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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel 1Karl E. Blankenship, Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) Project Manager, Mobile District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Remediation of Contaminated Soil at Camp Sibert, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 3, 2011. 2Terry de la Paz, Chief, Installation Restoration Branch, Environmental Management Division, RSA, Alabama, “Remediation of Buried CWM at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” U.S. Army, Presentation to the committee on November 2, 2011. 3Steven A. Cobb, Chief, Governmental Hazardous Waste Branch, Land Division, Department of Environmental Management (ADEM), “Remediation of Buried CWM in Alabama: The State Regulator’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 2, 2011. 4William R. Brankowitz, Senior Chemical Engineer, Science Applications International Corporation, “Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project Redstone Arsenal (RSA) Interim Historical Report,” presentation to the committee on January 18, 2012. 5Ibid. 6Harley Heaton, Vice President-Research, UXB International, to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, personal correspondence on March 16, 2012. 7Dan G. Noble, Project Manager, Spring Valley Baltimore District, USACE, personal correspondence to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, February 3, 2012. 8Dan G. Noble, Project Manager, Spring Valley Baltimore District, USACE, “History of the American University Experiment Station,” presentation to the committee on November 2, 2011. 9Dan G. Noble, Project Manager, Spring Valley Baltimore District, USACE, personal correspondence to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, February 3, 2012. 10Karl E. Blankenship, FUDS Project Manager, Mobile District, USACE, “Remediation of Contaminated Soil at Camp Sibert, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 3, 2011. 11Dan G. Noble, Project Manager, Spring Valley Baltimore District, USACE, “History of the American University Experiment Station,” presentation to the committee on November 2, 2011. 12Karl E. Blankenship, FUDS Project Manager, Mobile District, USACE, “Remediation of Contaminated Soil at Camp Sibert, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 3, 2011. 13Harley Heaton, Vice President-Research, UXB International, personal correspondence to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, March 16, 2012. 14Raymond Cormier, Director, Mission Support, Deseret Chemical Depot, personal communication to Nancy Schulte, NRC study director, April 2, 2012. 15Karl E. Blankenship, FUDS Project Manager, Mobile District USACE, “Remediation of Contaminated Soil at Camp Sibert, Alabama: The Installation Manager’s Perspective,” presentation to the committee on November 3, 2011. 7 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Policy, Funding, and Organization INTRODUCTION As discussed in the introduction to this report and the preceding chapters, the Department of Defense (DOD) mission for the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions and of non-stockpile chemical materiel, for both of which the Army is executive agent (EA), is becoming more complex and longer lasting than had once been envisioned as the program for the remediation of recovered buried chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) transitions into a significant large-scale program that greatly exceeds the scope of the existing smaller-scale munitions and hazardous substance cleanup programs on active and former defense sites and ranges. The existing structure utilized by the Army, in its capacity as EA for the destruction of non-stockpile chemical materiel, must now be reconfgured to prepare for the remediation of RCWM at over 250 sites in the United States. Different organizations design and acquire the specialized chemical warfare materiel (CWM) destruction and related equipment, other organizations operate the equipment, another organization transports the equipment and personnel, and various organizations within the Army Corps of Engineers and the Offices of the Secretary of the Army and of the Secretary of Defense play significant roles in setting policy, obtaining federal funding from three separate budget accounts, prioritizing sites for remediation, and participating in state decisions on selecting remedies. Since May 2005 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [USD(AT&L)] has been considering assigning the responsibility for the recovery and destruction of buried CWM in the United States to the Secretary of the Army and consolidating the characterization, recovery, and destruction responsibilities for buried CWM under a single organization within the Army.1 In response to the Army’s request to the National Research Council to suggest ways to improve coordination among organizations involved in conducting investigations, recoveries, and cleanup activities for non-stockpile CWM, the committee received a number of briefings and reviewed a number of planning documents related to the proposed policy planning, organization, and funding for the RCWM program. Chapter 2 traced the history of remediation of chemical warfare materiel up to July 2007. This chapter reviews evolving DOD and Army policy and their organization and programs for the recovery and destruction of buried CWM and makes recommendations that, if adopted, should lead to improvement. CHRONOLOGY, 2007 THROUGH THE PRESENT RCWM RCWM Program Implementation Plan of 2007 On September 20, 2007, the Secretary of the Army responded to the tasking in the USD(AT&L)’s May 2005 memorandum (see Chapter 2). The Secretary’s report “Recovered Chemical Warfare Material (RCWM) Program Implementation Plan (Recovery and Destruction of Buried Chemical Warfare Material), July 2007” (DOD, 2007), hereinafter referred to as RCWM Plan 2007, is the only RCWM document provided to the committee that has been formally approved by the Secretary of the Army. As such, it establishes an authoritative baseline for development and implementation of the RCWM program unless it is superseded by a subsequent plan approved by the Secretary. In his memorandum forwarding the plan, the Secretary expressed the belief that consolidating responsibilities for the program under the Army would provide for consistency in approach, avoid the duplication of programs, and make more efficient use of limited resources. The Secretary also expressed the view that “while the enclosed plan addresses preliminary implementation procedures, additional coordination will be required within DOD and among the Services 1USD(AT&L) Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, “Designation of Responsibility for Recovery and Destruction of Buried Chemical Warfare Material (CWM),” May 3, 2005.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel to determine precise resource requirements and finalize roles and responsibilities.”2 Although the USD’s tasking was specific to the recovery and destruction of buried CWM, the Secretary of the Army’s report addressed all situations involving the recovery and destruction of buried CWM, regardless of the circumstances of recovery, and expanded the scope of the plan to provide a comprehensive approach for addressing RCWM, including unexploded ordnance and other materials of interest, such as munitions that have unknown liquid fll and chemical agent identification sets (CAIS). The plan was developed by a buried CWM integrated product team (IPT) and an overarching integrated product team (OIPT) formed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Environment, Safety and Occupational Health [DASA(ESOH)]) with representatives from his Office, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Elimination of Chemical Weapons) [DASA(ECW)], the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), the Army G-3, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), CMA’s Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP), and the U.S. Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM) 20th Support Command (CBRNE). It states, in part, as follows: During this plan’s development the need for an Executive Agent (EA) for the RCWM program was made clear. Multiple agencies are currently responsible for various aspects of a response that involves or potentially involves CWM (e.g., planning, budgeting, execution). The agencies have independently developed costs for various aspects of the RCWM program. These estimates have been highly variable.… An integrated approach is needed to address these issues. The designation of an EA with responsibility for ensuring an integrated consistent approach to the oversight and management of all aspects of the RCWM is recommended. The IPT made almost a dozen determinations: a. The assignment of EA responsibility to the Army would provide the DOD with visibility for total requirements and an integrated consistent approach for addressing (1) the RCWM aspects of responses conducted at DERP-funded munitions response sites (MRS); (2) range clearance and other activities conducted on operational ranges where CWM material is known or suspected to be present, or where it is encountered; and (3) explosives or munitions emergency response where a munition with an unknown liquid fll or CWM is encountered. b. The scope of the EA’s responsibilities and the RCWM program should be broadened to make the EA responsible for the support of all circumstances that could involve RCWM including: addressing the discovery and assessment of munitions with unknown liquid flls; UXO determined to be chemical-flled munitions; CWM commingled with conventional munitions; and providing an approach for addressing CWM on operational ranges and other areas that are outside the DERP. c. Overall, the RCWM program should be managed as part of DOD’s Installations and Environment (I&E) program, not as an acquisition program. In addressing CWM recovered under a variety of situations (e.g., during munitions response on active, BRAC, and FUDS properties, during range clearance activities, and during explosives and munitions emergencies) multiple funding sources might be involved. d. Planning and management of CWM responses should remain integrated with the Service I&E programs, not managed as a separate program. e. RCWM should be handled as nonsurety material. f. The roles and responsibilities for compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) were not expected to change should the Army be made EA for the RCWM program. g. NSCMP’s equipment and associated personnel for assessment of recovered munitions and destruction of RCWM personnel should transition from the NSCMP-managed acquisition-related program to an Army operational activity. h. Any estimate for the RCWM program’s total estimated cost should include specific funds to support: • NSCMP’s sustainment of operational crews, staff, and equipment. • Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) required to support the RCWM program. • Necessary archival research. • The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) 20th Support Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives) (CBRNE)’s two chemical battalions [Technical Escort (TE)] (formerly U.S. Army Material Command’s Technical Escort Unit) support of explosive and munitions emergency responses. i. Funding and management of CWM responses should be consolidated to the extent practical. However, separate funding—a separate appropriation—should be established for those activities collectively referred to as emergency. j. I&E programs of the respective Services should continue to prioritize, plan, and fund CWM response actions, less assessment and destruction; and should coordinate with the EA to obtain prioritization based on Defense-wide needs and to ensure that assessment and destruction requirements can be met. 2RCWM Plan 2007.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel k. If a separate appropriation is not established, the costs associated with these functions should be absorbed by the I&E programs of the respective Services. However, due to the complexity of the requirements, the uncertainties of costs at specific installations, the high-level of public concern, and the risk to the I&E programs of the respective Services, the best approach was believed to be a separate appropriation.3 The OIPT recommended as follows: a. The Secretary of Defense [should] assign the Secretary of the Army as the EA for the DOD RCWM program, b. The Secretary of the Army [should]: • Delegate the EA responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment [ASA(I&E)], allowing for further delegation authority as AS A(I&E) determines necessary. • Designate the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as the RCWM Response Executor. c. The EA [should] establish an RCWM Program Management Office (PMO) to manage the resources and develop policy necessary to respond to and destroy any RCWM, and guide the transition process d. U.S. Army CMA [should] support development of a separate appropriation to fund the emergency response functions.4 The RCWM Plan 2007 has provided the basis for Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) changes to the RCWM program. Approval of the Secretary’s report and development and approval of a final implementation plan for the recovery and destruction of RCWM have been the subject of a continuing series of Army and OSD staff actions since the report was submitted to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment [DUSD(I&E)] on September 20, 2007. A step forward in this regard occurred on April 1, 2009, when DASA(ESOH) recommended the immediate implementation of a draft Army regulation that provided interim guidance for chemical warfare materiel response and related activities (U.S. Army, 2009a). The interim guidance prescribed Department of the Army procedures to be taken should CWM or munitions with an unknown liquid fll be encountered either during a planned CWM response or during another environmental response or during construction or other activities. It included procedures for the protection of human health and the environment and stressed the importance of working with environmental regulators and safety officials and of implementing a public outreach program during response activities. The draft regulation also provided information on compliance with CWC requirements. The draft regulation did not, however, contain new policy guidance or assign responsibilities for the program. On March 1, 2010, the USD(AT&L) formally designated the Secretary of the Army as EA for the RCWM program (see Appendix C). In 2011 the Army established a provisional RCWM integrating Office to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize the DOD’s RCWM response program and related activities.5 On September 19, 2011, a draft document prepared by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment ASA(IE&E) was issued as Secretary of the Army memorandum “Delegation of Executive Agent Responsibilities for DOD’s Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel Program (RCWM-P).” This draft document, if implemented, would transfer EA responsibility for the program for RCWM from ASA(ALT) to ASA(IE&E). This essentially would make the ASA(IE&E) the line manager in charge of the program. Neither a detailed program management plan nor a program organization was presented to the study committee during its review.6 On April 17, 2012, the ASA(I&E) sent a memorandum to the USD(AT&L) requesting that the USD either reevaluate the direction provided in its memorandum (Appendix C) relating to the source of funding for the RCWM program or finalize the directed action. The letter recommended that a separate nonacquisition program element be established under the Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal, Defense (CAMD,D) budget account to make transparent the costs associated with the RCWM program and that OSD identify a near- and long-term funding profle for the program from DOD’s Total Obligation Authority. The letter further requested that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense [ASD(NCB)] programs continue to manage the CAMD,D account, including the new program element for the RCWM program, with the DUSD(I&E) providing general environmental policy oversight (U.S. Army, 2012). Finding 7-1. As of April 30, 2012, neither the responsible officials within OSD—namely, the DUSD(I&E), the Office of the OSD comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense) [ASD(NCB)]—nor the responsible officials in the Army had completed the task assigned to them by the USD(AT&L) memorandum of March 1, 2010. 3Adapted from paragraph 4, Executive Summary to RCWM Plan 2007, pp. ii-iv. 4Adapted from paragraph 5, Executive Summary to RCWM Plan 2007, p. iv. 5J.C. King, Assistant for Munitions and Chemical Matters, Office of the DASA-ESOH, “The Army RCWM Program: A Policy Perspective,” presentation to the committee on September 29, 2011. 6Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment, draft document dated September 19, 2011, provided to the committee by J.C. King on September 27, 2011.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel Recommendation 7-1. The Army should formally approve, then submit, a final implementation plan for the recovery and destruction of buried chemical warfare materiel as required by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in its memorandum of March 1, 2010. The Army’s RCWM Implementation of Plan 2010 The USD(AT&L) memorandum “Final Implementation Plan for the Recovery and Destruction of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel, March 1, 2010” (Appendix C) designated the Secretary of the Army as the DOD EA for the destruction of non-stockpile chemical warfare munitions, agents, and by-products. The memorandum delineated the Secretary’s authorities and responsibilities as EA as including the following function among others: (a) maintaining DOD’s inventory of locations known or suspected to contain CWM and chemical agent identifications sets (CAIS); (b) the execution of CWM response or other actions, such as range clearance activities, needed to address these sites; (c) supporting explosives or munitions emergency response that may involve recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) or CAIS; (d) addressing, regardless of the circumstances under which found, RCWM and munitions and other materials that have an unknown liquid or chemical agent fll (munitions and materials of interest); (e) planning, programming and budgeting for the EA functions for the assessment of the fll of RCWM and munitions and other materials of interest, the destruction of RCWM, and those functions and equipment related to such assessment and destruction; and (f) integrating and coordinating the RCWM Program with all DOD Components. Collectively, these and related functions make up the RCWM Program. Quoting almost directly from the RCWM Implementation Plan, 2007, and clearly refecting the intent of that plan, the USD(AT&L) memorandum observed: This EA designation ensures a comprehensive approach for addressing RCWM and determining whether munitions and other materials of interest are RCWM. Under the EA determination, the Army’s execution of the RCWM program will provide consistency, avoid duplication, and provide for the efficient use of those limited resources that support the assessment of liquid and chemical agent flls and the destruction of RCWM. The memorandum directed the DUSD(I&E) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination with the Army and the ASD(NCB), to determine an appropriate funding profle for a new RCWM account that would include the following: • The funding source for the assessment of RCWM and munitions and other materials of interest, the destruction of RCWM, the sustainment of crews and equipment and the maintenance of related equipment will be the Chemical Agent and Munitions Destruction, Defense (CAMD,D) appropriation pending establishment of a single, focused RCWM program account. Once implemented and funded, the RCWM program account will be resourced from the DOD’s Total Obligation Authority and will be separate and distinct from the CAMD,D account used for other portions of the chemical demilitarization program. • Those functions and activities not related to the assessment of RCWM and munitions and other materials of interest and the destruction of RCWM will be funded by the DERP accounts or other appropriations normally available to fund such functions and activities. • Once established, the RCWM program account will fund: a) the assessment of RCWM to determine the most likely chemical agent fll; b) the assessment of munitions and other materials of interest to determine whether they are RCWM; c) destruction of RCWM; d) the sustainment and maintenance of required crews and equipment; and e) program management and other necessary functions of the EA. Finally, the memorandum requested that the Army, within 180 days of receipt of the memorandum, develop and submit to the USD(AT&L) timelines and milestones that are coordinated with DUSD(I&E), ASD(NCB), and the other DOD components at least for the following activities: • Delineate program management roles and responsibilities to ensure seamless work fow and funding at the sites currently identified as being CWM response sites; • Determine the funding required for support of the RCWM program for consideration in the planning, programming, and budgeting process for the fscal year 2012 through 2017 Program Objective Memorandum; and • Provide technical advice and support the planning, programming, and budgeting process for environmental response actions that may involve RCWM under the DERP. Army Role and Responsibilities September 19, 2011, Draft On September 27, 2011, at its first meeting, the committee was briefed on a draft memorandum prepared by ASA(IE&E) for approval by the Secretary of the Army.7 This draft memo acknowledged the Secretary’s designation as the DOD RCWM EA by the USD(AT&L) memorandum of March 1, 2010. The draft memo delegated the Secretary’s EA responsibilities, functions, and authorities to ASA(IE&E), with further delegation authorized as the ASA(IE&E) might direct. The Secretary’s memorandum also stated that the 7Ibid.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel ASA(ALT) would remain responsible for the chemical demilitarization program except that for demilitarization and any related functions required to support the DOD’s RCWM program. The ASA(IE&E) was also given responsibility for safeguarding RCWM involved in an explosives or munitions emergency or recovered during planned munitions responses or range clearance activities. The memorandum established supporting roles in the RCWM program for FORSCOM, the Army Materiel Command, and USACE, as agreed to by the ASA(IE&E). An accompanying draft enclosure to the Secretary’s memorandum8 further delegated EA authority to DASA(ESOH), delineated its roles and responsibilities and those of supported DOD components and supporting elements of the Army Secretariat and Staff, major commands, agencies, and Offices. The assigned responsibilities of DASA(ESOH) included these: • Providing policy and guidance for the DOD RCWM program; • Providing centralized oversight of the RCWM program; • Ensuring cross-functional coordination among the Services’ environmental program managers and the Army program managers; • Ensuring cost-effective and efficient use of limited resources that support the RCWM program; • Developing and compiling funding requirements for support of the program using input from the military services, environmental program managers, Army program execution managers, and the Army Materiel Command; • Establishing a provisional RCWM Integrating Office; • Ensuring the development and maintenance of an inventory of known or suspected CWM and CAIS sites and other locations of potential interest; • Approving an annual work plan for the RCWM program, including CWM responses and other planned activities—for example, range clearance activities developed by the provisional RCWM Integrating Office in coordination with the military departments’ environmental program managers, the Army’s program execution managers, and the Army Materiel Command); and • Providing oversight of activities of the Center for Treaty Implementation and Compliance to ensure compliance with the CWC. Provisional RCWM IO The assigned roles, responsibilities, and guidance, including the establishment of the provisional RCWM Integrating Office (RCWM IO), conformed to the guidance outlined in the RCWM Plan 2007. The draft enclosure to the Secretary’s memorandum provided general scope and responsibilities of the proposed provisional RCWM IO. The memorandum did not propose who should chair the IO. During the course of the committee’s review, CMA gave the committee the draft of a charter for the IO.9 Under this charter, CMA is the acting chair of the provisional RCWM IO on behalf of DASA(ESOH). The RCWM IO is composed of representatives of relevant Army organizations, including AMC, CMA, ACSIM, USACE, the 20th Support Command, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, and critical subdivisions of those organizations such as NSCMP, ECBC, the Chemical Biological Applications and Risk Reduction Agency (CARA), the U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center/Chemical Warfare Design Center (in Huntsville, Alabama), and the U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety. The committee notes that the IO is, as its name implies, operating on an interim basis, awaiting formal approval by higher Army and DOD authorities. The provisional IO plays an important role in the RCWM program by coordinating planning, programming, and remediation requirements and resolving issues across DOD. The committee believes, however, that despite its important role, the provisional IO lacks the authority required to execute its mission. Finding 7-2. As an advisory and coordinating Office, the provisional IO has no authority to direct any of its members to comply with its decisions. FUNDING Background As discussed in Chapter 2, Congress authorizes programs and appropriates funding for the express purpose of implementing those programs consistent with its direction. In most cases, a program’s funding is directed to be expended solely for that program—that is, it must not be mixed with funding for any other program (commingled). In the case of the RCWM program, while chemical weapons munitions remediation is funded separately by CAMD,D, two other important funding programs frequently come into play during some aspects or phases of the overall effort: DERP and Operations and Maintenance (O&M). Congressionally mandated restrictions on the use of these funding programs require the Executive Branch (primarily DOD) to carefully coordinate and account for their use. The fact that RCWM might be buried along with conventional munitions at many sites means that properly accounting for 8Ibid. 9From a draft of proposed charter for the establishment of an RCWM IO provided to the committee via e-mail from W.R. Betts III to Nancy Schulte, January 13, 2012.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel the activities and funding in each case can become costly and complex. An additional complication for RCWM requirements is that the CAMD,D funding program was established primarily to destroy large quantities of stockpiled chemical weapons, and funding for RCWM remediation accounts for only a small portion of that effort. Once the stockpiled weapons have been destroyed and their demilitarization sites remediated, CAMD,D funding could be eliminated, making future funding for RCWM problematic. The CAMD,D budget account, as discussed in Chapter 2, includes funding for two major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs): (1) Chemical Demilitarization—U.S. Army CMA and (2) Chemical Demilitarization—Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA). The CMA MDAP for which the Army is EA includes funding for the Chemical Stockpile Elimination (CSE) project, the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project (CSEPP), and the NSCMP. CMA has completed the destruction of the 90 percent of the U.S. stockpile for which it is responsible and is remediating the demilitarization sites themselves. As those activities are completed, the CMA’s responsibilities are expected to lessen to those necessary to support stockpile storage and CSEPP at the two ACWA sites and sustainment of the NSCMP. The CAMD,D funding is anticipated to be reduced accordingly. As the ACWA program and remediation of the ACWA demilitarization sites is completed in the 2021 to 2023 time frame, the need for funds for CAMD,D could be eliminated entirely.10 As is the case for other budget elements, the President’s budget request for the project is authorized and appropriated annually by Congress. The President’s budget request includes annual budget estimates for the following 4 years, and, when available, the estimated cost to complete the project. All are subject to change. Annual funding for the program beyond 2017 has not been determined; however, the cost and time to complete the program were recently estimated to exceed the previous estimate by about $2 billion and 2 years.11 DERP is a very broad program encompassing funding for early site investigation and characterization through funding for remediation, including, by definition, chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. DERP funds are commonly used for conventional munitions cleanup at RCWM sites, comprising site characterization and remediation up to the point of identifying the RCWM munitions. According to a briefing from DUSD(I&E),12 once an RCWM is discovered, DERP funding can no longer be used, and CAMD,D funding must be used for the assessment and remediation of the RCWM. The committee notes, as described in Chapter 2, that according to Army guidance, funds appropriated for the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP) in the Environmental Restoration, Army (ER,A) budget account can be used to conduct identification, investigation, removal, and remedial actions to address unexploded ordnance (UXO), discarded military munitions (DMM), and munitions constituents. By definition under this guidance, DMM and military munitions include chemical munitions and materiel. The committee notes further that under Section 2703 of Title 10, U.S. Code, all funds appropriated to carry out the Secretary of Defense’s function relating to environmental response are appropriated to what is essentially a transfer account, ER,A, and are subsequently transferred to an appropriate account (e.g., O&M, Military Construction) for conducting environmental responses. It seems, then, to the committee that the various budget accounts currently used by the Army or OSD for funding RCWM activities could be more flexible. O&M funding, in the context of RCWM, is used for the O&M of active training ranges for each of the military services, including environmental restoration of the ranges. Like funding for DERP, O&M funding is not used to remediate RCWM on active training ranges. Rather, CAMD,D funding is employed. Finding 7-3. The committee could not ascertain whether the current practice of prohibiting the use of DERP and O&M funding for RCWM assessment and remediation is based on a statute or on DOD policy. The operational limitations imposed by the Army’s practice of allowing only funds from the CAMD,D budget account to be used for the processing and remediation of RCWM and the inability of the OSD staff and the Army to reach agreement on the establishment of a separate budget account for RCWM remediation, as directed by the USD(AT&L) (DOD, 2010), support the committee’s consensus view that the Secretary of Defense should seek a legal interpretation of the current practice of using only CAMD,D funding and prohibiting the use of DERP and O&M funding for RCWM assessment and remediation. If the legal interpretation affrms the current practice, the consensus of the committee is that the Secretary should consider seeking legislative relief from these restrictions. Recommendation 7-2. The Secretary of Defense should seek a legal interpretation of the perceived prohibition on spending Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to assess and remediate recovered chemical warfare materiel. If it is determined that only Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense (CAMD,D) funds may be used for 10FY 2013 Budget Estimate, CAMD,D, OSD Comptroller, February 2012. 11U.S. Army Element, ACWA, press release “Department of Defense approves new cost and schedule estimates for chemical weapons destruction plants.” Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., April 17, 2012. 12Deborah A. Morefeld, Manager, DERP, Environmental Management, Office of the DUSD(I&E), Remediation Operations from an OSD Installations and Environment Perspective, presentation to the committee on November 1, 2011.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel RCWM assessment and remediation, the Secretary should seek legislative authority to change this stricture in order to permit the commingling of DERP, O&M, and CAMD,D funding for these RCWM activities. FIGURE 7-1 Current organization for policy, oversight, and funding for RCWM. USAEC, U.S. Army Environmental Command. Depending on how and where CWM is discovered, authority and funding for RCWM activities emanate from two OSD Offices and two Army Secretariat Offices. The two OSD Offices are ASD(NCB) for CAMD,D and DUSD(I&E) for DERP and O&M. The two Army Secretariat Offices are ASA(ALT) for CAMD,D and ASA(IE&E) for DERP and O&M, as shown in Figure 7-1. Thus, there is no single advocate for the program. In addition, at present the NSCMP must compete annually for funding from the CAMD,D budget account, which is also the source of funding for the much larger chemical stockpile destruction program. Not only have estimates for completing the stockpile program been pushed out to 2021-2023, they have also increased significantly.13 As the stockpile program nears completion, the CAMD,D account can be expected to come under increasing pressure for significant reductions, if not total elimination. The long-term funding and oversight issues inherent in a growing and enduring RCWM remediation mission need to be addressed by establishing an enduring funding stream that is integrated with other long-term environmental remediation programs. The CAMD,D appropriation, being tied to the completion of the stockpile program, is a problematic long-term source of funding for RCWM requirements, including the stockpile’s derivative NSCMP. Because the stockpile program is expected to complete its mission by 2021-2023, that portion of the CAMD,D funding that supports RCWM requirements will need to be retained and moved to other enduring funding streams. Finding 7-4. Authority and funding for RCWM activities, depending on how and where CWM is discovered, emanate from two OSD Offices and two Army Secretariat Offices. There is no single proponent for the program. In addition, the non-stockpile chemical materiel program is a derivative of the stockpile program which is expected to complete its mission by 2020. A portion of CWM’s funding and oversight will need to be retained and moved to other enduring funding programs. Recommendation 7-3. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army should each select a single Office to champion and fund remediation of all RCWM. 13U.S. Army Element, ACWA, press release “Department of Defense approves new cost and schedule estimates for chemical weapons destruction plants.” Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., April 17, 2012.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel As previously noted, on March 1, 2010, the USD(AT&L) approved and sent to the Secretary of the Army a memorandum designating the Secretary of the Army as the DOD EA for the destruction of non-stockpile chemical warfare munitions, agents, and by-products. The Army has not yet submitted a final implementation plan for the recovery and destruction of buried chemical warfare materiel as required by that memorandum. RCWM Program Funding Requirements The committee has been provided information from various sources regarding the overall costs of completing the RCWM program. The cost estimates vary greatly. Moreover, they are often presented as ranges, with extensive caveats. For example, • In 2003, the DOD Inspector General (DOD IG), in reviewing the increased costs for the stockpile and non-stockpile chemical materiel disposal program (D-2003-128),14 found that the NSCMP did not have the information needed to prepare a reliable estimate of the cost and a schedule for disposing of buried CWM. The PMNSCM estimated that, in addition to the $ 1.6 billion in the FY2003 cost estimate for the disposal of non-stockpile CWM declared under the CWC and in order to continue research, development, and testing of non-stockpile chemical warfare disposal technologies, a further $11.7 billion would be required for disposal of the buried munitions. As noted in the DOD IG’s report, according to the Acting DASA(ECW), the $11.7 billion cost estimate was based on an estimate that had not been updated since 1996 except for an adjustment refecting the infation indices. The DOD IG recommended that the USD(AT&L) issue directions to the environmental Offices of the DOD components to identify, schedule, and fund the disposal of buried chemical warfare materiel from active installations and BRAC installations. The DOD IG also recommended that NSCMP update the plan and the cost estimate for disposal of buried munitions after the environmental Offices implement the USD(AT&L) directive.15 • The Army RCWM Program Implementation Plan (DOD, 2007) approved by the Secretary of the Army in July 2007 projected the total cost of the RCWM program over a 30-year period as a range —Program startup (including training staff and developing appropriate cost estimate tools) was estimated at approximately $10 million for assessment and destruction, $36 million per year for emergency response functions, $5 million per year for RDT&E, and $10 million for archival research over 4 years. The total emergency response cost is $41 million per year, which reaches $43.5 million per year during the first 4 years when $2.5 million for the archival research effort is included. —The low end of the cost estimate is $2.5 billion, including $765 million for investigation; cleanup, minus assessment and destruction; and site close-out, and $1.5 billion for assessment and destruction and emergency response functions. —The high end of the cost estimate is $17 billion, refecting the projected cost of complete removal of all munitions at CWM sites where there is no record of decision. This amount includes (1) $1 billion for investigation; cleanup, less assessment and destruction; and site closeout, and (2) $16 billion for assessment and destruction and other emergency response functions. —The cost of remediating any additional discovered munitions. As described earlier in this subsection, the cost of completing the RCWM is difficult to predict. A key reason for this difficulty is the lack of reliable information about the nature of the chemical munitions and materiel to be found at RCWM sites, including an estimate of the total number of munitions requiring remediation. As was just seen, some sources estimate the cost of the program at as low as $2.5 billion and others put it as high as $17 billion. The FY13 President’s budget request for RCWM operations has increased to $133 million. Even if Congress approves this funding level, completing the RCWM program would take a minimum of 25 years and a maximum of 128 years (at the current annual funding level in uninfated dollars).16 In discussing this estimate, many committee members shared the view that dragging the program out for such a long period would present an unacceptable long-term cost and risk to the nation. Uncertainty about the amount of long-term funding needed for the RCWM program will adversely impact planning and programming for the program. This situation is problematic not only at the Army level, but also at OSD. The committee received briefings on the Army’s experience at Pine Bluff Arsenal and its ongoing preparations for operations at Redstone Arsenal. The information amassed by the Army will allow it to develop a 5-year level-of-effort program on which it can base its request for RCWM funding 14Office of the Inspector General, “The Chemical Demilitarization Program: Increased Costs for Stockpile and Non-Stockpile Chemical Disposal Programs.” D-2003-128, September 4, 2003. Available at http://www.dodigmil/audit/reports/fy03/03-128.pdf. . Accessed June 6, 2012. 15Office of the Inspector General, Corps of Engineers Equipment Reporting on Financial Statements for FY 2002. D-2003-123, August 20, 2003. Available at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy03/03-123.pdf. Accessed June 6, 2012. 16Committee estimate.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel in the FY 2014-2018 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).17 Finding 7-5. The Army has a basis for developing a 5-year level-of-effort program that would in turn provide a basis for setting RCWM funding requirements in the FY 2014-2018 POM. Finding 7-6a. Long-range policy for the remediation of buried munitions, including CWM, is not clearly defined, in part because the inventory of suspected buried munitions and sites is incomplete. Finding 7-6b. The lack of an accurate inventory of the buried munitions and of a reliable cost estimate for the RCWM program severely limits the ability of the DUSD(I&E) and the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, in consultation with the ASD(NCB) and the Army, to establish budget requirements and draw up an appropriate funding plan for a new and separate RCWM account. The consensus of the committee is that the overall RCWM program is substantially underfunded and that an inventory estimate is urgently required to provide a quantitative basis for overall program funding. Recommendation 7-4a. The Secretary of Defense should, as a matter of urgency, increase funding for the remediation of chemical warfare materiel to enable the Army to complete the inventories of known and suspected buried chemical munitions no later than 2013 and develop a quantitative basis for overall funding of the program, with updates as needed to facilitate accurate budget forecasts. Pending establishment of a final RCWM management structure, this task should be assigned to the director of the CMA as chair of the provisional RCWM integrating Office. Recommendation 7-4b. As the RCWM executive agent, the Secretary of the Army should establish a policy that addresses all aspects of the remediation of chemical warfare materiel and that prioritizes remediation requirements, and the Secretary of Defense should identify a new long-term funding source to support the program. The committee’s recommendation to increase funding is important and necessary. Though the exact amount of the nation’s liability is not presently determinable with precision, it is known that, at a minimum, the contents of these sites must be identified and that there will very likely be significant costs for treating at least portions of some sites. It is beyond the scope of the committee’s task to arrive at a more refined cost estimate. As with the DOD Installation Restoration Program, the FUDS program, and the munitions remediation program, a number of inherent uncertainties, making the exact amount and timing of the expenditures not yet determinable. Unlike determining the cost of a tank or of operating a military base, determining the cost of environmental remediation projects has historically been quite difficult. In the case of buried chemical materiel, the materiel is not only buried and exact numbers of agent-flled materiel unknown, but the remediation technology is relatively new and highly specialized. Costs can vary by an order of magnitude based on the case-by-case determination of the regulators. Based on the committee’s review, the ultimate costs far exceed existing funding levels. However, the committee recognizes that the ultimate rate of expenditure will be constrained by the existing budget realities facing the Army. The USD(AT&L) memorandum stated that the source of funding for the assessment and destruction of RCWM and the sustainment of crews and related equipment would be the CAMD,D appropriation pending the establishment of an RCWM program account. The committee notes the ASA(IE&E) memorandum (U.S. Army, 2012) requesting that the USD(AT&L) either re evaluate his direction regarding the funding source for the RCWM program or finalize the directed action. The committee believes that the actions requested by the ASA(I&E) would not relieve either the currently bifurcated budget structure [management of the RCWM budget by ASD(NCB) and of the DERP budget by DUSD(I&E)] or the multiple-headed management structure of the current RCWM program, and that it essentially maintains the status quo in the program. The committee does agree with the ASA that whatever the directed action, it needs to be finalized. That is, a separate RCWM budget account should be established and the management of the program unifed. Recommendation 7-5. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment and the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programs and the Army, should proceed immediately to establish a separate budget account for recovered chemical warfare materiel, as directed by the memorandum of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics dated March 1, 2010, and to ensure that funding requirements for the recovered chemical warfare materiel program are included in the FY 2014-2018 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ORGANIZATION OF RCWM ACTIVITIES Chapter 2 described in detail the key players within DOD who are involved to one degree or another with the policy, planning, programming budgeting, and execution functions of the RCWM program. Organizations at every level of DOD 17William R. Brankowitz, Senior Chemical Engineer, Science Applications International Corporation, “The Redstone Arsenal Archival Review,” briefing to the committee on January 18, 2012.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel have a role to play in the program. In some cases multiple Offices at a given level are involved. At the OSD level, two main Offices, ASD(NCB) and DUSD(I&E), work on RCWM policy and funding matters in coordination with the USD(Comptroller) (Figure 7-1). As was briefed to the committee and discussed earlier in this chapter, these Offices have not yet completed the action to establish a separate funding account for RCWM as directed by the USD(AT&L). Within the Department of the Army two secretariat (i.e., policy) Offices—ASA(IE&E) and ASA(AL&T)—have been very involved with the RCWM program. The Army has, to its credit, assigned responsibility to one of these Offices [ASA(IE&E)], which has enabled the Army to begin setting up a long-term organization to lead the program. At the Army staff level, the main player is the ACSIM Office and its feld operating agency, the Installation Management Command (IMCOM). The committee judges that the ACSIM and IMCOM are performing a creditable job of integrating the Army’s cleanup requirements (including DERP and CAMD,D) and presenting them in a defendable POM and budget request. Some remaining duplication of effort on the part of IMCOM’s AEC and of USACE merits the Army’s Finding 7-7. The Army has assigned responsibility for the RCWM program to an appropriate secretariat level organization, the ASA(I&E). The ACSIM is developing a credible program for Army cleanup including RCWM. Recommendation 7-6. The Army should examine the RCWM roles and responsibilities to determine where money can be saved by eliminating duplication of functions, such as those of the Army Environmental Command and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Army Offices executing the RCWM program are shown in Figure 7-2. The committee evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of this “baseline” RCWM organization in light of the charge in the Statement of Task. An important feature of the baseline organization is the provisional RCWM IO, which is composed of representatives from several Army organizations, as well as from appropriate Offices in the Air Force (AFCEE) and the Navy (NAVFAC). A chart of the RCWM Offices, including the provisional IO (in highlighted oval) is provided in Figure 7-2. FIGURE 7-2 RCWM Army execution structure. RDECOM, Research, Development, and Engineering Command. SOURCE: Adapted from the presentation of J.C. King to the committee on September 26, 2011.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel The provisional RCWM IO coordinates emergency responses and planned RCWM projects for DOD in keeping with the Army’s role of RCWM executive agent. The provisional IO has met several times while it awaits formal approval by the Army and DOD. The committee considers the establishment of the provisional IO to be a step in the right direction in the overall management of the program but has some significant concerns with it conceptually: • The provisional IO is temporarily led by a senior civilian at CMA. By being placed at this level in the hierarchy of the Army bureaucracy, subordinated to a deputy assistant secretary of the Army, the provisional IO leader is seriously handicapped when it comes to infuencing decisions and practices of such a disparate group of individuals spread throughout DOD. • The target grade of the provisional IO leader is GS-15, and as of April 12, 2012, the Army was still trying to fll this position. While the grade is senior in the federal civilian General Schedule, the person who flls it will lack the authority and status called for by the scope and visibility of the RCWM program. • The provisional IO is a coordinating body without formal tasking or decision-making authority. Once the larger RCWM projects (see Chapter 5 on Redstone Arsenal) begin in earnest, the provisional IO may be overwhelmed by the responsibility, especially if a series of emergency response events were to coincide with planned projects. Finding 7-8. The provisional RCWM IO leader lacks directive authority, is too low in the Army staff bureaucracy, and is too junior in rank to be held accountable for the execution of the RCWM program. At the major command level, FORSCOM, AMC, and USACE share RCWM program execution roles. Two of their subordinate Offices, ECBC (part of AMC) and CARA (part of FORSCOM) have specialized missions, only some of which are devoted to the RCWM program. Briefings provided to the committee indicate that these two Offices have some overlapping functions that may add to the cost of the program, particularly during emergency response activities. The committee judges, however, that the overlap is not significant enough to warrant a major reorganization of either Office. Finding 7-9. ECBC and CARA perform important activities in support of the RCWM program. In practice, however, they operate with some redundancy in the feld. Recommendation 7-7. The Army should reexamine the roles and responsibilities of Edgewood Chemical Biological Center and the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (Enhanced) Analysis and Remediation Activity with the objective of eliminating any overlapping functions, particularly on emergency response activities. The CMA’s NSCMP and the USACE’s Huntsville Engineering and Support Center are key players for the execution of both emergency responses and planned RCWM projects. As described in Chapter 2, both PMSNCM and USACE have a long history of working separately and together on the program. NSCMP has depth in project planning and technology utilization, while USACE has hands-on technical skills in RCWM project management, construction management, and contract management. NSCMP, which reports to CMA, has several organizational layers (see Figure 2-11). Further, it is more of an operational organization, lacking sufficient program and project management capability to manage large projects such as Redstone Arsenal. The committee is also concerned that CMA may not have a continuing role in the Army once the stockpile program winds down in the next several years, leaving NSCMP without an enduring higher authority to report to. These factors introduce significant risk and uncertainty to the RCWM program, raising the possibility that emergency responses or large planned remediation projects will not have adequate or sustainable management and funding support. Finding 7-10. CMA may be disestablished or downsized in anticipation of the completion of the stockpile program. Recommendation 7-8. The Army should review the long-term requirements for executing the RCWM program with the objective of making organizational changes that will eliminate duplication of effort and ensure sustainable management support. Organizational Alternatives Based on the discussion, findings, and recommendations above, the committee recommends two significant changes to the baseline organization (Figure 7-2) to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the RCWM program and its leadership. Organizational Change One The first change addresses the challenges facing the provisional IO and the accountability and effectiveness of his or her leadership. As concluded in Finding 7-8, the IO and its leadership lack directive authority and are placed too low in the Army organization. As discussed above, an individual at the GS-15 level will not be able to effectively lead the program. The committee concluded that the position should be upgraded and flled by a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) or by a military general Officer. This person would have directive authority over other program participants within the Army and, through agreements
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel with the other Services, within the appropriate RCWM activities of the Air Force and Navy. He or she and would establish, chair, and direct a new OIPT for RCWM. The new RCWM OIPT, composed of higher-level representatives of the organizations in the current provisional RCWM IO along with appropriate members from OSD, would replace the provisional RCWM IO. OIPT members should be fairly senior in their grade, and in their knowledge and experience, and their parent organizations should give them authority to make decisions. One example of a senior executive with tasking authority18 to direct a large, expensive program of national interest, but having potential risk is the executive of the Army’s highly successful chemical stockpile demilitarization program. In this case, the senior executive reported directly to ASA(RDA)—now known as ASA(ALT), the Army’s acquisition executive. The level in the Army organization to which the new SES or general Officer executive reports is important because it affects that individual’s ability to lead the organization. The reporting Office for the new program executive needs to have the authority and breadth of mission commensurate with the responsibilities of the position. The committee evaluated assigning the new SES/general Officer program executive to one of the following: (1) Army major command (such as AMC, FORSCOM, or USACE, (2) Army staff (e.g., ACSIM), or (3) an Army secretariat Office. Alternative 1 would assign the RCWM program executive to an Army MACOM, placing the executive at an operational execution level. Organizations at this level usually lack reach outside their defined mission areas and are weak candidates for an Office expected to have directive authority across the entire Army and to leverage the OSD, the Navy, and the Air Force. For this reason the committee determined that this alternative was not acceptable. Alternative 2, an RCWM program executive reporting to an Army staff organization such as ACSIM, places the official at a higher level in the Army organization. As described in Chapter 2 and above, ACSIM has the greatest Army Staff responsibilities for the RCWM program, being the integrating Office for RCWM CAMD,D funding as well as for other major funding programs such as DERP and Army-installation-related O&M. ACSIM, though, does not have significant Army staff authority over organizations such as AMC or FORSCOM, much less over related Navy or Air Force organizations. Accordingly, the committee does not believe that ACSIM, or any other Army staff organization, has the authority needed for an RCWM program executive to be accountable and effective. Alternative 3, an RCWM program executive reporting to an Army secretariat Office, provides the authority, the breadth of responsibilities, and the stature the program demands. As described in Chapter 2, the Army secretariat is a policy-level set of organizations led by political appointees. They oversee a very broad segment of Army programs and requirements. As the Secretary of the Army has directed, the appropriate Army secretariat Office for leading the RCWM program is the ASA(IE&E). Because of its policy and its directive authority within the Army structure, the committee concluded that ASA(IE&E) was the appropriate reporting Office for the new RCWM program executive. In addition, the visibility of the RCWM program and the risks it entails also demand that the SES or general Officer assigned to lead the program should have a level of authority paralleling that of the deputy assistant secretaries within the ASA(IE&E). Accordingly, the committee determined that it would be best if the RCWM program executive reports directly to the ASA(IE&E). Finding 7-11. To have the organizational reach and authority needed to lead the program effectively, the new SES or general Officer RCWM program executive should report to a high level in the Army. Recommendation 7-9. The Secretary of the Army should establish a new position at the level of the Senior Executive Service (civilian) or a general Officer (military) to lead the RCWM program. The person who flls this position would report directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy and Environment). The Secretary should delegate full responsibility and accountability for RCWM program performance to this person, including for programming, planning, budgeting, and execution and for day-to-day oversight, guidance, management, and direction of the program. Organizational Change Two The second organizational change considered by the committee involved the organizations executing the RCWM program. Consistent with the discussions in the preceding section, the committee was very concerned about the current placement of NSCMP within the Army structure. The committee evaluated several alternatives for the long-term reporting relationship for NSCMP. The alternative reporting Offices that the committee considered are as follows: (1) Retain NSCMP with CMA, (2) Assign NSCMP to the USACE Huntsville Engineering and Support Center, (3) Assign it to ECBC, (4) Assign it to the Army AEC, (5) Assign it to DASA(ESOH), or (6) Assign it to the ACWA Program Executive Office. 18Tasking authority is the authority of the RCWM program executive with respect to day-to-day oversight, guidance, management, and direction of the program and to budget planning and allocation, and program and budget execution and performance by the RCWM commands, agencies, and organizations.
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel The committee carefully selected a set of criteria to evaluate the six alternatives: (A) Ease of implementation, (B) Functional organization (size, budget, scalability), (C) efficiency, (D) Compatibility with organization’s mission, (E) Technical expertise, (F) Accountability through clean lines of authority, (3) Longevity of program (durable chain of command). In applying the above criteria, the committee concluded that alternatives 4, 5 and 6 rated poorly against criteria A-D: • Alternative 4, assign to AEC, was eliminated because AEC’s mission did not line up well with NSCMP and would not result in improved efficiency. • Alternative 5, assign to DASA(ESOH), was eliminated because the Army Secretariat’s role is predominately policy making, while that of NSCMP is operational. • While ACWA (alternative 6) has significant technical expertise, the committee eliminated this alternative because of a congressional mandate that placed ACWA under the DOD and the CMA under the Army’s chain of command. ACWA is expected to be disestablished at the completion of its program, leaving no long-term reporting Office for NSCMP. Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 were more suitable than 4, 5, and 6: • Alternative 1, retain NSCMP with CMA, rated positively with respect to criteria A, D, and F. The committee believed, however, that the status quo would not improve efficiency or allow NSCMP to manage a large RCMA program. And, as stated in the last section, CMA is expected to be phased out as the stockpile program winds down, leaving NSCMP without a long-term higher headquarters to report to (criterion G). Undoubtedly, the staff of NSCMP has the relevant chemical technical skills (criterion E). However, other technical skills required for non-stockpile operations, such as civil engineering, soil mechanics, and explosives, must be tasked to other organizations. By definition, the NSCMP could exist for a long time, but its long-term suitability as a relatively small, highly specialized operational element without a functioning, higher-level headquarters and its dependence on other organizations is questionable. The committee concluded that this alternative is weak with respect to the overall criteria. • Alternative 2 was realignment of the NSCMP with another key Army organization that is required to accomplish RCWM neutralization, such as USACE. In this arrangement, NSCMP could provide chemical expertise and program planning and management skills to that organization. • Alternative 3, assignment to ECBC, was viewed positively with respect to criteria D, E, and G but was viewed negatively for criteria B (scalability), C (improved efficiency) and F (accountability). In the committee’s judgment, assigning NSCMP to ECBC did not result in sets of skills and responsibilities needed to effectively execute the RCWM program. The committee determined that alternative 2—assign NSCMP to USACE Huntsville Engineering and Support Center—would result in the best long-term ft for NSCMP. This alternative was rated negative only against criterion A (ease of implementation) but positive for criteria B, C, D, F, and G (criterion E was rated no change to negative). In the committee’s judgment, this alternative would provide continuity of program execution and cost-effective synergy between NSCMP and USACE and would mean an enduring reporting organizational relationship for NSCMP. Finding 7-12. The Huntsville Center of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would be the best long-term ft for a realigned NSCMP. Recommendation 7-10. The Army should realign the non-stockpile chemical materiel program from the Army Materiel Command/Chemical Materials Agency to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Huntsville Engineering and Support Center. Recommendation 7-11. To provide for an effective transition, the new program executive should enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Army Materiel Command/ Chemical Materials Agency outlining the reporting ladder and transition plan for the realignment of the non-stockpile chemical materiel program. Recommended Path Forward The committee recommends that OSD and the Army review and implement the funding and organizational changes recommended in this chapter in a timely manner. Many of the findings listed above have been known within OSD and the Army for several years, lacking only the completion of the relevant plans, budgets, inventories, and organizational assignments. The committee believes that the assignment of an SES civilian or general officer RCWM program executive with full authority and responsibility for planning, programming, budgeting, and executing the RCWM program, who has direct access to and visibility at the highest levels of the Department of the Army and the OSD secretariat is absolutely
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel critical to the future success of the program. It will be vital for the effectiveness of the program executive and the program itself that the executive possess the authority and ability to exercise oversight and management and to provide fiscal and operational guidance and direction to the operating elements of the RCWM and control the funds for RCWM both during development and defense of the program plan and budget and during the execution of the annual program. The committee’s recommendations for RCWM program and budget planning are illustrated in Figure 7-3. Owing to the timing of the DOD POM and budget cycles, the committee urges OSD to establish a separate program account for the RCWM program and include the currently estimated funding levels in the FY2014-2018 POM. This would require the Army to program RCWM requirements and OSD to establish the accounts in the summer of 2012 (see Recommendation 7-5). To allow OSD to formulate and defend long-term RCWM program requirements, the Army’s provisional RCWM IO must complete the inventory of known and suspected buried chemical weapons as a first order of business (see Recommendation 7-4a) and submit it to OSD as soon as possible with a target at the end of FY2013. This inventory is a critical element in alerting the administration and the Congress FIGURE 7-3 RCWM program future funding. While the destruction of stockpile chemical weapons nears completion in the current decade, the challenges of the RCWM program continue to increase as more is learned about the magnitude of the problem. The committee is very concerned that the RCWM program lacks the authority, leadership, and accountability demanded by the size, visibility, and risk of the program. The committee recommends that the Army detail a strong SES or general Officer to this program immediately in FY2012 and continue to select strong SES or general Officer leaders for the positions thereafter. The Secretary of the Army should direct that this new RCWM program executive report directly to ASA(IE&E) and provide the authority needed for the program executive to discharge his or her responsibilities effectively (Recommendation 7-9). The committee’s recommended structure for Army RCWM organization and authority is shown in Figure 7-4, which incorporates the recommended Program Executive with the general-Officer-level RCWM program executive reporting to the ASA(IE&E); the RCWM OIPT under the direction of the RCWM program executive; the tasking
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel authority of the RCWM program executive; and the realignment of NSCMP under the USACE Huntsville Engineering and Support Center. The fgure also delineates the lines of command, tasking authority, and coordination among the various elements of the program. FIGURE 7-4 Army RCWM organization and authority recommended by committee. NOTE: Tasking authority is the authority of the RCWM Program Executive with respect to day-to-day oversight, guidance, management, and direction of Army elements on all RCWM matters, including program and budget planning and allocation, and program and budget execution and performance by the RCWM commands, agencies, and organizations. Once assigned, the RCWM program executive should, at a minimum, undertake the following: • Form and chair a new RCWM OIPT composed of decision makers from key organizations involved in the policy, programming, and execution of the RCWM program. The new RCWM OIPT, composed of higher level representatives of the organizations in the current provisional RCWM IO along with appropriate members from OSD, would replace the provisional RCWM IO. OIPT members should be fairly senior in grade, knowledge and experience, and should be given the authority to make decisions by their parent organizations. • Develop an integrated DOD priority list of potential RCWM remediation sites for approval by the Secretary of the Army. • Develop and execute a coordinated 5-yr program plan and budget estimate for remediation of the identified priority RCWM sites. • Review requirements for RCWM emergency response functions and establish a program plan and budget to support the required capabilities. —Required RCWM emergency response infrastructure —Research and development, technology, procurement —Known remediation support —Response to emergency response contingencies • Develop and defend in the FY2014-2018 POM/budget execution submission a budget program and plan for RCWM remediation that will, assuming approval and funding by Congress, support execution of the approved RCWM plan and support maintenance of an RCWM emergency response infrastructure. As the new RCWM program executive position and the recommended supporting OIPT are constituted, the committee
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Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel recommends that the Army begin transitioning the alignment of PMNSCM from AMC/CMA to the USACE Huntsville Center. Recommendation 7-12. As a necessary first step, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environ- ment, the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programs, and the Secretary of the Army should proceed immediately to implement the guidelines contained in the March 1, 2010, memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.