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100 CHAPTER 5 Countermeasures 5.1 Introduction 2. Identify your tunnel by "structural tunnel type" (immersed tube, cut-and-cover, bored or mined, air-rights The main objective of this chapter is to identify and structure), and eliminate the columns that don't apply to describe potential methods that can be used by tunnel own- your facility. ers and operators to make structural improvements (interior 3. Review each of the "hazard or threat scenario" columns to and exterior) and system improvements at critical locations identify and eliminate rows that don't apply to your facil- for the purpose of improving the structural and operational ity. For example, within the "path to target" column you security and safety of transportation tunnels and associated may eliminate the "waterway" rows if your tunnel is not underground infrastructure (including stations, ventilation underwater. shafts, and electrical substations). 4. Make a list of countermeasure guides (i.e., Tables 34 through 41) that you need to review based on the 5.2 Hazard and Threat Directories remaining cells. Hazard and threat directories are tables that compile the hazard and threat scenarios for a particular tunnel mode (i.e., 5.2.2 System Hazard and Threat Directories road, transit, or rail) and direct the user to the appropriate countermeasure guides (Tables 34 through 41), which con- System hazard and threat directories were developed using tain more detailed information. information contained in Section 4.5.4 (potentially critical locations); Table 24 (vulnerabilities of critical locations); and Tables 25, 26, and 27 (system vulnerabilities to most likely 5.2.1 Structural Hazard and Threat hazard and threat scenarios for road, transit, and rail tunnels, Directories respectively). These directories, presented as Tables 31, 32, From the information contained in Section 4.4.2 (modes and 33, show the hazard and threat scenarios that are consid- of tunnel failure) and Section 4.4.3 (effects of other extreme ered to be the most critical from a system standpoint for road, events), it was determined that explosives and large fires are transit, and rail tunnels, respectively. the hazards and threats that must be considered when assess- The directories lead the user to more detailed information ing structural vulnerability and damage potential. This find- contained within the countermeasure guides, which are pre- ing, combined with other information contained in those sented as Tables 34 through 41. In using the system hazard sections, led to development of Table 28, which presents 13 and threat directories (Tables 31 through 33), the following hazard and threat scenarios within road tunnels that are con- steps should be performed: sidered to be the most critical from a structural standpoint. Similarly, Tables 29 and 30 were developed to present 13 haz- 1. Identify your tunnel by mode (road, transit, or rail), and ard and threat scenarios that are considered to be the most choose the appropriate system hazard and threat directory. critical for transit and rail tunnels, respectively. 2. Identify system types within your facility under "targeted In using Tables 28 through 30, the following steps should system" (ventilation system, life safety system, power dis- be performed: tribution, command and control, and communications) to eliminate the columns that don't apply to your facility. 1. Identify your tunnel by mode (road, transit, or rail) and 3. Review each of the "hazard or threat scenario" columns to choose the appropriate directory. identify and eliminate rows that don't apply to your facility.

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Table 28. Structural hazard and threat directory for road tunnels. Hazard or Threat Scenario Structural Tunnel Type Bored or Bored or Air- Hazard or Tactical Delivery Immersed Cut-and- Mined in No. Path to Target Target Mined in Rights Threat Device Tu b e Cover Soft to Firm Strong Rock Structure Ground 1H Large IED Tunnel Roadway Truck Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A 2H Medium Tunnel Roadway Car/Van Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A IED 3H Small IED Tunnel Roadway Backpack Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A 4H Large Fire1 Tunnel Roadway Tanker Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A 5H Large IED Tunnel Roadway Truck Column/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Wall/Roof Slab 6H Medium Tunnel Roadway Car/Van Column/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 IED Wall/Roof Slab 7H Small IED Tunnel Roadway Backpack Column/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Wall/Roof Slab 1 8H Large Fire Tunnel Roadway Tanker Column/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Wall/Roof Slab 9H Large Fire1 Tunnel Roadway Tanker Portal Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 10H Very Large Waterway Ship or Depth Portal or Shaft Table 37 N/A Table 37 Table 37 N/A IED Charge from Ship Wall 11H Very Large Waterway Depth Charge from Top of Tunnel Table 38 N/A Table 38 N/A N/A IED Ship 12H Large IED Surface Truck Roof Slab N/A Table 35 N/A N/A Table 35 Roadway over Tunnel 13H Medium Surface Truck or Multiple Roof Slab N/A Table 35 N/A N/A Table 35 IED Roadway over Backpacks Tunnel Abbreviation: Note: N/A = Not Applicable 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)

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Table 29. Structural hazard and threat directory for transit tunnels. Hazard or Threat Scenario Structural Tunnel Type Bored or Bored or Air- Hazard or Tactical Delivery Immersed Cut-and- Mined in No. Path to Target Target Mined in Rights Threat Device Tube Cover Soft to Firm Strong Rock Structure Ground 1T Large IED Trackway Transit Car/ Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A Engine 2T Medium Trackway Transit Car/ Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A IED Engine or Multiple Backpacks 3T Small IED Trackway/ Backpack Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A Stations/Shops/ Portals 4T Large Fire1 Trackway IED on Transit Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A Vehicle 5T Large IED Trackway Transit Column/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Car/Engine Wall/Roof Slab 6T Medium Trackway Transit Car/ Column/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 IED Engine or Multiple Wall/Roof Slab Backpacks 7T Small IED Trackway/ Backpack Column/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Stations/Shops/ Wall/Roof Slab Portals 8T Large Fire1 Trackway IED on Transit Column/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Vehicle Wall/Roof Slab 9T Large Fire1 Trackway IED on Transit Portal Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Vehicle 10T Very Large Waterway Ship or Depth Portal or Shaft Table 37 N/A Table 37 Table 37 N/A IED Charge from Ship Wall 11T Very Large Waterway Depth Charge Top of Tunnel Table 38 N/A Table 38 N/A N/A IED from Ship 12T Large IED Surface Roadway Truck Roof Slab N/A Table 35 N/A N/A Table 35 over Tunnel 13T Medium Surface Roadway Truck or Multiple Roof Slab N/A Table 35 N/A N/A Table 35 IED over Tunnel Backpacks Abbreviation: Note: N/A = Not Applicable 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)

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Table 30. Structural hazard and threat directory for rail tunnels. Hazard or Threat Scenario Structural Tunnel Type Bored or Bored or Air- Hazard or Tactical Delivery Immersed Cut-and- Mined in No. Path to Target Target Mined in Rights Threat Device Tu b e Cover Soft to Firm Strong Rock Structure Ground 1R Large IED Trackway Rail Car/Engine Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A 2R Medium Trackway Rail Car/Engine or Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A IED Multiple Backpacks 3R Small IED Trackway/ Backpack Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A Stations/Shops/ Portals 4R Large Fire1 Trackway IED on Rail Vehicle Liner Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 N/A 5R Large IED Trackway Rail Car/Engine Column/Wall/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Roof Slab 6R Medium Trackway Rail Car/Engine or Column/Wall/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 IED Multiple Backpacks Roof Slab 7R Small IED Trackway/ Backpack Column/Wall/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Stations/Shops/ Roof Slab Portals 8R Large Fire1 Trackway IED on Rail Vehicle Column/Wall/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 36 Roof Slab 9R Large Fire1 Trackway IED on Rail Vehicle Portal Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 10R Very Large Waterway Ship or Depth Portal or Shaft Table 37 N/A Table 37 Table 37 N/A IED Charge from Ship Wall 11R Very Large Waterway Depth Charge from Top of Tunnel Table 38 N/A Table 38 N/A N/A IED Ship 12R Large IED Surface Truck Roof Slab N/A Table 35 N/A N/A Table 35 Roadway over Tunnel 13R Medium Surface Truck or Multiple Roof Slab N/A Table 35 N/A N/A Table 35 IED Roadway over Backpacks Tunnel Abbreviation: Note: N/A = Not Applicable 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)

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Table 31. System hazard and threat directory for road tunnels. Hazard or Threat Scenario Targeted System Hazard or Path to Tactical Ventilation Life Safety Power Command No. Target Comms. Threat Target Delivery Device System System Distribution and Control 14H Large IED Surface Truck C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 15H Medium Surface Car/Van C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 IED Roadway 16H Small IED Surface Backpack2 C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 17H Large IED Surface Truck Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A Roadway 18H Medium Surface Car/Van Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A IED Roadway 2 19H Small IED Surface Backpack Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A Roadway 3 20H Large IED Surface Truck Vent. Structure Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 3 21H Medium Surface Car/Van Vent. Structure Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 IED Roadway 22H Small IED Surface Backpack2 Vent. Structure3 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 23H Large IED Tunnel Truck C&C Center Above or N/A N/A N/A Table 34 Table 34 Roadway Adjacent to the Tunnel 24H Medium Tunnel Car/Van C&C Center Above or N/A N/A N/A Table 34 Table 34 IED Roadway Adjacent to the Tunnel 25H Large IED Tunnel Truck Vent. Structure Above or Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Roadway Adjacent to the Tunnel 26H Medium Tunnel Car/Van Vent. Structure Above or Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 IED Roadway Adjacent to the Tunnel

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Table 31. (Continued). Hazard or Threat Scenario Targeted System Hazard or Path to Tactical Ventilation Life Safety Power Command N o. Target Comms. Threat Target Delivery Device System System Distribution and Control 27H Small IED Tunnel Backpack Exposed Ductbank N/A N/A Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Roadway 28H Large Fire1 Tunnel Tanker Portal4 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Roadway 29H Large Fire1 Tunnel Tanker Any Tunnel Location Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 5 Roadway Adjacent to Critical Facility 30H HazMat Tunnel Truck Any Tunnel Location Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Roadway 31H C/B/R Tunnel Vial/Aerosol/ Tunnel Occupants Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Roadway Package 32H C/B/R Tunnel Vial/Aerosol/ Tunnel and Discharge Table 40 N/A N/A N/A N/A Supply Air Package Plume Area Occupants System 33H C/B/R Tunnel Vial/Aerosol/ Tunnel and Discharge Table 40 N/A N/A N/A N/A Supply Air Package Plume Area Occupants System 34H Cyber Virtual Digital Virus C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 41 N/A Attack Code Abbreviations: Notes: Vent. = Ventilation 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) Comms. = Communications 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside C&C = Command and Control 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans is housed in central location C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel HazMat = Hazardous Material 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators or C&C centers N/A = Not Applicable

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Table 32. System hazard and threat directory for transit tunnels. Hazard or Threat Scenario Targeted System Hazard or Path to Tactical Ventilation Life Safety Power Command No. Target Comms. Threat Target Delivery Device System System Distribution and Control 14T Large IED Surface Truck C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 15T Medium Surface Car/Van C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 IED Roadway 2 16T Small IED Surface Backpack C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 17T Large IED Surface Truck Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A Roadway 18T Medium Surface Car/Van Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A IED Roadway 19T Small IED Surface Backpack2 Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A Roadway 20T Large IED Surface Truck Vent. Structure3 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 3 21T Medium Surface Car/Van Vent. Structure Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 IED Roadway 3 22T Small IED Surface Backpack Vent. Structure Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 23T Large IED Surface Truck Station Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 24T Small IED Surface Backpack2 Station Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 25T Small IED Trackway Backpack Exposed Ductbank or N/A Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 MEC Equipment 26T Small IED Trackway Backpack2 Station Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34

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Table 32. (Continued). Hazard or Threat Scenario Targeted System Hazard or Path to Tactical Ventilation Life Safety Power Command No. Target Comms. Threat Target Delivery Device System System Distribution and Control 1 2 27T Large Fire Trackway Incendiary Portal Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Device on Train 1 28T Large Fire Trackway Incendiary Any Tunnel Location Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Device on Train Adjacent to Critical Facility5 29T Hazardous Trackway Device on Train Any Tunnel Location Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Materials 30T C/B/R Trackway Vial/Aerosol/ Tunnel/Station Occupants Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Package on Train 31T C/B/R Tunnel Air Vial/Aerosol/ Tunnel/Station and Table 40 N/A N/A N/A N/A Supply Package Discharge Plume Area System Occupants 32T C/B/R Tunnel Air Vial/Aerosol/ Tunnel/Station and Table 40 N/A N/A N/A N/A Supply Package Discharge Plume Area System Occupants 33T Cyber Virtual Digital Virus C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 41 N/A Attack Code Abbreviations: Notes: Vent. = Ventilation 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) Comms. = Communications 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside C&C = Command and Control 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans is housed in central location C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel HazMat = Hazardous Material 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators or C&C centers N/A = Not Applicable

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Table 33. System hazard and threat directory for rail tunnels. Hazard or Threat Scenario Targeted System Hazard or Path to Tactical Ventilation Life Safety Power Command No. Target Comms. Threat Target Delivery Device System System Distribution and Control 14R Large IED Surface Truck C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 15R Medium Surface Car/Van C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 IED Roadway 16R Small IED Surface Backpack2 C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 17R Large IED Surface Truck Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A Roadway 18R Medium Surface Car/Van Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A IED Roadway 2 19R Small IED Surface Backpack Substation N/A N/A Table 39 N/A N/A Roadway 20R Large IED Surface Truck Ventilation Structure3 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 3 21R Medium Surface Car/Van Ventilation Structure Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 IED Roadway 22R Small IED Surface Backpack2 Ventilation Structure3 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 23R Large IED Surface Truck Station Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 24R Small IED Surface Backpack2 Station Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Table 39 Roadway 25R Small IED Trackway Backpack Exposed Ductbank or N/A Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 MEC equipment 26R Small IED Trackway Backpack2 Station Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34

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Table 33. (Continued). Hazard or Threat Scenario Targeted System Hazard or Path to Tactical Ventilation Life Safety Power Command N o. Target Comms. Threat Target Delivery Device System System Distribution and Control 1 4 27R Large Fire Trackway Incendiary Portal Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Device on Train 1 28R Large Fire Trackway Incendiary Any Tunnel Location Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Device on Train Adjacent to Critical Facility5 29R Hazardous Trackway Device on Train Any Tunnel Location Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Materials 30R C/B/R Trackway Vial/Aerosol/ Tunnel/Station Occupants Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Table 34 Package on Train 31R C/B/R Tunnel Air Vial/Aerosol/ Tunnel/Station and Table 40 N/A N/A N/A N/A Supply Package Discharge Plume Area System Occupants 32R C/B/R Tunnel Air Vial/ Aerosol/ Tunnel/Station and Table 40 N/A N/A N/A N/A Supply Package Discharge Plume Area System Occupants 33R Cyber Virtual Digital Virus C&C Center N/A N/A N/A Table 41 N/A Attack Code Abbreviations: Notes: Vent. = Ventilation 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) Comms. = Communications 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside C&C = Command and Control 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans is housed in central location C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel HazMat = Hazardous Material 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators or C&C centers N/A = Not Applicable

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110 Table 34. Countermeasure guide. Hazard or Threat Scenario Nos.: 1H-4H, 9H, 23H-31H; 1T-4T, 9T, 25T-30T; 1R-4R, 9R, 25R-30R PV: insufficient tunnel liner thickness; inadequate tunnel cover; relative proximity of hazard or threat to liner OV: uncontrolled access of vehicles into tunnels; insufficient vehicle inspections and/or cargo restrictions DP: tunnel collapse requiring up to several months to repair; rapid flooding and inflow of granular backfill material for underwater tunnels; total or partial loss of system function Order-of- CM CM Functions and Relative Multiple-Benefit CM Magnitude P/Op Strategy Type Descriptions Effectiveness Potential # Cost Lighting H M P DR Anti-Theft, Safety 1 Ventilation System H VH P, Op M Safety 2 Fire Detection System M L P DT Safety 3 Fire Protection System H H P, Op M Safety 4 Minimum Measures CCTV System or CCVE H M P, Op DT, I Traffic Surveillance 5 Security Awareness Training H L Op DT, M 6 Roving Patrols M L Op DR, DT, I Safety, Security 7 HazMat Restrictions L L Op DR Safety, Security 8 Identify Unqualified Background Checks L L Op DR, DT 9 Employees Full-Scale Emergency H L Op DT, I, M 19 Response Exercises Guards at Portals H L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 20 Measures for Threat Level an Elevated Inspections H L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 21 (Personal/Vehicle) Bomb-Sniffing Dogs M L Op DR, DT Public Assurance 22 Onsite Credential Checks L L Op DR Anti-Theft 23 Explosive Detectors--Mobile H L P DT 26 Explosive Detectors--Fixed H M P DT 28 Interior Liner Steel Plates or 1,2,3 H VH6 P M 31 Panels Interior Liner Concrete 1,2 H VH6 P M 32 Permanent Enhancements Panels Decrease Interior Concrete or Maintenance, M4 VH 6 P M Increase Usable 33 Chemical Grouting Interior Liner Bolting or Tie- Life of Structure 4 6 M H P M 34 Backs1,2 Exterior (Ground) Concrete H4 VH P M 35 or Chemical Grouting 5 Rip-Rap over Tunnel H VH P M Erosion Protection 36 Precast Concrete Slab over H VH P M Erosion Protection 37 Tunnel5 Decrease Disperse Functions (i.e., Maintenance, H H P M Redundant Systems) Increase Usable Life of Systems Footnotes 1. If operating environment and/or clearances allow. 2. Thickness of steel plates or panels, concrete panels, and shotcrete depends on size of IED or fire. 3. For very large fires, steel liner must be one continuous, seamless plate and attaching mechanisms must be fire- resistant. 4. Effectiveness will depend on surrounding soil properties. 5. Underwater tunnel only--amount of rip-rap and thickness of concrete slab depends on size of IED. 6. Cost may increase due to low-clearance applications, electrified transit and rail tunnels, track outage durations, bonding, and grounding.

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111 Table 35. Countermeasure guide. Hazard or Threat Scenario Nos.: 12H, 13H; 12T, 13T; 12R, 13R PV: insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover; relative proximity of hazard or threat to roof slab OV: uncontrolled access of vehicles into tunnels; insufficient vehicle inspections and/or cargo restrictions DP: tunnel collapse requiring up to several months to repair; total or partial loss of system function Order-of- CM CM Functions and Relative Multiple-Benefit CM Magnitude P/Op Strategy Type Descriptions Effectiveness Potential # Cost Lighting H M P DR Anti-Theft, Safety 1 Ventilation System H VH P, Op M Safety 2 Fire Detection System M L P DT Safety 3 Fire Protection System H H P, Op M Safety 4 Minimum Measures Traffic CCTV System or CCVE H M P, Op DT, I 5 Surveillance Security Awareness Training H L Op DT, M 6 Roving Patrols M L Op DR, DT, I Safety, Security 7 HazMat Restrictions L L Op DR Safety, Security 8 Identify Background Checks L L Op DR, DT Unqualified 9 Employees Full-Scale Emergency H L Op DT, I, M 19 Response Exercises Guards at Portals H L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 20 Measures for Threat Level an Elevated Inspections H L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 21 (Personal/Vehicle) Bomb-Sniffing Dogs M L Op DR, DT Public Assurance 22 Onsite Credential Checks L L Op DR Anti-Theft 23 Explosive Detectors--Mobile H L P DT 26 Explosive Detectors--Fixed H M P DT 28 Interior Roof Steel Plates1,2 H VH P M 38 Permanent Enhancements Interior Roof Concrete 1,2 H VH P M Decrease 39 Panels Maintenance, Exterior Roof Steel Plates1,2 H VH P M Increase Usable 40 Life of Structure Exterior Roof Concrete H VH P M 41 Panels1,2 Decrease Disperse Functions (i.e., Maintenance, H H P M Redundant Systems) Increase Usable Life of Systems Footnotes 1. If operating environment and/or clearances allow. 2. Thickness of steel plates or panels, concrete panels, and shotcrete depends on size of IED or fire. 3. Effectiveness will depend on surrounding soil properties. 4. Underwater tunnel only--amount of rip-rap and thickness of concrete slab depends on size of IED. 5. Cost may increase due to low-clearance applications, electrified transit and rail tunnels, track outage durations, bonding, and grounding.

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112 Table 36. Countermeasure guide. Hazard or Threat Scenario Nos.: 5H-8H; 5T-8T; 5R-8R PV: insufficient column/wall/roof slab protection within air-rights structure OV: uncontrolled access of vehicles into tunnels; insufficient vehicle inspections and/or cargo restrictions DP: extensive column/wall/roof slab damage requiring up to several months to repair; total or partial loss of system function Order-of- CM CM Functions and Relative Multiple-Benefit CM Magnitude P/Op Strategy Type Descriptions Effectiveness Potential # Cost Lighting H M P DR Anti-Theft, Safety 1 Ventilation System H VH P, Op M Safety 2 Fire Detection System M L P DT Safety 3 Fire Protection System H H P, Op M Safety 4 Minimum Measures Traffic CCTV System or CCVE H M P, Op DT, I 5 Surveillance Security Awareness Training H L Op DT, M 6 Roving Patrols M L Op DR, DT, I Safety, Security 7 HazMat Restrictions L L Op DR Safety, Security 8 Identify Background Checks L L Op DR, DT Unqualified 9 Employees Full-Scale Emergency H L Op DT, I, M 19 Response Exercises Guards at Portals H L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 20 Measures for Threat Level an Elevated Inspections H L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 21 (Personal/Vehicle) Bomb-Sniffing Dogs M L Op DR, DT Public Assurance 22 Onsite Credential Checks L L Op DR Anti-Theft 23 Explosive Detectors--Mobile H L P DT 26 Explosive Detectors--Fixed H M P DT 28 1,2 Interior Roof Steel Plates H VH P M 38 1,2 Interior Roof Concrete H VH P M 39 Panels Bollards to Control Access H L P DR, DT Pedestrian and 42 Permanent Enhancements User Safety, Anti- Fencing to Control Access H L P DR, DT Trespassing 43 1,2 Concrete Encasement of M L P M 44 Columns 1,2 RFP Wrapping of Decrease M L P M Maintenance, 45 Columns Steel Jacketing1,2 of Increase Usable M L P M Life of Structure 46 Columns Redundant Columns or H H P M 47 Walls1,2 Decrease Disperse Functions (i.e., Maintenance, H H P M Redundant Systems) Increase Usable Life of Systems Footnotes 1. If operating environment and/or clearances allow. 2. Thickness of steel plates or panels, concrete panels, and shotcrete depends on size of IED or fire. 3. Effectiveness will depend on surrounding soil properties. 4. Underwater tunnel only--amount of rip-rap and thickness of concrete slab depends on size of IED. 5. Cost may increase due to low-clearance applications, electrified transit and rail tunnels, track outage durations, bonding, and grounding.

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113 Table 37. Countermeasure guide. Hazard or Threat Scenario Nos.: 10H; 10T; 10R PV: insufficient portal/shaft wall strength OV: uncontrolled water traffic; insufficient ship inspections and surveillance DP: tunnel collapse causing operational disruption and requiring up to several weeks to repair; rapid flooding if portal/shaft wall is close to the water Order-of- CV CM Functions and Relative Multiple-Benefit CM Magnitude P/Op Strategy Type Descriptions Effectiveness Potential # Cost Identify Measures Minimum Background Checks L L Op DR, DT Unqualified 9 Employees Full-Scale Emergency H L Op DT, I, M 19 Response Exercises Inspections H L Op DR, DT, I Safety 21 (Personal/Vehicle) Measures for Threat Level an Elevated Bomb-Sniffing Dogs M L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 22 Onsite Credential L L Op DR, DT Anti-Trespassing 23 Checks Waterborne Patrols M L Op DR, DT, I Safety 24 Ship-Tracking Protocols M L Op DT Dock Scheduling 25 Interior Liner Steel Plates 6 H VH P M 31 or Panels1,2,4 Interior Liner Concrete Decrease H VH6 P M 32 Panels1,2 Maintenance, Permanent Enhancements Interior Concrete or Increase Usable M5 VH 6 P M Life of Structure 33 Chemical Grouting Interior Liner Bolting or M5 H6 P M 34 Tie-Backs1,2 Decrease Exterior (Ground) 5 Maintenance, Concrete or Chemical H VH P M 35 Increase Usable Grouting Life of Structure 1,7 6 Floodgates M VH P M 48 3 Increase Usable Barrier Walls H H P DR, M 49 Life of Structure Bollards3 or Fenders in Increase Usable H H P DR, M 50 the Water Life of Structure Footnotes 1. If operating environment and/or clearances allow. 2. Thickness of steel plates or panels, concrete panels, and shotcrete depends on size of IED or fire. 3. Thickness of barrier walls, bollards, or fender system depends on size of IED and distance of portal/shaft wall to water traffic. 4. For very large fires, steel liner must be one continuous, seamless plate and the attaching mechanisms must be fire- resistant. 5. Effectiveness will depend on surrounding soil properties. 6. Cost may increase due to low-clearance applications, electrified transit and rail tunnels, track outage durations, bonding, and grounding. 7. Effectiveness will depend on physical dimensions of the tunnel.

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114 Table 38. Countermeasure guide. Hazard or Threat Scenario Nos.: 11H; 11T; 11R PV: insufficient strength of tunnel top OV: uncontrolled water traffic; insufficient ship inspections and surveillance DP: tunnel collapse causing operational disruption and requiring up to several weeks to repair; rapid flooding if portal/shaft wall is close to the water Order-of- CM CM Functions and Relative Multiple-Benefit CM Magnitude P/Op Strategy Type Descriptions Effectiveness Potential # Cost Identify Measures Minimum Background Checks L L Op DR, DT Unqualified 9 Employees Full-Scale Emergency H L Op DT, I, M 19 Response Exercises Inspections H L Op DR, DT, I Safety 21 (Personal/Vehicle) Measures for Threat Level an Elevated Bomb-Sniffing Dogs M L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 22 Onsite Credential Checks L L Op DR, DT Anti-Trespassing 23 Waterborne Patrols M L Op DR, DT, I Safety 24 Ship-Tracking Protocols M L Op DT Dock Scheduling 25 Interior Liner Steel Plates H VH5 P M 31 or Panels1,2,3 Interior Liner Concrete Permanent Enhancements H VH5 P M Decrease 32 Panels1,2 Maintenance, Increase Usable Interior Concrete or M4 VH 5 P M Life of Structure 33 Chemical Grouting Interior Liner Bolting or M4 H5 P M 34 Tie-Backs1,2 7 Erosion Rip-Rap over Tunnel H H P M 36 Protection Precast Concrete Slab Erosion 7 H H P M 37 over Tunnel Protection Floodgates1,6 M VH5 P M 48 Footnotes 1. If operating environment and/or clearances allow. 2. Thickness of steel plates or panels, concrete panels, and shotcrete depends on size of IED or fire. 3. For very large fires, steel liner must be one continuous, seamless plate and the attaching mechanisms must be fire- resistant. 4. Effectiveness will depend on surrounding soil properties. 5. Cost may increase due to low-clearance applications, electrified transit and rail tunnels, track outage durations, bonding, and grounding. 6. Effectiveness will depend on physical dimensions of the tunnel. 7. Amount of rip-rap and thickness of concrete slab depend on size of IED.

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115 Table 39. Countermeasure guide. Hazard or Threat Scenario Nos.: 14H-22H; 14T-24T; 14R-24R PV: insufficient perimeter protection of critical structure OV: insufficient surveillance of critical structure DP: total or partial loss of system function Order-of- CM CM Functions and Relative Multiple-Benefit CM Magnitude P/Op Strategy Type Descriptions Effectiveness Potential # Cost Lighting H L P DR Anti-Theft, Safety 1 Ventilation System H M P, Op M Safety 2 Fire Detection System M L P DT Safety 3 Fire Protection System H H P, Op M Safety 4 CCTV System or CCVE H M P, Op DT, I Traffic Surveillance 5 Security Awareness H L Op DT, M 6 Training Minimum Measures Roving Patrols M L Op DR, DT, I Safety, Security 7 HazMat Restrictions L L Op DR Safety, Security 8 Access Controls Pedestrian and User (Bollards, Fences, H L P DR, DT Safety, Anti- 10 Walls, Locks) Trespassing Employee Identification H L P DR Work Hour Tracking 11 System Intrusion Detection H M P DT, I Anti-Trespassing 12 System Applicable to Any Evacuation Protocols L H Op M 13 Hazard Full-Scale Emergency H L Op DT, I, M 19 Response Exercises Inspections H L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 21 (Personal/Vehicle) Measures for Threat Level an Elevated Bomb-Sniffing Dogs M L Op DR, DT, I Public Assurance 22 Onsite Credential H L Op DR, DT, I Anti-Trespassing 23 Checks Explosive Detectors-- H L P DT, I 26 Mobile Enhancements Explosive Detectors-- H M P DT, I 28 Permanent Fixed Disperse Functions Increase Usable Life (i.e., Operate H H P M of Systems Redundant Systems)

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Table 40. Countermeasure guide. Hazard or Threat Scenario Nos.: 32H, 33H; 31T, 32T; 31R, 32R PV: insufficient perimeter protection of ventilation intakes with respect to C/B/R OV: insufficient surveillance of ventilation intakes with respect to C/B/R DP: loss of life; required decontamination of vent system and facility Order-of- Multiple- CM CM Functions and Relative CM Magnitude P/Op Strategy Benefit Type Descriptions Effectiveness # Cost Potential Lighting H L P DR, DT Traffic Safety 1 Traffic CCTV System or CCVE H M P, Op DT, I 5 Surveillance Security Awareness Training M L Op DT, I, M 6 Minimum Measures Safety, Roving Patrols M L Op DR, DT, I 7 Security Access Controls (Bollards, M M P DR Safety 10 Fences, Walls, Locks) Anti- Intrusion Detection System H M P DT 12 Trespassing Extend/Heighten Supply Air H M P DT 14 Intakes Full-Scale Emergency H L Op DT, I, M 19 Response Exercises Measures for Threat Level Inspections Public an Elevated H L Op DT 21 (Personal/Vehicles) Assurance C/B/R Detectors--Mobile H M P DT 27 Access Controls (Concrete H L1 P DR Safety 10 Walls) Enhancements C/B/R Detectors--Fixed H M P DT 29 Permanent Increase Redundant Ventilation H VH P M Usable Life of 30 Systems Systems Integrate Ventilation System Operation with C/B/R H M Op M Detectors Footnote 1. Cost of wall depends on height and length. Table 41. Countermeasure guide. Hazard or Threat Scenario Nos.: 34H; 33T; 33R PV: insufficient or outdated electronic protection software OV: insufficient or outdated electronic protection software DP: lost or inappropriate traffic and MEC equipment control Order-of- Multiple- CM CM Functions and Relative CM Magnitude P/Op Strategy Benefit Type Descriptions Effectiveness # Cost Potential Background Checks M L Op DR, DT 9 Minimum Measures Protect Anti-Virus Software H L P, Op I 15 Integrity of Data and Signals, Computer Firewalls H L P, Op I Protect 16 Investment in Backup Manual Control of Digital H M P, Op M Systems 17 Systems Regularly Scheduled Data H L Op M 18 Backup