separating management and oversight functions, more effective adaptations need to be identified and implemented for the longer term.

Limiting the involvement of the board and its chair in day-to-day management might also make it easier for CIRM to attract and retain good senior management. There has been a high degree of turnover in the Institute’s senior management positions. Since 2006, CIRM has had five acting, interim, or official presidents, four chief scientific officers, four general counsels, and four financial/administrative officers (CIRM, 2011d). This high turnover rate, together with the creation and then elimination of the role of vice president of operations, may reflect unresolved management issues and a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities both within management ranks and between the board and management (Hayden, 2009; Miller, 2010). At her departure after just 14 months in 2009, chief scientific officer Marie Csete said she hoped her leaving would mark “a new start” for the agency. “I had tried everything I could to change what I think needed to change from the inside, and that was not going to happen,” she said. “I felt I would have more impact by stepping away and advising the leadership of the board on my way out about ways to revise the structure and management of the agency to make it more optimal” (Hayden, 2009, p. 17).

Interface Between the Chair and President

A related issue to the interface between the ICOC and management is the division of responsibilities between the chair and the president. As noted above, Proposition 71 assigns considerable responsibility for CIRM operations to the chair:

The chairperson’s primary responsibilities are to manage the ICOC agenda and work flow including all evaluations and approvals of scientific and medical working group grants, loans, facilities, and standards evaluations, and to supervise all annual reports and public accountability requirements; to manage and optimize the institute’s bond financing plans and funding cash flow plan; to interface with the California Legislature, the United States Congress, the California health care system, and the California public; to optimize all financial leverage opportunities for the institute; and to lead negotiations for intellectual property agreements, policies, and contract terms.8

By contrast, Proposition 71 charges the president with overseeing staff support for the ICOC and its working groups, in addition to serving as chief executive of the Institute and overseeing its staff:


8Proposition 71, 125290.45. ICOC Operations, 4.b.1.A.

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