when disease outbreaks are quickly identified, mitigated, and contained, but the consequences of such disease outbreaks can be enormous if and when a system fails. This study provides a high-level view of whether each of the three options stipulated by DHS could be feasible in meeting the nation’s needs. As discussed in Chapter 4, the committee also recognizes that the three DHS-proposed options may not be the only options worth considering. Concerns considered in this study—costs, necessary capabilities, and infrastructure needs—do not reflect all of the factors decision-makers must consider. The factors that were considered in the original assessment that led to decisions about the NBAF may or may not have changed. For example, safety concerns still linger on the issue of bringing foot-and-mouth disease research onto the US mainland and the risk of accidental release of FMDv and its consequent impacts (NRC, 2010, 2012). Decisions about infrastructure needs should not be made in the absence of risk concerns as well as the many other factors worthy of consideration. The committee concludes that to most appropriately fill critical laboratory needs in the United States, all factors of concern (including site location, risk assessment, political considerations, adaptability for the future) will need to be considered in a more comprehensive assessment (Conclusion 10).
NRC (National Research Council). 2010. Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security’s Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
NRC. 2012. Evaluation of the Updated Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.