Framework and Structure


The Chemical and Biological Mission Is Broad and the Strategy Is Unclear

CBDP Mission: “Provide global chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense capabilities in support of National Strategies”

A contribution to the persistent problem space, besides the organization, is that the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) mission statement is overly broad, allowing wide-ranging interpretation of what is included and, therefore, what is most important. Among the four principle missions are

  • Warfighting: Operate Through,
  • Homeland Defense,
  • Warfighting Support Functions, and
  • Consequence Management (Foreign or Domestic).

Among these four missions, priorities vary within each office and with leadership changes each shift priorities in terms of resource allocation and programmatic emphasis.

In the last decade and a half, the CBDP has seen its strategy shift—appropriately in the view of the committee—as leadership has sought a better balance between chemical threats (previously dominant) and

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2 Framework and Structure ORGANIZATIONAL CONCERNS The Chemical and Biological Mission Is Broad and the Strategy Is Unclear CBDP Mission: "Provide global chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense capabilities in support of National Strategies" A contribution to the persistent problem space, besides the organiza- tion, is that the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) mis- sion statement is overly broad, allowing wide-ranging interpretation of what is included and, therefore, what is most important. Among the four principle missions are Warfighting: Operate Through, Homeland Defense, Warfighting Support Functions, and Consequence Management (Foreign or Domestic). Among these four missions, priorities vary within each office and with leadership changes each shift priorities in terms of resource allocation and programmatic emphasis. In the last decade and a half, the CBDP has seen its strategy shift-- appropriately in the view of the committee--as leadership has sought a better balance between chemical threats (previously dominant) and 25

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26 CORE CAPABILITIES IN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE biological threats (of greater concern post 2001 anthrax mailings), and to address the rise of sub- or transnational perpetrators. Accompany- ing the strategy shift have been changes in investment priorities, but not necessarily in a comparably balanced way. Seeking to have impact quickly, leadership first de-emphasized contamination avoidance in favor of broad-spectrum medical countermeasures. More recently that too has shifted to greater international cooperative public health monitoring and threat reduction. The changes have resulted in rapid ramp-up of invest- ments initially in the Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative (TMTI) in 2005, followed more recently by a decline in TMT funding1 but upticks in biosurveillance and the biological aspects of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. While it is difficult to argue against the importance of any of these principle mission areas, all of them demand sustained investments over many years to achieve both fielded capabilities and a robust S&T base to support and advance the state of the art against threats that are not static. Significant variations in funding over three- to four-year cycles are unlikely to yield much progress. For example, the complexities of the development and approval process for a new medical countermeasure require a commitment of approximately eight to ten years. A different set of challenges faces implementation of an international biosurveillance network as it will require that information from many, varied data streams must be carefully integrated in order for analysis to be meaningful. The committee believes in the wisdom of a defense-in-depth strategy, which balances investments end to end, from pre- to post-event elements. Moreover, sustained investments over appropriate periods of time are required. This approach does not translate to guaranteed funding to per- formers--they should still be accountable for progress--but it does mean that program decisions come with leadership commitment of continued support as milestones are met on the path to fielded new or improved capabilities. 1 The committee heard from several former TMT performers; one possible conclusion is that TMT became a "Big Science" project that outgrew the CBD organizational structure and management culture that was geared toward managing small, independent projects within distinct divisions (e.g., Diagnostics, Medical Countermeasures, etc.). It appears likely that this small-science managerial culture still predominates throughout the Department of Defense (DoD), which has potential implications for the newly growing programs, particu- larly since their success requires effective managerial coordination across both the JSTO-CBD and the JPEO-CBD.

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FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE 27 Organization of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program History Prior to the first Gulf War (1991), chemical and biological defense science and techology (S&T) was conducted in the individual Military Services, with the Army being the primary participant (supplemented by limited interest, funding, and execution in the other Services). While the threat was generally known throughout DoD, and perhaps the gen- eral public, until the confrontation with Iraq there had never been an imminent chemical and biological (CB) threat. Fortunately, there was no documented use of either a chemical or biological agent by Iraq against US forces. Nonetheless, the perceived lack of adequate protection against chemical and biological agents rose to an unprecedented level of interest, both within DoD and Congress. Congressional interest resulted in the enactment of PL 103-160 in 1993. This statute consolidated the CBDP into a joint program, with "over- sight" at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). To address the need for Joint Service participation and execution of the program, two groups were established. First, the Joint Service Integration Group (JSIG) was directed to identify Joint requirements and to lead development of a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) that would address the needs of the Services. Second, the Joint Service Materiel Group (JSMG) was cre- ated to oversee the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) functions of the CBDP. The JSMG created the Joint Program Office (JPO) to manage the advanced development aspects of the program. The Army took the lead for creating this office and it essentially reported to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisi- tion (ASARDA), thus creating a bifurcated reporting chain. The JPO was originally headed by an Army Colonel (Chemical Corps background), with a civilian deputy. Subsequently, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD), successor to the JPO, was recognized as an Acquisition billet and therefore filled with appropri- ately trained individuals, while maintaining a senior civilian as the dep- uty. Both the JSIG and JSMG had flag officer members, and theoretically reported to the OSD to comply with the mandate that OSD be the single focal point within DoD. This somewhat cumbersome management struc- ture remained in place for approximately 10 years. Changes in leadership at various levels resulted in changes in program direction and varying levels of interest, oversight, and advocacy for the program from the OSD. The second Gulf War in the early 2000's led to the difficult realization that not much had changed in the CBDP in the preceding decade. Sub- sequently, a memo from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, issued in 2003, created the current program

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28 CORE CAPABILITIES IN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE management structure. In this arrangement, management of the S&T pro- grams was assigned to the JSTO-CBD within the Defense Threat Reduc- tion Agency (DTRA), the advanced development programs continued to be managed by the JPEO-CBD, and the responsibility for establishing the requirements for the CBDP was assigned to a new office within the J-8 of the Joint Staff (the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Bio- logical, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (JRO-CBRND)). This system, represented in Figure 2.1, has created a program management structure which has different reporting chains (i.e., the JSTO-CBD reports to DTRA leadership; the JPEO-CBD reports to ASARDA; and the JRO-CBRND reports to the Joint Staff). Oversight at the OSD level is limited, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense (DASD(CBD)) having no mandated authority to change pro- gram direction, influence the POM and budget, or coordinate individual program/project efforts. This management structure, not surprisingly, is far from effective. Despite claims to the contrary, the committee observed that individual components work independently, with no clear definition of mission and no clear allegiance to program leadership. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemi- cal, and Biological Defense Programs/Chemical and Biological Defense (OASD(NCB/CB)), JRO-CBRND, JSTO-CBD, and JPEO-CBD each view the chemical and biological defense mission from a different perspective. Although this is appropriate to some degree, the coordination and col- laboration between these groups is far from seamless, which limits their ability to contribute to the mission and vision of the program as a whole.2 JRO-CBRND views the program in terms of operational elements (i.e., Sense, Shape, Shield, Sustain) and functionalities (e.g., chem- ical point detection and biological prophylaxis). JPEO-CBD views the program in line with the JRO-CBRND oper- ational elements in terms of acquisition and fielding of products (e.g., Joint Chemical Agent Detector, anthrax vaccine). JSTO-CBD views the program in terms of S&T capabilities (four thrusts and seven enablers), with the focus on research and early development. These different views are summarized in Figure 2.2. Overall, there is a lack of clarity within CBDP regarding the full scope of the mission space. Though all parts of the program agree on the dominance of the war fighting mission, there is not necessarily agreement on whether the goal of CBD should be enabling warfighters to "operate through" or if 2 See Appendix C for individual framework descriptions.

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Other Key Stakeholders Chairman, Under Secretary of Defense Joint Chiefs (Acquisition, Technology, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) of Sta and Logistics) Ass't Secretary of Defense (Health A airs) Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Services OVERSIGHT Combatant Commands Other Government Agencies Assistant Secretary of Defense Director, for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological J-8 Defense Programs Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Defense Advanced for Chemical and Biological Defense Defense Threat Reduction Research Projects Agency (DTRA) Agency (DARPA) Joint Requirements O ce CBRN Defense Joint Science and Technology O ce (Chemical and Biological Defense) REQUIREMENTS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Secretary of the Army CBDP Program Analysis and Joint Program Executive O ce Test and Evaluation Executive Integration O ce Chemical and Biological Defense TEST AND PROGRAM ADV DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION INTEGRATION AND ACQUISITION FIGURE 2.1 Organizational chart of the CBDP enterprise. Solid lines indicate formal line of authority; dotted lines indicate neces- sary coordination, but no formal lines of authority. The principal program players in the CBDP are highlighted with red borders. The dotted line or no line connectivity among them is factual. No hard-line relationships exist among these offices and the com- mittee observed that indeed each appears to act on its own, with separate organizing constructs as portrayed in the framework comparison of Figure 2.2. There is, in fact, no program-wide chemical and biological defense strategy, or common characterization Figure 2-1 29 of the program elements. Broadside

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30 CORE CAPABILITIES IN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE DASD(CBD) JRO and JPEO JSTO Capability Focus Areas: Operational Elements: Strategic Thrusts and Enablers: Disease Surveillance, Threat Detection Surveillance Sense and Point of Need Diagnostics Adaptive Medical Countermeasures Medical Countermeasures Shape and Technologies Hazard Mitigation Shield Threat Activity Sensing and Reporting Rapid Response and Restoration Enabling Technologies Sustain Science and Technology Supportive Enablers FIGURE 2.2 Chart comparing the high-level frameworks, primary CBDP enter- prise elements. it is achieving zero casualties after exposure to CB threats. In addition, these different missions mean that many parts of the organizations do not share a common understanding of what priority should be placed on the support missions (either for the warfighter or to civil authorities). All of this is concerning for both CBDP's development and acquisition functions because ambiguity about mission priorities could lead to overspecified, underspecified, and/or unspecified requirements, or worse, no fielded capability. THE COMMITTEE'S APPROACH Taking into consideration the multiple perspectives of the CBDP offices, the committee found that it needed both common definitions and a common framework in order to determine the core S&T capabilities that are required for the CBDP. The committee agreed on a series of definitions to discuss the CBDP capabilities. The chemical and biological defense enterprise is encouraged to maintain a well-defined set of terms for use in the CBDP enterprise. The working definitions for this report are: CBD operational capability: Ability to assure success of the mili- tary mission by avoiding or operating in/through a chemically or biologically contaminated environment.

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FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE 31 S&T capability: RDT&E capacity and RDT&E competency to enable development, improvement, and/or innovation of a CBD operational capability. a.RDT&E capacity: Resources (e.g., equipment, facilities, peo- ple, plans, funds, etc.) that enable a capability. b.RDT&E competency: Quality at which a function or service can be provided, as recognized by outside experts. Core (adj.): Essential to ensuring the capability. Using these definitions, the committee began to think about a frame- work for the development and discussion of Core S&T Capabilities for the CBDP. Taking advantage of the Joint Requirement Office's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Operational Ele- ments3 (Shape, Sense, Shield, Sustain) and the CBDP Strategic Framework Constructs from the office of the DASD(CBD)4 (Prevent, Protect, Mitigate, Respond, Recover), the committee mapped these elements to the four overarching missions as described in Figure 2.3. Warfighting: Operate Through Support to Warfighter Shape / Sense / Shield / Mitigate / Sustain / Attribute / Prevent Ops Warning Protect Respond Recover Retaliate Homeland Defense Foreign Consequence Management FIGURE 2.3 Overview chart of the relationship between the four mission areas of CBDP and the program's six operational elements. 3 Modernization Plan for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense, Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense, January 5, 2012. NewProgram 4 Chemical and Biological Defense 2-3 (CBDP) Strategic Framework and Department of Defense (DoD) Organization, Dr. Robert Cohn, Chief Scientist, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs/Chemical and Biological Defense, February 15, 2012.

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32 CORE CAPABILITIES IN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE Sense / Ops Mitigate / Attribute / Shape / Prevent Shield / Protect Sustain / Recover Warning Respond Retaliate 1. Enabling CBRN ISR 2. Chemical and Biological Agent Detection 3. Individual and Collective Protection 4. Medical Countermeasures 5. Hazard Assessment, Management and Decontamination 6. Cross-cutting Science and Technology FIGURE 2.4 Chart depicting the relationship between the six CBDP Operational Elements and the six CBD S&T capability categories. Figure 2-4 Once the appropriate correlations between the CBD Operational Ele- ments and the missions of the CBD program were identified, they were used by the committee to identify S&T capability categories required to address both the missions and the defined operational elements. The six committee-identified CBD S&T capability categories can be discussed based on their mapping to the "time oriented" operational elements. A listing and mapping of the CBD S&T capability categories is found in Figure 2.4. The CBDP is of such broad scope that it has a role to play in all stages of chemical and biological defense. While the CBDP is not a direct actor in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the program plays a role in the development of ISR S&T tools. To this end, the committee identified (1) Enabling CBRN Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon- naissance as one of the core S&T capability categories. The program plays a greater role in (2) Chemical and Biological Agent Detection which supports Sense/Operational Warning and Shield/Protect opera- tional elements. The operational element Shield/Protect, coupled with Mitigate/Respond supports the (3) Individual and Collective Protection S&T capability. (4) Medical Countermeasures falls under Shield/Pro- tect, Mitigate/Respond, and Sustain/Recover, while (5) Hazard Assess- ment, Management, and Decontamination is supported by overlapping Sustain/Recover with Attribute/Retaliate, an operational element that is only on the edges of the purview of the CBDP. Finally the committee identified several S&T capabilities that are core to all of the identified operational elements. These capabilities are covered in (6) Cross-Cutting Science and Technology. As stated previously, the committee found many operational frame- works present within the units of the CBDP enterprise. Each unit views the problem through its own lens. With the framework for viewing the core S&T capabilities in hand, the disparate frameworks of OASD(NCB/CB),

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FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE 33 JRO-CBRND, JSTO-CBD, and JPEO-CBD fit under the six S&T capability categories defined by the committee (see Appendix D for a chart compar- ing the S&T capability frameworks of the CBDP enterprise elements in relationship to the committee's six CBD S&T capability categories). The next chapter will expand on the S&T capability categories, iden- tify the core S&T capabilities that are need to be maintained by the CBDP, and consider where the capabilities may be obtained. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In Chapter 2 the committee identified the following findings and recommendations: Mission and Strategy Finding 2.1: The CBDP mission is too broadly stated. The stated mis- sion of CBDP is to "Provide global chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense capabilities in support of National Strategies." The mis- sion statement is large enough to allow for a wide variety of interpreta- tions, making it challenging for both the customers of the program and the facilities that support its work to understand the program priorities. The CBDP has responsibilities that span missions from protecting the warfighter and providing support to the warfighter, to defending the United States from attack (i.e., Homeland Defense) and supporting local authorities following a chemically or biologically related incident (i.e., Consequence Management, Foreign or Domestic). Events requiring the Department to perform each of these missions could unfold in innumer- able, unexpected ways; for example, naturally occurring disease or unintentional chemical exposures may be difficult to distinguish from intentional attacks; intelligence, as noted above, has historically proved uncertain and/or unreliable in assessing the CB threat; innovations, as witnessed in the case of improvised explosive devices, will certainly occur in the development and use of chemi- cal and biological weapons; and the United States has a poor understanding of the intentions of those who might use chemical and biological weapons, and an even poorer understanding of the barriers that prevent them from doing so. The combination of a broadly stated mission and numerous uncer- tainties calls for top-level guidance on focus and priorities, which the current program lacks.

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34 CORE CAPABILITIES IN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE Finding 2.2: There is no program-wide CB defense strategy, nor com- mon characterization of the program elements among the participating organizations. The many different organizations currently involved in the CBDP (e.g., OASD(NCB/CB), JRO-CBRND, JSTO-CBD, and JPEO-CBD) each view the chemical and biological defense mission from different per- spectives. Although this can be expected based on their different roles, the coordination and collaboration between these groups is far from seamless. As a result, the program has been--and continues to be--limited in its ability to deliver fielded solutions in a timely manner. Finding 2.3: Strategic priorities tend to change with changes in senior leadership. As a result, efforts requiring sustained and/or longer-term commitments (e.g., medical countermeasures) are unable to deliver timely results, if at all. Recommendation 2.1: The DASD(CBD) should lead a mission and strategy development activity that aligns all of the program elements and offices. The differences among offices in how they portray and com- municate their stories, in their priorities, and in the terminology they use to describe the program are stark. Bold moves are needed to break the current stagnation that permeates the chemical and biological S&T and acquisition environment. Tweaking the management or refocusing a few projects will not be sufficient. The recommended alignment activity should promote a shared understanding of and commitment to key priori- ties for maintaining the core capabilities and expertise needed to fulfill the overall program mission and strategy.