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Literature Review
Collection and Preparation of Data
Accident & Incident
Aircraft
Normal Operations
Development of Risk Development of Test Development of
Models Plan Software Outline
Interim Meeting
Development of
Execution of Test Plan Analysis Software
Select airports
Collect airport data Testing of Analysis
Run analysis for selected airports Software
Validate models & software
Revised Software
Final report
Figure 5. Study tasks.
Accident and Incident Data the runway ends and within 1000 ft of the runway centerline.
The criteria represents the area where the overwhelming ma-
Accident and incident data were collected from the following jority of runway excursions and undershoots occur and are
sources: similar to those used in ACRP Report 3 and by the FAA (David
· FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS). 1990). Using such criteria, 1414 accidents and incidents were
· FAA/National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) identified to provide the information used to develop the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). frequency and location models. Events that took place since
· National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Accident 1980 and for which reports were available were included in
Database & Synopses. the database.
· MITRE Corporation Runway Excursion Events Database Part of the data used to develop the frequency models was
V.4 (2008). complemented from other sources of information, particu-
· Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB). larly for aircraft, airport, and meteorological conditions. For
· International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Accident/ example, in some cases the weather information during the
Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) system. incident was missing and the actual METAR for the airport
· Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). was obtained. In other situations, the runway used was miss-
· Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Avi- ing and the FAA Enhanced Traffic Management System Per-
ation Civile (BEA). formance Metrics (ASPM) was consulted.
· UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB).
· New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission Filter Applied to the Data
(TAIC).
· Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore. Criteria for filtering data were established to make the events
· Ireland Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU). comparable. The first filter was an attempt to use information
· Spain Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes from only specific regions of the world having accident rates
de Aviación Civil (CIAIAC). that are comparable to the U.S. rate. This information was com-
· Indonesia National Transportation Safety Committee bined with U.S. data to develop the location models. For the
(NTSC). frequency models, only U.S. data were used because compre-
· Netherlands Aviation Safety Board (NASB). hensive incident records are only available in the United States.
The criteria used are shown in Table 1.
More than 260,000 aviation accident and incident reports The accident and incident database was organized in Mi-
were screened from 11 countries to identify the cases relevant crosoft Access. The ACRP Report 3 database was modified to
to this study. Out of those, more than 140,000 events were simplify its use. The system provides the software tools needed
screened from U.S. databases. The relevant events were fil- to utilize the data in a flexible manner and includes the capa-
tered prior to gathering data from each report. bility to add, modify, or delete data from the database, make
A list of accidents and incidents containing the cases used for queries about the data stored in the database, and produce
model development is presented in Appendix B of this report. reports summarizing selected contents. Figure 6 shows the
The list includes the accidents that occurred within 2000 ft of database organization.
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Table 1. Filtering criteria for accidents and incidents.
Filter # Description Justification
1 Remove non-fixed wing aircraft entries Study is concerned with fixed wing aircraft
accidents and incidents only
2 Remove entries for airplanes with Cut off criteria to maintain comparable level of pilot
certified max gross weight < 6,000 lbs qualifications and aircraft performance to increase
the validity of the modeling
3 Remove entries with unwanted FAR Some FAR parts have significantly different safety
parts. Kept Part 121, 125, 129, 135 and regulations (e.g., pilot qualifications). The following
selected Part 91 operations. cases were removed:
o Part 91F: Special Flt Ops.
o Part 103: Ultralight
o Part 105: Parachute Jumping
o Part 133: Rotorcraft Ext. Load
o Part 137: Agricultural
o Part 141: Pilot Schools
o Armed Forces
4 Remove occurrences for unwanted Study focus is the runway safety area. Situations
phases of flight when the RSA cannot help mitigating accident and
incident consequences were discarded to increase
model validity.
5 Remove all single engine aircraft and Piston engine aircraft are now used less frequently
all piston engine aircraft entries in civil aviation and therefore have been removed,
to increase the validity of the modeling. Moreover
single and piston engine aircraft behave differently
in accidents due to the lower energy levels involved
and the fact that the major focus of this study is air
carrier aircraft.
6 Remove all accidents and incidents It would be unfeasible to have an RSA with more
when the point of first impact and the than 2000ft beyond the threshold or 1000ft from the
wreckage final location is beyond runway centerline, the gain in safety is not
2000ft from runway end and 1000ft significant and both the previous ACRP study and
from runway centerline. the FAA study used the 2000ft criteria (David
1990).
Figure 6. Accident and incident database for aircraft overruns, undershoots, and veer-offs.
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Accidents/Incidents by Type
500
400
# of Events
300
200
100
0
LDOR LDUS LDVOFF TOOR TOVOFF
ACC 138 51 111 61 22
INC 363 60 448 62 98
Type of Event
Figure 7. Summary of accidents and incidents by type.
The database includes, for each individual event or opera- and incidents; veer-offs accounted for 48%; and undershoots
tion, the reporting agency, the aircraft characteristics, the accounted for only 8% of the total number of events.
runway and environmental conditions, event classification (ac- Figure 9 presents the number of incidents and accidents by
cident or incident), and other relevant information such as year from 1978 to 2008. The number of events reported in the
consequences (fatalities, injuries, and damage) and causal 1970s was relatively low, most likely due to underreporting
or contributing factors required to develop the probability and lower volumes of traffic. The number of events increased
models. A unique identifier was assigned to each event. slowly, and there is a sharp drop during the past 3 years. It is
possible that some events are still undergoing the investiga-
tion and that reports were not available by the time data col-
Summary of Data
lection was completed.
Figure 7 presents the summary of accidents and incidents Figures 10 to 14 show the distribution of accidents and in-
by type, and Figure 8 shows the relative percentages for each cidents according to their location. For overruns and under-
type. Landing events accounted for 83% of the events. Over- shoots, the locations refer to the longitudinal distance from
runs (landing and takeoffs) accounted for 44% of accidents the runway end. For veer-offs, it is the lateral distance from
the runway longitudinal edge.
Five hundred one landing overrun events were identified.
Events by Type
In approximately 95% of the events, the aircraft stopped within
1000 ft after overrunning the runway, and close to 77% stopped
TOOR within 500 ft.
TOVOFF
9% 8% One hundred eleven landing undershoot events were iden-
tified, and in approximately 94% of the cases, the aircraft
LDOR
35% touched the terrain within 1000 feet of the runway arrival end.
Approximately 85% touched down within 600 feet and 80%
within 500 feet.
Veer-off distances were measured from the runway edge.
Of the 559 cases of landing veer-off identified, in approxi-
mately 80% of the cases the fuselage of the aircraft deviated less
than 175 feet from the runway edge. For 88% of the events, the
aircraft was within 250 feet of the runway edge.
A total of 123 takeoff overrun accidents and incidents were
LDVOFF identified. For approximately 83% of the cases, the stop loca-
40% LDUS tion was within 1000 feet of the runway departure end, and
8% for 56%, the aircraft stopped within 500 feet.
Figure 8. Percentage of accidents and incidents Of the 120 takeoff veer-off accidents and incidents, in
by type. approximately 76% of the cases the fuselage of the aircraft
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Reported Events per Year
70
ACC
60 INC
Number of Occurrences
50
40
30
20
10
0
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
Year
Figure 9. Number of reported accidents and incidents from 1978 to 2008.
Location Distribution for LDOR Events Location Distribution for LDVO Events
120 70
100 60
50
80
# of Events
# of Events
40
60
30
40
20
20 10
0 0
00
00
00
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
e
0
0
0
0
0
e
50
0
0
0
0
10
30
50
70
90
or
30
35
40
45
50
or
10
15
20
25
11
13
15
17
19
M
M
Distance from Threshold (ft) Distance from Runway Edge (ft)
Figure 10. Location distribution for landing Figure 12. Location distribution for landing
overruns. veer-offs.
Location Distribution for LDUS Events Location Distribution for TOOR Events
35 30
30 25
25
20
# of Events
# of Events
20
15
15
10
10
5 5
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
00
00
e
00
00
00
00
00
ss
0
0
0
0
0
10
30
50
70
90
or
90
70
50
30
10
Le
11
13
15
17
19
19
17
15
13
11
M
Distance from Threshold (ft) Distance from Threshold (ft)
Figure 11. Location distribution for landing Figure 13. Location distribution for takeoff
undershoots. overruns.
