management structure. In this arrangement, management of the S&T programs was assigned to the JSTO-CBD within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the advanced development programs continued to be managed by the JPEO-CBD, and the responsibility for establishing the requirements for the CBDP was assigned to a new office within the J-8 of the Joint Staff (the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (JRO-CBRND)). This system, represented in Figure 2.1, has created a program management structure which has different reporting chains (i.e., the JSTO-CBD reports to DTRA leadership; the JPEO-CBD reports to ASARDA; and the JRO-CBRND reports to the Joint Staff). Oversight at the OSD level is limited, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense (DASD(CBD)) having no mandated authority to change program direction, influence the POM and budget, or coordinate individual program/project efforts. This management structure, not surprisingly, is far from effective. Despite claims to the contrary, the committee observed that individual components work independently, with no clear definition of mission and no clear allegiance to program leadership.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs/Chemical and Biological Defense (OASD(NCB/CB)), JRO-CBRND, JSTO-CBD, and JPEO-CBD each view the chemical and biological defense mission from a different perspective. Although this is appropriate to some degree, the coordination and collaboration between these groups is far from seamless, which limits their ability to contribute to the mission and vision of the program as a whole.2

  • JRO-CBRND views the program in terms of operational elements (i.e., Sense, Shape, Shield, Sustain) and functionalities (e.g., chemical point detection and biological prophylaxis).
  • JPEO-CBD views the program in line with the JRO-CBRND operational elements in terms of acquisition and fielding of products (e.g., Joint Chemical Agent Detector, anthrax vaccine).
  • JSTO-CBD views the program in terms of S&T capabilities (four thrusts and seven enablers), with the focus on research and early development.

These different views are summarized in Figure 2.2. Overall, there is a lack of clarity within CBDP regarding the full scope of the mission space. Though all parts of the program agree on the dominance of the warfighting mission, there is not necessarily agreement on whether the goal of CBD should be enabling warfighters to “operate through” or if


2 See Appendix C for individual framework descriptions.

The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement