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Chapter 5: Common USFS Threats 47 1. Incendiary and explosive devices (IEDs)--for example, planted in a facility or on a suicide bomber, car, truck, underwater mine, or fuel container. 2. Acts of force--for example, hijacking or commandeering a vessel or facility. Acts of force may include use of firearms, knives, or other weapons or use of physical impact (e.g., ramming) to inflict injury to persons or damage a vessel or facility. 3. Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents--for example, chlorine, anthrax, and dirty bombs. The following three sections apply the three threat categories to the 11 security areas to form a summary threat identification and review. 5.2 Explosives and Incendiaries The use of explosives and incendiaries (e.g., TNT, C-4, and flammable chemicals and gases) to commit acts of terrorism has been relatively common in recent decades. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been particularly common in regions with high levels of terrorism (e.g., the Middle East). In addition to explosives, fuel tanks represent a common incendiary that could be used to create fire or explosion. IEDs may be used to cause physical damage, loss of life, and mass fear. They may be delivered by a variety of means: By person--including suicide bombers; people setting remotely detonated, time-detonated, or sensor-detonated IEDs; people creating IEDs (e.g., igniting fuel or creating electrical fires); people concealing IEDs in hand baggage, and so forth. (Note: use of IEDs with the intent to commandeer or hijack a facility or vessel is addressed below in Section 5.3, Acts of Force.) By vehicle--including cars, trucks, or railcars.Vehicles may conceal diesel, fertilizer, liquefied nat- ural gas (LNG), gasoline, and other IEDs. Large cars can accommodate up to about 1,000 pounds of explosives without significant modifications and more with significant modifications of the suspension. Trucks may deliver thousands of pounds of explosive material to destroy build- ings, large vessels, and so forth. Delivery by truck (e.g., as in the Oklahoma City bombing, the first World Trade Center bombing, and the Beirut marine barracks) is the most common mode of IED delivery. By vessel--including boats or other floating vessels (e.g., USS Cole style). As an artillery--including rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers. While RPGs may be legally obtained in the United States, ammunitions may enter the country only through ille- gal means. RPGs may be fired from the shore or from passing boats. Underwater--including IEDs that divers attach to the hull, mines that divers place in the path of a ferry, and so forth. Overhead--including IEDs that are dropped from bridges or cliffs, light aircrafts, commer- cial airliners, remotely controlled aircrafts, helicopters, and so forth. The threat of IEDs differs widely by ferry system and other characteristics. To determine the vulnerability of each security area to each type of threat, the ferry operation needs to conduct a vulnerability assessment that takes into consideration the particular conditions and characteris- tics of the ferry system, including operational and site-specific security measures. Table 8 presents hypothetical relative vulnerabilities among security areas for IED delivery. Tables such as this may assist ferry operators in selecting areas for concentration of specific pre- ventive measures. While an assessment such as that shown in Table 8 will vary among ferry systems, in general, IED carried on people into the system pose a relatively moderate to high threat in more areas