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· Provide appropriate rescue equipment (e.g., emergency 3.2.12 Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH)
vehicles, golf carts for moving in the walkway, and Evacuation under the World Trade
breathing apparatuses for emergency responders) and Center
improved communications.
· Revise rescue procedures so that the fire chief of either
Location: PATH rapid transit station under the
Oakland or San Francisco, depending solely on where the World Trade Center
fire occurred, was in charge of operations. Date: September 11, 2001
· Change the doors to the gallery to enable people inside to
Incident Category: terrorist bombing of buildings
get out as easily as people outside to get in. above the rail station
· Receive approval from the Oakland and San Francisco fire
Tunnel Length: N/A; rail station under bombed
chiefs on the new fire rescue procedures. building
Fatalities and Injuries: None in this portion of the incident
Conclusions
Synopsis
Both fire departments had practiced tunnel emergency
procedures in drills that involved entering the tunnel tubes Two planes flown by terrorists struck the World Trade Cen-
and the central corridor, or the gallery that connects them. ter's (WTC's) twin towers during the morning rush hour on
Firefighters were trained that the gallery was the place to flee September 11, 2001, resulting in fire and heat that caused the
to during a fire or smoke condition because panic doors buildings to collapse. This case study does not discuss the
every 100 feet (30 meters) were programmed to open as soon overall incident, but looks specifically at the successful evac-
as they were touched. Although this worked during drills, in uation of employees, passengers, and trains from the PATH
the actual incident the gallery filled with smoke, thus becom- rapid transit station under the WTC.
ing a dangerous location. When firefighters tried to exit the
gallery and enter the relative safety of the eastbound (unaf-
Analysis of Pre-Incident Information and Events
fected) tube, they were unable to find the keyholes in the
doors. The firefighter who died was trapped in the smoke- PATH was acquired in 1962 by the Port Authority of
filled gallery. New York and New Jersey from the bankrupt Hudson and
The incident was attributed to lack of communication Manhattan Railroad. The system and its tunnels linking
between the train operator and central operations, poor coor- New York and New Jersey, which had been built in 1908,
dination, and errors of judgment, all of which made the inci- were the first passenger rail connections between the two
dent a key factor in the development of National Fire states. Prior to September 11, 2001, the PATH rapid transit
Protection Association transit industry guidelines (NFPA system of 13 stations carried approximately 260,000 week-
130) on responses to fire incidents [Ref. 2]. day passengers, about 67,000 of whom boarded PATH at the
WTC station located about 70 feet (21 meters) below the
WTC towers.
References
When the first plane hit the WTC at 8:46 a.m., the PATH
Braun, E. (1978). Fire Hazard Evaluation of BART Vehicles. rush hour was not quite over. Yet within 5 minutes, despite the
Washington, DC: Urban Mass Transportation Admin., Depart- surrounding chaos, a train dispatcher at the station had the
ment of Transportation. (Final Report, NBSIR 78-1421) presence of mind to ask his control center what he should do
Rubinstein, S. (1979, Jan. 19). "Key Questions in BART about passengers he had just unloaded and those who had
Probe." San Francisco Chronicle, p. 1. just entered his train on Track 4. He was told to immediately
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District. (1979, take his train and passengers out of the station and back to
Nov. 12). Cal-OSHA Reporter, vol. 6, no. 37. New Jersey. Although tapes released later indicated that at
Stack, P. (1979, Jan. 18)."BART Fire Under Bay: One Dead, least one conductor did not think he would be able to reverse
46 Hurt." San Francisco Chronicle, p. 1. his train to get out of the 14th Street station, passengers at
Stack, P. (1979, Jan. 19)."Fireman Tells of His Ordeal Under Manhattan stations were boarded or reboarded onto trains
the Bay." San Francisco Chronicle, n.p. that traveled under the Hudson, returning them all to safety
Wegars, D. (1979, Jan. 20). "PUC Order--No BART Under in New Jersey.
Bay." San Francisco Chronicle, p. 1. The only train that was unable to leave the WTC station
Williamson, G. (1979, Jan. 18). "BART Trouble Before Fire was found later on Track 4 with debris covering four of
Reported." San Francisco Chronicle, p. 6. its seven cars. However, there were no fatalities because
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45
all occupants had fled the station before the buildings Damage and Service Restoration
collapsed.
An important part of damage control that pertained specif-
ically to the PATH portion of the events of September 11, 2001,
Analysis of the Incident involved securing the basin under the collapsed towers to
ensure that the PATH system was not flooded beyond the
Within minutes of the first plane striking the north tower
immediate event. A 60-foot (18-meter)-deep cavern that
of the WTC at 8:46 a.m., at least four PATH employees indi-
became known as the "bathtub" formed the foundation and
vidually contacted the PATH control center at Journal Square
side walls of the basement levels of the WTC and kept out water
in Jersey City to report that an unexplained explosion or fire
from the Hudson River. If the bathtub had given way, water
seemed to have occurred at the WTC. None were aware of the
would have rushed into what had been the basement levels of
magnitude of the event. Based on instructions from a PATH
the WTC and subsequently into the two PATH tubes under the
deputy director who was at the WTC, by 8:52 a.m. the system's
river. Although some water damage occurred at the Exchange
trainmaster began to issue instructions to conductors and
Place station in Jersey City, had the water not been contained it
operators to avoid the station. Had it not been for these
could have reached the PATH terminus at West 33rd Street and
prompt instructions, trains would have continued to arrive at
Sixth Avenue in midtown Manhattan, and from there flooded
the station at 3- and 5-minute intervals, unloading passengers
adjoining New York City subway tunnels. Further flooding was
directly into buildings that would soon collapse. This would
prevented, and it was eventually determined that much of the
undoubtedly have resulted in a far larger number of deaths in
water in the PATH tubes was not from the bathtub, but from
conjunction with the WTC attack.
broken water mains, firefighters' hoses, and rainwater.
Staff aboard a train from Newark that was carrying about
On November 23, 2003, PATH service linking lower Man-
1,000 passengers announced that passengers should reboard;
hattan and New Jersey was restored at the temporary WTC
the staff then moved the train out of the station and to the
PATH station. The station, which opened 1 month ahead of
Exchange Place station in Jersey City. The passengers who
schedule, was the final part of Port Authority's $566 million
had not reboarded were evacuated from the Trade Center by
program to restore the rail service into lower Manhattan that
Port Authority police officers and other operations person-
was severed on September 11, 2001. It was the first public
nel. A second train originating in Hoboken, New Jersey, and
space to re-open within the WTC site since the terrorist
also carrying approximately 1,000 passengers was scheduled
attacks. Although the temporary station cost $323 million to
to arrive at the WTC station just after the Newark train. The
build, the station lacks many of the amenities of the original
crew was ordered by the trainmaster to keep its doors closed,
station, including heating, air conditioning, and features nec-
move through the WTC, and loop around and proceed to
essary to comply with the federal Americans with Disabilities
Exchange Place. A third train scheduled to leave the
Act (ADA). It is planned that these features will be included
Exchange Place station for the WTC station was directed to
in the permanent station.
discharge all passengers at Exchange Place and to proceed to
In addition to the cost of the temporary station, $106 mil-
the WTC to evacuate any stranded passengers and Port
lion was spent by the Port Authority to restore the PATH tun-
Authority personnel. That train, which left the station at
nels under the Hudson River. The interior of some tunnel
about 9:10 a.m., was the last to leave before all city-bound
sections had to be stripped, and equipment damaged by the
trains were halted in New Jersey. The timely decision to evac-
collapse of the towers and subsequent flooding (such as
uate trains from the WTC station and to halt those heading
tracks, electrical wiring, and train signals) had to be replaced.
toward it resulted in no trains being trapped in the tunnels
The $106 million also included restoration and enhancement
when the towers collapsed and no passengers or staff being
of the Exchange Place station in Jersey City.
left in the station.
The WTC temporary station is slated to be replaced with a
proposed $2 billion permanent WTC Transportation Hub
Fatalities and Injuries that will include underground pedestrian connections to
more than a dozen New York City subway stations and an
There were no fatalities or injuries in this portion of the
additional connection to the Metropolitan Transportation
incident.
Authority's proposed Fulton Street Transit Center.
Fire and Emergency Response Conclusions
Fire and emergency response was not involved for this por- Based on normal ridership patterns, it is estimated that as
tion of the incident. many as 3,000 PATH passengers were prevented from
