that suggest solutions for the shortfalls identified in Chapter 2. After considering best practices in the context of strengths and shortfalls, the committee arrived at three major recommendations designed to guide the Air Force toward a new and more comprehensive ISR CP&A process. This section presents and provides a rationale for each recommendation.

Recommendation 4-1. The Air Force should adopt an ISR CP&A process that incorporates the following attributes:

•  Encompasses all ISR missions;

•  Addresses all ISR domains and sources, including non-traditional ISR;

•  Includes all ISR assets in a sensor-to-user chain (e.g., PCPAD and communications);

•  Collaborates with ISR-related entities;

•  Provides traceability from process inputs to outputs;

•  Is mission/scenario-based;

•  Is repeatable and enduring;

•  Supports trade-off analyses;

•  Is scalable in size, time, and resolution; and

•  Reduces labor and cost over time.1

Rationale: The Air Force currently has a reasonable ISR CP&A process but has indicated that this process requires improvements. The committee identified gaps in capability in the existing Air Force process, explored best practices for CP&A in both government and some industry organizations, and developed a set of desired attributes from its analysis of gaps and best practices that represent a robust ISR CP&A process. With the addition of three capabilities, the Air Force can attain the desired attributes by enhancing rather than replacing the current process. The three capabilities are as follows: (1) a front-end Problem Definition and Approach (PDA) capability, (2) a robust Multi-resolution Gap Analysis (MGA) capability, and (3) a suite of automated tools that underpin that analysis of the cost, risk, and utility associated with investment alternatives. The full process and an explanation of how it satisfies the desired attributes are presented later in this chapter. The committee acknowledges that the proposed process should accommodate the use of all levels of classified material in the analysis. Although industry presentations included examples of tools being used to process classified information, both security and


1The committee acknowledges that any process needs to accommodate the use of all levels of classified material in the analysis. However, security and time constraints precluded the committee from making recommendations for multi-level security analysis. Chapters 2 and 4 provide supporting discussions.

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