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Rights & Permissions Free PDF Access Sign in to download PDF book and chapters Free Resources Display this book on your site! Related Titles Safety in the Underground Construction and Operation of the Exploratory Studies Facility at Yucca Mountain Underground Engineering for Sustainable Urban Development Other Related Titles NCHRP Report 525 Volume 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure (2007) National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Citation Manager Export the bibliographic data for this book in your chosen format Web Search Builder Use this book's key terms to search within this book, across our collection, or across the Web. Skim This Chapter Skim this chapter and use this chapter's key terms to search within this book. Reference Finder Paste in your own text to find books that relate to your topic. Citation Manager Transportation Research Board. "4.5.2 Categorization of Systems." NCHRP Report 525 Volume 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007. Please select a format: Page 72   E-mail Share on facebook Facebook Share on delicious Delicious Share on stumbleupon Stumble Share on twitter Twitter More Sharing ServicesMore Page 72 Front Matter (R1-R15) Chapter 1 - Introduction (1-1) 1.4 Assumptions (2-3) 2.1 Major Hazards and Threats (4-5) 2.2 Damage Potential (6-6) 2.3.1 Hazard Scenarios in Relation to Assets (7-10) 2.3.2 Threat Scenarios in Relation to Assets (11-14) 2.4 Conclusions (15-15) 3.2.1 Moscow Subway Suicide Bombing (16-17) 3.2.2 Jungangno (Chungang-Ro) Subway Station Arson Fire (18-20) 3.2.3 St. Gotthard Tunnel Fire (21-21) 3.2.4 Howard Street CSX Tunnel Fire (22-25) 3.2.5 Kitzsteinhorn Tunnel Cable Car Fire (26-27) 3.2.6 Mont Blanc Tunnel Fire (28-31) 3.2.7 Channel Tunnel Fire (32-33) 3.2.8 Subway Sarin Gas Attack (34-36) 3.2.9 Chicago Freight Tunnel Flood (37-38) 3.2.10 London Underground (the Tube) King's Cross Station Fire (39-41) 3.2.11 Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) Transbay Tunnel Fire (42-43) 3.2.12 Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) Evacuation under the World Trade Center (44-45) 3.4.2 Lessons Observed (46-49) 3.4.3 Role of MEC Systems in Case Study Incidents (50-50) 4.2 Types of Transportation Tunnels (51-51) 4.3.1 Immersed Tube Tunnels (52-54) 4.3.3 Bored or Mined Tunnels (55-58) 4.4.2 Modes of Tunnel Failure (59-64) 4.4.3 Effects of Other Extreme Events (65-67) 4.4.4 Critical Factors in Vulnerability Assessment of Transportation Tunnels (68-68) 4.4.5 Damage Potential Rating of Tunnels (69-69) 4.5.1 Key Safety Functions (70-71) 4.5.2 Categorization of Systems (72-78) 4.6 Chapter Summary (79-99) 5.2.2 System Hazard and Threat Directories (100-116) 5.3.2 Information Contained in Countermeasure Guides (117-120) 5.4 Countermeasure Descriptions (121-121) 5.4.1 Recommended Minimum Measures (122-131) 5.4.2 Recommended Measures for an Elevated Threat Level (132-135) 5.4.3 Recommended Permanent Enhancements (136-148) 5.5 Conclusion (149-151) 6.2.1 People (152-152) 6.2.3 Engineering and Technological Systems and Controls (153-153) 6.3 Security System Integration (154-155) 6.5 Conclusions (156-156) 7.2 Report Tables on a CD (157-158) 7.10 Owner Orientation Workshops (159-159) 7.14.1 Tunnel Structural Elements (160-160) 7.17 Interactive Electronic Version of this Report (161-161) 7.24 Structural Blast Damage Potential Analyses (162-162) 7.26 Issues Identified by Case Studies (163-163) References Cited in the Report (164-165) Additional Sources (166-166) List of Abbreviations (167-168) Abbreviations used without definitions in TRB publications (169-169)

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72 Table 13. (Continued). Damage Potential Definition A = Severely · Collapse--requires several months to 1 year to repair Catastrophic · Rapid flooding B = Catastrophic · Explosion - moderate to large area breach failure - potential flooding - facility closure over several weeks to months · Fire - significant liner damage (e.g., deep fire induced spalling through concrete liner; local failure of load carrying structural elements) - requires several weeks to months to repair C = Critical · Explosion - local breach failure - significant water inflow - requires a few days to weeks to repair · Fire - moderate liner damage (e.g., 6-inch [15-centimeter] fire induced concrete spalling; steel reinforcement exposed) - requires a few days to weeks to repair D = Serious · Explosion - local damage of liner--no breaching - controllable water inflow - repairable within 24 hours to a few days · Fire - local damage of liner (e.g., 2- to 3-inch [5- to 7.6-centimeter] fire induced concrete spalling) - repairable within 24 hours to a few days E = Marginal · Explosion - minor damage--spalling, cracking, lining overstress - repairable within 1 hour · Fire - minor damage (e.g., less than 1-inch [2.5-centimeter] fire induced concrete spalling) - repairable within 1 hour F = Negligible · Explosion - no damage · Fire - no damage important to the ability of owners to effectively and safely · Ventilation operate any transportation tunnel. Systems serving trans- ­ Emergency ventilation portation tunnels handle the following key safety functions: · Life safety ­ Fire protection · Emergency ventilation, ­ Drainage · Fire protection, · Electrical · Drainage, ­ Primary · Power supply, ­ Ancillary · Lighting, ­ Traction · Signals, ­ Emergency · Train control, · Command and Control · Traffic control, ­ Traffic control · System control, and ­ Train control · Communications. ­ Signals ­ System control · Communications 4.5.2 Categorization of Systems The systems serving the above key safety functions have Ventilation includes all of the systems, equipment, and been categorized into five primary categories to simplify the facilities required to provide ventilation of a tunnel during an designation of critical elements: emergency.

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73 Table 14. Structural vulnerabilities to most likely hazard or threat scenarios for road tunnels. Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway Target: Tunnel Liner Hazard Tactical Cut-and- Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario Immersed or Delivery PV/OV/DP Cover Soft to Firm No. Tube Tunnel Strong Rock Threat Device Tunnel Ground 1H Large Truck PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED OV no inspections at portals to limit vehicle type, size, or cargo DP A A A-B C 2H Medium Car/Van PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED OV no inspections at portals to limit vehicle type, size, or cargo DP B B B-C D 3H Small Backpack PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED OV public access to roadway; inadequate surveillance DP D D D-F E 4H Large Tanker PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner 1 Fire OV no vehicle inspections at portals to limit size, type, or cargo DP D C B-C D Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway Target: Column/Wall/Roof Slab Hazard Tactical Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Air-Rights Structure No. Threat Device 5H Large Truck PV insufficient protection of column, wall, or roof slab; relative IED proximity of threat to column, wall, or roof slab OV no inspections at entrances to limit vehicle type, size, or cargo DP B 6H Medium Car/Van PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative IED proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV no inspections at entrances to limit vehicle type, size, or cargo DP C 7H Small Backpack PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative IED proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV public access to roadway; inadequate surveillance DP D 8H Large Tanker PV insufficient fire protection of column/wall/roof slab Fire1 OV no vehicle inspections at entrances to limit size, type, or cargo DP C Abbreviations: Note: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1 . More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential (continued on next page)

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74 Table 14. (Continued). Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway Target: Portal Bored or Mined Hazard Tactical Air- Immersed Cut-and- Tunnel Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Rights Tube Cover No. Threat Device Structure Tunnel Tunnel Soft to Firm Strong Ground Rock 9H Large Tanker PV insufficient portal strength Fire1 OV no vehicle inspections at portals to limit size, type, or cargo DP C D C B-C D Path to Target: Waterway Target: Portal or Shaft Wall Hazard Tactical Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario Delivery or PV/OV/DP Immersed Tube Tunnel Soft to Firm Strong No. Device Threat Ground Rock 10H Very Depth PV insufficient portal or shaft wall strength Large Charge OV uncontrolled ship traffic movement through channel over IED or Ship tunnel with uninspected cargo DP A A A Path to Target: Waterway Target: Top of Tunnel Hazard Tactical Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Immersed Tube Tunnel Soft to Firm Strong No. Threat Device Ground Rock 11H Very Depth PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover Large Charge OV uncontrolled ship traffic movement through channel over IED from tunnel with uninspected cargo Ship DP A A C Path to Target: Surface Roadway over Tunnel Target: Roof Slab Hazard Tactical Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Cut-and-Cover Tunnel Air-Rights Structure No. Threat Device 12H Large Truck PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover IED OV if parking structure, no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo DP A A 13H Medium Truck or PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover IED Multiple OV if parking structure, no vehicle inspections to limit size, Backpacks type, or cargo DP B B Abbreviations: Note: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential

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75 Table 15. Structural vulnerabilities to most likely hazard or threat scenarios for transit tunnels. Path to Target: Trackway Target: Tunnel Liner Hazard Tactical Cut-and- Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario Immersed or Delivery PV/OV/DP Cover Soft to Firm Strong No. Tube Tunnel Threat Device Tunnel Ground Rock 1T Large Transit Car/ PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED Engine OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops DP A A A-B C 2T Medium Transit Car/ PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED Engine or OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled Multiple access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, exits/stairs) Backpacks DP B B B-C D 3T Small Backpack PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, exits/stairs); inadequate surveillance DP D D D-F E 4T Large IED on PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner Fire1 Transit OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops Vehicle DP D C B-C D Path to Target: Trackway Target: Column/Wall/Roof Slab Hazard Tactical Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Air-Rights Structure No. Threat Device 5T Large Transit Car/ PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative IED Engine proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops DP B 6T Medium Transit Car/ PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative IED Engine or proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab Multiple OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled Backpacks access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, exits/stairs) DP C 7T Small Backpack PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative IED proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, exits/stairs); inadequate surveillance DP D 8T Large IED on PV insufficient fire protection of column/wall/roof slab Fire1 Transit OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops Vehicle DP C Abbreviations: Note: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential (continued on next page)

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76 Table 15. (Continued). Path to Target: Trackway Target: Portal Hazard Tactical Air- Immersed Cut-and- Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Rights Tube Cover Soft to Firm Strong No. Threat Device Structure Tunnel Tunnel Ground Rock 9T Large IED on PV insufficient portal strength Fire1 Transit OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access Vehicle to rail cars and engines; no cargo restrictions; insufficient inspection of cargo containers at origin DP C D C B-C D Path to Target: Waterway Target: Portal or Shaft Wall Hazard Tactical Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Immersed Tube Tunnel Soft to Firm Strong No. Threat Device Ground Rock 10T Very Depth PV insufficient portal or shaft wall strength Large Charge OV uncontrolled ship traffic movement through channel over IED or Ship tunnel with uninspected cargo DP A A A Path to Target: Waterway Target: Top of Tunnel Hazard Tactical Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Immersed Tube Tunnel Soft to Firm Strong No. Threat Device Ground Rock 11T Very Depth PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover Large Charge OV uncontrolled ship traffic movement through channel over IED from tunnel with uninspected cargo Ship DP A A C Path to Target: Surface Roadway over Tunnel Target: Roof Slab Hazard Tactical Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Cut-and-Cover Tunnel Air-Rights Structure No. Threat Device 12T Large Truck PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover IED OV no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo DP A A 13T Medium Truck or PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover IED Multiple OV no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo Backpacks DP B B Abbreviations: Note: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential

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77 Table 16. Structural vulnerabilities to most likely hazard or threat scenarios for rail tunnels. Path to Target: Trackway Target: Tunnel Liner Hazard Tactical Cut-and- Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario Immersed or Delivery PV/OV/DP Cover Soft to Firm Strong No. Tube Tunnel Threat Device Tunnel Ground Rock 1R Large Rail Car/ PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED Engine OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops DP A A A-B C 2R Medium Rail Car/ PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED Engine or OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled Multiple access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, exits/stairs) Backpacks DP B B B-C D 3R Small Backpack PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner IED OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, exits/stairs) DP D D D-F E 4R Large IED on Rail PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner Fire1 Vehicle OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops DP D C B-C D Path to Target: Trackway Target: Column/Wall/Roof Slab Hazard Tactical Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Air-Rights Structure No. Threat Device 5R Large Rail Car/ PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative IED Engine proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops DP B 6R Medium Rail Car/ PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative IED Engine proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, tunnel exits/stairs) DP C 7R Small Backpack PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative IED proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, tunnel exits/stairs); inadequate surveillance DP D 8R Large IED on Rail PV insufficient fire protection of column/wall/roof slab Fire1 Vehicle OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops DP C Abbreviations: Note: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential (continued on next page)

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78 Table 16. (Continued). Path to Target: Trackway Target: Portal Hazard Tactical Air- Immersed Cut-and- Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Rights Tube Cover Soft to Firm Strong No. Threat Device Structure Tunnel Tunnel Ground Rock 9R Large IED on PV insufficient portal strength Fire1 Rail OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access Vehicle to rail cars and engines; no cargo restrictions; insufficient inspection of cargo containers at origin DP C D C B-C D Path to Target: Waterway Target: Portal or Shaft Wall Hazard Tactical Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario and Delivery PV/OV/DP Immersed Tube Tunnel Soft to Firm Strong No. Threat Device Ground Rock 10R Very Depth PV insufficient portal or shaft wall strength Large Charge OV uncontrolled ship traffic movement through channel over IED or Ship tunnel with uninspected cargo DP A A A Path to Target: Waterway Target: Top of Tunnel Hazard Tactical Bored or Mined Tunnel Scenario and Delivery PV/OV/DP Immersed Tube Tunnel Soft to Firm Strong No. Threat Device Ground Rock 11R Very Depth PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover Large Charge OV uncontrolled ship traffic movement through channel over IED from tunnel with uninspected cargo Ship DP A A C Path to Target: Surface Roadway over Tunnel Target: Roof Slab Hazard Tactical Scenario or Delivery PV/OV/DP Cut-and-Cover Tunnel Air-Rights Structure No. Threat Device 12R Large Truck PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover IED OV no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo DP A A 13R Medium Truck or PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover IED Multiple OV no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo Backpacks DP B B Abbreviations: Note: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential