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References Abbreviations ABS American Bureau of Shipping API American Petroleum Institute BOEMRE Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement BSI British Standards Institution CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board CSB U.S. Chemical Safety Board DNV Det Norske Veritas HSE Health and Safety Executive, United Kingdom IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors ISO International Organization for Standardization MMS-USCG Minerals Management Service–U.S. Coast Guard MOC Management of Change NAE-NRC National Academy of Engineering–National Research Council NRC National Research Council OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PSA Petroleum Safety Authority SPE Society of Petroleum Engineers USCG U.S. Coast Guard U.S. NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ABS. 2012. Guidance Notes on Safety Culture and Leading Indicators of Safety. Houston, Tex. http://www.eagle.org/eagleExternalPortalWEB/ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/ Rules&Guides/Current/188_Safety/Guide. Accessed May 31, 2012. ABSG Consulting Inc. 2006. Review of Process Safety Management Systems at BP North American Refineries for the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. ABSG Consulting Inc., Houston, Tex. API. 1990. Management of Process Hazards. API RP 750 (with errata). API, Washington, D.C. API. 1993. Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities, 1st ed. API RP 75. API, Washington, D.C. 106

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