Characteristics of a resilient community include “a sense of ownership and responsibility towards the community … (and) the ability to communicate and share resources during … or very shortly after … the disaster.”

Iowa citizen, 2011

5

Building Local Capacity and Accelerating Progress: Resilience from the Bottom Up

National resilience emerges, in large part, from the ability of local communities to plan and prepare for, absorb, respond, and recover from disasters and adapt to new and diverse conditions such as economic growth and decline, technology innovations, and rising sea level. Interventions to enhance resilience to disasters require both the “bottom-up” approaches at the local community level detailed in this chapter and the “top-down” strategies at the federal and state levels addressed in Chapter 6.

Bottom-up interventions are essential because local conditions vary greatly across the country and often jurisdictional issues exist around who can respond to the call to increase resilience, and when. The nation’s communities are unique in their history, geography, demography, culture, economic enterprise, governance, and infrastructure. Moreover, the risks faced by every community vary according to local hazards and exposure levels, vulnerabilities, and capacities to mitigate. Plans to enhance resilience to hazards and disasters in one locale may not match community baselines, assets, and requirements in another (see Chapters 2 and 3; NRC, 2011b). Building resilience in the face of disaster risk can also have benefits for a community even in the absence of a disaster in advancing the social capital for dealing with more mundane community challenges.

Although each community is responsible for developing its own path toward greater resilience, the committee identified some universal steps that can aid local communities in making progress to increase their capacity to withstand and recover from disasters. These steps are intended to strengthen both the social infrastructure, which reflects the ties among people and their commitments to collective problem solving, and the physical infrastructure, which includes the built environment and critical lifelines that house and sustain human activity. These steps include

  

• Engaging the whole community in disaster policy making and planning;

• Linking public and private infrastructure performance and interests to resilience goals;



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Characteristics of a resilient community include "a sense of ownership and responsibility towards the community . . . (and) the ability to communicate and share resources during . . . or very shortly after . . . the disaster." Iowa citizen, 2011 5 Building Local Capacity and Accelerating Progress: Resilience from the Bottom Up National resilience emerges, in large part, from the ability of local communities to plan and prepare for, absorb, respond, and recover from disasters and adapt to new and diverse conditions such as economic growth and decline, technology innovations, and rising sea level. Interventions to enhance resilience to disasters require both the "bottom-up" approaches at the local community level detailed in this chapter and the "top-down" strategies at the federal and state levels addressed in Chapter 6. Bottom-up interventions are essential because local conditions vary greatly across the country and often jurisdictional issues exist around who can respond to the call to increase resilience, and when. The nation's communities are unique in their history, geography, demography, culture, economic enterprise, governance, and infrastructure. Moreover, the risks faced by every community vary according to local hazards and exposure levels, vulnerabilities, and capacities to mitigate. Plans to enhance resilience to hazards and disasters in one locale may not match community baselines, assets, and requirements in another (see Chapters 2 and 3; NRC, 2011b). Building resilience in the face of disaster risk can also have benefits for a community even in the absence of a disaster in advancing the social capital for dealing with more mundane community challenges. Although each community is responsible for developing its own path toward greater resilience, the committee identified some universal steps that can aid local communities in making progress to increase their capacity to withstand and recover from disasters. These steps are intended to strengthen both the social infrastructure, which reflects the ties among people and their commitments to collective problem solving, and the physical infrastructure, which includes the built environment and critical lifelines that house and sustain human activity. These steps include Engaging the whole community in disaster policy making and planning; Linking public and private infrastructure performance and interests to resilience goals; 117

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118 DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE Improving public and private infrastructure and essential services (such as health and education); Communicating risks, connecting community networks, and promoting a culture of resilience; Organizing communities, neighborhood, and families to prepare for disasters; Adopting sound land-use planning practices; and Adopting and enforcing building codes and standards appropriate to existing hazards. This chapter reviews the essential elements of these steps as a means for communities to secure a foundation either to begin, or to help reinforce, initiatives and programs to enhance resilience. WHOLE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT Consensus is emerging among policy makers (DHHS, 2009; DHS, 2010; FEMA, 2010, 2011), practitioners (Patton, 2007; Waugh and Streib, 2006), and researchers (NRC, 2010, 2011b) that collaboration between the private and public sectors can enhance the disaster resilience of a community. Indeed, the National Research Council has released a number of recent reports that spotlight the role of privatepublic partnerships and collaborative organizational structures in strengthening community resilience to disasters (NRC, 2005a, 2006a, 2009, 2010, 2011b). The most pressing issue in moving forward with this kind of collaboration is how to involve the community and businesses--both part of the private sector--effectively and productively in decision making and capacity building for disaster resilience. During the course of this study, the committee has identified four mechanisms for engagement that could assist communities in building capacity and becoming an effective part of the decision making process for disaster resilience (Table 5.1). These mechanisms tie back to the risk management cycle outlined in Chapter 2. Table 5.1 Mechanisms for Community Engagement in Disaster Policy Making Mechanism Purpose Development of broad-based Rather than just an instrument to secure a community coalitions community's concrete commitment to disaster resilience, the development of a broad-based community coalition is itself a resilience-generating mechanism in that it links people together to solve problems and builds trust. Involvement from a diverse set of Because no single entity can deliver the community members--the "full complete public good of resilience (see fabric" of the community Chapter 3), resilience becomes a shared

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BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY AND ACCELERATING PROGRESS 119 value and responsibility. Collaboration in fostering interest in resilience in the community can ensure that the full fabric of the community has the opportunity to be included in the problem-solving endeavor--and that it represents public and private interests and people with diverse social and economic backgrounds. Building organizational capacity Meaningful privatepublic partnerships and leadership for community resilience depend upon strong governance and organizational structures, leadership, and sustained resources for success. Resilience plan A priority activity for a local disaster collaborative is planning for stepwise improvements in community resilience. Community Coalitions to Foster Community Resilience Teaming up to take proactive steps to manage risks--such as a resilience privatepublic coalition--embodies several preconditions for successful adaptation by a community facing a major disturbance or stress. In their interdisciplinary review of the resilience literature, Norris et al. (2008) conclude that those communities that adapt well to adversity--and quickly return to a state of population wellness--do so through reliance on four key resources and their interactions: (1) economic resources (including the level and diversity of, and access to, these resources), (2) social capital (including organizational and interpersonal links, the sense of community among the citizens, and citizens' own participation in community life), (3) information and communication (which have to involve trusted information sources and outlets), and (4) community competence (group skills for collective action and a system of shared beliefs). Another leading model of resilience similarly recognizes resources, communication, connectedness, commitment, and shared values, and critical reflection and skill building as major contributing factors to a community's ability to rebound from disasters (Pfefferbaum et al., 2008). In this context, privatepublic partnerships become an essential vehicle for enhancing community resilience to disasters (e.g., the Safeguard Iowa Partnership; see NRC, 2011b). Such partnerships have the potential to focus diverse social networks around a common cause, to facilitate the sharing of information essential to understanding risk and means to reduce it, and to apply the intellectual strengths of many people to the problems of building resilience to disasters. These partnerships serve as coalitions to act as a collective and cohesive unit that can define, address, and solve problems for the betterment of the community (Pfefferbaum et al., 2008). Experience in the emergency

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120 DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE management sector illustrates how privatepublic coalitions are integral to community efforts to build resilience (Box 5.1). BOX 5.1 Emergency Management and Unity of Effort to Increase Resilience The following is extracted from the document "Principles of Emergency Management" (IAEM, 2007) and identifies some of the principles of emergency management that relate to the role of emergency managers as practitioners of risk management. "Emergency managers ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all elements of a community. In the early 1980s, emergency managers adopted the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS), an all-hazards approach to the direction, control and coordination of disasters regardless of their location, size and complexity. IEMS integrates partnerships that include all stakeholders in the community's decision-making processes. IEMS is intended to create an organizational culture that is critical to achieving unity of effort between governments, key community partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. Unity of effort is dependent on both vertical and horizontal integration. This means that at the local level, emergency programs have to be integrated with other activities of government. For example, department emergency plans have to be synchronized with and support the overall emergency operations plan for the community. In addition, plans at all levels of local government ultimately have to be integrated with and support the community's vision and be consistent with its values. Similarly, private sector continuity plans have to take into account the community's emergency operations plan. Businesses today are demanding greater interface with government to understand how to react to events that threaten business survival. Additionally, businesses can provide significant resources during disasters and thus may be a critical component of the community's emergency operations plan. In addition, given the high percentage of critical infrastructure owned by the private sector, failure to include businesses in emergency programs could have grave consequences for the community. In this sense of using coalitions to best advantage to increase disaster resilience, local emergency management programs also have to be aligned and synchronized with higher-level plans and programs in government. The need for this kind of synchronization is most noticeable in the dependence of local government on county, state and federal resources during a disaster [see below; also Chapter 6]. If plans have not been aligned and synchronized, allocation of resources may be delayed. Integrating emergency management into daily decisions in the community is important so that critical decisions are not made only during times

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BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY AND ACCELERATING PROGRESS 121 of disasters. While protecting the population is a primary responsibility of government, this kind of protection is difficult to accomplish without building partnerships among disciplines and across all community sectors, including the private sector and primary communications entities such as the media." The Full Fabric of Community Woven into Resilience Coalitions Resilience is a shared responsibility. As outlined in Chapter 3, responsibility for strengthening resilience does not rest solely with government, particularly given the wealth of resources and capacities resident in the community itself. In the United States, the public sector constitutes just 10 percent of the total workforce (NRC, 2011b). The remaining 90 percent works in both the private sector--from small, individually owned businesses to national and global conglomerates--and in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and faith-based organizations (FBOs). Ownership, management, and intimate technical understanding of the country's critical infrastructure--water, power, communication, health care, and transportation networks--rests largely in private hands. Community- and faith-based groups usually have established leadership and communication structures and social standing in the community. They have proven powerful allies in disaster response and recovery (Wachtendorf and Kendra, 2004) and thus have natural roles in the building of overall disaster resilience (Box 5.2). Often, they are assisted by their networks outside of the disaster region, thus improving the response to the disaster, and providing valuable experience for groups in other regions. For example, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, churches around the country assisted their counterparts in New Orleans and Mississippi. Universities did the same, taking in students from the affected region for the fall semester, often at no charge. BOX 5.2 Health Department Uses Community Approach to Protect People Against Carbon Monoxide Poisoning In December of 2006, record-setting torrential rains and high wind speeds in King County, Washington, interrupted power to 1.5 million utility customers. As power outages wore on, area hospitals saw unprecedented numbers of patients with carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning. This health threat accounted for 8 of the state's 15 storm-related fatalities. The profile of early patients showing up at local hospitals with evidence of CO poisoning suggested that immigrant groups were at increased risk. Faced with no power, for instance, some Somali and Vietnamese immigrants turned to cooking and warming themselves over charcoal grills indoors. The difficulties conducting effective outreach to immigrant and refugee communities during this power outage

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122 DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE propelled Public HealthSeattle and King County to reevaluate communications procedures to include the whole of the community. Working with their Vulnerable Populations Action Team (VPAT), the health department developed a Community Communications Network consisting of over 150 community organizations to relay information to the people they serve. Stronger relationships developed with many of these organizations, leading to the formation of new groups who were ready to mobilize, such as a Somali Health Board of ethnic community leaders. Informational interviews and focus groups with diverse members of the local communities lead to better information about trusted sources of information and effective methods of distribution. In January 2012, the region experienced a snow and ice storm that led to a similar power outage situation. However, with the strengthened resilience coalition in place, Public HealthSeattle and King County rapidly disseminated CO information to community partners using channels recommended by the community. Flyers in 25 languages blanketed hardware stores, grocery stores, language schools, apartments and businesses in identified neighborhoods. Information was broadcast over ethnic media outlets, community webcasts, loudspeakers at Lunar New Year festivals, taxicab dispatchers, and through a robo-call from a local mosque. Most importantly, hundreds of community partners received CO warnings and relayed information to their constituents. As a result, the number of CO poisonings was a tenth of what they were 5 years prior, and there were no fatalities. This culturally sensitive, social network- driven response likely reduced poisoning incidents. At the same time, it built up relationships and goodwill between the health department and diverse community segments. Sources: Broom (2007); Public HealthSeattle and King County (2006, 2012a,b). Successful collaborations in the interest of resilience also require input from people representing the full spectrum of a community's members including minorities, the disenfranchised, those with disabilities, children, senior citizens, and other subgroups that are potentially vulnerable to disaster impacts. Integrating the perspectives and contributions of these populations into resilience-enhancing activities is especially important because the chances for greater victimization during a disaster are unevenly distributed in society, as are opportunities for enhanced safety (Tierney et al., 2001; NRC, 2006b; Enarson, 2007; Morrow, 2008; Mary Claire Landry, personal communication, 2011 [see also Appendix B and NRC, 2011a]). At the same time, the resilience of at-risk populations and the perspective that they can bring to disaster risk reduction cannot be underestimated (Schoch-Spana et al., 2008). People who have coped with daily disasters such as poverty, deprived neighborhoods, or high rates of crime and violence may not see themselves as vulnerable, and ethnic groups cut off from mainstream society may still have strong internal ties that protect against some disaster impacts. An example is the Vietnamese community in

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BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY AND ACCELERATING PROGRESS 123 New Orleans and their recovery after Hurricane Katrina (Box 5.3; see also NRC, 2011a). At the broadest scale of the nation, integrating the full fabric of a community into a resilience-enhancing collaboration may require a diverse set of strategies and incentives to motivate participation. People may be more inclined to embrace disaster loss reduction and enhanced public safety when they see something of personal value in reaching for these goals (Geis, 2000). A commercial enterprise, for example, may be motivated to engage in resilience- enhancing initiatives by the potential return on investments (e.g., reduced chances for business interruption), by access to information that improves business continuity planning, and by an increase in its public standing in the community (NRC, 2011b). A good example of this occurred in Rutland, Vermont, which was severely affected by flooding from Hurricane/Tropical Storm Irene in August 2011, as was the surrounding region. The only large grocery store in the area was badly flooded, but a very functional, temporary solution was established to allow residents to meet their daily needs and return to a sense of normalcy (Figure 5.1). BOX 5.3 Seeing Itself as Self-Reliant, a Vietnamese Community Weathers Serial Disasters in the Gulf About 8,000 of the approximately 40,000 Vietnamese residents on the U.S. Gulf Coast live in New Orleans East, among a large African American and Hispanic population (NRC, 2011a). Many community members came from Vietnam in 1975, when a large number of South Vietnamese immigrants arrived in the United States. Presently, the East New Orleans community now includes the children and grandchildren of these original immigrants. The residents with whom the committee spoke during their visit to the area described their relative isolation before Katrina as one without interaction with other sociocultural groups living in the area, but that all of these groups joined together after Katrina. They described themselves as self-reliant people who had built new lives after fleeing Vietnam. Community members spoke of their collective efforts to get everyone to safety during and immediately after Hurricane Katrina in a community where they said ~30 percent were elderly. The pastor of the local Catholic church where many of the residents attend services, Rev. Vien The Nguyen, took a boat through flooded neighborhoods to check on community members; they lost only one elderly person to the storm out of the entire population. Their evacuation planning was coordinated through the church and the local radio station directly through community initiatives. Because fishing was a main source of income, Hurricane Katrina significantly affected a large segment of the community's livelihood, and after the storm, the community collectively decided to work together to rebuild, sharing with the community building and carpentry skills that some community members had developed back in Vietnam. Of the experience, one community

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124 DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE member said "We are all carpenters now (NRC, 2011a)." After repairing their houses, they helped each other repair their boats, without bank loans, and with little immediate help from federal or other government sources. Nonetheless, when some federal funding did arrive, the community members expressed some surprise and gratitude for the additional support. As with other communities along the Gulf Coast, the Deepwater Horizon blowout and subsequent oil spill in 2010 affected the community in East New Orleans again. With one-third of the community in the fishing industry, the fishing season was severely affected and anticipated income from the fishing industry put into doubt. The Vietnamese community members stressed their ability to plan as a community, to carry out their plans when disaster struck, to rebuild, and to work together to seek improvements in their community following both disasters. From an outside perspective, their refugee experience and cultural values around helping each other helped to build both resilience and a sense of community, which served as points of strength during natural and human-induced disasters. In California's Alameda County, Collaborating Agencies Responding to Disaster (CARD) promotes disaster preparedness among grassroots groups and social services agencies serving vulnerable populations, by providing them with dual-use tools. CARD, for instance, has transformed the traditional Incident Command System into a leadership course that improves the skills of nonprofit organizations at managing resources and relating to other agencies on a day-to- day basis (Schoch-Spana et al., 2008). FIGURE 5.1 Grocery store in a tent. This tent began operating shortly after the flooding in Vermont as a result of Hurricane Irene. A generator truck is off to the left and the brick and mortar store (the damaged grocery store) behind the tent. The makeshift tent supplied residents' needs through at least early January 2012. Source: Allan H. Stern.

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BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY AND ACCELERATING PROGRESS 125 Building a diverse constituency base around the public goal of disaster resilience has the added benefit of countering interests that otherwise motivate people to engage in risky behavior. Driven by a profit motive, for example, developers may elect to build homes in hazard-prone areas such as along the nation's coasts; similarly, people continue to purchase homes in these areas, driven by the wish to live in what they perceive as a desirable location. In addition, development of vulnerable coastal zones or river floodplains may be encouraged by local decision makers who see such development as an opportunity to expand the tax base for their jurisdiction. On the other hand, strategies exist both to deter people from either building or choosing to live in hazard-prone areas and to mitigate against existing hazards through specific building techniques and approaches (see structural and nonstructural measures in Chapter 2). A broad-based constituency may help build the local political will to execute community resilience-enhancing measures possible only through public institutions and government action. Positive examples include Tulsa, Oklahoma's land-use reforms and stormwater utility fees in support of the local flood control program (Meo et al., 2004), or locally supported taxes to subsidize the retrofitting of public buildings against seismic hazards, in the case of Berkeley, California (Chakos et al., 2002; see also Chapter 2). However, these kinds of systematic remedies in the public interest can be unpopular to some and prove difficult to establish more broadly in the country. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, while committed to a long-term recovery and mitigation strategy following the dramatic 2008 floods, is nonetheless challenged with how to cover its portion of the costs associated with a proposed flood protection and management system (Chuck Wieneke, personal communication, March 8, 2011). Organizational Capacity and Leadership to Sustain Collaboration Strong leadership and a sustained organizational base are critical for facilitating collaboration to enhance resilience. Successful community-based partnerships leading to improved hazard mitigation practices often have had key, inspired individuals or champions who have catalyzed larger institutional changes (Prater and Lindell, 2000). Such was the case in the Berkeley, California, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, cases mentioned earlier. Institutionalizing a shared vision improves the likelihood that the collaboration will be sustained even after the dynamic leadership changes (NRC, 2010). Sustaining publicprivate resilience coalitions requires an individual or group dedicated to advancing the collective project and keeping resilience on the community's overall agenda when interest might otherwise lag or opposition is encountered. For example, local coordinators for government-sponsored programs such as FEMA's Project Impact, preparedness coordinators for local health departments, and dedicated staff and institutional champions have been suggested as key ingredients for successful collaborations for resilience- building activities (Roussos and Fawcett, 2000; Tierney, 2000; Avery and Zabriskie-Timmerman, 2009; Orians et al., 2009).

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126 DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE Although the coordinating function is seen as central to the longevity and effectiveness of a resilience-focused collaboration, opinions are divided as to whether government or a nonpartisan entity is the appropriate actor to fulfill this duty (NRC, 2011b). Whether a governmental entity or a nongovernmental group is the final accountable entity for integrating individuals, communities, and businesses to increase community resilience, any resilience-focused collaboration is necessarily a part of consistent support for the legal authority of emergency management agencies. Regardless of where responsibility for coordination lies, resource allocation for this management function is important. A Resilient Future Relies upon a Commitment to Planning Communities can greatly increase their resilience through short- and long-term planning that is developed, endorsed, and implemented by officials of government, business, health care, education, and community-based organizations (CBOs). The plan would include risk management (see Chapter 2), community organization with chartered roles and responsibilities, named leaders, and a jointly developed community-committed culture; a resource management function to assign value to the community assets (plans, programs, control/oversight; see Chapter 3); and metrics to assess progress (see Chapter 4) (Table 5.2). To maximize effective implementation, a resilience plan may align its goals with a culture of self-reliance; community self-sufficiency; and mutual aid and interdependencies with neighboring communities, state and federal government entities, and NGOs CBOs, and FBOs. Although specific resilience goals may vary among communities, a common set of principles (see Chapter 1) may help build a culture of resilience and steps toward achieving higher levels of disaster resilience. Table 5.2 Suggested Elements of a Local Resilience Plan Program Element Attributes Community organization Reflects community structure and leadership Standards and codes Represents current and needed building and development codes, standards, and zoning ordinances, where compliance and enforcement are emphasized Performance metrics and resilience Represents assessment status and rating system needs for essential progress in building resilience and desired performance of critical services and infrastructure following disruption

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BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY AND ACCELERATING PROGRESS 127 Education and communication Represents critical education, outreach, and communication plans and practices for resilience to reach all community members Local capacity Designed to establish baselines and close essential capacity gaps in the community Resource management Integrates resources such as human and financial capital, mutual aid agreements, asset management strategies, essential relationships within interdependent communities and agencies LINKING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE INTERESTS Lifelines The second step for enhancing resilience at the local level is to link private and public infrastructure performance and interests. Accountability for critical infrastructure systems is dispersed across the public and private sectors (see Chapter 3). Lifelines-- essential utility (e.g., domestic water/wastewater systems, industrial waste systems, power systems, fuel systems, telecommunications systems) and transportation systems (e.g., highways, bridges, railroads, transit systems, airports, seaports, waterways)--are both publicly and privately owned and share the attributes of being distributed systems, rather than isolated facilities. They also provide products and services that are transferred through networks that often cross legal and jurisdictional boundaries (ALA, 2005). To complicate matters, these lifelines are in variable states of age and condition. It is essential to conduct assessments of the quality and condition of these, and to make needed improvements in order to enhance resilience. Genuine resilience of community lifelines cannot be achieved in piecemeal fashion by private and public entities acting on their own. Instead, as Chapter 3 outlined, resilience requires that local infrastructure leaders come together to assess the status, vulnerability, and interdependencies of their holdings; set performance metrics for individual components and entire systems; and develop plans for enhancing the infrastructure's ability to withstand failure and for speeding the resumption of operations during disaster response and recovery (Box 5.4). As a locally based method of risk management, public private infrastructure coalitions can also run joint community exercises using stress scenarios to test their systems for weak spots, initiate operational

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148 DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 6. To provide for the safe use and occupancy of buildings and for healthful and convenient distribution of population; 7. To provide for promotion of the civic amenities of beauty and visual interest, for preservation and enhancement of historic buildings and places, and for promotion of large-scale developments as means of achieving unified civic design; and 8. To provide for development in accord with the Comprehensive Plan. SOURCE: New Orleans Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, March 3, 2011, http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16306&stateId=18&stateName=Louisiana. Consequences of a Lack of Building Code Enforcement and Zoning Provisions Despite widespread availability of codes and zoning guidelines and agreement by most officials that these governance tools benefit community resilience, many unsafe buildings still exist and many communities continue to allow development in hazardous areas. The major reasons that municipal and state jurisdictions find it difficult to enforce building codes and zoning laws include the lack of resources or number of qualified personnel to do so, pressure from developers to grow communities, and lack of political will to manage land use through zoning (Burby, 1998). Building code enforcement costs money, namely in the form of salaries for qualified, trained technical staff who inspect both new and retrofit construction, issue judgments on compliance, and carry out follow-up inspections when failure to comply arises. Municipal and county governments facing limited budgets, and many competing public demands often result in cuts to these critical personnel. As expressed by useful-community-development.org, "Most towns and cities practice only complaint-based code enforcement, largely for cost reasons."10 Construction and building inspectors held about 106,400 jobs in 2008, and the median annual wages of construction and building inspectors were $50,180 in May 2008 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). Many of the 19,510 incorporated towns and cities in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) struggle to maintain the most basic public services delivered by police, fire, and teachers. At the same time that inspectors are in short supply, the builders and building owners may resist compliance, especially if such measures require additional investment. Though the short-term funding issues are unfortunately often the determinant of local code enforcement, the adoption and enforcement of building codes have proven to be economically beneficial in reducing property damage, improving life safety, and increasing the resilience of communities (Cohen and Noll, 1981; Multihazard Mitigation 10 http://www.useful-community-development.org/code-enforcement.html.

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BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY AND ACCELERATING PROGRESS 149 Council, 2002). However, tension between local and national interests arises when local building codes contain provisions that respond to specific community interests and concerns. The national code may be seen as a constraint on the community's ability to construct buildings the way that they require (NRC, 1989b). Strategies to Reverse Lack of Enforcement Existing engineering technologies, tools, and design criteria provide guidance for codes and standards to support prevention, mitigation, and risk avoidance; however, accelerating the enforcement of these regulations has proved to be difficult and expensive for local government. What is the best way to encourage and accelerate the enforcement of building and zoning codes where enforcement is currently not universal? One potential mechanism is to tie the adoption and enforcement of building codes to state eligibility requirements for federal disaster relief funds and programs. Although sometimes politically unpopular, such an approach can help build a culture of resilience. Other mechanisms may include the provision of additional training to public safety officials for code enforcement inspections(e.g., fire departments, emergency services personnel, emergency managers) who could assist in tight fiscal times (Timm, 2004). Finally, penalties and sanctions levied against developers who blatantly ignore codes is another option, but this may also result in the need for more inspections and the resources to hire additional staff. To address resilience in the built environment, codes and standards may also need to consider integrating new language, considering all of the building design criteria, and expanding standards beyond life-safety aspects, including safety and usability (Poland, 2011). Performance-based standards and codes, for example, have historically served as objective-based requirements for a building designer to meet (Ching and Winkel, 2009). New building codes and standards that extend beyond life-safety aspects may include resilient design concepts in a performance-based approach, as well as continuity of operations (NIBS and DHS, 2010). Additionally, the codes could integrate frequent and well-adopted design measurements and standards, providing a flexible platform to address different facility and structure types and recognizing the differing levels of performance that are required. Higher minimums for building codes may be another mechanism to increase the visible, direct links between building code and standard enforcement and resilience. The current minimum requirements prescribed by building codes, while laying the groundwork for resilience, do not provide adequate design guidance for resilience. An outcome of the Designing for a Resilient America: A Stakeholder Summit on High Performance Resilient Buildings and Related Infrastructure held in November 2010 was that U.S.

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150 DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE building codes and standards need to set more stringent minimum requirements, for health and life safety, that are enforced by many jurisdictions across the country and supported by state legislation.11 Design guidance on providing serviceability criteria and enhanced safety standards is limited or, in some cases, unavailable to designers and owners because higher resiliency requirements are not integrated at the most minimum model building codes. Uniform adoption by jurisdictions begins with the development of design criteria, building codes, and standards that address resiliency objectives and the technologies and validation for their use (NIBS and DHS, 2010). RESEARCH AND INFORMATION NEEDS A number of areas need additional research to fully understand local opportunities for and constraints to enhancing community resilience. First, no systematic or evidence-based assessment has been conducted to identify which strategies are most effective in fostering local collaborations to build community resilience. Most of the information appears to be anecdotal or tied to case studies at present, with little evidence to support whether generic strategies can be customized for the local context. Second, the economic impacts of changes in building codes or zoning laws are not tied well or directly to the receipt of disaster relief. Would such explicit ties make communities more receptive to implementation and/or enforcement of building codes and zoning laws? At present, that question cannot be answered. Finally, studies are needed to evaluate the reliability and validity of information communicated through social media and whether the integration of social media into disaster preparedness, response, and resilience efforts affects the costs, quality, or outcomes (Merchant et al., 2011). SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Resilience requires reinforcement of our physical environment--the buildings and critical infrastructure that support the communities in which we live. It also requires the strengthening of our social infrastructure--the local community networks that can mobilize to plan, make decisions, and communicate effectively. The interconnectedness of the social and physical infrastructure requires that both aree enhanced simultaneously with equal consideration to increasing resilience. The principal action through which a local community could vastly accelerate progress toward enhanced resilience of its 11 For more information on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security stakeholder summit, please see http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/st-bips-designing-resilient.shtm. Accessed February 12, 2012.

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BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY AND ACCELERATING PROGRESS 151 social and physical infrastructure is establishment of a problem-solving coalition of local leaders from public and private sectors, with ties to and support from federal and state governments, and with input from the greater citizenry. The charge of such a coalition would be to assess the community's exposure and vulnerability to risk, educating and communicating about risk, and evaluating and expanding its capacity to handle such risk. A truly robust coalition would have at its core a strong leadership and governance structure, with a person or persons with adequate time, skill, and dedication necessary for the development and maintenance of relationships among all partners. Recommendation: Federal, state, and local governments should support the creation and maintenance of broad-based community resilience coalitions at local and regional levels. Efforts to support coalition development should include: Assessment by the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human Services--to the extent that these two agencies administer state and local grant programs to bolster national preparedness capabilities--of present federal funding frameworks and technical guidance. Such an assessment could gauge whether communities have sufficient support and incentive to adopt collaborative problem-solving approaches toward disaster resilience and disaster risk management. Adoption by communities of collaborative problem-solving approaches in which all private and public stakeholders (e.g., businesses, NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs) are partners in identifying hazards, developing mitigation strategies, communicating risk, contributing to disaster response, and setting recovery priorities. The emergency management community is an important integrated part of these discussions, potentially taking on a leadership role. Commitment by state and local governments to secure adequate personnel to create and sustain publicprivate resilience partnerships, to promulgate and implement proposed national resilience standards and guidelines for communities, and to assist communities in the completion of the proposed national resilience scorecard. Building codes and standards are effective in mitigating and reducing disaster risk to communities. However, codes and standards have some variability due to the nature of local hazards; across the nation they are unevenly enforced and many people do not know they exist. In addition to codes and standards, guidelines, certifications, and practices also can be effective in fostering resilience. Recommendation: Federal agencies, together with local and regional partners, researchers, professional groups, and the private sector should

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152 DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE develop an essential framework (codes, standards, and guidelines) that drive the critical structural functions of resilience. This framework should include national standards for infrastructure resilience and guidelines for land use and other structural mitigation options, especially in known hazard areas such as floodplains. The Department of Homeland Security is an appropriate agency to help coordinate this government- wide activity. The adoption and enforcement of this framework at the local level should be strongly encouraged by the framework document and accompanied by a commitment from state and local governments to ensure that zoning laws and building codes are adopted and enforced.

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