Cover Image

Not for Sale



View/Hide Left Panel
Click for next page ( 118


The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement



Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page 117
117 For example, within the "hazard or threat"column you may summarizes the physical vulnerabilities ("PV" in the tables) of eliminate the "HazMat" row if restrictions are already in the scenarios. The third line summarizes the operational vul- place in your tunnel. You may also be able to eliminate nerabilities ("OV" in the tables) of the scenarios, and the whole columns (for example, you may eliminate the "sub- fourth line summarizes the damage potential ("DP" in the station" column if you don't have a substation). tables) of a successful attack. 4. Make a list of countermeasure guides (i.e., Tables 34 through 41) that you need to review based on the Countermeasure Type remaining cells. In the first column, the countermeasures ("CMs" in the tables) are grouped into three categories: 5.3 Countermeasure Guides Minimum measures, 5.3.1 Introduction Measures for an elevated threat level, and Permanent enhancements. The countermeasure guides (Tables 34 through 41) con- tain a great deal of information in a compressed amount of These categories were created on the basis of the current space. Each of these guides describes various countermea- state of practice, the current method of thinking concerning sures that can be considered for a number of hazard or threat physical security of a transportation asset, and a knowledge- scenarios outlined in Tables 14 through 16 (structural vul- able body of study concerning the physical and structural nerabilities to most likely hazard and threat scenarios) and weaknesses of tunnel structures and systems. Tables 25 through 27 (system vulnerabilities to most likely hazard and threat scenarios). For example, Table 34 groups Minimum Measures. This category refers to physical, together scenarios 1H4H and 9H from Table 28, 1T4T and permanent measures and temporary, operational measures 9T from Table 29, and 1R4R and 9R from Table 30. All of that should already be in place in every tunnel. These meas- these scenarios have common physical vulnerabilities (i.e., ures may be required by local code or be widely accepted insufficient tunnel liner thickness, inadequate tunnel cover, standard design and practice as designated by professional and relative proximity of hazard or threat to liner), opera- societies. The measures may represent the current state of tional vulnerabilities (i.e., uncontrolled access of vehicles practice in tunnel safety and security, born of lessons into tunnels and insufficient vehicle inspections and/or learned and a collective body of knowledge. The measures cargo restrictions), and damage potentials (i.e., tunnel col- are above-average in efficiency and generally moderate lapse requiring up to several months to repair, rapid flood- in cost. ing and inflow of granular backfill material for underwater These measures include tunnels, and total or partial loss of system function). Thus, the possible countermeasures for all of these scenarios are Lighting; the same. For another example, Table 39 groups together sce- Ventilation system; narios 14H22H from Table 31, 14T24T from Table 32, and Fire detection system; 14R24R from Table 33. All of these scenarios have common Fire protection system; physical vulnerabilities (i.e., insufficient perimeter protec- Closed-circuit television (CCTV) system or closed-circuit tion of a critical facility), operational vulnerabilities (i.e., video equipment (CCVE); insufficient surveillance of a critical structure), and damage Security awareness training; potentials (i.e., total or partial loss of system function). Thus, Roving patrols; the possible countermeasures for all of these scenarios are HazMat restrictions; the same. Background checks (of employees and/or vendors); Access controls (bollards, fences, walls, locks); 5.3.2 Information Contained in Employee identification system; Countermeasure Guides Intrusion detection system; Evacuation protocols; Text Above the Table Extend/heighten supply air intakes; The first line of text above the tables in each countermeasure Anti-virus software; guide identifies the applicable hazard or threat scenarios from Computer firewalls; the directories (Tables 28 through 33). This identification is a Backup manual control of systems; way to cross-reference application of specific countermea- Regularly scheduled data backup; and sures to various hazard and threat scenarios. The second line Full-scale emergency response exercises.

OCR for page 117
118 Measures for an Elevated Threat Level. These countermea- Interior liner steel plates or panels; sures are temporary, normally operational measures designed Interior concrete panels; to be implemented when the tunnel system faces an elevated Interior concrete or chemical grouting; threat level. The threat level would ordinarily be based on the Exterior (ground) concrete or chemical grouting; general location of the tunnel or an actual threat directed at the Interior liner bolting or tie-backs; facility. Typically, the credibility of a threat to a tunnel or the sur- Rip-rap over tunnel; rounding area is assessed by a law enforcement or intelligence Precast concrete slab over tunnel; agency and passed through to the tunnel owner or operator. Interior roof steel plates; The measures deployed under this category are opera- Interior roof panels; tional. They largely consist of personnel-specific actions that Exterior roof steel plates; can be deployed quickly across any area of the tunnel and kept Exterior roof concrete panels; in place as long as desired. The measures are also portable and Bollards to control access; can be ended quickly once the elevated threat condition has Fencing to control access; passed. The costs for implementing these temporary meas- Concrete encasement of columns; ures are variable and directly related to the level of increased RFP wrapping of columns; presence and operations at the tunnel. The costs rise as the Steel jacketing of columns; level of protection and the deployment durations increase. Redundant columns or walls; Countermeasures that are deployed for an elevated threat Floodgates; and level normally provide a measure of public assurance. This Disperse functions (i.e., redundant systems). public assurance aids to temper any loss of mission due to increased travel times through the tunnel or inconvenience due to temporary changes of routine while transiting the tunnel. Countermeasure Functions and Descriptions Measures recommended for implementation during an elevated threat level include The second column within each table describes the coun- termeasure and its function. The range of countermeasures Guards at portals; explored in this guide track closely to the hazards and threats Inspections (personal/vehicle/ship); identified in Chapter 2. The countermeasure guides do not Bomb-sniffing dogs; address weather induced hazard scenarios that are common Onsite credential checks; in certain areas, such as blizzards and floods, because a tun- Waterborne patrols; nel owner or operator encountering serious weather events Ship-tracking protocols (in restricted areas); would already have a body of knowledge and practice that is Explosive detectors--mobile; and best for the local situation. Patterns of weather induced dis- C/B/R detectors--mobile. ruptions to a tunnel, if any, have been set by history. In addi- tion, countermeasures do not address weather events because Permanent Enhancements. This category includes all such events cannot be deterred, deflected, or interdicted. structural and system alterations of the tunnel environment Each listed countermeasure represents a general class of that are added to increase the safety and security of the tun- measures, where appropriate. There is some latitude regard- nel. Permanent enhancements are costly and require time to ing which specific measure from the class will be imple- design and build. The sometimes significant alteration of the mented. For example, in the class of lighting, the system tunnel requires capital investment by the owner and cooper- chosen could be high-pressure sodium, low-pressure ation of management to implement these measures. sodium, incandescent, or any other type of fixture to provide Permanent enhancements will often serve the dual benefit illumination to a given area. The lighting may be mounted to of extending the usable life of the tunnel structure and sup- a pole or wall or hung from a mast arm. The lighting system port systems. The renovations and improvements to may be placed 20 to 50 feet (6 to 15 meters) apart, depend- strengthen the structure or provide redundancy may decrease ing on the illumination requirements. The myriad of choices the need for future capital investment to mitigate the effects for the implementation may be settled only by a review of of use and age. local conditions. The recommended measures include the following: The countermeasures listed will lead the user to a subsec- tion of measures for further exploration. The decision on Explosive detectors--fixed; which countermeasures should be implemented must be C/B/R detectors--fixed; based on full knowledge of what currently exists in the tun- Redundant ventilation systems; nel environment, as well as what local conditions dictate.

OCR for page 117
119 Relative Effectiveness operator can affect the prices paid to obtain the countermea- sures. The ranges are wide to ensure the suitability of this The third column rates the relative effectiveness of the report for a nationwide audience. countermeasure as low (L), medium (M), or high (M). While The cost estimates are based on reasonable assumptions of the ratings assigned to the various countermeasures are based how many countermeasure items would likely be needed in a on many years of engineering expertise and past project tunnel environment. Where possible, a direct comparison to experience, it must be pointed out that the rating system is a tunnel retrofit was applied. The collective experience of the subjective. research team was used in developing the cost estimates. The This rating gives the likely effectiveness of the recom- final cost of all countermeasures and mitigation would need mended countermeasure to secure the asset, improve the to be established locally and be based on the actual conditions safety of the asset, or mitigate the damage potential of a suc- the tunnel owner or operator faces. cessfully delivered disruption. The rating scale indicates how In Tables 34 through 41, the cost estimate indicators are as useful the countermeasure would be as a single-source follows: measure. The effectiveness ratings are not intended to provide use- Low (L)--Cost estimate to implement this countermea- fulness of each countermeasure coupled or installed in tan- sure in a tunnel system should not exceed $1 million. dem with others that appear on Tables 34 through 41. The Medium (M)--Cost estimate to implement this counter- ratings for the effectiveness of each countermeasure are based measure in a tunnel system should range between $1 mil- on the collective experience of the research team and their lion and $3 million. combined 200+ years of tunnel design, construction, and High (H)--Cost estimate to implement this countermea- operation. The ratings are also drawn from the experience sure in a tunnel system should range between $3 million gained in other, current work, including that performed on and $10 million. behalf of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Very high (VH)--Cost estimate to implement this coun- several state and regional authorities. termeasure in a tunnel system should exceed $10 million. Order-of-Magnitude Cost Physical/Operational The fourth column gives an order-of-magnitude cost rang- The fifth column of Tables 34 through 41 indicates whether ing from low (L; up to $1 million) to very high (VH; over the countermeasure is a physical measure (P), an operational $10 million). Again, the cost ratings are very subjective and measure (Op), or both. depend on a number of variables, including tunnel length, Physical measures are constructed or deployed in a set loca- tunnel construction type, construction materials, surround- tion and require some type of inspection, design, construc- ing earth geology and groundwater conditions, available tion, and maintenance activities. Physical countermeasures clearances, and interruption of operations (e.g., lane closures, require planning before deployment (such as preparation of track outages, and disconnection of catenary and/or third rail design and construction documents) so as to maximize effi- power). The continuous operation of a facility is a primary ciency and value in serving the safety and security needs of goal of a tunnel owner or operator. Therefore, mitigation the tunnel asset. measures should be performed from the outside of the tun- Operational measures use personnel and are flexible, nel as opposed to the inside whenever possible to avoid inter- dynamic to the fluidity of a hazard or threat, and mobile. ruption of ongoing operations. Operational measures can be elevated or downgraded to The order-of-magnitude costs of countermeasures are match the level of hazard or threat anticipated. given as general guidance only because the implementation of any countermeasure is subject to local variables that can- Strategy not be accounted for in this guide. The local variables could make the cost higher or lower than the cost estimate. Simi- The sixth column of each table indicates the strategy or larly, if the tunnel operations and maintenance staff have the strategies of each countermeasure. The strategies have capability to install or implement certain countermeasures, evolved and been refined over time in accordance with the the overall cost to the owner would be significantly decreased. work of the National Academy of Science, the U.S. Depart- The cost estimates are given in broad ranges to reflect the ment of Homeland Security, and practitioners across the disparity in prices across the geographical areas of the 500+ nation. The strategies are aligned with current thinking in the tunnels in the United States. Labor costs, climate, equipment area of transportation risk and security, including the upcom- durability, and the purchasing power of the tunnel owner or ing multimodal guide entitled, "Guide to Risk Management

OCR for page 117
120 of Multimodal Transportation Infrastructure," which is being Strategic mitigation measures are long-range mitigation developed under NCHRP Project 20-59(17). measures that require effort and resources well in advance Possible strategies are deterrence (DR), detection (DT), of a potential or actual hazard or threat. These measures interdiction (I), and mitigation (M; including response and involve planning and preparation, which generally include preparedness): Institutional arrangements and plans or memoranda of Deterrence (i.e., Deflection): This category identifies coun- understanding, termeasures with a sure strategic objective, namely making Communications or public outreach plans, an asset so difficult to disrupt, or so costly to the intentional Interdiction plans for intentional acts, attacker, that any disruption is not attempted. This category Continuity of operations plan, may also include the owner or operators' ability to present Emergency response and recovery plan, their asset as impervious to intentional harm, such that the Agency preparedness plan, attacker is diverted to explore another target or not attack Agency mobilization plan, at all. The concept of deterrence is not usable against natu- Drill and exercise guide, and ral hazards. Hurricanes, blizzards, floods, and other acts of Personal preparedness plans (for responding employees). nature cannot be deterred from their natural course. Detection: This category identifies countermeasures in Strategic mitigation measures with all of these compo- which the owner or operator can recognize that a hazard or nents allow the tunnel operating agency to prepare and threat exists and can communicate that actual or perceived respond to any disruption as one unified body, so well- hazard or threat to responders. This category applies to versed and well-practiced in the plans that it can take last- countermeasures implemented to learn of a disruptive minute, on-the-spot actions. event. The methods, techniques, technology, and person- Strategic mitigation measures may also involve physi- nel deployed to learn of a pending or actual incident may cally improving an asset so that it is impervious to the vary based on local conditions. The means of detection impact of the hazard or threat deployed. For example, rein- may range from the physical, including sensors and forcing a tunnel with steel plates will make the tube better implanted devices, to the operational, including analysis of able to withstand a blast overpressure, fire, or derailed intelligence gleaned from various sources. train. A full list of ideas to mitigate a hazard or threat by The act of detection extends to natural disasters and using physical improvements and design is discussed in other unintentional events as clearly as to events of nefari- Section 5.4. ous origin. Use of technology to pinpoint an unusual Tactical measures include an emergency response to the weather event or a faulty pump that may flood a road is as scene at the time of disruption. Rescuing people, diverting applicable to detecting a hazard as the police officer on traffic, and activating backup equipment can restore the fixed post at the portal inspecting cargo and discovering an asset's operations. The ability to mitigate the damage explosive. Each action is valid. potential of a hazard or threat by preparedness or response Interdiction: This category identifies countermeasures in depends on the institution's ability to have well-planned, which the owner or operator can meet a hazard or threat well-executed operational measures in place. These meas- after it has begun the delivery process. The owner or oper- ures will likely include the involvement of personnel and ator should have preestablished personnel and material agencies beyond the jurisdiction of the tunnel owner or resources that may immediately be deployed upon learn- operator. The need for advanced planning and tactical ing of the hazard or threat, which may be en route, at the coordination is crucial for the success of this tool to be target, or in the process of being delivered. Interdiction employed as a mitigating measure against all hazards and most normally applies to intentional acts of disruption, threats. such as an attacker or saboteur entering the asset. Interdic- tion is a less significant strategy in dealing with natural Some countermeasures have multiple strategies associated weather events or spontaneous hazards, such as equipment with them, such as bollards, which act as both deterrence and fires. mitigation. Such countermeasures may receive higher prior- Mitigation: This category identifies countermeasures ity for this dual benefit. designed to lessen the damage potential of any successfully delivered hazard or threat. The wide-ranging measures that Multiple-Benefit Potential fall into this category include both strategic mitigation measures requiring forethought and planning and tactical Many countermeasures have potential to provide other mitigation measures conducted by on-scene responders. benefits besides increasing the safety and security of a tunnel.