time constraints precluded the committee from making detailed recommendations regarding analyses involving multi-level security.
Recommendation 4-2. The Air Force should evolve its ISR CP&A process to an integrated, overarching ISR investment process with clear organizational responsibility identified for each subprocess.
Rationale: One of the most important actions that the Air Force can take is to implement an integrated ISR CP&A process. As described in Chapter 2, the Air Force has evolved into a current situation that has multiple, overlapping investment processes that appear to duplicate effort. The integrated process should have clearly defined roles and responsibilities for participants and clear identification of the lead for each portion of the process. Although an integrated process is recommended, this really means an overarching process with multiple subprocesses. A single organization should be responsible for each subprocess. Different subprocesses may have different organizational leads. A candidate overarching process is described in detail in the section below entitled “Proposed Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capability Planning and Analysis Process.” An example of a subprocess is the materiel Solution Analysis process led by the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). Lastly, in many but not all cases the ISR CP&A process will feed the Air Force Corporate Process, in which components of the ISR process will be assigned to panels (e.g., ISR communications to the Communications Panel). During the Air Force Corporate Process, the impact of board and panel decisions on the overall required ISR capability should be continuously monitored to preclude, for example, a panel’s failing to fund a key ISR capability component that may have a low priority as far as that panel is concerned but is vital to the fulfillment of a high-priority ISR need (e.g., a communications link). This can best be self-monitored by establishing a set of interface or giver/receiver relationships across the Air Force. These interfaces become part of a set of agreements on what another board or element is expected and committed to perform. Updating these agreements on a regular basis, with signature concurrence from both sides of the interface, allows timely responses and should result in establishing areas of higher risk when the risk is not the usual technical or schedule risk but rather can be expressed in terms of the risk of an activity’s being funded. Mitigation plans for these risks may be developed in much the same manner as for technical or schedule risk.
Recommendation 4-3. The Air Force should adopt the proposed ISR CP&A process by incrementally building on its existing process using pilot projects. The scope of each pilot project should be compatible with available resources, be relevant to both current and future mission scenarios, and include metrics