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16 CHAPTER 3 Case Studies 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Case Study Descriptions This chapter consists of case studies of a variety of tunnel 3.2.1 Moscow Subway Suicide Bombing incidents that occurred between 1979 and 2004. Each case Location: Moscow, Russia study includes a list of references. Date: February 6, 2004 After an incident similar to the incidents described herein, Incident Category: terrorist bombing it is common practice for in-house or outside investigatory or Tunnel Length: N/A; subway train oversight agencies to report on the incident. However, such Fatalities and Injuries: 39 fatalities, 100+ injured reports are often unpublished and are rarely available to gen- eral readers. The information contained in these case studies Synopsis came from published sources that were readily available in libraries or through the Internet, without any special access to A bomb, later linked to Chechen separatists, exploded the systems described. Although some published oversight inside a crowded Moscow subway train during the morning reports were reviewed and included in the list of additional rush hour. The bomb destroyed the second car of the train as sources at the end of this report, most of the case study infor- it left the Avtozavodskaya station in southeast Moscow while mation presented herein came from newspaper accounts and traveling toward the center of the city. The incident was one after-incident analyses in magazines and academic journals. of three subway-related bombings attributed to Chechens. Because such sources can contain erroneous information, a piece of information was typically discounted if it differed Analysis of Pre-Incident Information and Events radically from that found in the majority of other accounts. However, there may be facts or interpretations of facts that The Moscow subway system, which carries an average of cannot be gleaned solely from published sources. 8.6 million riders a day, is considered the world's busiest sub- The case studies were selected for their applicability to the way system. The February 6, 2004, blast was neither the first overall project. They represent sketches of a wide variety of nor the last subway-related bombing, although it was the types of emergencies. The incidents include willful acts of deadliest up to that time. A bombing in a subway car in June arson and bombings in transit systems, road and rail acci- 1996 killed four people; a bomb blast on August 8, 2000, dents in tunnels, fires in tunnels and transit stations, and an ripped through a Moscow underpass leading from an under- urban tunnel flood. Summaries, pre-incident and incident ground railway station at central Pushkin Square, killing 13 analyses, fatalities and injuries, fire and emergency response people and injuring at least 90; another bomb had injured (including, in some instances, police response), damage and about a dozen people in February 2001. The incidents were service restoration, and findings of the agencies involved in blamed on Chechen rebels, although the Pushkin Square the incidents and various oversight groups are presented. bombing, according to police, may actually have been a turf Each case study ends with a list of references pertaining to it. battle between either rival businesspeople or criminal gangs. The chapter concludes with Table 4, which briefly summa- Regardless of motives, the bombings led to increased surveil- rizes each incident; a discussion of issues raised by the inci- lance of riders, particularly those who appeared to be dents; and Table 5, which shows the role of MEC systems in Chechens from the North Caucasus area, but the level of the case studies. crowding in the system makes programmed or thorough

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17 surveillance impossible. In addition to police routinely stop- gathered outside the Avtozavodskaya station. Other ambu- ping those who appear suspicious, there are security cameras lances gathered at the Paveletskaya station entrance, from throughout the system. which many of the survivors who were able to walk were evacuated. Some survivors were aided by police officers who were riding in the train two or three cars behind where the Analysis of the Incident bomb went off. A bomb exploded at 8:45 a.m. in a crowded rush-hour Moscow subway train on the Zamoskvoretskaya Line (the Damage and Service Restoration Green Line), killing at least 30 people and wounding more than 130 passengers. The bomb, which was hidden in a back- Both subway stations were reopened soon after the bomb- pack, exploded in the second car of the train as it left the ing. The Avtozavodskaya station was almost immediately Avtozavodskaya station traveling toward the center of the turned into an impromptu memorial, with people laying city. The train had moved 984 feet (300 meters) out of flowers on the station platform. the station when the explosion occurred near the first door Fear of additional explosions brought intensified security of the second car. The explosion shattered the train's win- at subway and rail stations, airports, and other public places. dows, welded metal seats to the train, and hurled bodies and One other subway station (Tekstilshchili), not far from the body parts out of the train. The third car was also damaged, Avtozavodskaya explosion, was evacuated for part of a non- and the blast shattered windows in other cars. The train trav- rush-hour Saturday afternoon and evening after an anony- eled several hundred feet before coming to a stop. mous threat was called in by telephone. Train operators initially had problems opening the car doors. Reports as to how the doors were opened differed; some Conclusions survivors said that the operator was able to open the doors, but some survivors maintained that the passengers pried the doors The explosion was attributed to Chechen separatists who open. Once the doors were opened, some survivors walked may have been attempting to influence the presidential elec- approximately 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) through the subway tion that took place on March 14, in which President Putin tunnel to the Paveletskaya station. Their walk took them under was reelected. The incident was the 13th terrorist attack of the the Moscow River and closer to the Kremlin. At the Pavelet- year in Russia. The terrorist attacks were mostly suicide skaya station, they were met by ambulances and firefighters. bombings and resulted in more than 260 people being killed. More than 60 of the deaths were in Moscow. Two previous bombings were in either a tunnel or subway station, includ- Fatalities and Injuries ing the August 8, 2000, bombing in a pedestrian tunnel near The fatalities and injuries all occurred on the train. Thirty- Pushkin Square, in which 13 people were killed and at least nine people were killed immediately in the blast. Of the 90 injured, and the February 5, 2001, bombing of the approximately 135 passengers injured, the vast majority (esti- Belorusskaya subway station, in which there were no fatalities mates ranged from 113 to 122) required hospitalization. but nine people were injured. The incident resulted, as had the others, in enhanced secu- rity at public transportation facilities in Moscow and other Fire and Emergency Response major Russian cities. However, government officials reported Firefighters, police, and emergency medical personnel there was little they could do to prevent bombings as long as responded to the incident in one of Moscow's deepest under- the perpetrators were prepared to die along with those killed ground stations. Bodies and body parts were scattered along in the attacks. The problem in preventing such bombings was the tracks, and many bodies remained in the train, covered in compounded by the conflicting reports as to whether the blood and soot. More than 700 people were evacuated from bomb was planted or carried. The conflicts stemmed from the two stations, many transported from the scene by buses some investigators having viewed a videotape of what they that were rerouted to assist in the evacuation to prevent fur- believed were the suspected bomber and her alleged accom- ther clogging of area streets. Police officers barricaded the plice standing on the platform of the station before boarding streets nearest the two stations and stopped all train traffic on the train. Others believed the explosion was caused by an the subway line. Because of the reliance on public trans- unattended bag left in the car. portation by commuters, street-level traffic congestion was The difficulty of preventing a suicide attack in a subway considerable. station was reinforced a few months later. On August 31, Wounded passengers were brought up on stretchers a female suicide bomber set off a bomb outside a Moscow on long escalators to the more than 50 ambulances that subway station, killing at least 10 people and injuring more