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1
Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Challenges
Facing the Air Force
INTRODUCTION
The United States is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war. As stated
in the 2012 National Defense Strategy:
Over the last decade, we have undertaken extended operations in Iraq and Afghan-
istan to bring stability to those countries and secure our interests. As we respon-
sibly draw down from these two operations, take steps to protect our nation's
economic vitality, and protect our interests in a world of accelerating change, we
face an inflection point. . . . Out of the assessment we developed a defense strat-
egy that transitions our Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today's wars to
preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security
interests. . . .1
The evolving strategic landscape encompasses a vast list of uncertainties that
include violent extremists, non-state actors, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, competition over dwindling natural resources, rapid growth in the
availability and use of technology worldwide, growing global economic interde-
pendency, and vulnerable and fragile commercial infrastructure.
For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active ap-
proach to countering threats related to the uncertainties listed above by monitoring
1Department of Defense (DoD). 2012. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Cen-
tury Defense. January. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
Accessed February 29, 2012.
9
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10 C a pa b i l i t y P l a n n i n g and A na ly s i s to O p t i m i z e A i r F o r c e ISR
global activities.2 The ability to carry out monitoring on a global scale will drive the
importance of and dependence on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) for our nation in the future.3 The range of ISR capabilities will expand to
monitor terrorism, support irregular warfare, support power projection into anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) environments, monitor weapons of mass destruction
and support arms control, defend our homeland, and provide support for response
to natural disasters.4
Fiscal challenges, as always, will drive the need to allocate defense resources as
efficiently as possible. This is especially true with respect to future ISR investments,
because ISR touches all elements of the national security infrastructure as well as
the nation's commercial infrastructure. Today's ISR capabilities consist of a mix of
Cold War systems; modern air, space, and cyberspace systems; and a set of quick-
reaction capabilities that were designed for specific point solutions. As the nation
looks to the future, a key challenge will be how to integrate these existing capabili-
ties with new capabilities to monitor the uncertain threats of the 21st century. The
United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners
to ensure access to and use of the global commons. The fact that the United States
operates in an integrated world and fights wars jointly and in coalitions drives the
paramount need for coordinated and fully integrated ISR capabilities. The desired
end state of a fully integrated ISR system drives the need for improved interoper-
ability, commonality, and modernization overlaid on a set of standards, protocols,
security, and open architectures.
Since September 2001, ISR capabilities have grown in importance and use by
the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community (IC), in part
because these capabilities provide information to the warfighter that serves as a
force multiplier. This shared information enables better and faster decisions, preci-
sion effects, and lower risk for the commander in the field. Under the U.S. national
security umbrella, the Air Force has a significant role in the acquisition, operation,
and support of many ISR capabilities because it is simultaneously a user, a provider,
and an operator in the Joint and coalition contexts. Air Force ISR capabilities deliver
2Although these threats need to be addressed by the Department of Defense, including all of the
military services, the intelligence community, and the Department of Homeland Security, the focus
of this research is directed particularly at Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
3"ISR" is defined as "[a]n activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of
sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current
and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function." SOURCE: DoD.
2010. "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02).
8 November. As amended through 15 October 2011." Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. Accessed February 6, 2012.
4DoD. 2012. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense . January. Avail-
able at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. Accessed February 29, 2012.
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ISR C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g the Air Force 11
needed information to strategic, operational, and tactical users alike, for operations
from humanitarian assistance to active combat. As the demand for ISR capabilities
grows, the Air Force experiences increasing pressure to allocate resources effectively
and to acquire needed capabilities efficiently, on time, and on schedule. Addition-
ally, Air Force ISR capabilities will be increasingly required to interoperate with
capabilities managed by other U.S. organizations and coalition forces.
COMMITTEE FORMATION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE
In response to a request from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Science, Technology, and Engineering, the National Research Council (NRC)
formed the Committee on Examination of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability Planning and Analysis (CP&A) Process. The
NRC approved the terms of reference (TOR) for the study in March 2011 (see
Box 1-1), and the Air Force funded this 18-month study in July 2011. Committee
members were then selected and approved by the NRC for their backgrounds in
academia, industry, and government (see Appendix A for biographical sketches
of the committee members). Subject-matter support was provided by the Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Air Force for ISR.
BOX 1-1
Terms of Reference
The NRC will:
1.Review the current approach to the Air Force corporate planning and programming process
for ISR capability generation.
2.Review various analytical methods, processes and models for large scale, complex domains
like ISR and identify best practices.
3.Apply the current approach and recommended best practices to the Air Force corporate
planning and programming process for ISR, in the context of the future Joint, National and
coalition partner environment.
4.Recommend improvements/changes to existing analytical tools, methods, roles/responsibili-
ties, organization and management, etc. that would be required to ensure that the Air Force
corporate planning and programming process for ISR is successful in addressing all Joint,
National, and Coalition partners' needs.a
aAir Force ISR investments include the air, space, and cyberspace domains, which, in turn, provide critical
inputs into the ground and maritime ISR domains. The Air Force sponsor requested that the committee focus
specifically on the air, space, and cyberspace domains for this report.
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12 C a pa b i l i t y P l a n n i n g and A na ly s i s to O p t i m i z e A i r F o r c e ISR
The Air Force recognizes that an architectural perspective that includes the
platforms, sensors, processors, terminals, and their connecting communications
and data links--that is, an end-to-end solution--is a logical construct to drive the
Air Force corporate planning and programming processes.
STUDY APPROACH
The committee held seven data-gathering meetings at which briefings were
provided by senior leaders from the IC, which included DoD components and
agencies (i.e., Air Force, Army, Navy, Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD]),
professional staff members from key congressional oversight committees, and
senior industry executives (see Appendix B for a listing of meetings and participat-
ing organizations). In addition to its data-gathering sessions, the committee held
two 3-day meetings to finalize its findings and recommendations. At all of these
meetings, the committee discussed and evaluated what any proposed improve-
ments to the Air Force CP&A process might accomplish, and it considered the
following questions from the perspective of a high-level decision maker:
1. What capabilities do I need to acquire and when?
2. What capabilities should I retire and when?
3. On what analytical basis are my decisions made?
4. How much risk do I accept and when?
5. What are the level and range of uncertainty in my judgments?
6. Are there architectural or operational changes that could provide a dra-
matic, positive change in capability, and that would remain close to the
current set of material solutions and/or cost?
To acquire the right capabilities, for the right reasons, under current and
potential future circumstances, is extremely challenging.5 Although the TOR for
this study is specific to the Air Force, Air Force decisions about whether to enact
the proposed ISR CP&A process will need to be made in the context of factors
including but not limited to the following: (1) congressional support, (2) contract
performance, (3) near-term versus far-term considerations and tactical versus stra-
tegic considerations, (4) requirements of other military services and the IC, and
5I.B. Holley. 1983. Ideas and Weapons, Office of Air Force History Reprint. Original Printing: Yale
University Press, 1953: Introduction, p. v: "Since time immemorial weapons have played a significant
role in tipping the scales of victory from one side to another . . . In recent years the pace has acceler-
ated . . . the degree to which scientific and technological advances are exploited for military purposes
depends upon the methods devised to that end. The haphazard and unsystematic means of other
ages have yielded to a more orderly process of conscious decision, development, test, and evaluation,
but even so these methods have lagged behind the creative forces of science."
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ISR C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g the Air Force 13
(5) roles and responsibilities of the military services and the IC as defined by Title
10 versus Title 50 of the U.S. Code.6 An ideal ISR CP&A process for the Air Force
would provide answers to these questions and reasonably sustain decisions made
over time in the context of the broad challenges of the 21st century.7
SCENARIOS THAT MAY GUIDE AIR FORCE ISR
FORCE-PLANNING PROCESSES
Strategic requirements for the broad range of ISR capabilities are embedded
within the 2012 National Defense Strategy.8 Along with this new guidance, the
DoD will base major force-planning efforts on a prediction of future conflicts and
the anticipated requirements of existing and "to be developed" weapons systems.
Budgetary restraint will also add significant risk that must be calculated into Air
Force ISR force planning.9 It is now assumed that the U.S. military will shrink over
the next 10 years, through fiscal year (FY) 2022.10
It is anticipated that this new direction for the DoD will be realized by means
of programmed budget reductions through the Future Years Defense Program
and through FY 2022, similar to the post-war build-down after World War II, the
6The military services and the IC have specific roles and responsibilities, as defined by Title 10 and
Title 50 of the U.S. Code, respectively. For additional information on Title 10, see http://uscode.house.
gov/download/title_10.shtml. For additional information on Title 50, see http://uscode.house.gov/
download/title_50.shtml. Accessed March 21, 2012.
7Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion of the recommended ISR CP&A process.
8DoD. 2012. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense . January, p. 1.
Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. Accessed February 29,
2012.
9The Honorable Michael Donley, SECAF, and General Norton Schwartz, CSAF. Joint Statement,
White Paper. "Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy with Constrained Budgets." February 2012.
Available at http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120201-027.pdf. Accessed September
4, 2012. "Defense cuts totaling $487 billion over 10 years will be hard but manageable, though, sig-
nificant challenges remain. The need to transition contingency appropriations into baseline budgets
still overhangs DoD resource planning, excess basing capacity still needs to be addressed through the
proposed Base Realignment and Closure Commission, and many more decisions due to unforeseen
events will intervene in the next decade. The Air Force's FY13 budget request is the culmination of
an unprecedented season of difficult choices. We can and expect to absorb currently programmed
reductions with increased but acceptable risk, provided no further cuts are enacted. The possibility
of the BCA reducing defense spending by billions more will put at risk our ability to execute the
new strategic guidance."
10Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe. 2012. "Obama Announces New Leaner Military Approach." Wash-
ington Post, January 5. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-
announces-new-military-approach/2012/01/05/gIQAFWcmcP_story.html. Accessed April 12, 2012.
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14 C a pa b i l i t y P l a n n i n g and A na ly s i s to O p t i m i z e A i r F o r c e ISR
Korean War, and the Vietnam War.11 In this larger context, the Air Force is devel-
oping a process to plan its ISR investment strategy that will likely be informed
by the scenario-based modeling of potential future conflicts and the anticipated
constraints on resources. The Air Force has used scenario-based planning, un-
derstanding its limitations, for over four decades.12 The following sections briefly
discuss several conflict scenarios in the context of regional, global, and homeland
security challenges and venues in which the Air Force would apply various mixes of
ISR capabilities. These sections are intended to provide the reader with a sense of
the complexities involved in planning for future Air Force ISR capabilities--com-
plexities that become even more complicated in a fiscally constrained environment.
Regionally Specific (Traditional) Scenarios
Overall, it is anticipated that combat operations will continue in Southwest
Asia until 2014, with limited contingency and counterinsurgency (COIN) opera-
tions anticipated beyond the conclusion of major U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.
DoD planners are also considering the potential for other future regional conflicts
in addition to those in Southwest Asia. Any major regional conflict will require
the operational surveillance of the entire regional or theater battlefield in order to
underpin U.S. actions, even though the totality of U.S. military land forces may be
dispersed into brigade- or regiment-sized elements focused by country, province,
or village. Success in establishing persistent, theater-wide surveillance is normally
considered by regional combatant commanders as the first priority, followed closely
with as much COIN support as possible delivered directly to ground units. Repre-
sentative Air Force ISR missions will include the following: theater-wide persistent
situational awareness; high-value, time-critical targeting; countering of improvised
explosive device; and COIN support for brigade- or regiment-sized ground forces
arrayed across a region. In regional conflicts featuring significant U.S. ground force
engagement that is not concentrated but distributed across an entire region or
11Gordon Adams. 2011. "Rethinking National Security in an Era of Declining Budgets." Johns
Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory 2011-2012. Rethinking Seminar Series. October 27.
12USAF Center for Strategy and Technology. Future Conflict Studies. Air University web site. "The
premise of scenario planning is that it is better to get the future imprecisely right than to get the future
precisely wrong. We know that our predictions of the future are never exactly correct. Rather than
picking one definitive picture of the future and planning for that future, scenario planning allows a
region to consider various possibilities and identify policies that can adapt to changing circumstances.
Scenarios do not describe a forecasted end state. Scenarios are stories about future conditions that
convey a range of possible outcomes." Available at http://csat.au.af.mil/future-conflict.htm#scenarios.
Accessed March 28, 2012.
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ISR C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g the Air Force 15
BOX 1-2
Regional Conflict Scenario:
Planning Assumptions for Air Force ISR Capabilities
1.The demand for localized, tactical-level surveillance will increase as more brigades deploy to
various parts of a region.
2.Demands at a tactical level can rapidly exceed existing intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance (ISR) capabilities.
3.ISR priority systems must be very precise and highly flexible when meeting brigade and regi-
ment demands, and if ground forces are not significantly involved, there will also be a need
for ground truth.
4.Local understanding, cultural awareness, and anthropological depth may be the primary
emphases in winning "hearts and minds" in a post-major-combat period, but ISR capabilities
are required any time there are significant ground forces employed, whether they are engaged
in intense combat or nation-building activities.a
aNoah Shachtman. 2012. "Air Force's Top Brain Wants a `Social Radar' to `See into Hearts and Minds,'" Wired
Magazine Interview, January 19.
country, there are consistent planning assumptions about the Air Force ISR that
will most likely withstand variances in any regional conflict model (see Box 1-2).
Even with the reduction in military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air
Force will continue to plan for multiple scenarios that will involve various mixes of
ISR capabilities.13 There are many variations and permutations on predicting the
immediate aspects of the national security environment,14 but at least four other
regional concern categories currently draw significant attention:
13Thomas Barnett. 2004. The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. New
York: G.P. Putnam Sons.
14Andrew Krepinevich. 2009. 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st
Century. New York: Bantam Dell. The scenarios are as follows: (1) The collapse of Pakistan and the
breakup of its army into loyalist and radical Islamist factions, both armed with nuclear weapons. (2)
A series of terror attacks against cities in the United States involving stolen Russian nuclear warheads.
(3) A new and deadly flu pandemic sweeping north into the United States from Mexico, causing mas-
sive refugee flows. (4) A new war against Israel by Hezbollah, with the backing of Iran. (5) Rising civil
unrest in China, prompting the country to impose a blockade of Taiwan and threatening war against
the United States if it intervenes. (6) A terrorist war on the global economy, by means of attacking
infrastructure and logistics chains, and through sophisticated cyberattacks. (7) A civil war in Iraq
following a dramatic reduction of U.S. troops.
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16 C a pa b i l i t y P l a n n i n g and A na ly s i s to O p t i m i z e A i r F o r c e ISR
1. Preventing Iranian nuclear development and aggression;
2. "Arab spring"15 involvement in the Middle East;
3. Maintaining a balanced, mutually supportive relationship with China; and
4. Sustaining deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
Persian Gulf
Increasingly, there is international realization that, even in the face of severe
economic and political measures, the Iranian government is intent on developing
nuclear weapons.16 A confrontation with a nuclear-armed Iran has the potential to
be a truly "hybrid" war, one that might require the U.S. military to counter Iran's
conventional anti-access capabilities, defeat its irregular forces both at sea and on
land, prepare for attacks by terrorist groups against American targets or U.S. allies
globally, and, most importantly, conduct operations under the shadow of a possible
nuclear attack.17 In the event of a major confrontation, the United States would
view this hybrid scenario in a regional war context, plus taking into account all of
15President Barack Obama. 2011. Speech and explanations from Ben Zimmer, Visual Thesaurus,
"The Arab Spring Has Sprung," May 20, 2011: "Arab spring doesn't actually have to correspond to dates
between the vernal equinox and the summer solstice, because spring is understood metaphorically and
not literally. The obvious model for Arab spring is the Prague spring of 1968, when Czechoslovakia
enjoyed a brief interval of democratic reform before the Soviet Union invaded. As Michael Quinion
notes on his World Wide Words site, Arab spring and Prague spring have a much earlier precursor: the
European revolutions of 1848, which historians dubbed springtime of the peoples or spring of nations.
Those terms are translations of German Völkerfrühling and French printemps des peuples. From 1848
to 1968 to 2011, the social movements given the spring label have shared a hope for liberalization in
the face of oppressive regimes." However, Barry Rubin (Director for Global Research in International
Affairs) argues that, "in Middle Eastern usage it comes from the `Beirut spring' in which hundreds
of thousands of Lebanese demonstrated against the Syrian military presence and domination of the
country. In the short term the Lebanese protesters won. But because of a lack of U.S. and Western help
along with the ruthlessness of Syria, Iran, and their local allies (notably Hezbollah) the Beirut Spring
. . . was defeated. Syria is back in control to a large degree and while the Syrian-backed government
(including Hezbollah) has been kept at bay for months by bureaucratic maneuvers, presumably it
will get into power at some point. So the term `Arab Spring' is appropriate if we remember that the
Beirut Spring, a good example of what's being faced now, turned into the Beirut Winter."
16Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty. 2012. Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat
Iran's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threat, January 17. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments.
17Ibid.
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ISR C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g the Air Force 17
the other contingency models for worldwide counterterrorism, and possibly facing
the complication of nuclear weapons.18
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO): "In light of Iran's
pursuit of A2/AD capabilities, it seems unlikely that the U.S. military's legacy plan-
ning assumptions will remain valid."19 Accordingly, it is increasingly important for
Air Force ISR force planners to look in detail at the A2/AD challenges as well as the
exacting requirements for strategic and operational targeting.
Pacific Rim
In the Pacific Rim, Air Force planners may be considering multiple scenarios,
ranging from no ongoing military conflict but in which some degree of military
action can be foreseen in operations short of war, to operations that would presage
conflict with the intended effect of deterring aggressive military action. Further,
although that intention to deter military action may be steadfast, the possibility of
escalation remains. The challenge in Southeast Asia with respect to North Korea
and China is representative of this situation.
Arguably the greatest strategic choice concerns how best to respond to China's rapid rise
as a major power. Boasting the world's second-largest economy, Beijing has undertaken
a decade-long military buildup of its People's Liberation Army (PLA). Its focus is on the
Western Pacific, declared a vital interest by every U.S. administration for more than 60
years, with security commitments to such allies as Australia, Japan and South Korea, and
states like Taiwan.20
China and the United States are linked by both economics and politics to the
extent that it is in the best interests of both countries to maintain a stable Pacific
region.
18The Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted: "[F]uture adversaries are likely to use `hy-
brid warfare' tactics, a blending of conventional and irregular approaches across the full spectrum
of conflict . . . future conflict will likely be characterized by a fusion of different forms of warfare
rather than a singular approach . . . U.S. forces must become more adaptable and flexible . . . [DoD]
officials have discussed the need to counter the continuum of threats that U.S. forces could face
from nonstate- and state-sponsored adversaries, including computer network and satellite attacks;
portable surface-to-air missiles; improvised explosive devices; information and media manipulation;
and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive devices." SOURCE: GAO.
2010. "Hybrid Warfare: Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities," Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. GAO-10-1036R. September
10. Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101036r.pdf. Accessed March 23, 2012.
19Ibid.
20Andrew Krepinevich. 2011. "The Way to Respond to China." Los Angeles Times, November 9.
Available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/09/opinion/la-oe-krepinevich-pacific-20111109.
Accessed April 12, 2012.
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18 C a pa b i l i t y P l a n n i n g and A na ly s i s to O p t i m i z e A i r F o r c e ISR
The rise of China has triggered a debate among policy experts. On one side sit those who
advocate greater engagement. They focus on improving our economic and political rela-
tions as the path most likely to maintain stability and peace and . . . those who believe the
U.S. and its allies should take steps to offset China's growing military power with the goal
of retaining the stable military balance that has benefited all in the region, none more so
than China.21
Which of these views prevails will still have significant Air Force ISR force-
planning implications, especially in the category of doing everything possible to
prevent conflict and to prevent a Chinese strategic advantage in the region. Defense
policy analyst Andrew Krepinevich has outlined some examples of Chinese aggres-
sive tendencies and provocations, such as the following:
Chinese fighter jets intercepting and striking a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in international
waters, a Chinese anti-satellite test that created huge quantities of space debris, incidents
between Chinese and Japanese aircraft and ships in the East China Sea, and Chinese
provocations against Vietnamese oceanographic survey ships in the South China Sea. The
objective of China's buildup may not be to wage war. Rather, China may seek to steadily
shift the military balance in its favor to the point where Washington can no longer credibly
defend either its interests or its allies. In that case, war would not be necessary to ensure
China's regional hegemony.22
Air Force ISR force planners must consider the concept of future war im-
portant, in addition to considerations of how to prevent conflict. In this regard,
traditional deterrence models would have to adapt the focus on deterring Chinese
superiority within the region short of going to war.
The United States has been in a constant state of readiness on the Korean
Peninsula for more than 60 years. The argument can be made, however, that au-
thoritarian dictators can repress their populations for decades to the extent that
"confrontational stability" exists.23 There are at least three potentialities to consider
when viewing the Korean Peninsula: (1) a status quo transition from Kim Jong-il
to his son Kim Jong-un, (2) an overly aggressive transition that provokes responses
from South Korea and the United States, and (3) an accelerated collapsing of the
North Korean government. Bruce Bennett and Jennifer Lind argue as follows:
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23General argument made by Bruce Bennett and Jennifer Lind, Fall 2011, Journal of International
Security, and referenced in "Doomsday War Games: Pentagon's 3 Nightmare Scenarios," Christian
Science Monitor, December 2011.
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ISR C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g the Air Force 19
[T]he transition from apparent stability to collapse can be swift. A government collapse in
North Korea could unleash a series of catastrophes on the peninsula with potentially far-
reaching regional and global effects. This could trigger a massive outflow of the nation's
24 million people, many of whom are severely malnourished, across the border into South
Korea . . . Equally troubling, North Korea's weapons of mass destruction could find their way
onto the global black market. As a result, the consequences of a poorly planned response
to a government collapse in North Korea are potentially calamitous.24
The magnitude of a calamitous scenario could quickly outpace a U.S. military
response; as noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: "The instability or
collapse of a WMD [weapons of mass destruction]-armed state is among our most
troubling concerns."25 Such an occurrence could lead to a rapid proliferation of
WMD material, weapons, and technology and could quickly become a global cri-
sis posing a direct physical threat. Air Force ISR assets and capabilities would be
brought to bear significantly along three operational paths:
1. Maintaining persistent situational awareness of Democratic People's Re-
public of Korea (DPRK) forces,
2. Detecting precursors to a North Korean missile launch, and
3. Supporting immediate air strikes by both the Republic of Korea and the
United States in the event of a North Korean incursion into the South.
The battlefield geography is well known, and North Korea and South Korea
share a 238-km border; a conflict along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) (roughly
20,000 km2) would have a combat density greater than that of any engagement
in Iraq or Afghanistan. The threat of nuclear engagement is real and must be
considered as a worst case in order to deter and, in the event that deterrence fails,
plan for full-scale military action. Plans must also be made to manage, in the post-
engagement period, the subsequent human tragedy that would unfold for both
24Ibid.
25DoD. 2010. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. February. Available at http://www.defense.gov/
qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. Accessed April 12, 2012.
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20 C a pa b i l i t y P l a n n i n g and A na ly s i s to O p t i m i z e A i r F o r c e ISR
North and South Korea as well as for much of the Pacific Rim.26 The Korean
Peninsula is a clear example of Air Force ISR assets being needed at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels, as well as for purposes of pre-war deterrence and
the obtaining of early indications and warnings of the potential for a major re-
gional conflict.27
Global (Non-Traditional) Scenarios
It appears increasingly clear that the United States will confront a very diverse
and demanding array of strategic challenges over the coming decades: transna-
tional terrorist groups, weak and failed states, and the intersection between them;
the rise of a near-peer competitor that is not yet overtly hostile toward the United
States, but has nonetheless implemented a comprehensive military modernization
program devoted to countering the U.S. military's ability to project power; and
the proliferation of nuclear weapons to aggressive regimes and perhaps eventually
26Arguably, the North Korean regime is essentially stable; it survived its origin in 1950-1953, the
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and a devastating famine in 1995-1998. In stark
contradiction, authoritarian regimes, like Iran or China, tend to be more unstable. North Korea is a
thoroughly totalitarian society, in which all information about the outside world is limited, and dis-
senting voices are silenced. Although hardship and black markets may undermine the DPRK, there
is always China to provide support against disintegration. China has no interest in seeing the DPRK
collapse, since doing so (1) may unleash a destabilizing flood of refugees, and (2) its successor state
will probably align with, or be absorbed by, South Korea, which is a regional rival and a firm ally of
the United States. The Chinese will most likely do everything in their power to avoid a scenario in
which a united Korean Peninsula is allied more with the United States than with mainland China.
SOURCE: Evan B. Montgomery. 2010. Defense Planning for the Long Haul: Scenarios, Operational
Concepts, and the Future Security Environment. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
January 11. Available at http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/01/defense-planning-for-the-
long-haul/. Accessed March 23, 2012.
27Committee assumptions about Air Force ISR force planning: (1) The primary concern is to detect
North Korean missiles being prepped and fueled, so that the United States is capable of intercepting
them before launch. (2) Signs of the buildup will likely be detected, and confirmed for certain hours,
if not days, in advance. (3) The DPRK's air defense system is extremely dense, and many artillery
positions are concealed and/or hardened. (4) The system's obsolescence makes it ineffective against
stealth, and it can be easily jammed by modern/existing electronic countermeasures. (5) Although
hardened, the ensuing lack of mobility makes them very vulnerable to a full array of precision-guided
weapons. (6) Although foliage is still some cause for technical U.S. ISR concern, it is doubtful that
concealment will do the North Koreans much good when a majority of hidden artillery positions are
identifiable on publicly accessed satellite search engines. Additionally, it must be noted that the threat
environment in the Pacific region stands in stark contrast to that in Southwest Asia where currently
U.S. remotely piloted aircraft operate without significant restraint from anti-access or enemy denial
capabilities. It is also important to note that all U.S. military capabilities would be seriously degraded
by a loss of space assets.
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ISR C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g the Air Force 21
to non-state actors and to those nation-states where civil conflict is likely.28 The
cyber domain also presents the challenge of non-conventional attacks. Terrorist
cells or organizations could shift their emphasis from killing Americans to injur-
ing Americans financially, with cyberattacks on Wall Street becoming a common
occurrence, for example. There are at least three categories of non-traditional
scenarios that must be thought through conceptually to ascertain military force-
planning capabilities:
1. Non-military attacks provoking non-military or non-traditional responses:
Examples could be cyberattacks on public or private networked U.S. infra-
structure, and other terrorist activity of which the likely origin does not
reside in a nation-state and is widely construed as transnational.
2. Civil conflict in a country in which direct U.S. involvement is problematic--ei-
ther because the stakes do not rise to the level of direct harm to the United
States, or because the involvement includes the acceptance of significant
military risk with the anticipated political outcome being unclear.
3. Non-combat contingencies requiring U.S. military involvement directly or
indirectly: These could range in magnitude from needs for very localized
humanitarian support to massively large-scale responses that would be
beyond any single nation-state or region and for which the United Nations
humanitarian infrastructure would be ill prepared.29
U.S. military capabilities were brought to bear in the recent tragic events in
both Japan and Haiti, and in other parts of the world as well. In structuring for hu-
manitarian assistance, AF ISR capabilities of broad scope would be required--capa-
bilities ranging from assisting a foreign government with significant infrastructure
resources to assisting a government with degraded infrastructure.30
Homeland Security-Based Scenarios
There are numerous hypothetical scenarios involving current DoD military
capabilities in support of national and state agencies within current federal law. In
such scenarios, the DoD normally plays a supporting role rather than a primary
28Bruce Bennett and Jennifer Lind, Fall 2011, Journal of International Security, and referenced in
"Doomsday War Games: Pentagon's 3 Nightmare Scenarios." Christian Science Monitor, December
2011.
29George Freidman. 2009. The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century. New York: Doubleday.
30Japan and Haiti: In March 2011, a massive earthquake triggered the devastating tsunami that hit
Japan, causing a tragic chain of events affecting two nuclear power plants at Fukushima; on January
12, 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake tragically devastated Haiti; in both cases U.S. military support
was critical in delivering humanitarian aid and assistance.
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22 C a pa b i l i t y P l a n n i n g and A na ly s i s to O p t i m i z e A i r F o r c e ISR
role.31 Although there are numerous examples of defense in support of civil au-
thorities' activities, there are at least three major categories in which direct military
support is envisioned: (1) physical/territorial/border protection; (2) consequence
management of a natural disaster or terrorist-initiated disaster at a significant
threshold requiring a homeland federal response; and (3) presidentially directed
activity, currently defined by existing law or new proposed legislation.32 In the
homeland security-type scenarios, it will be most important for Air Force ISR force
planners to look at adaptive ways to use military assets in a wide-ranging spectrum
of activity, but in ways that would always recognize the legal restrictions inherent
in the use of such assets. The more robust scenarios would challenge the limits
of that civil adaptation so that operational-use challenges are highlighted from a
legal viewpoint rather than a technological basis, which is traditional in analyzing
a foreign threat.33 Arguably, any scenario-based viewpoint will assist planners as
they both assess the current state of their force planning and capability analysis
and develop new analytical techniques and processes. Robust discussion on these
potential scenarios is warranted and should naturally undergird all Air Force ISR
force planning.34
31Defense Support of Civil Authorities (or DSCA) is the current process by which United States
military assets and personnel can be used to assist in missions normally carried out by civil authori-
ties. These missions have included responses to natural and man-made disasters, law enforcement
support, special events, and other domestic activities. DSCA is the overarching guidance with respect
to how the United States military can be requested by a federal agency and the procedures that govern
the actions of the military during employment. The military can offer a variety of assistance, which
includes personnel or equipment. Among the most sought-after assets are transport (land, sea, and
air); fuel; communications; commodities including food, building supplies, and medicines; man-
power; technical assistance (especially logistics and communications), and the use of military facilities.
32The list of laws applicable to DSCA are numerous and complex; for example: Posse Comitatus Act,
18 U.S.C. 1385; Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. 331-335; Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistant Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121-5206; Homeland Security Act, 2002, 6 U.S.C. 101; National Emergencies
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1601-1651; Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. 1535, have all been used, modified, or are newly
created since September 11, 2001, and issues concerning DSCA are consistently being raised.
33Two examples may be anticipated: (1) civilian airspace incursion and (2) the legal restrictions
on spying on U.S. citizens. Air Force ISR planners would want to participate in some appropriate
manner in the development and execution of the Federal Aviation Agency's Next-Generation Air
Transportation System, specifically as it applies to management of the National Airspace System. There
are inherent challenges to flying aircraft without onboard pilots in both restricted and unrestricted
airspace. In the second example, the legal restrictions from using the vast array of ISR capabilities
against U.S. citizens must also always be in the forefront of Homeland Security-based ISR.
34Giulio Douhet, 1928: "to make a good instrument . . . first have a precise understanding of what
the instrument is to be used for . . . and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first
ask . . . what the next war will be like."
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ISR C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g the Air Force 23
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
This chapter provides a broad context of historical factors related to the devel-
opment of ISR capabilities and considers potential scenarios involving the use of
these capabilities. Chapter 2 addresses Task 1 of the TOR by reviewing the current
approach to the Air Force corporate planning and programming processes for
ISR CP&A. Chapter 3 covers Task 2 of the TOR by reviewing various analytical
methods, processes, and models for large-scale, complex domains like ISR, and
identifies best practices. Chapter 4 responds to Tasks 3 and 4 of the TOR by offer-
ing recommendations for Air Force consideration for the improvement of its ISR
CP&A process and an ideal model of an Air Force "system-of-systems" evaluation
process for ISR CP&A. Findings are embedded in the text of Chapters 2 and 3 after
the supporting evidence.
Appendix A provides biographical sketches of the committee members, and
Appendix B presents a list of the meetings held by the study committee, as well as
the names of the presenters and participating organizations. Appendix C serves as
a supplement to Chapter 3 by providing descriptions of additional organizational
CP&A processes and tools.
