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CHAPTER 5 Common USFS Threats 5.1 Introduction to Common Threats The same characteristics that make the USFS desirable (i.e., the wide extent of service and the popularity of use) also make it a potential target and a potential instrument of a terrorist act. The appeal of the USFS to terrorists may be in the potential use of vessels and facilities as a primary tar- get, as a secondary target of a terrorist act committed against another target, and as an instrument of a terrorist act. Operational characteristics of the system, such as the need to move a large num- ber of people on a tight schedule, increase the system's security vulnerability and present unique security requirements and challenges. Because the characteristics and operations of the USFS vary widely, different operations and ferry system components face different levels of threats with dif- ferent probabilities of occurrence. However, overall, the USFS is regarded as a relatively high-risk and high-probability target facing unspecified threats of unknown intensity and timing. In the words of a New York City ferry system employee, "ferries are perfect targets and perfect security challenges." The measure of threat "is based on the analysis of the intention and capacity of an adversary to undertake actions that would be detrimental to an asset or population."1 The potential threat against the USFS is an assumed threat based on expressed but general indications of intent to cause harm to U.S. citizens; circumstantial information that indicates a willingness to attack the USFS (e.g., noted surveillance of the Washington State Ferry System); and other events that indicate both the intent and capacity of the adversary to undertake such actions (e.g., 9/11 and the USS Cole). However, at the time of this writing, the threats to the USFS remain only potential because they are neither clear nor specific. The purpose of this chapter is to explore, in a summary format, the common threats to the USFS and threats to others that could materialize if the USFS were to be used as an instrument of a terrorist act (ITA). Security regulations, per 33 CFR 104 and 105, cover vessels and facilities by identifying six spe- cific security measures that a ferry system owner/operator needs to apply to address the poten- tial threat and to maintain an appropriate level of security: 1. Access control--to prevent unauthorized entry and the introduction of devices and acts that would damage or injure people or property. 2. Restricted areas--to prevent and deter unauthorized persons from accessing sensitive areas of the ferry system. 3. Handling of cargo--to ensure the safe and secure handling of cargo. 4. Delivery of vessel stores and bunkers--to deter people from tampering, contaminating, and using vessel stores and bunkers as a tool or means of injuring people and damaging property. 45

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46 Part II: Characteristics of the U.S. Ferry System 5. Monitoring--to have the capability to continuously monitor vessels and facilities in accor- dance with the owner and operator's security plan. 6. Security incident procedures--to coordinate incident procedures with local, state, and fed- eral authorities, including procedures for securing and evacuating vessels. While these six security measures are specifically enumerated by 33 CFR and point to areas of concern, they do not readily lend themselves to identifying specific threat areas or locations within the ferry system. A report produced for the U.S. Coast Guard by Internet Protocol Tele- phony (IPT) titled,"Scenario Selection for Ferry Special Assessment," identified 10 security loca- tions within ferry systems to help define area-specific threats. Based on discussions with ferry operators, SAIC has edited these locations to create 11 security locations: Location 1: Beyond site boundary--shore-side areas that may or may not directly relate to the ferry system but are of interest from a security perspective. Examples may include roads, build- ings, approaches to the ferry, connections to other modes of transportation (bus, subway, etc.), bridges, tunnels, other points where people congregate, tall structures that can be used for obser- vation and planning, and adjacent assets that can affect an event (e.g., stored fuel). Location 2: Facility perimeter--the shore-side property boundary, which may or may not be clearly marked (e.g., with a fence). Location 3: Vehicle parking--shore-side vehicle parking as distinct from vehicle holding prior to loading (i.e., Location 4, below). Vehicle parking includes both restricted parking areas and public parking areas. Location 4: Vehicle holding--shore-side area for parking and screening vehicles (e.g., cars, trucks, and railcars) prior to loading them onto a ferry. Note that this location is not applicable to passenger-only ferries. Locations 5: Passenger waiting area--shore-side areas for passenger drop-off and pick-up, bus stop, subway stop, and so forth. This location may also include ticketing and screening areas. Location 6: Terminal operations--shore-side areas for operation control that are not for gen- eral passengers (e.g., fueling, administration, and communications areas). Location 7: Adjacent to ferry (shore-side)--shore-side areas within approximately 30 feet of ferry vessels or their path. These areas may or may not have restricted access. Depending on the facility, this area may or may not overlap with passenger waiting and vehicle parking or hold- ing areas. Location 8: Adjacent to ferry (water-side)--water-side areas within approximately 30 feet of ferry vessels or their piers. These areas may or may not have restricted access. In some cases, private boats and commercial boats are located close to ferry terminal facilities and share water-side and shore-side access. Location 9: On-board (non-restricted)--areas on the ferry designated for passenger access. Location 10: On-board (restricted)--areas on the ferry designated for access by ferry system per- sonnel. Certain areas are restricted to specific personnel only (e.g., pilot and security personnel). Location 11: In transit--areas surrounding a ferry while it is operating on a route or otherwise in transit. This location includes areas below the water surface (e.g., diver or mine), from the air (e.g., airplane or plume of gas), and from land (e.g., top of a bridge or building). The above locations are used to assist in the assessment of specific threat types to the USFS, although it should be recognized that because ferry operations vary within the USFS, not all of the listed locations apply to all operations. In the assessment of potential threats to the USFS, three general threat categories are exam- ined for each of the 11 security areas: