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Life safety includes all of the systems, equipment, and facil- combined with the system element impact list to develop the
ities required to provide protection during an emergency to draft guidelines. The results of the combined assessment and
the tunnel and its inhabitants. list are presented in Table 23 as a list of potentially critical
Electrical includes both normal and emergency power for locations where each of the tunnel systems is vulnerable. The
ancillaries, systems, and train traction. table records the level of vulnerability as "Low,""Medium," or
Command and control includes traffic, train, and system "High."
control, along with signals. Table 24 estimates the vulnerabilities of critical locations.
Communications includes all communications systems Tables 25, 26, and 27 present system vulnerabilities to the
required to make the tunnel functional and safe. most likely hazard or threat scenarios for road tunnels, tran-
To create the above five primary categories of systems, the sit tunnels, and rail tunnels, respectively. These tables com-
research team started with an initial list of safety systems serv- bine the information given in Table 3 (hazard and threat
ing road, transit, and rail tunnels. Table 17 shows this initial scenarios) with the information given in Table 24 (vulnera-
list of safety systems, along with the tunnel functions associ- bilities of critical locations). The hazard and threat scenar-
ated with each system. After careful review of the data in this ios have been rearranged into subtables on the basis of the
table, the research team made several decisions. One decision "Path to Target" as well as the "Target." These items are
was to combine the categories of passenger rail tunnels and located at the top left side of each subtable. The hazards and
freight rail tunnels in this report because the vulnerabilities threats presented on the left side of the tables include the
and damage potentials are similar. The other decisions introduction to the tunnel property of large, medium, and
involve the elimination of some elements (such as emission small IEDs; large fires; hazardous materials; C/B/R; and
control, emission monitoring, and normal lighting) because cyber attack. All of the hazards and threats were developed
they do not affect the vulnerability of particular tunnels. In further to identify scenarios that include hazard or threat,
the end, the research team decided on the above five primary path to target, tactical delivery device, and ultimate target.
categories of systems. These revised primary categories are Each of the hazard or threat scenarios was considered for
depicted in Table 18. each of the five primary system categories presented in Sec-
tion 4.5.2. Each row presents a unique set of vulnerabilities
(both physical and operational) and a set of damage poten-
4.5.3 Degree of Impact on Safety and tials. This should provide the owner or operator with a clear
Operations guide to the types of hazard and threat scenarios possible
for tunnels.
When systems are disrupted, the degree of impact on the
safety and operations of the tunnel can vary. Table 19 pro-
vides a subjective evaluation of the different impacts and mit- 4.5.5 Summary
igation requirements. This evaluation is consistent with the
Nonstructural (i.e., tunnel systems) guidelines have been
FTA's ranking system [Ref. 20].
developed to provide the owner or operator with a simple
System paralysis can occur if a coordinated attack is aimed
method to identify the critical elements and locations within
at specifically related systems. For example, if a multiple-
his or her tunnel based on the hazard or threat, path to target,
point attack focuses on the electrical power supply as well as
tactical delivery device, and ultimate target. Each of the criti-
any emergency backup systems and is successful, most of the
cal systems has been assessed, and a set of vulnerabilities and
tunnel's MEC systems will be disabled. Such threats may
damage potentials have been identified for each reasonable
cause synergistic effects and may require systemwide checks
hazard or threat.
to be conducted before tunnel operations are resumed.
Tables 20, 21, and 22 subjectively highlight the impact of
system element disruption on each of the transportation tun- 4.6 Chapter Summary
nel function types. These subjective impact ratings are based
The information presented in this chapter allows tunnel facil-
on single-point attacks. In the case of multiple-point or coor-
ity owners, operators, and engineers to conduct preliminary
dinated attacks, the disruption to the tunnel systems would
vulnerability rating (i.e., screening) assessments of their facili-
obviously become more severe.
ties and, if needed, to derive priority lists of a tunnel's structural
components and system components for further study.
To determine the countermeasures available to the tunnel
4.5.4 Potentially Critical Locations
owner or operator, the research team applied comparative
A careful assessment of the potentially critical locations analysis to the hazard and threat scenarios to discern com-
was made for each tunnel function type. This assessment was mon themes. From this analysis, it was determined that the
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Table 17. Initial categories of safety systems.
Tunnel Function
Safety System Freight Passenger
Road Transit
Rail Rail
Ventilation System Transverse Ventilation ·
Type Longitudinal Ventilation · · · ·
Ventilation Buildings ·
Ventilation System Ventilation Shafts · ·
Facilities Vent Ducts (Transverse) ·
Intake Louvers · · · ·
Central Fans (Transverse) ·
Ventilation System
Equipment
Jet Fans (Longitudinal) · ·
Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) · ·
Ventilation System Emissions Control · ·
Function Smoke Management · · · ·
Plumbing Drainage · · · ·
Fire/Smoke Detection · Note 1 Note 1
Fire Standpipe/Hydrants · · · ·
Fire Apparatus ·
Life Safety Portable Fire Extinguishers · · · ·
Systems Fixed Fire Suppression2 Notes 3 & 4 Notes 5 & 6 Note 6
Emergency Exits · · · ·
Cross Passages · · · ·
8
CCTV ·
Auxiliary Power · · · ·
Electrical Power Traction Power7 · ·
Emergency Power · · · ·
Lighting Systems
Normal Lighting ·
Emergency Lighting · · · ·
Signal
Train Signals · · ·
Traffic Signals ·
Emergency Phones · · · ·
8
Communications SCADA /Data · · · ·
Control Center · · · ·
Automatic · · · ·
Control Systems
On-Site · · · ·
Remote · · · ·
Emissions Monitoring ·
Notes:
1. Fire/smoke detection are only in stations and ancillary facilities.
2. This category includes all fixed fire suppression systems such as sprinklers, mist, and deluge systems.
3. Fixed fire suppression systems are only in ancillary facilities.
4. There are three road tunnels in the United States with sprinkler systems in the roadway.
5. There are some U.S. transit stations with under-car sprinkler systems on tracks.
6. Fixed fire suppression systems are only in stations and ancillary facilities.
7. Traction power is in all transit and rail tunnels with electrified train vehicles.
8. CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition.
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Table 18. Revised categories of safety systems.
Tunnel Function
Safety System
Road Transit Rail
Ventilation
Ventilation Type
Transverse Ventilation ·
Longitudinal Ventilation · · ·
Ventilation Buildings ·
Ventilation Facilities
Ventilation Shafts · ·
Vent Ducts (Transverse) ·
Air Intakes · · ·
Central Fans (Transverse) ·
Ventilation Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) · ·
Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) · ·
Ventilation Function Smoke Management · · ·
Life Safety
Drainage Drainage · · ·
Fire/Smoke Detection · Note 1 Note 1
Fire Standpipe/Hydrants · · ·
Fire Apparatus ·
Fire Protection
Portable Fire Extinguishers · · ·
2
Fixed Fire Suppression Notes 3 & 4 Notes 5 & 6 Note 6
Emergency Exits · · ·
Cross Passages · · ·
8
CCTV ·
Electrical
Ancillary Power · · ·
7
Power Traction Power · ·
Emergency Power · · ·
Lighting Emergency Lighting · · ·
Command and Control
Train Control · ·
Traffic Control ·
Control
System Control · · ·
Signals · · ·
8
SCADA /Data · · ·
Command and Control Center · · ·
Communications
Communications Emergency Telephones · · ·
Notes:
1. Fire/smoke detection are only in stations and ancillary facilities.
2. This category includes all fixed fire suppression systems such as sprinklers, mist, and deluge systems.
3. Fixed fire suppression systems are only in ancillary facilities.
4. There are three road tunnels in the United States with sprinkler systems in the roadway.
5. There are some U.S. transit stations with under-car sprinkler systems on tracks.
6. Fixed fire suppression systems are only in stations and ancillary facilities.
7. Traction power is in all transit and rail tunnels with electrified train vehicles.
8. CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition.
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Table 19. Degree of impact on safety and operations.
Impact Rating Life Safety Tunnel Operations Operation Restoration
Incident impacts life safety Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation
Severely
sufficiently to require operations sufficiently to require restoration, taking several
Catastrophic
tunnel closure complete shutdown months to 1 year
Incident impacts life safety Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation
Catastrophic sufficiently to require operations sufficiently to require restoration, taking several weeks
tunnel closure complete shutdown to months
Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation
Critical Incident impacts life safety operations sufficiently to require restoration, taking a few days to
a disruption of operations weeks
Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation
Serious Incident impacts life safety operations sufficiently to require restoration, taking 24 hours to a
a disruption of operations few days
Incident impacts tunnel
Incident impacts operation
operations sufficiently to require
Marginal Incident impacts life safety restoration, taking less than 1
a modest disruption of
hour
operations
Incident does not impact Incident does not impact tunnel Incident does not impact
Negligible
life safety operations operation restoration
basic platforms for disruption emanated from four major cat- Large fires and explosive devices had a similar damage
egories of sources: potential as that of all other hazards and threats examined.
Fire, as a primary or secondary hazard (i.e., accidental com-
· Large fires; bustion) or threat (i.e., arson) can cause severe damage to the
· Explosive devices; tunnel because of closure. An explosion can cause similar dis-
· Hazardous materials, including chemical/biological/radio- ruption to the tunnel. Each of these main hazards and threats
logical (C/B/R) agents; and exhibited damage potential to both the structure and systems
· Cyber attacks. of the tunnel.
Therefore, the hazard and threat platforms were fully
The research team then analyzed the damage potential of a described as a series of scenarios, including the type and size
disturbance emanating from each of the four major categories of hazard or threat, the tactical delivery device, and the tar-
of sources. Damage is the loss of use of the tunnel. Minor dam- geted tunnel element. A lengthy list of scenarios was com-
age may result from a disabled car blocking one lane, and pressed to reflect the common hazard and threat platforms.
major damage may result from a fire that closes the tunnel to The vulnerabilities of various tunnel types to these hazard
traffic. The scope of the functional loss is significant, and the and threat scenarios, as well as the relative damage potential,
damage potential reflects the potential percentage loss of the appear in Tables 14, 15, and 16 for road, transit, and rail tun-
tunnel use. The percentage loss of the tunnel use is important, nels, respectively. The vulnerabilities of various tunnel
more so than the hazard or threat that triggered the incident. safety system types to the same set of hazard and threat sce-
Given this importance, the research team began to match the narios, along with relative damage potentials, appear in
greatest damage potential, or potential loss of use of the tun- Tables 25, 26, and 27 for road, transit, and rail tunnels,
nel, to the hazards and threats. The research team finally sum- respectively. These tables present the groundwork for the
marized the hazards and threats that have the greatest damage presentation of countermeasures, which is discussed in the
potential, or the potential for total loss of tunnel use. next chapter.
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Table 20. Disruptive impacts in road tunnels.
Tunnel Operation
Safety System Life Safety
Operations Restoration
Ventilation
Transverse Ventilation Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
System Type
Longitudinal Ventilation Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Ventilation Buildings Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Ventilation Shafts Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Facilities
Vent Ducts (Transverse) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Air Intakes Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Central Fans (Transverse) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Life Safety
Fire/Smoke Detection Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
CCTV Critical Critical Catastrophic
Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Systems Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Critical
Portable Fire Extinguishers Critical Marginal Critical
Fixed Fire Suppression Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Drainage Critical Critical Catastrophic
Emergency Exits Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Facilities Cross Passages Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Electrical
Auxiliary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Power Traction Power ----- ----- -----
Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Lighting Emergency Lighting Critical Critical Critical
Command and Control
Train Control ----- ----- -----
Traffic Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Command and
Control Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
SCADA/Data Critical Critical Critical
Command and Control
Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Center
Communications
Communications Emergency Phones Catastrophic Critical Critical
CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available.
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Table 21. Disruptive impacts in transit tunnels.
Tunnel Operation
Safety System Life Safety
Operations Restoration
Ventilation
Transverse Ventilation ----- ----- -----
System Type
Longitudinal Ventilation Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Ventilation Structures Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Ventilation Shafts Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Facilities
Vent Ducts (Transverse) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Air Intakes Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Central Fans (Transverse) ----- ----- -----
Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Life Safety
Fire/Smoke Detection Catastrophic Critical Critical
CCTV Critical Critical Critical
Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Systems Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Serious
Portable Fire Extinguishers Marginal Negligible Negligible
Fixed Fire Suppression Critical Serious Serious
Drainage Marginal Marginal Critical
Fixed Fire Suppression Critical Serious Serious
Facilities Emergency Exits Catastrophic Critical Catastrophic
Cross Passages Catastrophic Critical Catastrophic
Electrical
Primary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Auxiliary Power Critical Critical Critical
Power
Traction Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Lighting Emergency Lighting Critical Serious Serious
Command and Control
Train Control Catastrophic Critical Critical
Traffic Control ----- ----- -----
System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Command and
Control Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
SCADA/Data Critical Serious Serious
Command and Control
Catastrophic Critical Critical
Center
Communications
Communications Emergency Phones Catastrophic Serious Serious
CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available.
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Table 22. Disruptive impacts in rail tunnels.
Tunnel Operation
Safety System Life Safety
Operations Restoration
Ventilation
Transverse Ventilation ----- ----- -----
System Type
Longitudinal Ventilation Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Ventilation Structures Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Ventilation Shafts Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Facilities
Vent Ducts (Transverse) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Intake Louvers Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Central Fans (Transverse) ----- ----- -----
Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Life Safety
Fire/Smoke Detection Serious Serious Critical
CCTV Serious Serious Critical
Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Critical Critical Critical
Systems Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Critical
Portable Fire Extinguishers Negligible Negligible Negligible
Fixed Fire Suppression Negligible Negligible Negligible
Drainage Marginal Critical Critical
Emergency Exits Serious Serious Serious
Facilities Cross Passages Serious Serious Serious
Electrical
Primary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Auxiliary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Power
Traction Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Lighting Emergency Lighting Marginal Marginal Marginal
Command and Control
Train Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Critical
Traffic Control ----- ----- -----
System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Command and
Control Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
SCADA/Data Critical Serious Serious
Command and Control
Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic
Center
Communications
Communications Emergency Phones Critical Marginal Marginal
CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available.
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Table 23. Vulnerabilities of potentially critical locations.
Tunnel Function
Critical System Critical Location
Road Tunnel Transit Tunnel Rail Tunnel
Tunnel Low Low Low
Portals Low Low Low
Ventilation Structures High High High
Ventilation Shafts High High Medium
Ventilation
Stations ------- High High*
Ventilation Ducts High Low Low
Control Center High High High
Utilities High High High
Tunnel Medium Low Low
Portals Low Low Low
Ventilation Structures Medium Medium Medium
Ventilation Shafts Low Medium Medium
Fire Protection
Stations ------- High High*
Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low
Control Center Medium Medium Medium
Utilities High High High
Tunnel High Medium Medium
Portals Medium Low Low
Ventilation Structures Low Medium Medium
Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low
Drainage
Ventilation Ducts Medium Low Low
Stations ------- Low Low*
Control Center Low Low Low
Utilities High High High
Tunnel High High High
Portals Medium Medium Medium
Ventilation Structures High High High
Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low
Electrical
Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low
Stations ------- High High*
Control Center High High High
Utilities High High High
Tunnel High High High
Portals Low Low Low
Ventilation Structures Low Low Low
Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low
Communications
Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low
Stations ------- High High*
Control Center High High High
Utilities High High High
Tunnel High High High
Portals High High High
Ventilation Structures Low Low Low
Command and Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low
Control Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low
Stations ------- High High*
Control Center High High High
Utilities High High High
* Stations only in passenger rail tunnels.
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Table 24. Vulnerabilities of critical locations.
Primary Hazard or Threat
Cyber Attack
Medium IED
Critical System or
Hazardous
Critical Location
Large Fire
Large IED
Small IED
Element
Materials
C/B/R
Ventilation F F F F D F F
Life Safety F F F E D F D
Tunnel Shell Electrical C C C D D F D
Command and Control C C C F D F D
Communications C C C D D F D
Ventilation F F F F D F F
Life Safety F F F E D F D
Portals Electrical C C C D D F D
Command and Control C C C F D F D
Communications C C C D D F D
Ventilation B B C B D C D
Life Safety B B C B D C D
Ventilation
Electrical B B C C D C D
Structures
Command and Control B B C C D C B
Communications B B C C D C D
Ventilation B B C B D B B
Life Safety C C D B D C D
Ventilation Shafts Electrical C C D C D C D
Command and Control C C D B D C D
Communications C C D B D C D
Ventilation C C B B D B B
Life Safety D D C C D C D
Ventilation Ducts Electrical D D C C D C D
Command and Control D D C B D C D
Communications D D C B D C D
Ventilation B B C C D B B
Life Safety B B C B D C C
Stations Electrical B B C E D C C
Command and Control B B C C D C C
Communications B B C B D C D
Ventilation B B C C D C B
Life Safety B B C C D C C
Control Centers Electrical B B C C D C C
Command and Control B B C B D C B
Communications B B C B D C B
Ventilation C C C D D C F
Life Safety C C C D D C F
Substation Electrical B B B D D C F
Command and Control B B B D D C F
Communications B B B D D C F
A = Severely Catastrophic D = Serious
B = Catastrophic E = Marginal
C = Critical F = Negligible
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Table 25. Vulnerabilities to most likely hazard and threat scenarios for road tunnels.
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Stand-Alone Command and Control (C&C) Center
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
14H Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
15H Medium Car/Van PV Insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV Insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
16H Small Backpack2 PV Insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV Insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Stand-Alone Substation
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
17H Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A
18H Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A partial loss8 N/A N/A
19H Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
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Table 25. (Continued).
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Ventilation Structure3
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
20H Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss
21H Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss
22H Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss
Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway
Target: C&C Center Above or Adjacent to the Tunnel
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
23H Large Truck PV accessibility via public tunnel
IED OV no vehicle inspections at portals
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
24H Medium Car/Van PV accessibility via public tunnel
IED OV no vehicle inspections at portals
DP N/A N/A N/A partial loss partial loss
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
(continued on next page)
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Table 25. (Continued).
Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway
Target: Ventilation Structure Above or Adjacent to the Tunnel3
Hazard Tactical
Scenario Vent. Life Safety Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP C&C Comms.
No. System Systems Dist.
Threat Device
25H Large Truck PV ventilation shafts and ducts provide a clear path for blast wave to
IED propagate from tunnel to ventilation building
OV no vehicle inspections at portals
DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss
26H Medium Car/Van PV ventilation shafts and ducts provide a clear path for blast wave to
IED propagate from tunnel to ventilation building
OV no vehicle inspections at portals
DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss
Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery Target PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
27H Small Backpack Exposed PV public access into roadway
IED Ductbank OV inadequate surveillance
DP N/A N/A partial partial partial
loss7,8 loss7 loss7
28H Large Tanker Portal4 PV uncontrolled vehicle access
1
Fire OV no cargo restrictions
DP loss6 loss loss8 loss loss
29H Large Tanker Any PV uncontrolled vehicle access
1
Fire Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions
Location DP partial partial partial partial partial
6 8
Adjacent loss loss loss loss loss
to Critical
5
Facility
30H HazMat Truck Any PV uncontrolled vehicle access
Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions
Location DP function function function function function
9 9 9 9 9
loss loss loss loss loss
31H C/B/R Vial/ Tunnel PV uncontrolled vehicle access
Aerosol/ Occupants OV no vehicle inspections at portals
Package DP function N/A N/A N/A N/A
in Vehicle loss9
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in central location
Vent. = Ventilation 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
Dist. = Distribution 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or C&C
centers
C&C = Command and Control 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
Comms. = Communications 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
HazMat = Hazardous Material 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/ 9. Would require decontamination
Radiological
N/A = Not Applicable 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment
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Table 25. (Continued).
Path to Target: Tunnel Air Supply System
Target: Tunnel Occupants and Surrounding Population in Discharge Plume Area
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Vent. System Safety C&C Comms.
No. Dist.
Threat Device Systems
32H C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection
Aerosol/ OV insufficient access surveillance
Package on
Foot DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A
weapon delivery
9
device
33H C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection
Aerosol/ OV insufficient access surveillance
Package in
Motor DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vehicle weapon delivery
device9
Path to Target: Virtual
Target: C&C Center
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
34H Cyber Digital PV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software
Attack Virus OV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software
Code
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss of or N/A
inappropriate
traffic and MEC
equipment control
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
(continued on next page)
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Table 26. Vulnerabilities to most likely hazard or threat scenarios for transit tunnels.
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Standalone Command and Control (C&C) Center
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
14T Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
15T Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
16T Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Stand-Alone Substation
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
17T Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A
18T Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A partial loss8 N/A N/A
19T Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
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Table 26. (Continued).
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Ventilation Structure3
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
20T Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss
21T Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss
22T Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Station
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
23T Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss
24T Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP partial partial partial partial partial
loss10 loss10 loss8,10 loss10 loss10
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
(continued on next page)
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Table 26. (Continued).
Path to Target: Trackway
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery Target PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
25T Small Backpack Exposed PV public access into trackway
IED Ductbank OV inadequate access surveillance
or MEC DP N/A partial partial partial partial
Equipment loss7 loss
7, 8
loss
7
loss
7
26T Small Backpack Station PV open access to station
IED on Foot in OV no personal inspections
Train DP partial partial partial partial partial
loss10 loss
10
loss
10
loss
10
loss
10
27T Large IED on Any PV uncontrolled access to trains
Fire1 Train Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections
Location DP partial partial partial partial partial
6
Adjacent loss loss loss loss loss
to Critical
Facility5
28T Large IED on Portal4 PV uncontrolled access to trains
Fire1 Train OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections
DP partial partial partial partial partial
loss6 loss loss loss loss
29T HazMat Device on Any PV uncontrolled access to trains
Train Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections
Location DP function function function function function
loss9 loss
9
loss
9
loss
9
loss
9
30T C/B/R Vial/ Tunnel/ PV uncontrolled access to trains
Aerosol/ Station OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections
Package Occupants DP function function function function function
on Foot in loss9 loss
9
loss
9
loss
9
loss
9
Train
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
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Table 26. (Continued).
Path to Target: Tunnel Air Supply System
Target: Tunnel Occupants and Surrounding Population in Discharge Plume Area
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
31T C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection
Aerosol/ OV insufficient access surveillance
Package
on Foot DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A
weapon
delivery
device9
32T C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection
Aerosol/
Package in OV insufficient access surveillance
Motor DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vehicle weapon
delivery
device9
Path to Target: Virtual
Target: C&C Center
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
33T Cyber Digital PV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software
Attack Virus Code OV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss of or N/A
inappropriate
traffic and MEC
equipment control
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
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Table 27. Vulnerabilities to most likely hazard or threat scenarios for rail tunnels.
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Stand-Alone Command and Control (C&C) Center
Hazard Tactical
Scenario Vent. Life Safety Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP C&C Comms.
No. System Systems Dist.
Threat Device
14R Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
15R Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
16R Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Stand-Alone Substation
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
17R Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A
18R Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A partial loss8 N/A N/A
19R Small Backpack 2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
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Table 27. (Continued).
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Ventilation Structure3
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent.
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety Power Dist. C&C Comms.
No. System
Threat Device Systems
20R Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss
21R Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss
22R Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss
Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway
Target: Station
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
23R Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient access surveillance
DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss
24R Small Backpack PV insufficient perimeter protection
IED OV insufficient surveillance
DP partial partial partial partial partial
loss10 loss10 loss8, 10 loss10 loss10
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
(continued on next page)
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Table 27. (Continued).
Path to Target: Trackway
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery Target PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
25R Small Backpack Exposed PV public access into trackway
IED Ductbank OV inadequate access surveillance
or MEC DP N/A partial partial partial partial
Equipment loss7 loss
7, 8
loss
7
loss
7
26R Small Backpack Station PV open access to station
IED on Foot in OV no personal inspections
Train DP partial partial partial partial partial
loss10 loss
10
loss
10
loss
10
loss
10
27R Large IED on Any PV uncontrolled access to trains
1
Fire Train Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections
Location DP partial partial partial partial partial
6
Adjacent loss loss loss loss loss
to Critical
Facility5
28R Large IED on Portal4 PV uncontrolled access to trains
1
Fire Train OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections
DP partial partial partial partial partial
loss6 loss loss loss loss
29R HazMat Device on Any PV uncontrolled access to trains
Train Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections
Location DP function function function function function
loss9 loss
9
loss
9
loss
9
loss
9
30R C/B/R Vial/ Tunnel/ PV uncontrolled access to trains
Aerosol/ Station OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections
Package Occupants DP function function function function function
on Foot in loss9 loss
9
loss
9
loss
9
loss
9
Train
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
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Table 27. (Continued).
Path to Target: Tunnel Air Supply System
Target: Tunnel Occupants and Surrounding Population in Discharge Plume Area
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Vent. System Safety C&C Comms.
No. Dist.
Threat Device Systems
31R C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection
Aerosol/ OV insufficient access surveillance
Package on
Foot DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A
weapon delivery
9
device
32R C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection
Aerosol/
Package in OV insufficient access surveillance
Motor DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vehicle weapon delivery
device9
Path to Target: Virtual
Target: C&C Center
Hazard Tactical Life
Scenario Vent. Power
or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms.
No. System Dist.
Threat Device Systems
33R Cyber Digital Virus PV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software
Attack Code OV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software
DP N/A N/A N/A inappropriate or N/A
total loss of traffic
and MEC
equipment control
Abbreviations: Notes:
PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW)
OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside
DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in
Vent. = Ventilation central location
Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel
C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or
Comms. = Communications C&C centers
HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures
C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them
N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel
9. Would require decontamination
10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC
equipment
