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OCR for page 55
Attributes of Successful Ground Access Systems 55
transfer! The Bay Area case study is similar to the Paris case study in that both airports connect to
the same regional rail system. With the quality of the rail system held constant, the 9% mode share
in Oakland, compared with 7% from San Francisco, cannot be explained simply in terms of the
ease of airport transfer.
In the same vein, the 8% mode share to rail at New York JFK airport (no direct rail) compares
favorably with direct on-airport rail connections in Chicago (Midway and O'Hare); Portland,
Oregon; St. Louis; MinneapolisSt. Paul (determined from interviews with airport personnel);
Philadelphia; Cleveland; and Baltimore. Düsseldorf airport provides another case study: it offers
both a direct on-airport rail connection and an indirect connection via people mover to a nearby
station; travelers choose the indirect connection over the direct connection by two to one.
In short, directness of the connections on the airport cannot explain the wide variation in
mode shares reported, although there is strong anecdotal data to support the idea that fewer
transfers are better than more transfers.
Does Line-Haul Speed Explain High Ridership?
Without question, the speed of the line-haul vehicle between the airport and the downtown
area is important. Table 3-2 shows the relationship between overall speed of the train and the
mode share attained. Average speeds of more than 40 mph are attained in Zurich, Oslo, Narita,
Table 3-2. Market share by time and speed.
Implied
Rail Distance rail
travel from speed
Market share time CBD to CBD
Airport by rail (min) (miles) (mph)
Zurich 42% 10 7 42
Oslo 39% 19 30 95
Narita 36% 55 40 44
Amsterdam 35% 17 12 42
Copenhagen 33% 13 7 32
Munich 31% 40 17 26
Vienna 30% 16 12 45
London Stansted 29% 40 35 53
Paris Charles de Gaulle 28% 35 15 26
Hong Kong 28% 23 21 55
Frankfurt 27% 12 6 30
Express 9% 15 15 60
London Heathrow (23%)
Tube 14% 45 15 20
Geneva 21% 10 3 18
London Gatwick 20% 30 30 60
Stockholm 18% 20 25 75
Düsseldorf 18% 12 5 25
Brussels 16% 14 7 30
Paris Orly via 14% 35 9 15
People Mover
Shanghai Maglev 6% 8 18 135
SOURCE: M. A. Coogan.
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56 Ground Access to Major Airports by Public Transportation
and Hong Kong and contribute to strong rail mode shares in those cities. But, Table 3-2 shows
that line-haul speed alone does not explain the propensity to attain high market share.
High-Speed Service and High Market Share: Oslo Airport Express
The Oslo Airport Express train (Figure 3-1), which has the second highest mode share to rail
in the sample, is an example of a strategy based on a determination to attain high running speeds
and low terminal-to-terminal travel times. From the beginning, the running time of the train to
the new airport was to be no longer than the running time of the bus from the existing airport--
19 minutes. For this investment, the government set the following policy goal: the airport rail
system would attract 50% of the market, a mode share considerably higher than any system had
attained to date. Of this desired share, 42% was set as the goal for the Oslo Airport Express ser-
vice, with an 8% goal established for the traditional national train service. In Oslo, the strategy
to provide high-speed service to the downtown and additional direct service beyond has resulted
in a 39% market share for the dedicated Airport Express train and another 13% mode share to
the slower, lower priced Norwegian Railway.
High-Speed Service and Low Market Share: Shanghai Maglev
A dramatic example of a strategy to build a market based on the speed of the line-haul
vehicle comes from the Shanghai maglev project (8). On first look, the service characteristics
of the maglev are impressive. While the bus takes about 60 minutes and the taxi takes 50 min-
utes, the maglev makes the line-haul segment of the trip in just 8 minutes. The headway of the
super high-speed train is 15 minutes. A good connection is available at the airport: the maglev
station is connected by a pedestrian bridge (see Figure 3-2); no people mover or shuttle bus
is needed to access the service. However, it was not possible to get a maglev directly into the
center of the city, so a terminal was built on the edge of the downtown next to an existing
metro stop.
PHOTO: M. A. Coogan.
Figure 3-1. The Oslo Airport Express train was specifically designed for high
speeds on this service.
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Attributes of Successful Ground Access Systems 57
PHOTO: http://home.wangjianshuo.com/archives/20030809_pudong_airport_maglev_in_depth.htm.
Figure 3-2. The Shanghai Airport maglev station (left) is directly connected
to the air terminal (right) by this pedestrian bridge.
From Shanghai Airport, the exclusive airport bus follows a strategy of serving several areas
directly. Seven separate airport bus lines are operated to such destinations as the main train station
and the City Air Terminal. Headways for the separate bus services range from 15 to 30 minutes.
At a cost of around $7, the maglev service is roughly twice the cost of the airport bus, while
still somewhat cheaper than a taxi for one. However, with a party of two, the taxi becomes
cheaper than the maglev and directly competitive with the airport bus.
The faster maglev attracts only about 6% of the market, compared to 43% for the more direct
(and cheaper) airport buses. Market research undertaken in Shanghai shows that people traveling
on business had a lower than average use of the maglev, while their use of taxi (25%) was the high-
est of any market segment. Indeed, the business travelers also had the highest use of the airport bus
of any market segment, at 48% mode share. Retired persons had no recorded use of the maglev,
presumably because of the price differential. Highest use of the maglev came from "tours" and "vis-
iting friends." About half of the trips by arriving air travelers involved only one mode; about an equal
number involved two modes, the most popular being airport bus and taxi (about 15% of all trips).
Without question the low market share gained by the high-speed maglev is surprising. The
analysts noted that the higher income markets, like those traveling on business, chose the taxi
in spite of the obviously longer travel time to the city edge, at 60 minutes versus 8 minutes.
Clearly, the lower income travelers selected the cheaper buses, while the business travelers went
for the no-transfer service offered by the taxi. The lack of selection of the maglev-plus-taxi
option is puzzling.
The implications are clear: the analyst and service designer must be concerned with the door-to-
door travel times and the directness of public mode services rather than with the highest speed of
the vehicle (reported at 450 km [~280 mph] per hour for the Shanghai maglev). These conclusions
are consistent with the Hong Kong experience of the market response to one high-speed rail line
compared to a wide variety of more direct bus lines, as discussed below. In both cases, the resident
(who is aware of the local options) has a greater propensity to choose the directly routed bus than
does the visitor (who is less aware of local options).
