7

The Path Forward: Recommendations for Policy, Funding, and Organization

INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the introduction to this report and the preceding chapters, the Department of Defense (DOD) mission for the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions and of non-stockpile chemical materiel, for both of which the Army is executive agent (EA), is becoming more complex and longer lasting than had once been envisioned as the program for the remediation of recovered buried chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) transitions into a significant large-scale program that greatly exceeds the scope of the existing smaller-scale munitions and hazardous substance cleanup programs on active and former defense sites and ranges.

The existing structure utilized by the Army, in its capacity as EA for the destruction of non-stockpile chemical materiel, must now be reconfigured to prepare for the remediation of RCWM at over 250 sites in the United States. Different organizations design and acquire the specialized chemical warfare materiel (CWM) destruction and related equipment, other organizations operate the equipment, another organization transports the equipment and personnel, and various organizations within the Army Corps of Engineers and the offices of the Secretary of the Army and of the Secretary of Defense play significant roles in setting policy, obtaining federal funding from three separate budget accounts, prioritizing sites for remediation, and participating in state decisions on selecting remedies.

Since May 2005 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [USD(AT&L)] has been considering assigning the responsibility for the recovery and destruction of buried CWM in the United States to the Secretary of the Army and consolidating the characterization, recovery, and destruction responsibilities for buried CWM under a single organization within the Army.1

In response to the Army’s request to the National Research Council to suggest ways to improve coordination among organizations involved in conducting investigations, recoveries, and cleanup activities for non-stockpile CWM, the committee received a number of briefings and reviewed a number of planning documents related to the proposed policy planning, organization, and funding for the RCWM program. Chapter 2 traced the history of remediation of chemical warfare materiel up to July 2007. This chapter reviews evolving DOD and Army policy and their organization and programs for the recovery and destruction of buried CWM and makes recommendations that, if adopted, should lead to improvement.

CHRONOLOGY, 2007 THROUGH THE PRESENT

RCWM Program Implementation Plan of 2007

On September 20, 2007, the Secretary of the Army responded to the tasking in the USD(AT&L)’s May 2005 memorandum (see Chapter 2). The Secretary’s report “Recovered Chemical Warfare Material (RCWM) Program Implementation Plan (Recovery and Destruction of Buried Chemical Warfare Material), July 2007” (DOD, 2007), hereinafter referred to as RCWM Plan 2007, is the only RCWM document provided to the committee that has been formally approved by the Secretary of the Army. As such, it establishes an authoritative baseline for development and implementation of the RCWM program unless it is superseded by a subsequent plan approved by the Secretary.

In his memorandum forwarding the plan, the Secretary expressed the belief that consolidating responsibilities for the program under the Army would provide for consistency in approach, avoid the duplication of programs, and make more efficient use of limited resources. The Secretary also expressed the view that “while the enclosed plan addresses preliminary implementation procedures, additional coordination will be required within DOD and among the Services

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1USD(AT&L) Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, “Designation of Responsibility for Recovery and Destruction of Buried Chemical Warfare Material (CWM),” May 3, 2005.



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7 The Path Forward: Recommendations for Policy, Funding, and Organization INTRODUCTION In response to the Army’s request to the National Research Council to suggest ways to improve coordination among As discussed in the introduction to this report and the organizations involved in conducting investigations, recov- preceding chapters, the Department of Defense (DOD) eries, and cleanup activities for non-stockpile CWM, the mission for the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of lethal committee received a number of briefings and reviewed chemical agents and munitions and of non-stockpile chemi- a number of planning documents related to the proposed cal materiel, for both of which the Army is executive agent policy planning, organization, and funding for the RCWM (EA), is becoming more complex and longer lasting than program. Chapter 2 traced the history of remediation of had once been envisioned as the program for the remedia- chemical warfare materiel up to July 2007. This chapter tion of recovered buried chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) reviews evolving DOD and Army policy and their organiza- transitions into a significant large-scale program that greatly tion and programs for the recovery and destruction of buried exceeds the scope of the existing smaller-scale munitions and CWM and makes recommendations that, if adopted, should hazardous substance cleanup programs on active and former lead to improvement. defense sites and ranges. The existing structure utilized by the Army, in its capacity CHRONOLOGY, 2007 THROUGH THE PRESENT as EA for the destruction of non-stockpile chemical materiel, must now be reconfigured to prepare for the remediation RCWM Program Implementation Plan of 2007 of RCWM at over 250 sites in the United States. Different organizations design and acquire the specialized chemical On September 20, 2007, the Secretary of the Army warfare materiel (CWM) destruction and related equipment, responded to the tasking in the USD(AT&L)’s May 2005 other organizations operate the equipment, another organi- m emorandum (see Chapter 2). The Secretary’s report zation transports the equipment and personnel, and various “Recovered Chemical Warfare Material (RCWM) Program organizations within the Army Corps of Engineers and the Implementation Plan (Recovery and Destruction of Buried offices of the Secretary of the Army and of the Secretary of Chemical Warfare Material), July 2007” (DOD, 2007), here- Defense play significant roles in setting policy, obtaining fed- inafter referred to as RCWM Plan 2007, is the only RCWM eral funding from three separate budget accounts, prioritizing document provided to the committee that has been formally sites for remediation, and participating in state decisions on approved by the Secretary of the Army. As such, it establishes selecting remedies. an authoritative baseline for development and implementa- Since May 2005 the Under Secretary of Defense for tion of the RCWM program unless it is superseded by a Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [USD(AT&L)] has subsequent plan approved by the Secretary. been considering assigning the responsibility for the recov- In his memorandum forwarding the plan, the Secretary ery and destruction of buried CWM in the United States to expressed the belief that consolidating responsibilities for the Secretary of the Army and consolidating the character- the program under the Army would provide for consistency ization, recovery, and destruction responsibilities for buried in approach, avoid the duplication of programs, and make CWM under a single organization within the Army.1 more efficient use of limited resources. The Secretary also expressed the view that “while the enclosed plan addresses 1USD(AT&L) Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, “Designation of preliminary implementation procedures, additional coordi- Responsibility for Recovery and Destruction of Buried Chemical Warfare nation will be required within DOD and among the Services Material (CWM),” May 3, 2005. 82

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83 THE PATH FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATION to determine precise resource requirements and finalize roles discovery and assessment of munitions with unknown and responsibilities.”2 liquid fills; UXO determined to be chemical-filled Although the USD’s tasking was specific to the recovery munitions; CWM commingled with conventional and destruction of buried CWM, the Secretary of the Army’s munitions; and providing an approach for addressing report addressed all situations involving the recovery and CWM on operational ranges and other areas that are destruction of buried CWM, regardless of the circumstances outside the DERP. of recovery, and expanded the scope of the plan to provide a c. Overall, the RCWM program should be managed as comprehensive approach for addressing RCWM, including part of DOD’s Installations and Environment (I&E) unexploded ordnance and other materials of interest, such as program, not as an acquisition program. In address- munitions that have unknown liquid fill and chemical agent ing CWM recovered under a variety of situations identification sets (CAIS). (e.g., during munitions response on active, BRAC, The plan was developed by a buried CWM integrated and FUDS properties, during range clearance activi- product team (IPT) and an overarching integrated product ties, and during explosives and munitions emergen- team (OIPT) formed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of cies) multiple funding sources might be involved. the Army (Environment, Safety and Occupational Health d. Planning and management of CWM responses should [DASA(ESOH)]) with representatives from his office, the remain integrated with the Service I&E programs, not Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Elimination of managed as a separate program. Chemical Weapons) [DASA(ECW)], the Assistant Chief of e. RCWM should be handled as nonsurety material. Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), the Army G-3, f. The roles and responsibilities for compliance with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Chemical the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) were not Materials Agency (CMA), CMA’s Non-Stockpile Chemical expected to change should the Army be made EA for Materiel Project (NSCMP), and the U.S. Army’s Forces the RCWM program. Command (FORSCOM) 20th Support Command (CBRNE). g. NSCMP’s equipment and associated personnel for It states, in part, as follows: assessment of recovered munitions and destruction of RCWM personnel should transition from the During this plan’s development the need for an Executive NSCMP-managed acquisition-related program to an Agent (EA) for the RCWM program was made clear. Mul- Army operational activity. tiple agencies are currently responsible for various aspects of h. Any estimate for the RCWM program’s total esti- a response that involves or potentially involves CWM (e.g., mated cost should include specific funds to support: planning, budgeting, execution). The agencies have inde- pendently developed costs for various aspects of the RCWM • SCMP’s sustainment of operational crews, staff, N program. These estimates have been highly variable. . . . An and equipment. integrated approach is needed to address these issues. The • esearch, development, test and evaluation R designation of an EA with responsibility for ensuring an inte- ( RDT&E) required to support the RCWM grated consistent approach to the oversight and management program. of all aspects of the RCWM is recommended. • ecessary archival research. N • he U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) T The IPT made almost a dozen determinations: 20th Support Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives) a. The assignment of EA responsibility to the Army (CBRNE)’s two chemical battalions [Technical would provide the DOD with visibility for total Escort (TE)] (formerly U.S. Army Material Com- requirements and an integrated consistent approach mand’s Technical Escort Unit) support of explo- for addressing (1) the RCWM aspects of responses sive and munitions emergency responses. conducted at DERP-funded munitions response sites (MRS); (2) range clearance and other activities con- i. Funding and management of CWM responses should ducted on operational ranges where CWM material be consolidated to the extent practical. However, sep- is known or suspected to be present, or where it is arate funding—a separate appropriation—should be encountered; and (3) explosives or munitions emer- established for those activities collectively referred gency response where a munition with an unknown to as emergency. liquid fill or CWM is encountered. j. I&E programs of the respective Services should b. The scope of the EA’s responsibilities and the continue to prioritize, plan, and fund CWM response RCWM program should be broadened to make the actions, less assessment and destruction; and should EA responsible for the support of all circumstances coordinate with the EA to obtain prioritization based that could involve RCWM including: addressing the on Defense-wide needs and to ensure that assessment and destruction requirements can be met. 2RCWM Plan 2007.

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84 REMEDIATION OF BURIED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL k. If a separate appropriation is not established, the costs tance of working with environmental regulators and safety associated with these functions should be absorbed officials and of implementing a public outreach program by the I&E programs of the respective Services. during response activities. The draft regulation also provided However, due to the complexity of the requirements, information on compliance with CWC requirements. The the uncertainties of costs at specific installations, the draft regulation did not, however, contain new policy guid- high-level of public concern, and the risk to the I&E ance or assign responsibilities for the program. programs of the respective Services, the best approach On March 1, 2010, the USD(AT&L) formally designated was believed to be a separate appropriation.3 the Secretary of the Army as EA for the RCWM program (see Appendix C). In 2011 the Army established a provi- The OIPT recommended as follows: sional RCWM integrating office to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize the DOD’s RCWM response program and related activities.5 a. The Secretary of Defense [should] assign the Sec- retary of the Army as the EA for the DOD RCWM On September 19, 2011, a draft document prepared by program, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy b. The Secretary of the Army [should]: and Environment ASA(IE&E) was issued as Secretary of the Army memorandum “Delegation of Executive Agent • elegate the EA responsibilities to the Assistant D Responsibilities for DOD’s Recovered Chemical Warfare Secretary of the Army for Installations and Envi- Materiel Program (RCWM-P).” This draft document, if ronment [ASA(I&E)], allowing for further delega- implemented, would transfer EA responsibility for the tion authority as ASA(I&E) determines necessary. program for RCWM from ASA(ALT) to ASA(IE&E). This • esignate the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers D essentially would make the ASA(IE&E) the line manager in (USACE) as the RCWM Response Executor. charge of the program. Neither a detailed program manage- ment plan nor a program organization was presented to the study committee during its review.6 c. The EA [should] establish an RCWM Program Man- agement Office (PMO) to manage the resources and On April 17, 2012, the ASA(I&E) sent a memorandum to develop policy necessary to respond to and destroy the USD(AT&L) requesting that the USD either reevaluate any RCWM, and guide the transition process the direction provided in its memorandum (Appendix C) d. U.S. Army CMA [should] support development relating to the source of funding for the RCWM program of a separate appropriation to fund the emergency or finalize the directed action. The letter recommended that response functions.4 a separate nonacquisition program element be established under the Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal, Defense The RCWM Plan 2007 has provided the basis for Army (CAMD,D) budget account to make transparent the costs and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) changes to associated with the RCWM program and that OSD iden- the RCWM program. Approval of the Secretary’s report and tify a near- and long-term funding profile for the program development and approval of a final implementation plan for from DOD’s Total Obligation Authority. The letter further the recovery and destruction of RCWM have been the subject requested that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for of a continuing series of Army and OSD staff actions since Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense [ASD(NCB)] the report was submitted to the Deputy Under Secretary of programs continue to manage the CAMD,D account, includ- Defense for Installations and Environment [DUSD(I&E)] on ing the new program element for the RCWM program, with September 20, 2007. the DUSD(I&E) providing general environmental policy A step forward in this regard occurred on April 1, 2009, oversight (U.S. Army, 2012). when DASA(ESOH) recommended the immediate imple- Finding 7-1. As of April 30, 2012, neither the respon- mentation of a draft Army regulation that provided interim guidance for chemical warfare materiel response and related sible officials within OSD—namely, the DUSD(I&E), the activities (U.S. Army, 2009a). The interim guidance pre- Office of the OSD comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary scribed Department of the Army procedures to be taken of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense) should CWM or munitions with an unknown liquid fill be [ASD(NCB)]—nor the responsible officials in the Army had encountered either during a planned CWM response or dur- completed the task assigned to them by the USD(AT&L) ing another environmental response or during construction memorandum of March 1, 2010. or other activities. It included procedures for the protection of human health and the environment and stressed the impor- 5J.C. King, Assistant for Munitions and Chemical Matters, Office of the DASA-ESOH, “The Army RCWM Program: A Policy Perspective,” 3Adapted from paragraph 4, Executive Summary to RCWM Plan 2007, presentation to the committee on September 29, 2011. 6Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, pp. ii-iv. 4Adapted from paragraph 5, Executive Summary to RCWM Plan 2007, Energy and Environment, draft document dated September 19, 2011, pro - p. iv. vided to the committee by J.C. King on September 27, 2011.

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85 THE PATH FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATION Recommendation 7-1. The Army should formally approve, of RCWM, the sustainment of crews and equipment and the maintenance of related equipment will be the Chemical then submit, a final implementation plan for the recovery and Agent and Munitions Destruction, Defense (CAMD,D) destruction of buried chemical warfare materiel as required appropriation pending establishment of a single, focused by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technol- RCWM program account. Once implemented and funded, ogy and Logistics in its memorandum of March 1, 2010. the RCWM program account will be resourced from the DOD’s Total Obligation Authority and will be separate and distinct from the CAMD,D account used for other portions The Army’s RCWM Implementation of Plan 2010 of the chemical demilitarization program. The USD(AT&L) memorandum “Final Implementation • hose functions and activities not related to the assessment T Plan for the Recovery and Destruction of Buried Chemical of RCWM and munitions and other materials of interest Warfare Materiel, March 1, 2010” (Appendix C) designated and the destruction of RCWM will be funded by the DERP the Secretary of the Army as the DOD EA for the destruc- accounts or other appropriations normally available to fund such functions and activities. tion of non-stockpile chemical warfare munitions, agents, • Once established, the RCWM program account will fund: and by-products. The memorandum delineated the Secretary’s authorities a) the assessment of RCWM to determine the most likely and responsibilities as EA as including the following func- chemical agent fill; tion among others: b) the assessment of munitions and other materials of interest to determine whether they are RCWM; (a) maintaining DOD’s inventory of locations known or c) destruction of RCWM; suspected to contain CWM and chemical agent identifica- d) the sustainment and maintenance of required crews tions sets (CAIS); (b) the execution of CWM response or and equipment; and other actions, such as range clearance activities, needed to e) program management and other necessary functions address these sites; (c) supporting explosives or munitions of the EA. emergency response that may involve recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) or CAIS; (d) addressing, regard- Finally, the memorandum requested that the Army, within less of the circumstances under which found, RCWM and 180 days of receipt of the memorandum, develop and submit munitions and other materials that have an unknown liquid or to the USD(AT&L) timelines and milestones that are coor- chemical agent fill (munitions and materials of interest); (e) dinated with DUSD(I&E), ASD(NCB), and the other DOD planning, programming and budgeting for the EA functions components at least for the following activities: for the assessment of the fill of RCWM and munitions and other materials of interest, the destruction of RCWM, and • elineate program management roles and responsibilities those functions and equipment related to such assessment D and destruction; and (f) integrating and coordinating the to ensure seamless work flow and funding at the sites cur- RCWM Program with all DOD Components. Collectively, rently identified as being CWM response sites; • etermine the funding required for support of the RCWM these and related functions make up the RCWM Program. D program for consideration in the planning, programming, and budgeting process for the fiscal year 2012 through Quoting almost directly from the RCWM Implementation 2017 Program Objective Memorandum; and Plan, 2007, and clearly reflecting the intent of that plan, the • rovide technical advice and support the planning, pro- P USD(AT&L) memorandum observed: gramming, and budgeting process for environmental re- sponse actions that may involve RCWM under the DERP. This EA designation ensures a comprehensive approach for addressing RCWM and determining whether munitions and other materials of interest are RCWM. Under the EA Army Role and Responsibilities determination, the Army’s execution of the RCWM program will provide consistency, avoid duplication, and provide for September 19, 2011, Draft the efficient use of those limited resources that support the assessment of liquid and chemical agent fills and the destruc- On September 27, 2011, at its first meeting, the com- tion of RCWM. mittee was briefed on a draft memorandum prepared by ASA(IE&E) for approval by the Secretary of the Army.7 This The memorandum directed the DUSD(I&E) and the draft memo acknowledged the Secretary’s designation as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination the DOD RCWM EA by the USD(AT&L) memorandum of with the Army and the ASD(NCB), to determine an appro- March 1, 2010. The draft memo delegated the Secretary’s EA priate funding profile for a new RCWM account that would responsibilities, functions, and authorities to ASA(IE&E), include the following: with further delegation authorized as the ASA(IE&E) might direct. The Secretary’s memorandum also stated that the • he funding source for the assessment of RCWM and T munitions and other materials of interest, the destruction 7Ibid.

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86 REMEDIATION OF BURIED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL ASA(ALT) would remain responsible for the chemical the RCWM Plan 2007. The draft enclosure to the Secretary’s demilitarization program except that for demilitarization and memorandum provided general scope and responsibilities of any related functions required to support the DOD’s RCWM the proposed provisional RCWM IO. The memorandum did program. The ASA(IE&E) was also given responsibility for not propose who should chair the IO. safeguarding RCWM involved in an explosives or munitions During the course of the committee’s review, CMA gave the committee the draft of a charter for the IO.9 Under this emergency or recovered during planned munitions responses or range clearance activities. The memorandum established charter, CMA is the acting chair of the provisional RCWM supporting roles in the RCWM program for FORSCOM, the IO on behalf of DASA(ESOH). The RCWM IO is composed Army Materiel Command, and USACE, as agreed to by the of representatives of relevant Army organizations, including ASA(IE&E). AMC, CMA, ACSIM, USACE, the 20th Support Command, An accompanying draft enclosure to the Secretary’s mem- the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the Air Force orandum8 further delegated EA authority to DASA(ESOH), Center for Engineering and the Environment, and critical delineated its roles and responsibilities and those of sup- subdivisions of those organizations such as NSCMP, ECBC, ported DOD components and supporting elements of the the Chemical Biological Applications and Risk Reduction Army Secretariat and Staff, major commands, agencies, Agency (CARA), the U.S. Army Engineering and Support and offices. The assigned responsibilities of DASA(ESOH) Center/Chemical Warfare Design Center (in Huntsville, Ala- included these: bama), and the U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety. • Providing policy and guidance for the DOD RCWM The committee notes that the IO is, as its name implies, program; operating on an interim basis, awaiting formal approval by • Providing centralized oversight of the RCWM higher Army and DOD authorities. The provisional IO plays program; an important role in the RCWM program by coordinating • Ensuring cross-functional coordination among the planning, programming, and remediation requirements and Services’ environmental program managers and the resolving issues across DOD. The committee believes, how- Army program managers; ever, that despite its important role, the provisional IO lacks • Ensuring cost-effective and efficient use of limited the authority required to execute its mission. resources that support the RCWM program; • Finding 7-2. As an advisory and coordinating office, the Developing and compiling funding requirements for support of the program using input from the military provisional IO has no authority to direct any of its members services, environmental program managers, Army to comply with its decisions. program execution managers, and the Army Materiel Command; FUNDING • Establishing a provisional RCWM Integrating Office; • Ensuring the development and maintenance of an Background inventory of known or suspected CWM and CAIS sites and other locations of potential interest; As discussed in Chapter 2, Congress authorizes programs • Approving an annual work plan for the RCWM pro- and appropriates funding for the express purpose of imple- gram, including CWM responses and other planned menting those programs consistent with its direction. In activities—for example, range clearance activities most cases, a program’s funding is directed to be expended developed by the provisional RCWM Integrating solely for that program—that is, it must not be mixed with Office in coordination with the military departments’ funding for any other program (commingled). In the case of environmental program managers, the Army’s pro- the RCWM program, while chemical weapons munitions gram execution managers, and the Army Materiel remediation is funded separately by CAMD,D, two other Command); and important funding programs frequently come into play dur- • Providing oversight of activities of the Center for ing some aspects or phases of the overall effort: DERP and Treaty Implementation and Compliance to ensure Operations and Maintenance (O&M). compliance with the CWC. Congressionally mandated restrictions on the use of these funding programs require the Executive Branch (primarily DOD) to carefully coordinate and account for their use. The Provisional RCWM IO fact that RCWM might be buried along with conventional The assigned roles, responsibilities, and guidance, includ- munitions at many sites means that properly accounting for ing the establishment of the provisional RCWM Integrating Office (RCWM IO), conformed to the guidance outlined in 9From a draft of proposed charter for the establishment of an RCWM IO provided to the committee via e-mail from W.R. Betts III to Nancy Schulte, 8Ibid. January 13, 2012.

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87 THE PATH FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATION the activities and funding in each case can become costly and DERP funding can no longer be used, and CAMD,D fund- complex. An additional complication for RCWM require- ing must be used for the assessment and remediation of the ments is that the CAMD,D funding program was established RCWM. The committee notes, as described in Chapter 2, primarily to destroy large quantities of stockpiled chemical that according to Army guidance, funds appropriated for weapons, and funding for RCWM remediation accounts the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP) in the for only a small portion of that effort. Once the stockpiled Environmental Restoration, Army (ER,A) budget account weapons have been destroyed and their demilitarization sites can be used to conduct identification, investigation, removal, remediated, CAMD,D funding could be eliminated, making a nd remedial actions to address unexploded ordnance future funding for RCWM problematic. (UXO), discarded military munitions (DMM), and munitions The CAMD,D budget account, as discussed in Chapter 2, constituents. By definition under this guidance, DMM and includes funding for two major defense acquisition programs military munitions include chemical munitions and materiel. (MDAPs): (1) Chemical Demilitarization—U.S. Army CMA The committee notes further that under Section 2703 of and (2) Chemical Demilitarization—Assembled Chemi- Title 10, U.S. Code, all funds appropriated to carry out the cal Weapons Alternatives (ACWA). The CMA MDAP for Secretary of Defense’s function relating to environmental which the Army is EA includes funding for the Chemical response are appropriated to what is essentially a transfer Stockpile Elimination (CSE) project, the Chemical Stockpile account, ER,A, and are subsequently transferred to an Emergency Preparedness Project (CSEPP), and the NSCMP. appropriate account (e.g., O&M, Military Construction) for CMA has completed the destruction of the 90 percent of conducting environmental responses. It seems, then, to the the U.S. stockpile for which it is responsible and is remedi - committee that the various budget accounts currently used ating the demilitarization sites themselves. As those activi- by the Army or OSD for funding RCWM activities could be ties are completed, the CMA’s responsibilities are expected more flexible. to lessen to those necessary to support stockpile storage O&M funding, in the context of RCWM, is used for and CSEPP at the two ACWA sites and sustainment of the the O&M of active training ranges for each of the military NSCMP. The CAMD,D funding is anticipated to be reduced services, including environmental restoration of the ranges. accordingly. Like funding for DERP, O&M funding is not used to reme- As the ACWA program and remediation of the ACWA diate RCWM on active training ranges. Rather, CAMD,D demilitarization sites is completed in the 2021 to 2023 time funding is employed. frame, the need for funds for CAMD,D could be eliminated entirely.10 As is the case for other budget elements, the Finding 7-3. The committee could not ascertain whether the President’s budget request for the project is authorized and current practice of prohibiting the use of DERP and O&M appropriated annually by Congress. The President’s budget funding for RCWM assessment and remediation is based on request includes annual budget estimates for the following a statute or on DOD policy. 4 years, and, when available, the estimated cost to complete the project. All are subject to change. Annual funding for the T he operational limitations imposed by the Army’s program beyond 2017 has not been determined; however, practice of allowing only funds from the CAMD,D budget the cost and time to complete the program were recently account to be used for the processing and remediation of estimated to exceed the previous estimate by about $2 bil- RCWM and the inability of the OSD staff and the Army lion and 2 years.11 to reach agreement on the establishment of a separate DERP is a very broad program encompassing funding for budget account for RCWM remediation, as directed by the early site investigation and characterization through funding USD(AT&L) (DOD, 2010), support the committee’s consen- for remediation, including, by definition, chemical warfare sus view that the Secretary of Defense should seek a legal agents and chemical munitions. DERP funds are commonly interpretation of the current practice of using only CAMD,D used for conventional munitions cleanup at RCWM sites, funding and prohibiting the use of DERP and O&M fund- comprising site characterization and remediation up to the ing for RCWM assessment and remediation. If the legal point of identifying the RCWM munitions. According to a interpretation affirms the current practice, the consensus of briefing from DUSD(I&E),12 once an RCWM is discovered, the committee is that the Secretary should consider seeking legislative relief from these restrictions. 10FY 2013 Budget Estimate, CAMD,D, OSD Comptroller, February Recommendation 7-2. The Secretary of Defense should 2012. seek a legal interpretation of the perceived prohibition on 11U.S. Army Element, ACWA, press release “Department of Defense ap - s pending Defense Environmental Restoration Program proves new cost and schedule estimates for chemical weapons destruction (DERP) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to plants.” Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., April 17, 2012. 12Deborah A. Morefield, Manager, DERP, Environmental Management, assess and remediate recovered chemical warfare materiel. Office of the DUSD(I&E), Remediation Operations from an OSD Instal- If it is determined that only Chemical Agents and Munitions lations and Environment Perspective, presentation to the committee on Destruction, Defense (CAMD,D) funds may be used for November 1, 2011.

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88 REMEDIATION OF BURIED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL = Command = Funding SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASD(NCB) USD(AT&L) DUSD(I&E) SECRETARY OF ASA(ALT) ASA(IE&E) THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, DASA(ESOH) DASA(ECW) ARMY FORSCOM ACSIM/IMCOM AMC 20th Support CMA Command NSCMP CARA USACE USAEC FIGURE 7-1 Current organization for policy, oversight, and funding for RCWM. USAEC, U.S. Army Environmental Command. FIGURE 7-1 Current organization for policy, oversight, and funding.eps RCWM assessment and remediation, the Secretary should enduring RCWM remediation mission need to be addressed seek legislative authority to change this stricture in order by establishing an enduring funding stream that is integrated to permit the commingling of DERP, O&M, and CAMD,D with other long-term environmental remediation programs. funding for these RCWM activities. The CAMD,D appropriation, being tied to the completion of the stockpile program, is a problematic long-term source Depending on how and where CWM is discovered, of funding for RCWM requirements, including the stock- authority and funding for RCWM activities emanate from pile’s derivative NSCMP. Because the stockpile program is two OSD offices and two Army Secretariat offices. The two expected to complete its mission by 2021-2023, that portion OSD offices are ASD(NCB) for CAMD,D and DUSD(I&E) of the CAMD,D funding that supports RCWM requirements for DERP and O&M. The two Army Secretariat offices are will need to be retained and moved to other enduring fund- ASA(ALT) for CAMD,D and ASA(IE&E) for DERP and ing streams. O&M, as shown in Figure 7-1. Thus, there is no single advo- Finding 7-4. Authority and funding for RCWM activities, cate for the program. In addition, at present the NSCMP must compete annually for funding from the CAMD,D budget depending on how and where CWM is discovered, emanate account, which is also the source of funding for the much from two OSD offices and two Army Secretariat offices. larger chemical stockpile destruction program. Not only have There is no single proponent for the program. In addition, estimates for completing the stockpile program been pushed the non-stockpile chemical materiel program is a derivative out to 2021-2023, they have also increased significantly.13 of the stockpile program which is expected to complete its As the stockpile program nears completion, the CAMD,D mission by 2020. A portion of CWM’s funding and oversight account can be expected to come under increasing pressure will need to be retained and moved to other enduring fund- for significant reductions, if not total elimination. The long- ing programs. term funding and oversight issues inherent in a growing and Recommendation 7-3. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army should each select a single office to 13U.S. Army Element, ACWA, press release “Department of Defense ap - champion and fund remediation of all RCWM. proves new cost and schedule estimates for chemical weapons destruction plants.” Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., April 17, 2012.

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89 THE PATH FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATION As previously noted, on March 1, 2010, the USD(AT&L) —P rogram startup (including training staff and approved and sent to the Secretary of the Army a memo- developing appropriate cost estimate tools) was randum designating the Secretary of the Army as the DOD e stimated at approximately $10 million for EA for the destruction of non-stockpile chemical warfare assessment and destruction, $36 million per year munitions, agents, and by-products. The Army has not yet for emergency response functions, $5 million submitted a final implementation plan for the recovery and per year for RDT&E, and $10 million for archi- destruction of buried chemical warfare materiel as required val research over 4 years. The total emergency by that memorandum. r esponse cost is $41 million per year, which reaches $43.5 million per year during the first 4 years when $2.5 million for the archival research RCWM Program Funding Requirements effort is included. The committee has been provided information from —The low end of the cost estimate is $2.5 billion, various sources regarding the overall costs of completing the including $765 million for investigation; cleanup, RCWM program. The cost estimates vary greatly. Moreover, minus assessment and destruction; and site close- they are often presented as ranges, with extensive caveats. out, and $1.5 billion for assessment and destruc- For example, tion and emergency response functions. —The high end of the cost estimate is $17 billion, • In 2003, the DOD Inspector General (DOD IG), in reflecting the projected cost of complete removal reviewing the increased costs for the stockpile and of all munitions at CWM sites where there is no non-stockpile chemical materiel disposal program record of decision. This amount includes (1) $1 bil- (D-2003-128),14 found that the NSCMP did not have lion for investigation; cleanup, less assessment and the information needed to prepare a reliable estimate destruction; and site closeout, and (2) $16 billion of the cost and a schedule for disposing of buried for assessment and destruction and other emergency CWM. The PMNSCM estimated that, in addition to response functions. the $1.6 billion in the FY2003 cost estimate for the —The cost of remediating any additional discovered disposal of non-stockpile CWM declared under the munitions. CWC and in order to continue research, develop- ment, and testing of non-stockpile chemical warfare As described earlier in this subsection, the cost of com- disposal technologies, a further $11.7 billion would pleting the RCWM is difficult to predict. A key reason for be required for disposal of the buried munitions. As this difficulty is the lack of reliable information about the noted in the DOD IG’s report, according to the Act- nature of the chemical munitions and materiel to be found ing DASA(ECW), the $11.7 billion cost estimate at RCWM sites, including an estimate of the total number was based on an estimate that had not been updated of munitions requiring remediation. As was just seen, some since 1996 except for an adjustment reflecting the sources estimate the cost of the program at as low as $2.5 bil- inflation indices. The DOD IG recommended that the lion and others put it as high as $17 billion. The FY13 Presi - USD(AT&L) issue directions to the environmental dent’s budget request for RCWM operations has increased to offices of the DOD components to identify, schedule, $133 million. Even if Congress approves this funding level, and fund the disposal of buried chemical warfare completing the RCWM program would take a minimum materiel from active installations and BRAC installa- of 25 years and a maximum of 128 years (at the current annual funding level in uninflated dollars).16 In discussing tions. The DOD IG also recommended that NSCMP update the plan and the cost estimate for disposal this estimate, many committee members shared the view of buried munitions after the environmental offices that dragging the program out for such a long period would implement the USD(AT&L) directive.15 present an unacceptable long-term cost and risk to the nation. • The Army RCWM Program Implementation Plan Uncertainty about the amount of long-term funding needed (DOD, 2007) approved by the Secretary of the Army for the RCWM program will adversely impact planning and in July 2007 projected the total cost of the RCWM programming for the program. This situation is problematic program over a 30-year period as a range: not only at the Army level, but also at OSD. The committee received briefings on the Army’s experi- ence at Pine Bluff Arsenal and its ongoing preparations for 14Office of the Inspector General, “The Chemical Demilitarization Pro - operations at Redstone Arsenal. The information amassed gram: Increased Costs for Stockpile and Non-Stockpile Chemical Disposal by the Army will allow it to develop a 5-year level-of-effort Programs.” D-2003-128, September 4, 2003. Available at http://www.dodig. program on which it can base its request for RCWM fund- mil/audit/reports/fy03/03-128.pdf. Accessed June 6, 2012. 15Office of the Inspector General, Corps of Engineers Equipment Report- ing on Financial Statements for FY 2002. D-2003-123, August 20, 2003. Available at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy03/03-123.pdf. Accessed 16Committee June 6, 2012. estimate.

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90 REMEDIATION OF BURIED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL ing in the FY 2014-2018 Program Objective Memorandum Restoration Program, the FUDS program, and the munitions (POM).17 remediation program, a number of inherent uncertainties, making the exact amount and timing of the expenditures not Finding 7-5. The Army has a basis for developing a 5-year yet determinable. Unlike determining the cost of a tank or level-of-effort program that would in turn provide a basis of operating a military base, determining the cost of envi- for setting RCWM funding requirements in the FY 2014- ronmental remediation projects has historically been quite 2018 POM. difficult. In the case of buried chemical materiel, the materiel is not only buried and exact numbers of agent-filled mate- Finding 7-6a. Long-range policy for the remediation of riel unknown, but the remediation technology is relatively buried munitions, including CWM, is not clearly defined, new and highly specialized. Costs can vary by an order of in part because the inventory of suspected buried munitions magnitude based on the case-by-case determination of the and sites is incomplete. regulators. Based on the committee’s review, the ultimate costs far exceed existing funding levels. However, the com- Finding 7-6b. The lack of an accurate inventory of the bur- mittee recognizes that the ultimate rate of expenditure will be ied munitions and of a reliable cost estimate for the RCWM constrained by the existing budget realities facing the Army. program severely limits the ability of the DUSD(I&E) and The USD(AT&L) memorandum stated that the source of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, in consulta- funding for the assessment and destruction of RCWM and tion with the ASD(NCB) and the Army, to establish budget the sustainment of crews and related equipment would be requirements and draw up an appropriate funding plan for the CAMD,D appropriation pending the establishment of an a new and separate RCWM account. The consensus of the RCWM program account. committee is that the overall RCWM program is substan- The committee notes the ASA(IE&E) memorandum tially underfunded and that an inventory estimate is urgently (U.S. Army, 2012) requesting that the USD(AT&L) either required to provide a quantitative basis for overall program reevaluate his direction regarding the funding source for the funding. RCWM program or finalize the directed action. The com- mittee believes that the actions requested by the ASA(I&E) Recommendation 7-4a. The Secretary of Defense should, would not relieve either the currently bifurcated budget struc- as a matter of urgency, increase funding for the remediation ture [management of the RCWM budget by ASD(NCB) and of chemical warfare materiel to enable the Army to complete of the DERP budget by DUSD(I&E)] or the multiple-headed the inventories of known and suspected buried chemical management structure of the current RCWM program, and that it essentially maintains the status quo in the program. munitions no later than 2013 and develop a quantitative basis for overall funding of the program, with updates as needed The committee does agree with the ASA that whatever the to facilitate accurate budget forecasts. Pending establishment directed action, it needs to be finalized. That is, a separate of a final RCWM management structure, this task should be RCWM budget account should be established and the man- assigned to the director of the CMA as chair of the provi- agement of the program unified. sional RCWM integrating office. Recommendation 7-5. The Deputy Under Secretary of Recommendation 7-4b. As the RCWM executive agent, Defense for Installations and Environment and the Under the Secretary of the Army should establish a policy that Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, in coordination with the addresses all aspects of the remediation of chemical warfare Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and materiel and that prioritizes remediation requirements, and Biological Programs and the Army, should proceed imme- the Secretary of Defense should identify a new long-term diately to establish a separate budget account for recovered funding source to support the program. chemical warfare materiel, as directed by the memorandum of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technol- The committee’s recommendation to increase funding is ogy and Logistics dated March 1, 2010, and to ensure that important and necessary. Though the exact amount of the funding requirements for the recovered chemical warfare nation’s liability is not presently determinable with preci - materiel program are included in the FY 2014-2018 Program sion, it is known that, at a minimum, the contents of these Objectives Memorandum (POM). sites must be identified and that there will very likely be significant costs for treating at least portions of some sites. COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON It is beyond the scope of the committee’s task to arrive at THE ORGANIZATION OF RCWM ACTIVITIES a more refined cost estimate. As with the DOD Installation Chapter 2 described in detail the key players within DOD who are involved to one degree or another with the policy, 17William R. Brankowitz, Senior Chemical Engineer, Science Applica - planning, programming budgeting, and execution functions tions International Corporation, “The Redstone Arsenal Archival Review,” of the RCWM program. Organizations at every level of DOD briefing to the committee on January 18, 2012.

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91 THE PATH FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATION Finding 7-7. The Army has assigned responsibility for the have a role to play in the program. In some cases multiple offices at a given level are involved. RCWM program to an appropriate secretariat level organi- At the OSD level, two main offices, ASD(NCB) and zation, the ASA(I&E). The ACSIM is developing a credible DUSD(I&E), work on RCWM policy and funding matters program for Army cleanup including RCWM. in coordination with the USD(Comptroller) (Figure 7-1). As R ecommendation 7-6. T he Army should examine the was briefed to the committee and discussed earlier in this chapter, these offices have not yet completed the action to RCWM roles and responsibilities to determine where money establish a separate funding account for RCWM as directed can be saved by eliminating duplication of functions, such by the USD(AT&L). as those of the Army Environmental Command and the U.S. Within the Department of the Army two secretariat (i.e., Army Corps of Engineers. policy) offices—ASA(IE&E) and ASA(AL&T)—have been very involved with the RCWM program. The Army has, The Army offices executing the RCWM program are to its credit, assigned responsibility to one of these offices shown in Figure 7-2. The committee evaluated the strengths [ASA(IE&E)], which has enabled the Army to begin set- and weaknesses of this “baseline” RCWM organization in ting up a long-term organization to lead the program. At light of the charge in the Statement of Task. An important the Army staff level, the main player is the ACSIM office feature of the baseline organization is the provisional RCWM and its field operating agency, the Installation Management IO, which is composed of representatives from several Army Command (IMCOM). The committee judges that the ACSIM organizations, as well as from appropriate offices in the Air and IMCOM are performing a creditable job of integrating Force (AFCEE) and the Navy (NAVFAC). A chart of the the Army’s cleanup requirements (including DERP and RCWM offices, including the provisional IO (in highlighted CAMD,D) and presenting them in a defendable POM and oval) is provided in Figure 7-2. budget request. Some remaining duplication of effort on the part of IMCOM’s AEC and of USACE merits the Army’s attention. SECRETARY OF Executive Agent THE ARMY ASA (IE&E) DASA (ESOH) Executive ACSIM/ FORSCOM AMC USACE Management IMCOM Structure 20th Support RDECOM CMA Command Provisional RCWM IO Air NAVY Force Integrated Huntsville CARA ECBC NSCMP AEC BRAC Engineering and Product Team Support Center FIGURE 7-2 RCWM Army execution structure. RDECOM, Research, Development, and Engineering Command. SOURCE: Adapted from the presentation of J.C. King to the committee on September 26,Army execution structure.eps FIGURE 7-2 RCWM 2011.

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92 REMEDIATION OF BURIED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL The provisional RCWM IO coordinates emergency objective of eliminating any overlapping functions, particu- responses and planned RCWM projects for DOD in keep- larly on emergency response activities. ing with the Army’s role of RCWM executive agent. The provisional IO has met several times while it awaits formal The CMA’s NSCMP and the USACE’s Huntsville Engi- approval by the Army and DOD. The committee considers neering and Support Center are key players for the execution the establishment of the provisional IO to be a step in the of both emergency responses and planned RCWM projects. right direction in the overall management of the program but As described in Chapter 2, both PMSNCM and USACE have has some significant concerns with it conceptually: a long history of working separately and together on the program. NSCMP has depth in project planning and technol- • The provisional IO is temporarily led by a senior ogy utilization, while USACE has hands-on technical skills civilian at CMA. By being placed at this level in the in RCWM project management, construction management, hierarchy of the Army bureaucracy, subordinated to and contract management. a deputy assistant secretary of the Army, the provi- NSCMP, which reports to CMA, has several organiza- sional IO leader is seriously handicapped when it tional layers (see Figure 2-11). Further, it is more of an comes to influencing decisions and practices of such operational organization, lacking sufficient program and a disparate group of individuals spread throughout project management capability to manage large projects such DOD. as Redstone Arsenal. The committee is also concerned that • The target grade of the provisional IO leader is CMA may not have a continuing role in the Army once the GS-15, and as of April 12, 2012, the Army was still stockpile program winds down in the next several years, leav- trying to fill this position. While the grade is senior ing NSCMP without an enduring higher authority to report in the federal civilian General Schedule, the person to. These factors introduce significant risk and uncertainty to who fills it will lack the authority and status called for the RCWM program, raising the possibility that emergency by the scope and visibility of the RCWM program. responses or large planned remediation projects will not have • The provisional IO is a coordinating body with- adequate or sustainable management and funding support. out formal tasking or decision-making authority. Finding 7-10. CMA may be disestablished or downsized Once the larger RCWM projects (see Chapter 5 on Redstone Arsenal) begin in earnest, the provisional in anticipation of the completion of the stockpile program. IO may be overwhelmed by the responsibility, espe- Recommendation 7-8. The Army should review the long- cially if a series of emergency response events were to coincide with planned projects. term requirements for executing the RCWM program with the objective of making organizational changes that will Finding 7-8. The provisional RCWM IO leader lacks direc- eliminate duplication of effort and ensure sustainable man- tive authority, is too low in the Army staff bureaucracy, and agement support. is too junior in rank to be held accountable for the execution of the RCWM program. Organizational Alternatives At the major command level, FORSCOM, AMC, and Based on the discussion, findings, and recommendations USACE share RCWM program execution roles. Two of their above, the committee recommends two significant changes subordinate offices, ECBC (part of AMC) and CARA (part of to the baseline organization (Figure 7-2) to improve the FORSCOM) have specialized missions, only some of which efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the RCWM are devoted to the RCWM program. Briefings provided to program and its leadership. the committee indicate that these two offices have some overlapping functions that may add to the cost of the pro- Organizational Change One gram, particularly during emergency response activities. The committee judges, however, that the overlap is not significant The first change addresses the challenges facing the pro- enough to warrant a major reorganization of either office. visional IO and the accountability and effectiveness of his or her leadership. As concluded in Finding 7-8, the IO and Finding 7-9. ECBC and CARA perform important activities its leadership lack directive authority and are placed too low in support of the RCWM program. In practice, however, they in the Army organization. As discussed above, an individual operate with some redundancy in the field. at the GS-15 level will not be able to effectively lead the program. The committee concluded that the position should Recommendation 7-7. The Army should reexamine the be upgraded and filled by a member of the Senior Executive roles and responsibilities of Edgewood Chemical Biological Service (SES) or by a military general officer. Center and the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear This person would have directive authority over other (Enhanced) Analysis and Remediation Activity with the program participants within the Army and, through agree-

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93 THE PATH FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATION ments with the other Services, within the appropriate RCWM breadth of responsibilities, and the stature the program activities of the Air Force and Navy. He or she and would demands. As described in Chapter 2, the Army secretariat is establish, chair, and direct a new OIPT for RCWM. The new a policy-level set of organizations led by political appointees. RCWM OIPT, composed of higher-level representatives They oversee a very broad segment of Army programs and of the organizations in the current provisional RCWM IO requirements. As the Secretary of the Army has directed, the along with appropriate members from OSD, would replace appropriate Army secretariat office for leading the RCWM the provisional RCWM IO. OIPT members should be fairly program is the ASA(IE&E). Because of its policy and its senior in their grade, and in their knowledge and experience, directive authority within the Army structure, the committee and their parent organizations should give them authority concluded that ASA(IE&E) was the appropriate reporting to make decisions. One example of a senior executive with office for the new RCWM program executive. In addition, tasking authority18 to direct a large, expensive program of the visibility of the RCWM program and the risks it entails national interest, but having potential risk is the executive of also demand that the SES or general officer assigned to lead the Army’s highly successful chemical stockpile demilitar- the program should have a level of authority paralleling that ization program. In this case, the senior executive reported of the deputy assistant secretaries within the ASA(IE&E). directly to ASA(RDA)—now known as ASA(ALT), the Accordingly, the committee determined that it would be Army’s acquisition executive. best if the RCWM program executive reports directly to the The level in the Army organization to which the new SES ASA(IE&E). or general officer executive reports is important because it Finding 7-11. To have the organizational reach and author- affects that individual’s ability to lead the organization. The reporting office for the new program executive needs to have ity needed to lead the program effectively, the new SES or the authority and breadth of mission commensurate with the general officer RCWM program executive should report to responsibilities of the position. a high level in the Army. The committee evaluated assigning the new SES/general Recommendation 7-9. The Secretary of the Army should officer program executive to one of the following: (1) Army major command (such as AMC, FORSCOM, or USACE, (2) establish a new position at the level of the Senior Execu- Army staff (e.g., ACSIM), or (3) an Army secretariat office. tive Service (civilian) or a general officer (military) to lead Alternative 1 would assign the RCWM program executive the RCWM program. The person who fills this position to an Army MACOM, placing the executive at an operational would report directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army execution level. Organizations at this level usually lack reach (Installations, Energy and Environment). The Secretary outside their defined mission areas and are weak candidates should delegate full responsibility and accountability for for an office expected to have directive authority across the RCWM program performance to this person, including for entire Army and to leverage the OSD, the Navy, and the Air programming, planning, budgeting, and execution and for Force. For this reason the committee determined that this day-to-day oversight, guidance, management, and direction alternative was not acceptable. of the program. Alternative 2, an RCWM program executive report- ing to an Army staff organization such as ACSIM, places Organizational Change Two the official at a higher level in the Army organization. As described in Chapter 2 and above, ACSIM has the greatest The second organizational change considered by the Army Staff responsibilities for the RCWM program, being committee involved the organizations executing the RCWM the integrating office for RCWM CAMD,D funding as well program. Consistent with the discussions in the preceding as for other major funding programs such as DERP and section, the committee was very concerned about the cur- Army-installation-related O&M. ACSIM, though, does not rent placement of NSCMP within the Army structure. The have significant Army staff authority over organizations such committee evaluated several alternatives for the long-term as AMC or FORSCOM, much less over related Navy or Air reporting relationship for NSCMP. The alternative reporting Force organizations. Accordingly, the committee does not offices that the committee considered are as follows: believe that ACSIM, or any other Army staff organization, has the authority needed for an RCWM program executive (1) Retain NSCMP with CMA, to be accountable and effective. (2) Assign NSCMP to the USACE Huntsville Engineer- Alternative 3, an RCWM program executive reporting ing and Support Center, to an Army secretariat office, provides the authority, the (3) Assign it to ECBC, (4) Assign it to the Army AEC, (5) Assign it to DASA(ESOH), or 18Tasking authority is the authority of the RCWM program executive (6) Assign it to the ACWA Program Executive Office. with respect to day-to-day oversight, guidance, management, and direction of the program and to budget planning and allocation, and program and budget execution and performance by the RCWM commands, agencies, and organizations.

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94 REMEDIATION OF BURIED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL The committee carefully selected a set of criteria to evalu- In this arrangement, NSCMP could provide chemi- ate the six alternatives: cal expertise and program planning and management skills to that organization. • (A) Ease of implementation, Alternative 3, assignment to ECBC, was viewed (B) Functional organization (size, budget, scalability), positively with respect to criteria D, E, and G but (C) Efficiency, was viewed negatively for criteria B (scalability), C (D) Compatibility with organization’s mission, (improved efficiency) and F (accountability). In the (E) Technical expertise, committee’s judgment, assigning NSCMP to ECBC (F) Accountability through clean lines of authority, did not result in sets of skills and responsibilities (G) Longevity of program (durable chain of command). needed to effectively execute the RCWM program. In applying the above criteria, the committee concluded The committee determined that alternative 2—assign that alternatives 4, 5 and 6 rated poorly against criteria A-D: NSCMP to USACE Huntsville Engineering and Support Center—would result in the best long-term fit for NSCMP. • Alternative 4, assign to AEC, was eliminated because This alternative was rated negative only against criterion A AEC’s mission did not line up well with NSCMP and (ease of implementation) but positive for criteria B, C, D, would not result in improved efficiency. F, and G (criterion E was rated no change to negative). In • Alternative 5, assign to DASA(ESOH), was elimi- the committee’s judgment, this alternative would provide nated because the Army Secretariat’s role is pre - continuity of program execution and cost-effective synergy dominately policy making, while that of NSCMP is between NSCMP and USACE and would mean an enduring operational. reporting organizational relationship for NSCMP. • While ACWA (alternative 6) has significant techni- Finding 7-12. The Huntsville Center of the U.S. Army Corps cal expertise, the committee eliminated this alterna- tive because of a congressional mandate that placed of Engineers would be the best long-term fit for a realigned ACWA under the DOD and the CMA under the NSCMP. Army’s chain of command. ACWA is expected to Recommendation 7-10. The Army should realign the non- be disestablished at the completion of its program, leaving no long-term reporting office for NSCMP. stockpile chemical materiel program from the Army Materiel Command/Chemical Materials Agency to the U.S. Army Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 were more suitable than 4, 5, Corps of Engineers Huntsville Engineering and Support and 6: Center. • Recommendation 7-11. To provide for an effective transi- Alternative 1, retain NSCMP with CMA, rated positively with respect to criteria A, D, and F. The tion, the new program executive should enter into a memo- committee believed, however, that the status quo randum of understanding with the Commander of the U.S. would not improve efficiency or allow NSCMP to Army Corps of Engineers and the Army Materiel Command/ manage a large RCMA program. And, as stated in Chemical Materials Agency outlining the reporting ladder the last section, CMA is expected to be phased out as and transition plan for the realignment of the non-stockpile the stockpile program winds down, leaving NSCMP chemical materiel program. without a long-term higher headquarters to report to (criterion G). Undoubtedly, the staff of NSCMP Recommended Path Forward has the relevant chemical technical skills (criterion E). However, other technical skills required for non- The committee recommends that OSD and the Army stockpile operations, such as civil engineering, soil r eview and implement the funding and organizational mechanics, and explosives, must be tasked to other changes recommended in this chapter in a timely manner. organizations. By definition, the NSCMP could exist Many of the findings listed above have been known within for a long time, but its long-term suitability as a rela- OSD and the Army for several years, lacking only the tively small, highly specialized operational element completion of the relevant plans, budgets, inventories, and without a functioning, higher-level headquarters and organizational assignments. its dependence on other organizations is question- The committee believes that the assignment of an SES able. The committee concluded that this alternative civilian or general officer RCWM program executive with is weak with respect to the overall criteria. full authority and responsibility for planning, programming, • Alternative 2 was realignment of the NSCMP with budgeting, and executing the RCWM program, who has another key Army organization that is required to direct access to and visibility at the highest levels of the accomplish RCWM neutralization, such as USACE. Department of the Army and the OSD secretariat is abso-

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95 THE PATH FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATION 1. SINGLE ACCOUNT FOR SITE REMEDIATION (Would comingle DERP, RCWM, & O&M) 2. INTEGRATED PROGRAM PLAN AND BUDGET (RCWM) a. Required RCWM emergency response infrastructure b. Research and Development, technology, procurement c. Planned remediation support d. Response to emergency response contingencies 3. INTEGRATED DOD PRIORITY LIST FOR POTENTIAL RCWM REMEDIATION 4. COORDINATED FIVE YEAR PROGRAM PLAN AND BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR REMEDIATION OF IDENTIFIED PRIORITY RCWM SITES CONGRESS Program, Planning, Budget & Execution Oversight, OMB Guidance, Management, and Direction DOD (DUSD, I&E) ARMY RCWM Program (ASA, IE&E) Executive RCWM OIPT ACSIM (POM Consolidation) IRP / MMRP BRAC FUDS RANGE RCWM O&M DERP DERP BRAC RCWM FIGURE 7-3 RCWM program future funding. FIGURE S-3 RCWM program the extent of RCWM needs. At current funding levels, about future funding.eps lutely critical to the future success of the program. It will be vital for the effectiveness of the program executive and the the risks attending buried chemical weapons munitions will program itself that the executive possess the authority and remain for 25 to 128 years. ability to exercise oversight and management and to provide While the destruction of stockpile chemical weapons fiscal and operational guidance and direction to the operating nears completion in the current decade, the challenges of elements of the RCWM and control the funds for RCWM the RCWM program continue to increase as more is learned both during development and defense of the program plan about the magnitude of the problem. The committee is very and budget and during the execution of the annual program. concerned that the RCWM program lacks the authority, The committee’s recommendations for RCWM program leadership, and accountability demanded by the size, vis- and budget planning are illustrated in Figure 7-3. ibility, and risk of the program. The committee recommends Owing to the timing of the DOD POM and budget cycles, that the Army detail a strong SES or general officer to this the committee urges OSD to establish a separate program program immediately in FY2012 and continue to select account for the RCWM program and include the currently strong SES or general officer leaders for the positions there - estimated funding levels in the FY2014-2018 POM. This after. The Secretary of the Army should direct that this new would require the Army to program RCWM requirements RCWM program executive report directly to ASA(IE&E) and OSD to establish the accounts in the summer of 2012 and provide the authority needed for the program executive (see Recommendation 7-5). to discharge his or her responsibilities effectively (Recom- To allow OSD to formulate and defend long-term RCWM mendation 7-9). program requirements, the Army’s provisional RCWM IO T he committee’s recommended structure for Army must complete the inventory of known and suspected buried RCWM organization and authority is shown in Figure 7-4, chemical weapons as a first order of business (see Recom- which incorporates the recommended Program Executive mendation 7-4a) and submit it to OSD as soon as possible with the general-officer-level RCWM program executive with a target at the end of FY2013. This inventory is a criti- reporting to the ASA(IE&E); the RCWM OIPT under the cal element in alerting the administration and the Congress direction of the RCWM program executive; the tasking

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96 REMEDIATION OF BURIED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL Command Tasking Authority Coordination SECRETARY OF THE ASA (ALT) ASA (IE&E) ARMY RCWM PROGRAM CHIEF OF STAFF, DASA (ECW) EXECUTIVE ARMY RCWM OIPT ACSIM/ USACE AMC FORSCOM IMCOM Huntsville 20th Engineering CMA RDECOM Support and Support Command Center ECBC CARA AEC BRAC NSCMP FIGURE 7-4 Army RCWM organization and authority recommended by committee. NOTE: Tasking authority is the authority of the RCWM Program Executive 7-4 respect to day-to-day oversight, guidance, management, and direction of Army elements on all RCWM matters, FIGURE with Army RCWM organization and authority recommended by committee.eps including program and budget planning and allocation, and program and budget execution and performance by the RCWM commands, agencies, and organizations. • authority of the RCWM program executive; and the realign- Develop and execute a coordinated 5-yr program plan ment of NSCMP under the USACE Huntsville Engineering and budget estimate for remediation of the identified and Support Center. The figure also delineates the lines of priority RCWM sites. • command, tasking authority, and coordination among the Review requirements for RCWM emergency response various elements of the program. functions and establish a program plan and budget to Once assigned, the RCWM program executive should, at support the required capabilities. a minimum, undertake the following: —R e q u i r e d R C W M e m e rg e n cy r e s p o n s e infrastructure • Form and chair a new RCWM OIPT composed of —R esearch and development, technology, decision makers from key organizations involved procurement in the policy, programming, and execution of the —Known remediation support RCWM program. The new RCWM OIPT, composed —Response to emergency response contingencies • of higher level representatives of the organizations Develop and defend in the FY2014-2018 POM/ in the current provisional RCWM IO along with budget execution submission a budget program appropriate members from OSD, would replace the and plan for RCWM remediation that will, assum- provisional RCWM IO. OIPT members should be ing approval and funding by Congress, support fairly senior in grade, knowledge and experience, execution of the approved RCWM plan and support and should be given the authority to make decisions maintenance of an RCWM emergency response by their parent organizations. infrastructure. • Develop an integrated DOD priority list of potential RCWM remediation sites for approval by the Secre- As the new RCWM program executive position and the tary of the Army. recommended supporting OIPT are constituted, the com-

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97 THE PATH FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATION mittee recommends that the Army begin transitioning the ment, the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, the alignment of PMNSCM from AMC/CMA to the USACE Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Huntsville Center. Biological Programs, and the Secretary of the Army should proceed immediately to implement the guidelines contained Recommendation 7-12. As a necessary first step, the Deputy in the March 1, 2010, memorandum from the Under Secre- Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environ- tary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.