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48 Part II: Characteristics of the U.S. Ferry System Table 8. Hypothetical relative vulnerability of security areas to IEDs. (Comparisons valid only within each column.) IED Delivery Mode LOCATION Person Vehicle Vessel Artillery Mine Overhead 1. Beyond Site Boundary M M N/A L N/A ** 2. Facility Perimeter M H N/A L N/A ** 3. Vehicle Parking H H N/A M N/A ** 4. Vehicle Holding M H N/A L N/A ** 5. Passenger Waiting Area H M N/A L N/A ** 6. Terminal Operations M L N/A H N/A ** 7. Adjacent to Ferry (Shore-side) H L N/A H N/A ** 8. Adjacent to Ferry (Water-side) M L H H H ** 9. On-Board (Non-restricted) H L* N/A L N/A ** 10. On-Board (Restricted) M H* N/A L N/A ** 11. In Transit L L H H M ** H = high; M = medium; L = low; and N/A = not applicable mode for this security area. * Assumes that on-board cargo area, including vehicle storage area, is restricted. ** Assumes similar vulnerability among security areas without specification of a particular mode. than any other mode of IED delivery because, carried as such, IEDs may be precisely placed in the greatest variety of areas to yield the highest consequences. The flexibility in placement of per- sonally carried IEDs should not be confused with the relative probability of placement among delivery modes. Historically, the most common mode of IED delivery in the United States has been on trucks. Hence, the use of an analysis such as that presented in Table 8 should be restricted to assisting in determining the number of preventive measures installed in each area for a spe- cific threat on delivery-mode basis. Such an analysis should not be used to assess the extensive- ness of preventive measures between threat types or delivery modes. 5.3 Acts of Force Acts of force are perhaps the oldest type of threat in the maritime industry. These include attacks that may be directed to either shore-side facilities or the vessel itself. There are two gen- eral acts of force: Commandeering--seizing control of a portion or all of a facility or vessel for the purpose of piracy or hijacking. This act is commonly carried out with the use (or threatened use) of firearms; knives; IEDs; chemical, biological, or radiological agents; or other weapons. Ramming--driving a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft into a vessel or shore-side facility. A ferry may be rammed or commandeered for ramming. This act may involve the use of IEDs or chemi- cal, biological, or radiological agents, but the initial portion of the attack--the ramming itself--is an act of force. Table 9 presents hypothetical relative vulnerabilities among security areas for acts of force. The delivery mode in the table refers to either the commandeering object (i.e., vessel or facility) or the object used for ramming. An assessment such as that shown in Table 9 will vary among ferry systems. As with Table 8, the use of an analysis such as that presented in Table 9 should be