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FIGURE 3-1 Analytic underpinnings of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) force sizing for the Army. NOTE: Acronyms are defined in the list in the front matter. SOURCE: LTG Richard Zahner, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, U.S. Army. “Military Intelligence Rebalance.” Presentation to the committee, November 9, 2011.

and complex. Although the organizational processes described below apply, for the most part, to arenas with smaller scope and less complexity, each process was reviewed with the goal of identifying best practices and tools that the Air Force might consider incorporating into its own CP&A process.

U.S. Army

The U.S. Army developed a strategy to rebalance the Army Military Intelligence (MI) Force after a decade of intense ISR system development and deployment in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 This protracted period at war resulted in many system deployments accomplished with great urgency as Quick Reaction Capabilities (QRC), depicted in Figure 3-1. The overarching strategy for Army Intelligence is to optimize core intelligence capabilities in support of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and division and corps full-spectrum operations on a sustained Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle.3 Thus, the Army’s approach relies principally on its own organic ISR capability rather than on Air Force or na-

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2 U.S. Army. A Strategy to Rebalance the Army MI Force—Major Themes and Concepts. Available at http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/site/G-2%20Vision/nDocs.aspx. Accessed February 29, 2012.

3 LTG Richard Zahner, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, U.S. Army. “Military Intelligence Rebalance.” Presentation to the committee, November 9, 2011.



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