and energetics and, as mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, industrial chemicals, including pesticides and solvents, will be found at CWM remediation sites. In the remediation projects at Camp Sibert and Spring Valley, contaminated soil was sent to commercial TSDFs for disposal. The Camp Siebert project manager briefed the committee on one waste analysis issue, difficulties in obtaining toxicity characteristic leaching procedure analyses on soil contaminated with agent; these difficulties caused delays. TSDFs require such analyses before accepting the soil for land disposal. The Edgewood Chemical Biological Center laboratories do not perform these analyses, and commercial

image

14Raymond Cormier, Director, Mission Support, Deseret Chemical Depot, personal communication to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, April 2, 2012.

Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×

laboratories cannot accept agent-contaminated samples.15 The committee is passing along these comments, which impact the timing and cost of a remediation project, but without presenting any findings or recommendations.

image

15Karl E. Blankenship, FUDS Project Manager, Mobile District USACE, “Remediation of Contaminated Soil at Camp Sibert, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 3, 2011.

Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×
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Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×
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Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×
Page 77
Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×
Page 78
Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×
Page 79
Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×
Page 80
Suggested Citation:"6 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Targeted Research and Development." National Research Council. 2012. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13419.
×
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As the result of disposal practices from the early to mid-twentieth century, approximately 250 sites in 40 states, the District of Columbia, and 3 territories are known or suspected to have buried chemical warfare materiel (CWM). Much of this CWM is likely to occur in the form of small finds that necessitate the continuation of the Army's capability to transport treatment systems to disposal locations for destruction. Of greatest concern for the future are sites in residential areas and large sites on legacy military installations.

The Army mission regarding the remediation of recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) is turning into a program much larger than the existing munition and hazardous substance cleanup programs. The Army asked the Nation Research Council (NRC) to examine this evolving mission in part because this change is significant and becoming even more prominent as the stockpile destruction is nearing completion. One focus in this report is the current and future status of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Project (NSCMP), which now plays a central role in the remediation of recovered chemical warfare materiel and which reports to the Chemical Materials Agency.

Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel also reviews current supporting technologies for cleanup of CWM sites and surveys organizations involved with remediation of suspected CWM disposal sites to determine current practices and coordination. In this report, potential deficiencies in operational areas based on the review of current supporting technologies for cleanup of CWM sites and develop options for targeted research and development efforts to mitigate potential problem areas are identified.

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