government laboratories3 (e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy National Laboratories). Items to consider when making this assessment include agency mission, agency resources, and possible public health overlap.
While the committee does not necessarily believe that it should be a high bar for the CBDP to maintain in-house, DoD-controlled capabilities, there are some important questions to consider when discussing the location of the various S&T capabilities.
The committee used the decision tree (Figure 3.1) to determine whether individual capabilities should be maintained by the program and where. Many of the metrics used to address each decision node on the tree are subjective and the committee’s consensus view is described in this chapter. If the CBDP does not agree with an individual assessment of an S&T capability, they are encouraged to undertake a de novo analysis of that capability, using the decision tree above,4 to reach their own conclusion.
The CBDP must have a natural and fundamental role in the prevention of and strategic warning against threats to global and national security through the use of or exposure to priority biological and chemical agents. No other program is better positioned to project capability forward or contribute to global strategic, operational, and tactical warning and prevention. From the force health protection perspective, CBDP plans and provides resources for the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and delivery of vaccine, prophylaxis, and therapeutic technologies that protect US military personnel and civilians, as required when exposure is determined or suspected. Further, the CBDP supports and directs funding for detection, diagnosis, and biosurveillance, which simultaneously aids in advancing forensic capabilities that inform deci-
3 We make a distinction between non-DoD government labs and non-government performers. This is based on an assumption that government labs meet security and surety standards (e.g., ability to work with classified samples, materials, and information) and are designed to be an enduring capability that will be available when needed. Non-government labs have no such assumption of guaranteed continuity, even if security and surety standards are currently met.
4 The real intent of the committee’s approach is to illustrate how to apply a structured, systematic, and consistent process to decision making that allows for a common understanding of priorities and how they were developed. The results also provide a basis for continuity of support.