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32 Prieto, and Cornejo (2003) have presented evidence that vehi- operators and other workers and the effects of shift changes or cle crashes tend to be clustered more than would occur by jet lag (Comperatore, Kirby, Kingsley, and Rivera 2001a). chance alone. They analyzed the crash rates of 2,319 bus Night-shift workers perform worse on tasks of vigilance and drivers in a Spanish city over a period of 8 years from 1976 reaction times when compared with day workers, and aviators to 1983. No personality or other personal characteristics that flying in flight simulators at night have reduced hand-eye might be associated with crashes were identified or studied. coordination, poorer vigilance and calculation proficiency, The authors compared their empirical evidence with models of and impaired flight performance compared with day fliers crash rates predicted by chance and by equal probabilities. (Rothblum et al. 2002). Analysis of the crashes indicated that they tended to occur The identification of high-risk individuals has focused on closer together than can be explained by chance; the occur- personal readiness or fitness for duty. According to Rothblum rence of a crash seemed to increase the probability of a driver et al. (2002, p. 34): having another crash. Personal readiness failures occur when individuals fail to pre- 4.9.3 Safety Belt Use pare physically, mentally, or physiologically for duty. For instance, violations of work-rest rules, use of intoxicants and certain medications, and participating in exhausting domes- Section 392.16 of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regu- tic or recreational activities prior to reporting for duty can lations (FMCSRs) requires commercial drivers to wear safety impair performance on the job and can be preconditions for belts while driving. Nevertheless, 311 of 588 fatally injured unsafe acts. large truck drivers in 2002 were not wearing safety belts. One hundred thirty-four fatally injured drivers of large truck Rothblum et al. (2002) point out that screening tests have crashes were ejected (FMCSA web page; www.fmcsa.dot.gov/ been used for many years to select suitable employees for safetybelt). Most of these ejections occur during rollover safety-sensitive professions such as law enforcement and fire crashes, a particularly injurious type of crash for large truck safety. However, this is a controversial area with test validity occupants. and reliability being at issue. Tests are available for deter- In 2003, FMCSA completed a study of safety belt use by mining if someone is under the influence of drugs or alcohol truck drivers (3,909 trucks were observed). Of nearly 4,000 or severely fatigued, and simulator-type tests have been used commercial vehicle occupants observed, the usage rate was to analyze driver readiness. Further research is needed to 48%. This compares unfavorably with a current passenger identify valid, reliable methods across modes. vehicle occupant usage rate of 79% (U.S. DOT 2003). Accord- ingly, FMCSA has announced a goal of increasing commercial driver safety belt use. 4.10.1 Maritime Operations The most obvious connection between safety belt use and injury risk is the occupant protection afforded by safety belts. After the March 1988 Exxon Valdez accident, Exxon However, there is also evidence among the general population assessed the performance of all its ships' masters and mates. of drivers that nonsafety belt use is associated with various Most did very well, but it was determined that proficiency tests risky driver attitudes and behaviors. Lancaster and Ward for individuals should take place early in the selection and (2002) reviewed studies indicating that driver nonsafety belt training process rather than after they are on the job. Some ship use is associated with speeding, short headways (tailgating), operating companies do use screening tests to identify risk fac- alcohol use, red light running, more previous traffic viola- tors in individuals, but more research is needed to validate tions, and sensation-seeking personalities. Eby, Kostyniuk, them (Alex Landsburg, Maritime Administration, personal and Vivoda (2003) observed that safety belt use among drivers communication February 6, 2004). using hand-held cell phones was lower in every age group Crew endurance programs are also used in the maritime studied than among comparable noncell phone users. Thus, environment (Comperatore et al. 2001b). This type of pro- nonbelt use by a commercial driver should probably be gram educates personnel on how fitness for duty can affect not regarded as a safety "red flag." only job performance but long-term health. These programs assist personnel in controlling the hazards that affect fitness 4.10 RISK FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN OTHER for duty (Rothblum et al. 2002). Comperatore et al. (2001a) TRANSPORTATION MODES state that operators of Coast Guard systems should be moni- tored following the principles set out by crew endurance man- The research project also scanned other transportation modes agement (CEM) practices, in which "endurance refers to the to identify research on high-risk operators. This included mar- ability to maintain performance within safety limits." Signs of itime, rail, and air operations. The majority of research focus- stress include alienation, withdrawal, and lack of participa- ing on operator safety seems to have been focused on fatigue tion. Other behaviors that should be monitored include visible and generally emphasizes situational determinants of behav- daytime sleepiness and degradations in performance (i.e., low ior rather than individual constitutional differences. For exam- energy, lack of motivation, depression, irritability, introver- ple, there have been many studies of night-shift transportation sion, reduced and unclear communication with coworkers,