Cover Image

Not for Sale



View/Hide Left Panel
Click for next page ( 80


The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement



Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page 79
79 Life safety includes all of the systems, equipment, and facil- combined with the system element impact list to develop the ities required to provide protection during an emergency to draft guidelines. The results of the combined assessment and the tunnel and its inhabitants. list are presented in Table 23 as a list of potentially critical Electrical includes both normal and emergency power for locations where each of the tunnel systems is vulnerable. The ancillaries, systems, and train traction. table records the level of vulnerability as "Low,""Medium," or Command and control includes traffic, train, and system "High." control, along with signals. Table 24 estimates the vulnerabilities of critical locations. Communications includes all communications systems Tables 25, 26, and 27 present system vulnerabilities to the required to make the tunnel functional and safe. most likely hazard or threat scenarios for road tunnels, tran- To create the above five primary categories of systems, the sit tunnels, and rail tunnels, respectively. These tables com- research team started with an initial list of safety systems serv- bine the information given in Table 3 (hazard and threat ing road, transit, and rail tunnels. Table 17 shows this initial scenarios) with the information given in Table 24 (vulnera- list of safety systems, along with the tunnel functions associ- bilities of critical locations). The hazard and threat scenar- ated with each system. After careful review of the data in this ios have been rearranged into subtables on the basis of the table, the research team made several decisions. One decision "Path to Target" as well as the "Target." These items are was to combine the categories of passenger rail tunnels and located at the top left side of each subtable. The hazards and freight rail tunnels in this report because the vulnerabilities threats presented on the left side of the tables include the and damage potentials are similar. The other decisions introduction to the tunnel property of large, medium, and involve the elimination of some elements (such as emission small IEDs; large fires; hazardous materials; C/B/R; and control, emission monitoring, and normal lighting) because cyber attack. All of the hazards and threats were developed they do not affect the vulnerability of particular tunnels. In further to identify scenarios that include hazard or threat, the end, the research team decided on the above five primary path to target, tactical delivery device, and ultimate target. categories of systems. These revised primary categories are Each of the hazard or threat scenarios was considered for depicted in Table 18. each of the five primary system categories presented in Sec- tion 4.5.2. Each row presents a unique set of vulnerabilities (both physical and operational) and a set of damage poten- 4.5.3 Degree of Impact on Safety and tials. This should provide the owner or operator with a clear Operations guide to the types of hazard and threat scenarios possible for tunnels. When systems are disrupted, the degree of impact on the safety and operations of the tunnel can vary. Table 19 pro- vides a subjective evaluation of the different impacts and mit- 4.5.5 Summary igation requirements. This evaluation is consistent with the Nonstructural (i.e., tunnel systems) guidelines have been FTA's ranking system [Ref. 20]. developed to provide the owner or operator with a simple System paralysis can occur if a coordinated attack is aimed method to identify the critical elements and locations within at specifically related systems. For example, if a multiple- his or her tunnel based on the hazard or threat, path to target, point attack focuses on the electrical power supply as well as tactical delivery device, and ultimate target. Each of the criti- any emergency backup systems and is successful, most of the cal systems has been assessed, and a set of vulnerabilities and tunnel's MEC systems will be disabled. Such threats may damage potentials have been identified for each reasonable cause synergistic effects and may require systemwide checks hazard or threat. to be conducted before tunnel operations are resumed. Tables 20, 21, and 22 subjectively highlight the impact of system element disruption on each of the transportation tun- 4.6 Chapter Summary nel function types. These subjective impact ratings are based The information presented in this chapter allows tunnel facil- on single-point attacks. In the case of multiple-point or coor- ity owners, operators, and engineers to conduct preliminary dinated attacks, the disruption to the tunnel systems would vulnerability rating (i.e., screening) assessments of their facili- obviously become more severe. ties and, if needed, to derive priority lists of a tunnel's structural components and system components for further study. To determine the countermeasures available to the tunnel 4.5.4 Potentially Critical Locations owner or operator, the research team applied comparative A careful assessment of the potentially critical locations analysis to the hazard and threat scenarios to discern com- was made for each tunnel function type. This assessment was mon themes. From this analysis, it was determined that the

OCR for page 79
80 Table 17. Initial categories of safety systems. Tunnel Function Safety System Freight Passenger Road Transit Rail Rail Ventilation System Transverse Ventilation Type Longitudinal Ventilation Ventilation Buildings Ventilation System Ventilation Shafts Facilities Vent Ducts (Transverse) Intake Louvers Central Fans (Transverse) Ventilation System Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) Ventilation System Emissions Control Function Smoke Management Plumbing Drainage Fire/Smoke Detection Note 1 Note 1 Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Fire Apparatus Life Safety Portable Fire Extinguishers Systems Fixed Fire Suppression2 Notes 3 & 4 Notes 5 & 6 Note 6 Emergency Exits Cross Passages 8 CCTV Auxiliary Power Electrical Power Traction Power7 Emergency Power Lighting Systems Normal Lighting Emergency Lighting Signal Train Signals Traffic Signals Emergency Phones 8 Communications SCADA /Data Control Center Automatic Control Systems On-Site Remote Emissions Monitoring Notes: 1. Fire/smoke detection are only in stations and ancillary facilities. 2. This category includes all fixed fire suppression systems such as sprinklers, mist, and deluge systems. 3. Fixed fire suppression systems are only in ancillary facilities. 4. There are three road tunnels in the United States with sprinkler systems in the roadway. 5. There are some U.S. transit stations with under-car sprinkler systems on tracks. 6. Fixed fire suppression systems are only in stations and ancillary facilities. 7. Traction power is in all transit and rail tunnels with electrified train vehicles. 8. CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition.

OCR for page 79
81 Table 18. Revised categories of safety systems. Tunnel Function Safety System Road Transit Rail Ventilation Ventilation Type Transverse Ventilation Longitudinal Ventilation Ventilation Buildings Ventilation Facilities Ventilation Shafts Vent Ducts (Transverse) Air Intakes Central Fans (Transverse) Ventilation Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) Ventilation Function Smoke Management Life Safety Drainage Drainage Fire/Smoke Detection Note 1 Note 1 Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Fire Apparatus Fire Protection Portable Fire Extinguishers 2 Fixed Fire Suppression Notes 3 & 4 Notes 5 & 6 Note 6 Emergency Exits Cross Passages 8 CCTV Electrical Ancillary Power 7 Power Traction Power Emergency Power Lighting Emergency Lighting Command and Control Train Control Traffic Control Control System Control Signals 8 SCADA /Data Command and Control Center Communications Communications Emergency Telephones Notes: 1. Fire/smoke detection are only in stations and ancillary facilities. 2. This category includes all fixed fire suppression systems such as sprinklers, mist, and deluge systems. 3. Fixed fire suppression systems are only in ancillary facilities. 4. There are three road tunnels in the United States with sprinkler systems in the roadway. 5. There are some U.S. transit stations with under-car sprinkler systems on tracks. 6. Fixed fire suppression systems are only in stations and ancillary facilities. 7. Traction power is in all transit and rail tunnels with electrified train vehicles. 8. CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition.

OCR for page 79
82 Table 19. Degree of impact on safety and operations. Impact Rating Life Safety Tunnel Operations Operation Restoration Incident impacts life safety Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation Severely sufficiently to require operations sufficiently to require restoration, taking several Catastrophic tunnel closure complete shutdown months to 1 year Incident impacts life safety Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation Catastrophic sufficiently to require operations sufficiently to require restoration, taking several weeks tunnel closure complete shutdown to months Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation Critical Incident impacts life safety operations sufficiently to require restoration, taking a few days to a disruption of operations weeks Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation Serious Incident impacts life safety operations sufficiently to require restoration, taking 24 hours to a a disruption of operations few days Incident impacts tunnel Incident impacts operation operations sufficiently to require Marginal Incident impacts life safety restoration, taking less than 1 a modest disruption of hour operations Incident does not impact Incident does not impact tunnel Incident does not impact Negligible life safety operations operation restoration basic platforms for disruption emanated from four major cat- Large fires and explosive devices had a similar damage egories of sources: potential as that of all other hazards and threats examined. Fire, as a primary or secondary hazard (i.e., accidental com- Large fires; bustion) or threat (i.e., arson) can cause severe damage to the Explosive devices; tunnel because of closure. An explosion can cause similar dis- Hazardous materials, including chemical/biological/radio- ruption to the tunnel. Each of these main hazards and threats logical (C/B/R) agents; and exhibited damage potential to both the structure and systems Cyber attacks. of the tunnel. Therefore, the hazard and threat platforms were fully The research team then analyzed the damage potential of a described as a series of scenarios, including the type and size disturbance emanating from each of the four major categories of hazard or threat, the tactical delivery device, and the tar- of sources. Damage is the loss of use of the tunnel. Minor dam- geted tunnel element. A lengthy list of scenarios was com- age may result from a disabled car blocking one lane, and pressed to reflect the common hazard and threat platforms. major damage may result from a fire that closes the tunnel to The vulnerabilities of various tunnel types to these hazard traffic. The scope of the functional loss is significant, and the and threat scenarios, as well as the relative damage potential, damage potential reflects the potential percentage loss of the appear in Tables 14, 15, and 16 for road, transit, and rail tun- tunnel use. The percentage loss of the tunnel use is important, nels, respectively. The vulnerabilities of various tunnel more so than the hazard or threat that triggered the incident. safety system types to the same set of hazard and threat sce- Given this importance, the research team began to match the narios, along with relative damage potentials, appear in greatest damage potential, or potential loss of use of the tun- Tables 25, 26, and 27 for road, transit, and rail tunnels, nel, to the hazards and threats. The research team finally sum- respectively. These tables present the groundwork for the marized the hazards and threats that have the greatest damage presentation of countermeasures, which is discussed in the potential, or the potential for total loss of tunnel use. next chapter.

OCR for page 79
83 Table 20. Disruptive impacts in road tunnels. Tunnel Operation Safety System Life Safety Operations Restoration Ventilation Transverse Ventilation Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Type Longitudinal Ventilation Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Ventilation Buildings Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Ventilation Shafts Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Facilities Vent Ducts (Transverse) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Air Intakes Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Central Fans (Transverse) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Life Safety Fire/Smoke Detection Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic CCTV Critical Critical Catastrophic Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Systems Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Critical Portable Fire Extinguishers Critical Marginal Critical Fixed Fire Suppression Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Drainage Critical Critical Catastrophic Emergency Exits Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Facilities Cross Passages Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Electrical Auxiliary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Power Traction Power ----- ----- ----- Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Lighting Emergency Lighting Critical Critical Critical Command and Control Train Control ----- ----- ----- Traffic Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Command and Control Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic SCADA/Data Critical Critical Critical Command and Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Center Communications Communications Emergency Phones Catastrophic Critical Critical CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available.

OCR for page 79
84 Table 21. Disruptive impacts in transit tunnels. Tunnel Operation Safety System Life Safety Operations Restoration Ventilation Transverse Ventilation ----- ----- ----- System Type Longitudinal Ventilation Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Ventilation Structures Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Ventilation Shafts Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Facilities Vent Ducts (Transverse) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Air Intakes Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Central Fans (Transverse) ----- ----- ----- Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Life Safety Fire/Smoke Detection Catastrophic Critical Critical CCTV Critical Critical Critical Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Systems Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Serious Portable Fire Extinguishers Marginal Negligible Negligible Fixed Fire Suppression Critical Serious Serious Drainage Marginal Marginal Critical Fixed Fire Suppression Critical Serious Serious Facilities Emergency Exits Catastrophic Critical Catastrophic Cross Passages Catastrophic Critical Catastrophic Electrical Primary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Auxiliary Power Critical Critical Critical Power Traction Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Lighting Emergency Lighting Critical Serious Serious Command and Control Train Control Catastrophic Critical Critical Traffic Control ----- ----- ----- System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Command and Control Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic SCADA/Data Critical Serious Serious Command and Control Catastrophic Critical Critical Center Communications Communications Emergency Phones Catastrophic Serious Serious CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available.

OCR for page 79
85 Table 22. Disruptive impacts in rail tunnels. Tunnel Operation Safety System Life Safety Operations Restoration Ventilation Transverse Ventilation ----- ----- ----- System Type Longitudinal Ventilation Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Ventilation Structures Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Ventilation Shafts Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Facilities Vent Ducts (Transverse) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Intake Louvers Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Central Fans (Transverse) ----- ----- ----- Equipment Jet Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Shaft Fans (Longitudinal) Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Life Safety Fire/Smoke Detection Serious Serious Critical CCTV Serious Serious Critical Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Critical Critical Critical Systems Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Critical Portable Fire Extinguishers Negligible Negligible Negligible Fixed Fire Suppression Negligible Negligible Negligible Drainage Marginal Critical Critical Emergency Exits Serious Serious Serious Facilities Cross Passages Serious Serious Serious Electrical Primary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Auxiliary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Power Traction Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Lighting Emergency Lighting Marginal Marginal Marginal Command and Control Train Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Critical Traffic Control ----- ----- ----- System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Command and Control Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic SCADA/Data Critical Serious Serious Command and Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Center Communications Communications Emergency Phones Critical Marginal Marginal CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available.

OCR for page 79
86 Table 23. Vulnerabilities of potentially critical locations. Tunnel Function Critical System Critical Location Road Tunnel Transit Tunnel Rail Tunnel Tunnel Low Low Low Portals Low Low Low Ventilation Structures High High High Ventilation Shafts High High Medium Ventilation Stations ------- High High* Ventilation Ducts High Low Low Control Center High High High Utilities High High High Tunnel Medium Low Low Portals Low Low Low Ventilation Structures Medium Medium Medium Ventilation Shafts Low Medium Medium Fire Protection Stations ------- High High* Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low Control Center Medium Medium Medium Utilities High High High Tunnel High Medium Medium Portals Medium Low Low Ventilation Structures Low Medium Medium Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low Drainage Ventilation Ducts Medium Low Low Stations ------- Low Low* Control Center Low Low Low Utilities High High High Tunnel High High High Portals Medium Medium Medium Ventilation Structures High High High Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low Electrical Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low Stations ------- High High* Control Center High High High Utilities High High High Tunnel High High High Portals Low Low Low Ventilation Structures Low Low Low Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low Communications Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low Stations ------- High High* Control Center High High High Utilities High High High Tunnel High High High Portals High High High Ventilation Structures Low Low Low Command and Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low Control Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low Stations ------- High High* Control Center High High High Utilities High High High * Stations only in passenger rail tunnels.

OCR for page 79
87 Table 24. Vulnerabilities of critical locations. Primary Hazard or Threat Cyber Attack Medium IED Critical System or Hazardous Critical Location Large Fire Large IED Small IED Element Materials C/B/R Ventilation F F F F D F F Life Safety F F F E D F D Tunnel Shell Electrical C C C D D F D Command and Control C C C F D F D Communications C C C D D F D Ventilation F F F F D F F Life Safety F F F E D F D Portals Electrical C C C D D F D Command and Control C C C F D F D Communications C C C D D F D Ventilation B B C B D C D Life Safety B B C B D C D Ventilation Electrical B B C C D C D Structures Command and Control B B C C D C B Communications B B C C D C D Ventilation B B C B D B B Life Safety C C D B D C D Ventilation Shafts Electrical C C D C D C D Command and Control C C D B D C D Communications C C D B D C D Ventilation C C B B D B B Life Safety D D C C D C D Ventilation Ducts Electrical D D C C D C D Command and Control D D C B D C D Communications D D C B D C D Ventilation B B C C D B B Life Safety B B C B D C C Stations Electrical B B C E D C C Command and Control B B C C D C C Communications B B C B D C D Ventilation B B C C D C B Life Safety B B C C D C C Control Centers Electrical B B C C D C C Command and Control B B C B D C B Communications B B C B D C B Ventilation C C C D D C F Life Safety C C C D D C F Substation Electrical B B B D D C F Command and Control B B B D D C F Communications B B B D D C F A = Severely Catastrophic D = Serious B = Catastrophic E = Marginal C = Critical F = Negligible

OCR for page 79
88 Table 25. Vulnerabilities to most likely hazard and threat scenarios for road tunnels. Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Stand-Alone Command and Control (C&C) Center Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 14H Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss 15H Medium Car/Van PV Insufficient perimeter protection IED OV Insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss 16H Small Backpack2 PV Insufficient perimeter protection IED OV Insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Stand-Alone Substation Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 17H Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A 18H Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A partial loss8 N/A N/A 19H Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment

OCR for page 79
89 Table 25. (Continued). Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Ventilation Structure3 Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 20H Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss 21H Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss 22H Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway Target: C&C Center Above or Adjacent to the Tunnel Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 23H Large Truck PV accessibility via public tunnel IED OV no vehicle inspections at portals DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss 24H Medium Car/Van PV accessibility via public tunnel IED OV no vehicle inspections at portals DP N/A N/A N/A partial loss partial loss Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment (continued on next page)

OCR for page 79
90 Table 25. (Continued). Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway Target: Ventilation Structure Above or Adjacent to the Tunnel3 Hazard Tactical Scenario Vent. Life Safety Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP C&C Comms. No. System Systems Dist. Threat Device 25H Large Truck PV ventilation shafts and ducts provide a clear path for blast wave to IED propagate from tunnel to ventilation building OV no vehicle inspections at portals DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss 26H Medium Car/Van PV ventilation shafts and ducts provide a clear path for blast wave to IED propagate from tunnel to ventilation building OV no vehicle inspections at portals DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery Target PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 27H Small Backpack Exposed PV public access into roadway IED Ductbank OV inadequate surveillance DP N/A N/A partial partial partial loss7,8 loss7 loss7 28H Large Tanker Portal4 PV uncontrolled vehicle access 1 Fire OV no cargo restrictions DP loss6 loss loss8 loss loss 29H Large Tanker Any PV uncontrolled vehicle access 1 Fire Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions Location DP partial partial partial partial partial 6 8 Adjacent loss loss loss loss loss to Critical 5 Facility 30H HazMat Truck Any PV uncontrolled vehicle access Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions Location DP function function function function function 9 9 9 9 9 loss loss loss loss loss 31H C/B/R Vial/ Tunnel PV uncontrolled vehicle access Aerosol/ Occupants OV no vehicle inspections at portals Package DP function N/A N/A N/A N/A in Vehicle loss9 Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in central location Vent. = Ventilation 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel Dist. = Distribution 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or C&C centers C&C = Command and Control 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures Comms. = Communications 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them HazMat = Hazardous Material 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/ 9. Would require decontamination Radiological N/A = Not Applicable 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment

OCR for page 79
91 Table 25. (Continued). Path to Target: Tunnel Air Supply System Target: Tunnel Occupants and Surrounding Population in Discharge Plume Area Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Vent. System Safety C&C Comms. No. Dist. Threat Device Systems 32H C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection Aerosol/ OV insufficient access surveillance Package on Foot DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A weapon delivery 9 device 33H C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection Aerosol/ OV insufficient access surveillance Package in Motor DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A Vehicle weapon delivery device9 Path to Target: Virtual Target: C&C Center Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 34H Cyber Digital PV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software Attack Virus OV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software Code DP N/A N/A N/A total loss of or N/A inappropriate traffic and MEC equipment control Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment (continued on next page)

OCR for page 79
92 Table 26. Vulnerabilities to most likely hazard or threat scenarios for transit tunnels. Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Standalone Command and Control (C&C) Center Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 14T Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss 15T Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss 16T Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Stand-Alone Substation Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 17T Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A 18T Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A partial loss8 N/A N/A 19T Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment

OCR for page 79
93 Table 26. (Continued). Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Ventilation Structure3 Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 20T Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss 21T Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss 22T Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Station Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 23T Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss 24T Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP partial partial partial partial partial loss10 loss10 loss8,10 loss10 loss10 Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment (continued on next page)

OCR for page 79
94 Table 26. (Continued). Path to Target: Trackway Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery Target PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 25T Small Backpack Exposed PV public access into trackway IED Ductbank OV inadequate access surveillance or MEC DP N/A partial partial partial partial Equipment loss7 loss 7, 8 loss 7 loss 7 26T Small Backpack Station PV open access to station IED on Foot in OV no personal inspections Train DP partial partial partial partial partial loss10 loss 10 loss 10 loss 10 loss 10 27T Large IED on Any PV uncontrolled access to trains Fire1 Train Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections Location DP partial partial partial partial partial 6 Adjacent loss loss loss loss loss to Critical Facility5 28T Large IED on Portal4 PV uncontrolled access to trains Fire1 Train OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections DP partial partial partial partial partial loss6 loss loss loss loss 29T HazMat Device on Any PV uncontrolled access to trains Train Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections Location DP function function function function function loss9 loss 9 loss 9 loss 9 loss 9 30T C/B/R Vial/ Tunnel/ PV uncontrolled access to trains Aerosol/ Station OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections Package Occupants DP function function function function function on Foot in loss9 loss 9 loss 9 loss 9 loss 9 Train Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment

OCR for page 79
95 Table 26. (Continued). Path to Target: Tunnel Air Supply System Target: Tunnel Occupants and Surrounding Population in Discharge Plume Area Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 31T C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection Aerosol/ OV insufficient access surveillance Package on Foot DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A weapon delivery device9 32T C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection Aerosol/ Package in OV insufficient access surveillance Motor DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A Vehicle weapon delivery device9 Path to Target: Virtual Target: C&C Center Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 33T Cyber Digital PV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software Attack Virus Code OV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software DP N/A N/A N/A total loss of or N/A inappropriate traffic and MEC equipment control Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment

OCR for page 79
96 Table 27. Vulnerabilities to most likely hazard or threat scenarios for rail tunnels. Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Stand-Alone Command and Control (C&C) Center Hazard Tactical Scenario Vent. Life Safety Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP C&C Comms. No. System Systems Dist. Threat Device 14R Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss 15R Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss 16R Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Stand-Alone Substation Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 17R Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A 18R Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A partial loss8 N/A N/A 19R Small Backpack 2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP N/A N/A total loss8 N/A N/A Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment

OCR for page 79
97 Table 27. (Continued). Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Ventilation Structure3 Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety Power Dist. C&C Comms. No. System Threat Device Systems 20R Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss 21R Medium Car/Van PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss 22R Small Backpack2 PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Station Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 23R Large Truck PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient access surveillance DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss 24R Small Backpack PV insufficient perimeter protection IED OV insufficient surveillance DP partial partial partial partial partial loss10 loss10 loss8, 10 loss10 loss10 Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment (continued on next page)

OCR for page 79
98 Table 27. (Continued). Path to Target: Trackway Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery Target PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 25R Small Backpack Exposed PV public access into trackway IED Ductbank OV inadequate access surveillance or MEC DP N/A partial partial partial partial Equipment loss7 loss 7, 8 loss 7 loss 7 26R Small Backpack Station PV open access to station IED on Foot in OV no personal inspections Train DP partial partial partial partial partial loss10 loss 10 loss 10 loss 10 loss 10 27R Large IED on Any PV uncontrolled access to trains 1 Fire Train Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections Location DP partial partial partial partial partial 6 Adjacent loss loss loss loss loss to Critical Facility5 28R Large IED on Portal4 PV uncontrolled access to trains 1 Fire Train OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections DP partial partial partial partial partial loss6 loss loss loss loss 29R HazMat Device on Any PV uncontrolled access to trains Train Tunnel OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections Location DP function function function function function loss9 loss 9 loss 9 loss 9 loss 9 30R C/B/R Vial/ Tunnel/ PV uncontrolled access to trains Aerosol/ Station OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections Package Occupants DP function function function function function on Foot in loss9 loss 9 loss 9 loss 9 loss 9 Train Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment

OCR for page 79
99 Table 27. (Continued). Path to Target: Tunnel Air Supply System Target: Tunnel Occupants and Surrounding Population in Discharge Plume Area Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Vent. System Safety C&C Comms. No. Dist. Threat Device Systems 31R C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection Aerosol/ OV insufficient access surveillance Package on Foot DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A weapon delivery 9 device 32R C/B/R Vial/ PV insufficient perimeter protection Aerosol/ Package in OV insufficient access surveillance Motor DP functions as N/A N/A N/A N/A Vehicle weapon delivery device9 Path to Target: Virtual Target: C&C Center Hazard Tactical Life Scenario Vent. Power or Delivery PV/OV/DP Safety C&C Comms. No. System Dist. Threat Device Systems 33R Cyber Digital Virus PV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software Attack Code OV insufficient or outdated electronic protection software DP N/A N/A N/A inappropriate or N/A total loss of traffic and MEC equipment control Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) OV = Operational Vulnerability 2. Assumes perpetrator gets inside DP = Damage Potential 3. Assumes transverse system or longitudinal with fans housed in Vent. = Ventilation central location Dist. = Distribution 4. Worst case is downhill, unidirectional tunnel C&C = Command and Control 5. Such as ventilation buildings, substations, emergency generators, or Comms. = Communications C&C centers HazMat = Hazardous Material 6. Partial loss of emergency ventilation due to high temperatures C/B/R = Chemical/Biological/Radiological 7. Potential loss of downstream MEC systems or power to them N/A = Not Applicable 8. Unless you have dual power supply from both ends of the tunnel 9. Would require decontamination 10. Blast wave could propagate through station and destroy MEC equipment