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132 Table 58. Countermeasure 17: Backup manual control of systems. Design of switches, levers, and other manual devices to allow onsite control of support systems if the communication link to the Countermeasure Description operations center is breached. These manual control facilities should be at the site of support systems or near to the site of support systems. Types/Components Switches; levers; buttons. Use Critical support systems. Category Minimum measures. This measure provides a redundancy to the operation of the Strengths support systems. The manual controls enable the operation of the systems despite loss of central control and/or power. Weaknesses None. Rough Cost of Implementation Low--less than $1 million per tunnel. High--the systems machinery must always be kept in ready Operation and Maintenance condition. High--tunnel staff need to be trained to operate the systems Training Requirements manually. Life Expectancy 2040 years. Comments Table 59. Countermeasure 18: Regularly scheduled data backup. Program to duplicate data from network and then store that copy Countermeasure Description offsite. The offsite location should be at a distance from the main tunnel network system and have an independent power supply. Types/Components Software code. Use Across entire data network. Category Minimum measures. This measure is an investment to protect the integrity of the data Strengths network and mitigate any catastrophic loss due to hazard or threat. Weaknesses None. Rough Cost of Implementation Low--less than $1 million per tunnel. Operation and Maintenance Low. Training Requirements None. Life Expectancy The data backups should be done on frequent intervals. This countermeasure is readily available from vendors who can Comments provide a reliable, continually updated service to the tunnel owner or operator. Countermeasure 19: Full-Scale Emergency to exercise, and participants should be unaware of the sched- Response Exercises ule to measure true preparedness. See Table 60. At a minimum, every tunnel owner or operator should have a set of emergency response procedures and an emergency 5.4.2 Recommended Measures for an response plan (ERP) to address all potential emergencies at the Elevated Threat Level facility. This plan should be based on recommendations and Countermeasure 20: Guards at Portals standards developed by organizations such as the NFPA and the World Road Association (PIARC). On a biannual or A common practice among tunnel owners and operators annual basis, full-scale emergency response exercises should during periods of elevated threat is to place fixed security posts be conducted at the tunnel to practice the procedures set forth at the tunnel portals to monitor people and traffic, to conduct in the ERP. These exercises should include tunnel operators; inspections, and to be onsite to lead a response in the event of tunnel users (actual or staff); and all possible emergency an incident that disrupts the normal mission of the tunnel. response personnel, including firefighters, paramedics, and This measure is effective and adds a layer of deterrence to any police. The simulated emergencies should vary from exercise person contemplating an intentional disruption, a layer of

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133 Table 60. Countermeasure 19: Full-scale emergency response exercises. Program to conduct regularly scheduled, full-scale emergency Countermeasure Description response exercises. Types/Components Module-based; initial training; refresher sessions. Required practice for all tunnel employees and emergency Use responders. Category Minimum measures. Low-cost, effective method of teaching tunnel employees and Strengths emergency responders how to handle various tunnel emergencies. Weaknesses None. Rough Cost of Implementation Low--less than $1 million per tunnel. Operation and Maintenance None--measure is not mechanical. Training Requirements High--initial and refresher training of all employees is necessary. Life Expectancy 25 years to properly train newly hired employees. Comments detection of threats, a layer of interdiction to parry a threat in Establishment of the inspection cordon may deter people the process of being delivered to the tunnel, and a layer of from perpetrating an intentional disruption and provide a onsite mitigation to any successfully delivered threat. This means of detecting intentional or unintentional hazards and measure, similar to that of roving patrols, is very flexible and threats. Inspections provide a layer of screening, thereby rapidly deployable under any condition. The cost of the meas- decreasing the chance of a hazard or threat being successfully ure is commensurate with the length of time the post is fixed delivered. This countermeasure typically inspires public con- at the portal. If the post is not fixed at the portal under normal fidence in the overall security posture of the tunnel and lim- operating conditions, then additional personnel and resources its the decrease in tunnel use. See Table 62. must be obtained to staff the countermeasure. See Table 61. The specific vehicles or vessels to be searched will be deter- mined by the owner or operator in conjunction with law enforcement and will be based on their combined intelli- Countermeasure 21: Inspections (Personal/Vehicle) gence. In each jurisdiction, law enforcement will be the Inspections of both vehicles (including cargo) and persons authority vested with the power to conduct the inspections. are efficient measures of tracking who and what is entering Vessels may appear on suspicion lists because of ownership, the tunnel and to interdict potential hazards and threats. cargo, origin, or destination. Vessels with a measure of risk Table 61. Countermeasure 20: Guards at portals. Placement of trained police or security guards in fixed posts at the portals of tunnel structures to inspect machinery and items entering Countermeasure Description the tunnel and to observe all activities occurring in and around the portal. Types/Components Police; private security. Use Fixed posts must be placed at each portal. Category Measures for an elevated threat level. Provides a thorough screening of all persons and material entering Strengths the tunnel through the portals. The use of trained police or security allows flexibility and rapidity of deployment. Weaknesses Potentially expensive. Rough Cost of Implementation Low--less than $1 million per tunnel. Operation and Maintenance None--measure is not mechanical. High--each police officer or security guard placed at the portal needs Training Requirements to be highly trained to spot potential threats and to respond to confirmed threats. Life Expectancy Short-term duration, equal to elevated threat condition. Comments

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134 Table 62. Countermeasure 21: Inspections (personal/vehicle). The implementation of a system to inspect all persons and vehicles Countermeasure Description (including cargo) entering a tunnel structure. Types/Components Vehicle; ship; persons; cargo; automated inspection; hand inspection. Inspection system must be applied at all entry points to ensure equal Use application. Category Measures for an elevated threat level. Properly applied, inspection system should ensure that hazardous Strengths items are kept out of the tunnel. Greatly increases costs to shippers that use the tunnel system, and Weaknesses decreases the flow of traffic through the tunnel. Rough Cost of Implementation Low--less than $1 million per tunnel. Use of automated inspection device, such as a scanner, will require Operation and Maintenance external vendors and maintenance. High--each screener placed at the portal needs to be highly trained Training Requirements to spot potential hazards and threats and to respond to confirmed hazards and threats. Life Expectancy Short-term duration. Comments toward the tunnel may be excluded from passing near or over facilities (such as electrical substations), and nearby docks the subaqueous structure. and marine facilities. The origin of an explosive threat will Implementation of this inspection measure may require be outside the tunnel, allowing a sufficient window of the installation of specialized machinery and/or the addition opportunity for detection. The K-9 approach may also of personnel who are trained and legally authorized to con- serve as an effective deterrent. Because of the success rate of duct inspections. There is a cost associated with these dogs detecting even the faintest traces of explosives, an deployments, some of which may be offset by the use of aggressor could anticipate that his or her attempt to move existing, in-house resources. Total outlays must include or plant an explosive would fail with this countermeasure staffing costs, thereby having a variable cost element. The in place. See Table 63. tunnel may also lose users to other transportation assets if A trained K-9 is very effective at detecting explosives and the suitability of a replacement is deemed viable to the delays can be deployed and moved rapidly to a specific location. The associated with the inspections being conducted at the por- K-9 program requires ongoing costs and maintenance to keep tals. The longer the inspection measure is deployed, the and train the dogs. A dog can typically only work for 3 to higher the cost will be to the owner or operator. The eco- 5 hours a day and has a service life of only 4 to 5 years. There- nomic cost to the public may also increase as the shipment of fore, there is a continual need to resupply K-9 units to main- goods becomes delayed. tain effectiveness. The inspection measure is most effective when coupled with a viable method to determine which persons or vehi- Countermeasure 23: Onsite Credential Checks cles to inspect. An unfounded, blanket inspection ritual may not be as effective as a measured one based on sound During periods of elevated threat, a heightened security assumptions. To achieve the proper mix, tunnel owners/ posture may include implementation of a credentials check operators are encouraged to tailor their inspection methodol- on jobsites. The check would focus particularly on areas of ogy and surrounding protocols to local applicable conditions. active construction or rehabilitation. A guard or similarly recognized individual would inspect the credentials of each person entering the site. The credentials would likely Countermeasure 22: Bomb-Sniffing Dogs include a photo identification issued by the tunnel owner or operator that is valid for certain periods of time. See Another common, existing practice among tunnel own- Table 64. ers and operators is to conduct sweeps of the tunnel areas in search of explosives. A persistent program of frequent Countermeasure 24: Waterborne Patrols visits will decrease the opportunity for an aggressor to leave explosives within or near the tunnel. Deployment of bomb- When a tunnel crosses below a navigable waterway, water- sniffing dogs can be expanded to tunnel portals, support borne patrols may be instituted in response to an elevated

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135 Table 63. Countermeasure 22: Bomb-sniffing dogs. Countermeasure Description Using mobile canines to detect explosives in the tunnel. Types/Components Police; security. Use Throughout tunnel system. Category Measures for an elevated threat level. Very flexible in deployment schemes. K-9 is very effective in Strengths detecting explosives. Weaknesses Limited by availability of trained dogs. Rough Cost of Implementation Low--less than $1 million per tunnel. Operation and Maintenance None--measure is not mechanical. High--each K-9 handler and dog requires specialized, in-depth Training Requirements training. Life Expectancy 25 years. Comments Table 64. Countermeasure 23: Onsite credential checks. Countermeasure Description Credential checks on each jobsite entrance. Types/Components Employees; contractors; photo identification. Use At the entrance to all jobsites. Category Measures for an elevated threat level. Strengths Ensures that unauthorized individuals are not permitted onto a site. Weaknesses None. Rough Cost of Implementation Low--less than $1 million per tunnel. Operation and Maintenance Low--no mechanization. Medium--guard or checker must be trained to recognize a valid Training Requirements credential and to interdict a false identification. Life Expectancy 1 year. Comments threat condition. Waterborne patrols over the footprint of the waterways above a tunnel footprint. These protocols will tunnel elevate the security posture of the tunnel by providing allow the tunnel owner or operator to have input into the a flexible deterrence, detection, and interdiction force at a restrictions placed on vessels transiting the area. Content, major access point to the tunnel structure. Waterborne speed, and time of crossing may be regulated. These regula- patrols can be tasked to conduct inspections of vessels cross- tions would require the tunnel owner or operator to work ing the footprint or to halt traffic into the same area. They can with the U.S. Coast Guard, which maintains jurisdiction over be deployed based on timeframes of expected vessel traffic or navigable waterways. The effectiveness of the protocols can maintain a fixed post. The use of waterborne patrols in depends on the enforcement. Widespread adherence to the the area over the tunnel footprint is effective in securing that protocols may allow easier detection and, therefore, interdic- area. See Table 65. tion of a noncomplying transiting vessel. See Table 66. The cost of this measure includes the capital investment of Implementation of this countermeasure would require a boat and the variable costs associated with operating and substantial resources and time to gain the voluntary acquies- maintaining the boat as well as a trained crew. Maintenance cence of local shippers and users of the waterway. Cost vari- costs will depend on the amount of time for which the boat is ables would also include software and tracking devices. used. The sum of the costs depends on how often this meas- ure is deployed in response to an elevated threat level. Countermeasure 26: Explosive Detectors--Mobile Mechanical devices with the intent of detecting explosives Countermeasure 25: Ship-Tracking Protocols within the tunnel environment may be deployed in a mobile, A longer, strategic measure conducted in advance of, in tactical manner for use at several locations. See Table 67. place of, or in conjunction with waterborne patrols may Mobile detectors have many of the same capabilities and be the institution of ship-tracking protocols in navigable limitations as fixed detectors. Their chief advantage is the