National Academies Press: OpenBook

Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests (1989)

Chapter: 6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series

« Previous: 5 Quantification of Personnel Film Badge Uncertainties
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 80
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 81
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 82
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 83
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 84
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 85
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 86
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 87
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 88
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 89
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 90
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 91
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 92
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 93
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 94
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 95
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 96
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 97
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 98
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 99
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 100
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 101
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 102
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 103
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 104
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 105
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 106
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 107
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 108
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 109
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 110
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 111
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 112
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 113
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 114
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 115
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 116
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 117
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 118
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 119
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 120
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 121
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 122
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 123
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 124
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 125
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 126
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 127
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 128
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 129
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 130
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 131
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 132
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 133
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 134
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 135
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 136
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 137
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 138
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 139
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 140
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 141
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 142
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 143
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 144
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 145
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 146
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 147
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 148
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 149
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 150
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 151
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 152
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 153
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 154
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 155
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 156
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 157
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 158
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 159
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 160
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 161
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 162
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 163
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 164
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 165
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 166
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 167
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 168
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 169
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 170
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 171
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 172
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 173
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 174
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 175
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 176
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 177
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 178
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 179
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 180
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 181
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 182
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 183
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 184
Suggested Citation:"6 Uncertainty Analysis By Individual Test Series." National Research Council. 1989. Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1404.
×
Page 185

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

6 Uncertainty Analysis by Individual Test Series The United States conducted 19 atmospheric nuclear weapons test operations spanning the period from July 1945 to November 1962 (Table 6-1~. Each test operation was different in some aspect of personnel film badge dosimetry. The type and number of nuclear test detonations varied, environmental conditions were not the same in the Pacific as at Nevada Test' Site, type of film badge used changed, dosimeter film components used also changed, and film calibration and processing procedures differed for some operations. To assure that all these different factors affecting film dosimetry programs were considered, the film dosimetry bias and uncertainty for each test operation were analyzed separately. A full analytical discussion for each test operation follows in this chapter. Each of the individual discussions include consideration of personnel exposed; technical factors such as type of film badge, issue, processing and calibration procedures; availability of records; tabulation of bias and uncertainty values established; and tables showing deep-dose equivalent and 95% confidence limits of these values as functions of exposure. For some test operations, significant differences were found in uncertainties associated with results from badges worn by flight personnel, i.e., those who flew cloud sampling or similar missions in aircraft, and those worn by ground person- nel, including those aboard ships. In these cases, separate tabulations are pro- vided for flight and ground personnel. Relatively large radiological-spectrum bias and uncertainty values resulted when film badges used during some test operations were analyzed. These badges generally had an insufficient thickness of filter material and were used during the earlier operations. Another factor affecting dosimetry in early test operations was inadequate exposure-range cover 80

81 A) A, it .§ a. o of 3 c) e o d cat Ha. - 1 - D Cal .' - - a' a It u U. C ~ ~ ~ 9 9-, ~ ~ Y 9 _ Y Y . Y ' 7 E 9 s I y c ~ ~ ~ | ~ ~ 9 ~ · ~ ~ ~ g t ~ L 9 8 8 ,, g ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 ~ ~ _ ~ ~ c" s ~ ~ ~ - ~ c~ w) ~ ~ Go t~ _ so ~ _ t~ ~ ~ t#~ t~ ~ _ - _ ~_ o E E E E g Z Y Y Y e 3~ E = ~g s 5 y 9 0 -c ~82~ ~ t~ \0 ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - $ ~ - ' ~ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0\ ~ ~ E Z 9 9 o o y u E 3 E 9 9 o 9 0 = j ~3 U! ~o °° C~ . C,,

82 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY llV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS age of the dosimeter film or films used. Uncertainties in this regard are not listed in particular test operation bias and uncertainty tables, but are presented, where appropriate, in narrative form after tables which convert from film badge exposure to deep-dose equivalent. Bias and uncertainty tables conclude with overall values for converting film badge exposures of 0.2 R or more to deep-dose equivalents. PROJECT TRINITY Background Project STY was the first test of a nuclear explosive device. The detona- tion occurred atop a tower at the Alamogordo Bombing Range in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. The device was identical to the one in the weapon dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, a few weeks later. The yield (tons of 'iNT explosive that would release an equivalent energy) of both detonations was 21 kilotons (kt). The test was the culmination of the "Manhattan Project", the code name given to the atomic bomb development program directed by the Manhattan Engineer District of the Army Corps of Engineers. Scientists from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), part of the Manhattan Engineer District, devel- oped, constructed, and detonated the device. LASL personnel also provided radiation protection and film badge monitoring. Personnel Exposed Only a few hundred people observed the detonation near the test location (Maag and Rohrer 1982~, but the total number of observers, experimenters, and workers who had visited the site by the end of 1946 was about 1000. The highest recorded cumulative exposure was 15 R and was received by an individual who made several entries to "Ground Zero" shortly after the detona- tion. Most exposures occurred at or near "Ground Zero" but several people were exposed off-site while tracking the fallout cloud. Type of Film Badge A special film badge was used at Project TRINITY and was not used in any subsequent operations. The badge contained two film packets that were placed side by side in a brass holder. The brass was 0.020 inches (0.508 millimeters) thick and acted as a filter which reduced the characteristic over-response of film to low-energy photons. One film packet was manufactured by the Eastman Kodak Company and

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES - TRINITY 83 contained a single Type K film. The other packet was manufactured by Du Pont and was a special Type 552 packet. It-contained three films; a Type D-1 and two Type D-2 films (Reinert 1946; Littlejohn 1946; LASL 1945~. The Type D-1 and D-2 fUms are believed to correspond with Du Pont Type 502 and 510 films, respectively, manufactured later. The measurement range of the Type K film was generally considered to be 0.05 R to 5 R (Buckland 1945; Dessauer 1947~. Exposures as low as 0.0L R were reported for people who visited the site many months after the test (Reinert 1946~. The Type D-1 film had a range from 0.1 R to 10 R (Storm 1951; Ehrlich and Fitch 1951~. The Type D-2 film was less sensitive and measured exposures between 5 R and 40 R (Storm 1951; Ehrlich and Fitch 1951~. Conceptually, no problems should have been caused by overlap of the meas- urement ranges of the films. For unknown reasons, data for each of the films were not always recorded nor used in exposure evaluation. Some exposures were assessed using the Type K and the two D-2 films, some with the Type K and the D-1 films, and some with Type K alone. The first case produced overlap problems. The poor agreement that often occurred between the two D-2 films aggravated the problem. Badge Issue and Exchange Badges were generally issued at the test site. For the first few days after the detonation, entries were controlled by a "Going-In Board." This procedure as- sured that all personnel entering radiation areas were properly badged. The primary source of information concerning badge issuance is that presented in a report on safety and monitoring of personnel (Aebersold 1947~. There is no evidence that cohort badging was used (see Operation CROSSROADS). Calibrations, Processing, and Interpretation Calibrations were performed with a radium-beryllium source. The source activity was approximately 1000 millicuries (mCi) (LASL 19459. All films were exposed at a distance of 49.5 cm from the source with the time varied to achieve different levels of exposure. Seven exposure levels were used ranging from 0.19 R to 10.29 R (LASL 1945~. Calibrations were infrequent and the same character- istic curve was used for many developing batches. Developed films were evalu- ated with a Marshal densitometer (LASL 1945; Littlejohn 1946; Reinert 19461. An unexposed film was developed with each group of personnel film to account for base fog (LASL 1945). The exposure reported for individuals was obtained by averaging the exposure determined from the separate films. As indicated, the number of films used to calculate the exposure varied because some films were not always evaluated. Of

84 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS the 51 readings above 1 R. 19 were calculated from the K and both D-2 films. The rest used the K and D-1 films or the K by itself (Buckland 1945~. Current Availability of Records No personnel dosimeter films are available for review from the TRINITY event Density and exposure data for personnel films and films sent to various post offices in New Mexico are listed in LA Notebook 1144 (LASL 1945~. Data for two calibrations are available also. A summary of personnel exposures was reported by Buckland (1945) for those people exposed during the first few days after the detonation. Exposures occurring later were reported in Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory memoranda (Littlejohn 1946; R,einert 1946~. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty The following table presents bias and uncertainties that result from different influences on film badge performance. These values are appropriate for exposures ranging from approximately 0.2 R to 3 R. The brass filter created a positive bias, as it was unable to fully compensate for Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Project TRINITY Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.3 Radiological Spectrum 1.6 1.4 Wearing 0.8 1.1 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 1.4 1.5 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.0 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.8 1.6

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES TRINITY 85 the over-response of the films to low-energy photons. For 100 keV photons, Type K film filtered with 0.020 inches (0.508 mm) of brass over-responded by a factor of 10 (Storm and Bemis 19503. Allowing for other low energy photons that do not produce such a large over-response, the estimated bias is 1.6 for spectral depend ence. Larger uncertainties are associated with laboratory bias estimates at lower and higher exposures. For the lower exposures, the increase is attributed to the imprecision that occurs when films are used at their lower ranges of detection. Some additional uncertainty is introduced by the varying number of films used to determine exposure. For exposures over 3.0 R. the assignment procedure introduces even more uncertainty because of the disagreements between the two D-2 films. For ex- ample, the readings of the D-2 films in one badge were S.4 R and 11.S R while the Type K film in the badge indicated an exposure of 5.4 R. The exposure assigned from these readings was 8.5 R. but it is obvious that a large uncertainty exists. At the highest doses, when both D-2 films and the K film were averaged, a positive bias was created by the unequal weight applied by using both D-2 films. More confidence can be placed on the K film based on the available calibration data, but it represents only one third of the average value. The small numbers of high readings allowed each high exposure to be re- viewed. The overall effect of the film capabilities and assignment procedures is to create a laboratory bias of about 1.3. For the reasons presented above and the fact that the D-2 films were not always used, the uncertainty of the bias estimate is larger than that for lower exposures. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deem dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the TRINITY series. Film badge readings between 0.2 R and 3.0 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the next-to-the-last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for TRINITY given above. Readings between 3 and 15 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table; no exposures above 15 R were recorded. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings as described in Section S.B under laboratory Uncertainties.

86 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Project TRINITY Film Badge Best Estimate of 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Deep-Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.02 (0.00,0.05) 0.05 0.03 (0.01, 0.06) 0.06 0.03 (0.02, 0.07) 0~07 ~0.04 (0.02, 0.07) 0.08 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.09 0.05 (0.03, 0.09) 0.10 0.06 (0.03, 0.10) 0.12 - 0.07 (0.04, 0.1 1) 0.14 0.08 (0.05, 0.13) 0.16 0.09 (0.05, 0.15) 0.18 0.10 (0.06, 0.16) 0.20 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.20<Exp<3.0 0.56 E (0.35 E, 0.89 E) 3.0 - 15 0.43 E (0.22 E, 0.86 E) where E is the film badge exposure (To Discontinuity attributable to use of Type D-2 film for exposures above 3 R. OPERATION CROSSROADS Background Operation CROSSROADS was held in July 1946 at Bikini Atoll in the central Pacific. Its primary purpose was to determine the effect of atomic bombs on naval vessels. The operation consisted of two tests (DOE 1988; Berkhouse et al. 1984~: Personnel Exposed About42,000 personnel, 251 ships and 156 aircraft were involved in the tests. Ninety of the vessels were target ships in the Bikini lagoon. No personnel were /

6 UNCERTAI=YAlIALYSES BY TEST SERIES CROSSROADS Operation CROSSROADS Events 87 Name Date Type Yield (kt) ABLE 07/01/46 BAKER 07/25/46 Airdrop, detonated 21 at 520-foot altitude Underwater, in lagoon, detonated at 90-foot depth on the target ships at the time of the detonations. Most personnel were on the remaining (support) ships of the fleet. Personnel were primarily exposed to radiation during the period when they entered the lagoon after shot BAKER and boarded the target vessels that had been engulfed in a water plume, surface wave and spray resulting from the underwater explosion, during efforts to decontami- nate the ships, beginning ten days after shot BAKER, and during ammunition offloading of target ships that had been towed or sailed to Kwajalein. Because the ABLE detonation was 520 feet above the ocean and 1500 to 2000 feet from the target ships, residual radioactivity in the target array was mostly from neutron activation and it decreased rapidly. Accordingly, the number of film badges issued for ABLE decreased from 1,627 on 1 July to none on 7 July, with a total during this time interval of 2,132 (Berkhouse et al. 1984~. Only 71 badges were issued from 7 July until 24 July, the day before test BAKER. Badges issued from 24 July until 31 August, when most support ships had left Bikini, totaled 8101 (REECo 1982~. This time period included both recoveries after BAKER and attempts to decontaminate target vessels. More than 8000 film badges were issued on a daily basis to about 700 personnel unloading ammunition from target vessels at Kwajalein, beginning about 30 August and continuing until the end of the year (Berkhouse et al. 1984~. The test series was designed with the objective of keeping the daily exposure below 0.1 R. and badges were used to measure the daily exposure in order to limit work activities if a greater exposure was experienced on a single day. Type of Film Badge The film badge contained a single component type K double-emulsion dental film pack. It was covered by a 0.020-inch-thick lead cross filter, the arms of which were bent over the edges of the pack about 1/4 inch. The badge was in a

88 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS plastic envelope to minimize damage to the film by exposure to moisture. The badge was intended to cover the exposure range 0-2 R with a minimum detectable exposure of approximately 0.05 R. The lead filter thickness (0.020 inches) was thinner than was later found to be optimum (0.028 inches) for minimizing the excess response of the film emulsion to low energy components of the gamma and x-ray spectrum. Badge Issue and Exchange Badges were intended to be issued on a daily basis. That was the typical experience although a few badges were retained for 2 or 3 days and as long as 9 days. Badges were not issued to all personnel working or living in radiation areas. They were typically issued only to one or a few Rad-Safe monitors in a group. The film badge exposure of the Rad-Safe monitor was intended to be representa- tive of the exposure of all members of the group, a concept called cohort badging. During the major ship decontamination effort between August 4 and 10 there were typically two monitors per 100 personnel. All personnel in aircraft that were within 20 miles of the explosions were badged at the time of the test detonations. About 15% of the Navy personnel in the task force were issued at least one badge sometime during the test series. The largest number of badges issued to one person (a Rad-Safe monitor) was 19. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Calibration, processing, and interpretation took place aboard the USS Haven. Calibrations were performed with a radium source at constant distance with variable time to produce exposures varying by approximate factors of 2 between 0.05 R and 2 R. Calibration films were not processed with each batch of films that was developed. The calibrations were assumed to be valid over a series of successive development batches. New calibration curves were made at least for each new emulsion batch from the film badge manufacturer. An unexposed control badge was included in each development batch to determine the base fog of the film. The development temperature was controlled at 68°F but only to + 1°F accuracy (rather than + 0.5°F called for in later test series). Each developed film was read in four positions corresponding to locations under the arms of the lead cross and close enough to the edge to also be under the bent-over ends of the anus. The film density was read to a maximum optical density of 3, correspond- ing to an exposure of about 2 R. The average of the four optical-density readings on one film, minus the density of the unexposed film developed in the same batch, was used with the density versus exposure calibration curve to interpret the exposure to an individual badge. Optical-density readings also were taken in the

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES - CROSSROADS 89 unshielded four corners of each film for beta-exposure determination. As previ- ously discussed in Section 4.B, however, beta-dosimetry results in Operation CROSSROADS were not reliable. Film badges worn at Operation CROSSROADS were subject to the high temperature and humidity of the Pacific test site and were not free of env*on- mental damage in spite of the plastic "tropical" envelope. Recent evaluation of available film badges from that test series indicates substantial film darkening due to environmental damage. This darkening may have been difficult to separate from the density produced by radiation at the low densities typical of most of the films in the archives. Current Availability of Records Only a part of the more than 18~000 films from badges worn at Operation CROSSROADS is currently available. The films from the ammunition unloading operation at Kwajalein, more than 8000 films, are all that are in REECo archives at Las Vegas, Nevada. The film badge records that were made at the time of the tests are generally available. Even though the record keeping at the time of the tests was not uniformly done and penmanship was sometimes poor, 85-90% of the Navy badge records have been matched to individuals. The method of record keeping evolved during the test series. Because of the unexpected level of contamination of the ships following test BAKER, the large number of badges issued led to establishing a card file on each Rad-Safe monitor to record his daily exposures. At the time ammunition was unloaded from the target vessels at Kwajalein, the record keeping was greatly improved, so that each person had his daily and cumulative exposure record kept on a single SxS inch card. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty The following table presents bias and uncertainties that result from different sources. These values are appropriate for exposures greater than 2 R. The laboratory procedures seem to have been well established and free of bias. The broader range within which the temperature was controlled leads to the greater-than-normal value for the laboratory K. The thinner-than-optimum lead filter biases the results to overestimate the exposure and also increases the uncer- tainty in the effect of the filter. Film badge location and backscatter contributions to the exposure bias and uncertainty are similar to those in other test series. The uncertainty in the environmental effects of heat and water are reflected in the K value of 1.3. The bias and uncertainty in conversion of exposure to dose are assigned the values used throughout this report. The lack of a second film component to evaluate exposures greater than

go FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation CROSSROADS Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.3 Radiological Spectrum 1.3 1.3 Wearing 0.8 1.3 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 1.1 1.5 Environmental 1.0 1.3 Overall (Exposure) 1.1 1.7 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.5 1.8 approximately 2 R was rarely significant because the individual daily exposures were not this large. Cumulative exposures to a few test participants exceeded 2 R. but the lack of a second film component is only significant on an individual film badge, not on the cumulative exposure derived from several badges. The minimum detectable exposure of 0.05 R is in some places stated as 0.04 R. At this level of exposure, the uncertainty in the exposure deduced from the net film density is larger than this apparent inconsistency. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and range of deep-dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the CROSS- ROADS series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiply- ing by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for CROSSROADS given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section S.B under L aboratory Uncertainties.

6 UNCERTAIN Y. ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES SANDSTONE Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation CROSSROADS 91 Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.07) 0.05 0.03 (0.01, 0.08) 0.06 0.04 (0.02, 0.09) 0.07 0.05 (0.02, 0.10) 0.08 0.05 (0.03,0.11) 0.09 0.06 (0.03, 0.12) 0.10 0.07 (0.03, 0.13) 0.12 0.08 (0.04, 0.15) 0.14 0.09 (0.05, 0.17) 0.16 0.11 (0.06, 0.20) 0.18 0.12 (0.07, 0.22) 0.20 0.13 (0.07, 0.24) >0.20 0.67 E (0.37 E, 1.20 E) where E is the film badge exposure ~) Because only one film component was used during CROSSROADS, there were no overlap problems. OPERATION SANDSTONE Background Operation SANDSTONE was held in April and May 1948 at Enewetak Atoll in the Central Pacific. Its primary purpose was to proof-test improved design atomic weapons. The operation consisted of three tests:

92 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Operation SANDSTONE Events Event Date Type Yield (kt) X RAY 04/15/48 Tower 37 YOKE 05/01/48 Tower 49 ZEBRA 05/15/48 Tower 18 Personnel Exposed Approximately 10,000 personnel participated in the test series. The majority of them were at Kwajalein, 400 nautical miles southeast of the test site or on board ship more than 10 nautical miles from the test site. A minority were on Enewetak Island, a distance of approximately 10 nautical miles from test ZEBRA, and further away from tests X RAY and YOKE, and on a few ships of the task force that held positions close to Enewetak Island. One of these ships was the USS Bairoko, on which the photodosimetry section was based that had responsibility for film badge processing and interpretation throughout the test series. About 2800 persons were badged (REECo 1988~. The standard maximum radiation exposure for personnel was set at 0.1 it/day and at 3 R for specific missions. Radiation exposure was primarily experienced by work teams that visited the test sites after the detonations. Although fallout was produced in all three test shots, only following YOKE was there measurable fallout where personnel were sta- tioned. Measurable radiation was recorded on the USS Bairoko and at Kwajalein two and three days following detonation. Type of Film Badge The film badge packet consisted of two film components, Eastman type K to cover the exposure range from 0.06 to 2 R and Eastman type A primarily intended to cover the range between 1 and 10 R. The type A film had radiation sensitivity of much less than 1 R. however, and was typically calibrated at levels of 0.1 R and even lower. The minimum detectable dose of 0.06 R stated for the type K film was slightly different from the 0.04 R or 0.05 R stated for the same type of film in Operation CROSSROADS. The packet was covered with a 0.020-inch lead cross, and was enclosed in a waterproof plastic cover.

6 UNCERTAIN YA1lALYSES BY TEST SERIES SANDSTONE 93 Badge Issue and Exchange Badges were issued for single-day use to all personnel expected to be exposed to radioactivity. For example, on April 24, 9 days after test X RAY, monitors were instructed to issue badges to anyone who was expected to come closer than 530 yards from ground zero. When work was completed in a radioactive area, fUm badges were returned to the monitor for processing. A film badge also was issued to each crewmember of aircraft flying into radioactive areas. These badges were returned by air from Kwajalein, where the aircraft were stationed to the USS Bairoko at Enewetak, where processing was done. A total of approximately 6,000 badges was used in the test series. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation All calibrations, processing and interpretation were carried out on the USS Bairoko. Calibrations were made with radium sources at known distances for fixed times of typically 25 and 144 minutes. During the series, two different sources of 48.7 mg and 231.7 mg were used. The calibration badges were attached to a wooden rack to assure their positions. Twenty-five calibration series were carried out over the time of the operation. From the existing calibration records, the identification, data plotting, and curve drawing do not appear to have been carefully done so that these records do not permit detailed confirmation of the reproducibility of the calibrations, nor assurance that they were precisely used. New processing solutions were made up daily from pre-packaged chemi- cals to assure reproducibility of the processing. The processing and interpretation were carried out on a daily basis. Originally, the densitometry of the films was determined in serial number order. On days during which a large number of badges were issued, this took many hours for the small number of personnel doing this work. As the test series progressed, in order to quantify significant exposures so that changes in job assignments for a following day could be made earlier, a new procedure was instituted. A general screening of the processed films selected those with highest density which were then read first. The procedures for identifying film badges with individuals to whom they were issued were careful and thorough, though the personnel in charge recommended that future film badges receive identification numbers readable both on the developed film and on the outside of the packet to further simplify the record-keeping process. Current Availability of Records A number of the detailed calibration records are still available for both the type K and type A films. Some films from badges are also available. The detailed

94 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS personnel-exposure records are available. They indicate not only the readings of the densities of the two film components and their interpretation in exposure but also the exposure as recorded by a pocket dosimeter which was typically also worn by a participant in a radiation area. In some cases it appears that the dosimeter reading was used as well as (or even instead of) the film badge readings to assign a final exposure to an individual for a particular day. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty The following table presents bias and uncertainties that result from different sources. These values are appropriate for exposures greater than 2 R. Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation SANDSTONE Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.5 Radiological Spectrum 1.3 1.3 Wearing 0.8 1.3 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 1.1 1.5 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.1 1.8 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.5 1.S The laboratory procedures seem to have been very well established and free of bias, with calibrations made on almost a daily basis. However, the inaccurate plotting and drawing of calibration curves have led to assignment of a large uncertainty (K = 1.5) to the overall laboratory operations. The thinner-than- optimum lead filter biases the results to overestimate the exposure and also increases the uncertainty in the effect of the filter. The other radiological contri- butions and the environmental effects are similar to those in other well controlled test series. The bias and uncertainty in conversion of exposure to dose are assigned the values used throughout this report.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES SANDSI ONE 95 The presence of a second fUm component (type A) to cover the range higher than 2 R was important in a few cases, although cumulative exposures (not single- badge exposures) in excess of the mission maximum of 3 R were reported for only 1 1 individuals. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deem dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the SANDSTONE series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for SANDSTONE given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from We table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties. Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation SANDSTONE Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.07) 0.05 0.03 (0.01, 0.08) 0.06 0.04 (0.02, 0.09) 0.07 0.0S (0.02, 0.10) 0.08 0.05 (0.03, 0.11) 0.09 0.06 (0.03, 0.12) 0.10 0.07 (0.03, 0.13) 0.12 0.08 (0.04, 0.15) 0.14 0.09 (0.05, 0.17) 0.16 0.11 (0.06, 0.20) 0.18 0.12 (0.07, 0.22) 0.20 0.13 (0.07, 0.24) >0.20 0.67 E (0.37 E, 1.20 E) where E is We film badge exposures)

96 FILM BADGE DOSlMF[RY IN-ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Exposure ranges for the two film components used in SANDSTONE overlap sufficiently that no overlap problems existed. In addition, no exposures above the range of the insensitive film component occurred. OPERATION RANGER Background RANGER was the first test series at Me Nevada Test site CUTS). Five nuclear- detonation tests were conducted for weapons development purposes; the first on January 27, 1951, and the last on February 6, 1951. All were airdrops, with four burst heights between 1,000 and 1,100 feet above Frenchman Flat and the largest- yield test at more than 1,400 feet. The detonations included two yields of 1 kt, two of 8 kt, and one of 22 kt (DOE 1988~. The summary of RANGER detonations is as follows: Operation RANGER Events Event Date Type Yield (kt) ABLE 01/27/51 Airdrop 1 BAKER 01n8/51 Airdrop 8 EASY 02/01/51 Airdrop 1 BAKER-2 02/02/51 Airdrop 8 FOX 02/06/51 Airdrop 22 None of the tests resulted in local fallout. Thus, participants entering the surface ground-zero areas were exposed to radiation only from neutron activation products. Personnel Exposed According to the RANGER Security Group Report, 570 operation security badges were issued and 156 visitors were escorted to observer areas (Tyler 1951~. The Rad-Safe group report stated "all persons entering the contaminated areas

6 UNCERTAINTY AlIALYSES BY TEST SERIES RANGER 97 wore film badges which had to be returned to Los Alamos for processing" (Shipman 1952~. Reportedly, exposure records were kept for a total of 182 personnel who entered the "hot" area. Existing records, however, show only 180 personnel. The highest radiation intensity monitored was 16 R/h at 100 yards from ground zero for the 8 kt detonation on January 28, 1951 (Buckland 1951~. Five participants accumulated more exposure than the 3-roentgen exposure limit for the test series. The highest exposure was 4.4 roentgens, and the rest were less than 4. The five included three construction workers, one Rad-Safe monitor, and one project participant, a Navy Commander assigned to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Type of Film Badge The personnel film badge used during RANGER included the Du Pont 552 packet with a Type 502 sensitive component (0.05 to 10 R) and Type 510 insensitive component (5 to 50 R). The packet was contained in a prototype Los Alamos brass-cadmium badge with 0.020-inch-thick brass and cadmium filter clips (Shipman et al. 1951) that symmetrically covered both sides of the filter, and an open-window (unfiltered) area. This was the first use of a Los Alamos brass- cadmium type badge, and the production-model badges were issued to all person- nel at Los Alamos later in the year (Littlejohn 1988b). Because the production model of this badge was used later in 1951 during Operation BUSTER-JANGLE at the same Nevada location, limitations, bias, and uncertainties during RANGER are assumed to be the same as discussed in the section on BUSTER-JANGLE. Badge Issue and Exchange Film badges were issued to all participants who entered radiation areas and to Air Force personnel at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), at Las Vegas, Nevada, and Kinland AFT\, at Albuquerque, New Mexico. NTS film-badge issue and collec- tion was at the combination control point and Rad-Safe building some eight miles south of the surface ground-zero area. Collected badges were sent by plane to New Mexico for processing at LASL, an unwieldy procedure because the test series lasted only 11 days, and exposure results were not received in time to be useful for participants who entered radiation areas each day. As a consequence, self-reading pocket dosimeter results were relied upon as indicating cumulative exposure. These measurements sometimes were lower than film badge expo- sures, and overexposure of a few participants resulted. Preliminary typed reports were prepared from film badge processing results (REECo 1988~. On March 1 and March 6, memos listing exposures were sent from the Monitoring Section to He LASL H-Division Leader (Sterner 1951~.

98 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Los Alamos film badge processing procedures included developing control and standard calibration films with each batch. An NBS-calibrated radium source, LASL No. 231, about 51 millicuries, was used to expose calibration films for preparation of calibration curves and use as batch standards (Littlejohn 1988b). According to the supervisor of dosimetry at LASL during RANGER, a Weston densitometer was used for measuring optical densities up to 3, and an Ansco densitometer was used as backup to density 6 (Littlejohn 1988b). Los Alamos procedures included measuring densities in three film areas, under a 0.020-inch- thick brass filter, under a 0.020 inch-thick cadmium filter, and in an open-window area. The open window area density was used to assign beta exposure, but, as previously indicated in Section 4.B, beta dosimetry during RANGER was unreli- able. Current Availability of Records Exposure records that exist in the Master File source documents on file at Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., in Las Vegas, Nevada, in- clude two typewritten lists of exposures and a computer listing containing the same information. Both of these lists apparently were derived from two Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory "Inter-Office Memorandum" listings titled "Expo sores of Personnel Film Badges from the Nevada Tests" from Martha L. Starner, H-I Monitoring Section, to Thomas L. Shipman, M.D., H-Division Leader, dated 1 March and 6 March, 1951 (Sterner 1951~. These memos list"Badge Number", "Name", "Gamma", and "Beta." The gamma exposures appear to be in roentgens. RANGER films and calibration data currently are in storage at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty Bias and uncertainties for RANGER film badge exposures greater than 200 mR are listed in the following table. The use of 0.020 inch-thick brass and cadmium filters resulted in an over- response of the film emulsion to photon energies less than 100 keV of about a factor of 10. Optical density readings for RANGER films have not been located, but log sheets for BUSTER-JANGLE films, when the same filters were em- ployed, show that only cadmium densities were recorded and used to determine exposures, even though columns existed for brass-filter and open window densi

6 UNCERTAI=YAXALYSES BY TEST SERIES - RANGER Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation RANGER 99 Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.3 1.3 Wearing 0.8 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Combined Radiological 1.1 1.4 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.1 1.5 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.5 1.5 ties and ratios for determining other information. Thus, spectral response in the above table reflects greater bias, 1.3, and uncertainty, 1.3, than the usual 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. Otherwise, good procedures employed by well-trained LASL personnel and short exposure periods in a relatively dry environment result in minimal bias and uncertainties for other sources of these values. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the RANGER series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multi- plying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for RANGER given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties.

100 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation RANGER Finn Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) O.W (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.06) 0.05 0.03 (0.02, 0.07) 0.06 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.07 0.05 (0.03, 0.08) 0.08 0.05 (0~03, 0~09) 0.09 0.06 (0.04, 0.10) 0.10 0.07 (0.04, 0.11) 0.12 0.08 (0.05, 0.13) 0.14 0.09 (0.06, 0.15) 0.16 0.11 (0.07, 0.16) 0.18 0.12 (0.08, 0.18) 0.20 0.13 (0.09, 0.20) >0.20 0.67 E (0.44 E, 1.00 E) where E is the film badge exposure ~) Exposure ranges for the two film components used in RANGER overlap sufficiently that no overlap problems existed. In addition, no exposures above the range of the sensitive fUm component occurred. OPERATION GREENHOUSE Background Operation GREENHOUSE was the fifth atomic weapon test series and the third to be conducted in the Pacific. It was the second operation occurring in the Enewetak Atoll area, following Operation SANDSTONE by three years. The following table lists the test events for Operation GREENHOUSE. The tests were part of the thermonuclear or fusion weapons development program.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES GREENHOUSE Operation GREENHOUSE Events 101 Event Date Type Yield~kt) DOG 4/08/51 Tower ~ EASY 4/21/51 Tower 41 GEORGE 5/09/51 Tower * ITEM 5/25/51 Tower * * Unannounced yields Joint Task Force 3, created by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed the Operation. Task Unit 3.1.5 provided technical Rad- Safe support and film badge monitoring service, assisted by health physicists from the national nuclear weapons laboratories. Personnel Exposed Approximately 9,350 people participated in the operation and film badges were issued to 3,335 people (Cooney 1951~. After some of the tests, fallout was deposited unexpectedly on Enewetak, Parry and Japtan islands where housing, recreation, and laboratory facilities were located. Film badges were not required for most people on these islands because they were planned to be radiation-free areas, and film badge supplies were insufficient to begin monitoring, once the problem occurred. Uneven deposition of fallout and variations in the hme people spent on the island necessitated individual reconstructions of fallout exposures. Film badges were analyzed to exclude the effects of fallout; thus doubling of the fallout contribution in exposure records (Cooney 1951) was avoided. The highest film badge reading was 8.8 R (Berkhouse et al. 1983a). The average exposure to individuals who were issued film badges was 0.51 R (Cooney 1951~. Excluding 913 people receiving less Han 0.1 R. the average film badge- determined exposure was 0.71 R. Type of Film Badge The film badge used during Operation GREENHOUSE consisted of a Du Pont

102 FILM BADGE DOSIMEIRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Type 553 film packet partially wrapped with 0.020 inch-thick (0.508 mm) lead strip (Cooney 1951; Littlejohn 1951~. Inside the packet were three films, Type 502, Type 510 and Type 606. The measurement range for high-energy photons for the Type 502 was 0.05 R to 10 R (Ehrlich 1951~. Ranges for the Type 510 and Type 606 were 1 R to 50 R and 10 R to 300 R. respectively. The Type 606 films were seldom evaluated because exposures were too low (Cooney 1951~. Examination of the highest exposed films reveal no measurable density above background on the Type 606 component. No overlap problems appeared between the other two film types. The lead strip acted as a filter for low-energy photons but it was poorly designed and did not adequately cover both sides of the packet. Only a quarter inch of the strip extended over the edge of the packet to cover the rear. Littlejohn (1951) believed the area of the film covered on both sides did not allow for an appropriate density measurement. Considering the aperture of the densitometer and the penumbra region seen along the edge of the filtered area, Littlejohn's concern was valid. The possibility exists that density measurements were made in the film area that was only filtered from the front. If so, overestimates of exposure would occur. Without filtration on both sides, errors would be introduced by backscat- tered low-energy photons and incorrect wearing of the badge. An identification number was embossed onto each packet. Some films became exposed by light because the embosser occasionally perforated the paper wrap- ping of the packet. This problem was discovered early in the operation and the numbers of film affected were minimized by wrapping packets in black electrical tape (Cooney 1951~. Badge Issue and Exchange Film badges were issued from the Rad-Safe building on Parry Island. A few badges were issued on Kwajelein to Air Force cloud-sampling pilots and ground crews servicing contaminated aircraft. Most badges were issued for specific missions and were to be returned by the end of the day. Littlejohn (1951) noted that some badges were not returned on time and were used for more than a month. Announcements were made at the theater to remind people to return their badges. Retrieval of unreturned badges was inhibited by the failure to note an individual's base organization on the issue record (Cooney 1951~. Cohort film badging was performed on several naval vessels that were not expected to enter radiation areas but several were caught in unexpected fallout. Procedures for assigning exposures from badged cohorts were not located.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES GREENHOUSE Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation 103 Films were calibrated by exposure to a 948 milligram radium source. Dis- tances ranged from 12 cm to several meters. Eighteen exposure levels were used, ranging from 0.05 R to 50 R. Fixtures did not permit exact repositioning of the source or films. Errors that may have been introduced at the shorter distances (i.e. higher exposure levels) were not of significance, as personnel exposures were not experienced at exposure levels corresponding to these distances. Often, films were exposed at a nonperpendicular angle to the radiation beam Littlejohn 1951~. The uncertainty from this contributing factor is reflected in the increased values of K for this test series. Sets of calibrated film were developed daily but not necessarily together with the personnel film. An unexposed control badge did accompany the personnel films through the development process. Careless drawing of the daily calibration curves was noted in a review of the film badge program (Littlejohn 1951~. Discrepancies between film badges and pocket ionization chambers were ascribed to this carelessness or to poor technician training. A Weston model 877 densitometer was used to evaluate the films (Cooney 1951~. Its useful measurement range was from 0 to 3.0 optical density units (Littlejohn 1952~. Unspecified measures were taken to compensate for or to remove the contribu- tion from fallout to the film badge reading. The cumulative exposure from fallout prior to test ITEM was about 2 R and increased to about 5 R afterwards. Allowing for the shielding effects of buildings and storage boxes, unexposed stored film could have received several hundred mR, causing problems. The existence of a problem was revealed in Cooney's report (1951) where little confidence was placed on film readings less than 0.4 R. During review of the data from the Operation, some films were retrieved and analyzed in an attempt to deduce the method used to adjust film readings for fallout. Calibration and unexposed control films as well as all density data no longer exist. Comparisons of the reported exposure and new density measure- ment did not reveal consistent patterns. A film reported with an exposure of 0.04 R on April 9, 1951, had a gross density of 0.87. A film reported with 0.4 R three days later had a density over 3.0. The densities are too high for the reported exposures unless a large control density for background and fallout was sub- tracted during the original analysis. Current Availability of Records A summary of personnel exposures exists at the REECo repository in Las

104 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Vegas. Also available are many of the films and copies of individual 5 x 8-inch e~osure-history cards. Annex 9.3 of the Scientific Director's Report for Operation Greenhouse con- tains much information about the film badge program and the unexpected fallout problem (Cooney 1951~. Estimated Bias and Uncertainly The following table lists biases and uncertainties for exposures greater than 0.4 R. No bias appears to have been introduced, but the uncertainties in the estimates are much higher than other test series. Estimated Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Operation GREENHOUSE Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.3 Radiological Spectrum 1.1 1.2 Weanng 0.9 1.3 Backscatter 1.1 1.2 Combined Radiological 1.1 1.4 Environmental 1.0 1.6 Overall (Exposure) 1.1 1.9 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.4 2.0 The laboratory uncertainty reflects the imprecision of the calibration routines and technician performance. The poor lead filter design and resulting decrease in filtered area for the rear of the packet significantly increase the uncertainty estimate compared to other film badge designs. The effects of fallout contribute the most to the uncertainties of the estimates. Treated as an environmental factor, the accumulation of exposure from fallout introduces a time consideration. The values in the table are for exposures received prior to shot ITEM, the detonation that produced the most fallout. After ITEM the uncertainty in the environmental factors is increased from 1.6 to 1.8.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES-GREENHOUSE 105 The exposure from fallout causes the most uncertainty in lower film badge readings where the amount of fallout is comparable to the person's mission exposure. Without information on the approach used to exclude the effects of fallout, and with the report comments that exposures less than 0.4 R had question- able accuracies, a large uncertainty in the estimate at low exposures is created. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deem dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge~readings in the GREENHOUSE series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for GREENHOUSE given above. Read- ings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties. Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation GREENHOUSE Film Badge i Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.08) 0.05 - 0.04 (0.01, 0.09) 0.06 0.04 (0.02, 0.10) 0~07 0.05 (0.02, 0.11) 0.08 0.06 (0.03, 0.13) 0.09 0.06 (0.03, 0.14) 0.10 0.07 (0.03, 0.15) 0.12 0.09 (0.04, 0.18) 0.14 0.10 (0.05, 0.21) 0.16 0.11 (0.06, 0.23) 0.18 0.13 (0.06, 0.26) 0.20 0.14 (0.07, 0.29) >0.20 - 10 0.71 E (0.36 E, 1.43 E) where E is the film badge exposure ~)

106 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS No overlap problems were experienced with the 3-component film packets used in GREENHOUSE. OPERATION BUSTER-JANGLE Background BUSTER-JANGLE was the second test series at the Nevada Proving Ground (NPG; referred to as Nevada Test Site, NTS, during RANGER, January and February 1951, and renamed NTS December 31, 1954) (Ponton et al. 1982d). Seven nuclear detonation tests were conducted from October 22 to November 29, 1951, the first five for weapons development purposes and the last two for determining weapons effects. Desert Rock Troop maneuvers were conducted after some of the tests. The first test device was on a 100-foot tower, and the resulting yield was less than 0.1 kt. The next four development tests were airdrops at altitudes of from 1,100 to 1,400 feet for the highest yield test. Both effects tests had yields of 1.2 kt. One effects test device was detonated on the surface, and the other was buried 17 feet belong the surface (DOE 1988; Haw- thorne 1979~. The following table is a summary of the BUSTER-JANGLE tests. Operation BUSTER-JANGLE Events Event Date Type Yield(kt) ABLE 10/22/51 Tower < 0.1 BAKER 10/28/51 Airdrop 3.5 CHARLIE 10/30/51 Airdrop 14 DOG 11/01/51 Airdrop 21 EASY 11/05/51 Airdrop 31 SUGAR 11/19/51 Surface 1.2 UNCLE 1 1/29/51 Crater 1.2

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES BUSIER-JANGLE Personnel Exposed 107 According to Shipman, only NPG test personnel entering potential radiation- exposure areas were issued film badges during BUSTER-JANGLE by the NPG radsafe group. The number of personnel issued film badges by NPG Rad-Safe was 1,749, a total of 226 at Kirdand Air Force Base (AFB) in New Mexico, at Indian Springs AFB near NPG, and the rest at NPG (Shipman 1953~. Desert Rock military personnel took part in military maneuvers after tests, were observers, or were support troops. According to Kean, badging for these personnel took place at Camp Desert Rock, a 6th Army camp two miles south of the NPG main entrance through Camp Mercury. Badges issued at Desert Rock for Exercise I included 883 to combat-team members, 1,587 to support troops, and 2,796 to observers. At least 260 observers and inspection-team personnel were badged for Exercises II and III. (Keen 1951; Fitch 1951~. Desert Rock troops entered and exited NPG in convoys. AEC maximum permissible exposure limits of 3.0 R for most NPG and Desert Rock personnel and 3.9 R for cloud-sampling personnel were established for BUSTER-JANGLE. Three cloud-sampling personnel received exposures of 3.94, 4.02, and 4.4 R and three Desert Rock personnel were in the group of less than 50 non-cloud-sampling personnel exposed to between 3 R and a maximum below 6 R (Shipman 1953; Ponton et al. 1982~. Type of Film Badge The Du Pont 553 film packet was used during BUSTER-JANGLE by both the NPG and Desert Rock Rad-Safe groups. The 553 contained component types 502 (0.02 - 10 R), 510 (5 - 50 R), and 606 (10 - 300 R). NPG film packets were in the Los Alamos brass-cadmium badge with 0.020-inch-thick brass and cadmium filters plus an open window. Desert-Rock film packets were in sealed, clear plastic envelopes, and probably had 0.020-inch-thick lead filters, as were used a few months later at NPG during operation ~MBLER-SNAPPER (Keen 1951; Shipman et al. 1951; Storm 1951~. Environmental damage did not appear to be a problem during BUSTER- JANGLE. Film badges were issued for short periods of time, seldom more than one day. Environmental conditions at NPG did not cause film-emulsion problems experienced in Pacific Operations, particularly with the cool fall temperatures that prevailed during BUSTER-JANGLE.

108 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY LV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Other limitations of film badges in general include spectral response, angular response, and shielding by the body. These limitations were discussed in previous parts of this report' and are addressed under Estimated Bias and Uncertainty in this part. Generally, well-trained dosimetry technicians, a three-filter badge at NPG, and moderate environmental conditions minimized bias and uncertainties, while use of only 0.020 inch-thick filters increased spectral sensitivity and result- ing bias and uncertainty. Remaining limitations of film badges are related to field use, including film-packet damage. Because wearing periods were short, and perhaps because self-reading pocket dosimeters also were worn when participants entered radiation areas, no mention is made in BUSTER-JANGLE Rad-Safe reports of problems with damaged film badges. Overlap problems experienced with two-component film packets used during other test operations were not a problem during BUSTER-JANGLE. The three- component Du Pont 553 packet provided more overlap than needed; however, no overlap was necessary because the highest exposures were less than 6 R and well within the range (0.02 - 10 R) of the type 502 film component. Badge Issue and Exchange Not all support personnel at NPG were issued film badges during BUSTER- JANGLE. Participants entering radiation areas, Air Force cloud-sampling pilots and crews, supporting Air Force personnel, and participants who might be ex- posed to radioactive material from experiments were issued film badges which were to be processed by the NPG Rad-Safe Unit. All personnel entering radiation areas were required to check through the Rad-Safe Unit, where film badges were issued before entering, and upon exit, when film badges were collected for processing on the same day. Film badge requirements for personnel of opera- tional aircraft were met by the Rad-Safe Unit and such film badges were pro- cessed by the Rad-Safe Unit at Control Point Building 2 (CP-2) (LASL 1951~. Desert Rock Battalion Combat Team (BCT) member film badges were issued on D-1 (day prior to test) at Camp Desert Rock and collected on D-day in the forward area prior to return to camp. Observer film badges were issued by the III Corps Visitors Bureau when each individual reported to Camp Desert Rock, and were collected by the Bureau after the test was observed when the observers returned to camp. Personnel of the III Corps were not in a central-issue location, so some badges were issued in camp on D- 1 and others on D-day during muster in the forward area. After test activity, the majority of badges were collected at a designated check point in the forward area, and the remainder after individuals returned to camp (Keen 1951~. NPG film badge issue, processing, and results data were maintained on Sx8- inch cards, usually one for each individual. Cards listed Name, Contractor (organization usually listed), Badge (number), Dates (usually one-day badges), Gamma (in mR), Gamma Total (cumulative), Beta (column was not used), Beta

6 UNCERTAINTYANALYSES BY TEST SERIES BUSI ER-JANGLE 109 Total (not used), Dosimeter (self-reading pocket, sometimes listed), D Total (seldom used), and Remarks (REECo 1988~. Perhaps the pocket dosimeter readings were for comparison with film' badge readings, or were entered on the card in case films were found to be damaged after development. The dates that film badges were worn were used to show statistics on film badges issued for each test, and cumulative gamma totals were used to prepare exposure reports. Desert Rock roster sheets were used to issue film badges and show exposure results. Each sheet had a date and columns for Name, Rank, ASN (Army Serial Number), Organization, Home Station, Film Badge No., and Total Dosage (in mR). The last two columns were hand-written while the remaining information usually was typed (REECo 1988~. Data were tabulated to show, by BCT mem- bers, observers, and III Corps participants, badges worn, badges reported, per- centage reported, maximum reading, minimum reading (20 mR), and average reading. These data were reported (Keen 1951), and the fUms and records "kept on file in Headquarters, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project until further disposition is directed". Source documents and some films were retrieved from archives by REECo about 15 years later. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation NPG film badges were processed at Rad-Safe Building CP-2 by Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory STALL) and military personnel using LASL equipment and procedures; 10 LASL H-Division and 3 military personnel handled dosimetry and records (Shipman 1953~. Los Alamos records show radium 226 source, number 231, was used for calibrating personnel film badges during this time. The radium source was NBS-calibra~d. Control and standard calibration films were devel- oped with each batch of personnel films under carefully controlled conditions at 68 + 0.5°F (Littlejohn 1988a). Desert Rock film badges were processed in a mobile photo-laboratory truck at PEG by qualified Army Signal Corps personnel. Films were developed for 5 minutes at 68°F using Kodak liquid dental x-ray developer. Films were calibrated with a cobalt 60 source (Keen 1951~. The 13 personnel handling NPG dosimetry and records were experienced (10 LASL personnel) and trained (3 military personnel) in LASL procedures. The Weston densitometer was used for measuring film densities up to 3, and the Ansco was used as backup to density 6 (Littlejohn 1988a). The NPG minimum reportable exposure was 60 mR according to the radiological safety report (Ship- man 1953), but exposure records indicate the minimum detectable exposure depended on the processing date and usually varied from 40 mR to 70 mR. Desert Rock film densities were measured with an Ansco-Sweet photo-densitometer, and the Desert Rock minimum reportable exposure was 20 mR (Keen 1951~.

110 at. FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY [V ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Current Availability of Records REECo has in its source document archives copies of the 5x8-inch individual exposure record cards used at NPG and the Desert Rock roster sheets used to record exposures. At least some of the developed films and various exposure listings are also stored at REECo. Los Alamos National Laboratory has in storage dosimetry work sheets that led to entries on the 5x8-inch cards, and REECo has copies. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty Bias and uncertainties for BUSTER-JANGLE exposures greater than 200 mR are listed in the following table. Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation BUSTER-JANGLE Source B K . Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.3 1.3 Wearing 0.8 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Combined Radiological 1.1 1.4 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.1 1.5 Conversion to Dose-Deep Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.5 1.5 In the above table, a laboratory bias of 1.0 and an uncertainty of 1.2 reflect well-trained dosimetry technicians and good procedures of the experienced Los Alamos Health Division. Spectrum bias of 1.3 and uncertainty of 1.3 are higher than for some test series because brass and cadmium filters used were only 0.020 inches thick compared to the 0.028 inch-thick lead filter later determined to be optimum for maintaining reasonably uniform response over a wide range of

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES BUSI ER-lAlIGLE 111 fission and activation product photon energies. This determination was made at a meeting in August 1952 between representatives from major laboratories and government agencies (AEC 1952~. Environmental bias of 1.0 and uncertainty of 1.1 reflect moderate environmental conditions in Nevada during the fall of 1951 and usual film badge wearing periods of only one day. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deem dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the BUSTER-JANGLE series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for BUSTER-JANGLE given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation BUSTER-JANGLE Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.06) 0.05 0.03 (0.02, 0.07) 0.06 0.04 (0.02. 0.08) 0.07 0.05 (0.03, 0.08) 0.08 0~05 (0.03, 0.09) 0.09 0.06 (0.04, 0.10) 0.10 0.07 (0.04, 0.11) 0.12 0.08 (0.05, 0.13) 0.14 0.09 (0.06, 0.15) 0.16 0.11 (0.07, 0.16) 0.18 0.12 (0.08, 0.18) 0.20 0.13 (0.09, 0.20) >0.20 0.67 E (0.44 E, 1.00 E) where E is the film badge exposure ~)

112 FILM BADGE DOSIMEI RY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties. No overlap problem would have been experienced with the 3-component types used in BUSTER-JANGLE; however, no film badge exposures were above the range of the most sensitive component OPERATION TUMBLER-SNAPPER Background Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER was the third series of nuclear tests con- ducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) from 1 April 1952 to 5 June 1952. It consisted of eight low- to intermediate-yield tests in two phases. The fast was the Tumbler phase of four tests on weapons effects. The second was the Snapper phase consisting of four tests to improve the design of nuclear weapons. The eight test shots are summarized in the following table: Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER Events Event Date Type Yield(kt) ABLE 4/01/52 Airdrop 1 BAKER 4/15/52 Airdrop 1 CHARLIE 4/22/52 Airdrop 31 DOG 5/01/52 Airdrop 19 EASY 5/07/52 Tower 12 FOX 5/25/52 Tower 11 GEORGE 6/01/52 Tower 15 HOW 6/05/52 Tower 14 The test series had two purposes, to advance the development of nuclear weapons and to train troops in tactical nuclear warfare.

6 UNCERTAIN7YANALYSESBY TEST SERIES TUMBLER-SNAPPER 113 Personnel Exposed According to the Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER Radiological Safety Re- port to the Test Director, 2243 test personnel were issued film badges at the Nevada Proving Grounds (NPG) from April 1 to June 9, 1952. Of this number, 27 individuals accumulated exposures above the 3.9 R maximum established for the operation (Gwynn 1952~. About 270 Air Force personnel were in radioactive debris cloud sampling activities, and about 80 of these actually flew in the sampling aircraft (GAO 1987~. The DNA historical report on TUMBLER-SNAPPER indicates that about 10,600 Department of Defense personnel were issued film badges at Camp Desert Rock, two miles south of the NPG main entrance, and these additional personnel participated in Desert Rock troop maneuvers or as observers after some of the nuclear detonations (Ponton and Maag 1982 a,b, Ponton et al. 1982a). Type of Film Badge Two types of films badges were used. The first was the NPG Badge which was issued to NPG test participants, including radioactive debris cloud-sampling aircraft and ground crews, and provided to and processed for Desert Rock partici- pants. The badge consisted of a Du Pont 558 film packet with a 0.020-inch-thick lead filter required to cover an area one-half-inch wide by one-inch long on each side of the packet. The packet was embossed with an identification number before being heat-sealed in a 0.002-inch-thick polyethylene envelope. The lead was improperly folded around the packet by the manufacturer in the first group of badges, extending only 1/4-inch over one side of the packet until corrected by the manufacturer after shot ABLE to cover equal areas on both sides. The second type of badge was the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) badge which was issued only to radioactive debris cloud-sampling pilots. It contained a piece of Du Pont 502 film, paper wrapped, enclosed in a 0.020-inch- thick brass holder, with two windows on each side of the holder, one open to the air and one covered on both sides with 0.020-inch-thick cadmium. Density readings for exposure and calibration were made under the cadmium window (AEC undated). The stated range and accuracy of the film badge packets are summarized by Brady and Nelson (1985~. The 508 film component was reported to have a range of 0.01 R to 6 R. However, a calibration curve was found for the TUMBLER- SNAPPER series going up to 10 R. The 1290 film had a reported range of 20 to 3000 R. However, it appears that the highest individual badge readings were all below 10 R and it never was necessary to read the 1290 film component. The 502 film component had a reported range of 0.02 to 10 R.

114 Badge Issue and Exchange FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY fiV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS N G badges were issued to NPG test participants, including personnel in- volved in radioactive debris cloud-sampling, and to Desert Rock participants. Badges were issued and exchanged at Indian Springs Air Force Base by Air Force personnel, at Camp Desert Rock by Desert Rock personnel, and at N G by NPG Rad-Safe personnel. All badges were provided and processed, however, by NPG Rad-Safe. In addition, LASL badges also were worn by cloud samplers after Shot ABLE in lieu of pocket dosimeters, which were found to be leaking in Shot ABLE. It appears (Fackler 1953, page 115) that after Shot BAKER, the two badges were wom, taped side by side; their readings were averaged because of doubt as to the reliability of one reading. According to Gwynn (1952) "A permanent record of these dosage readings was made against the individual's name & organizations." and that "Daily prepa- ration, for submission to the director of Rad-Safe Group, of integrated dosage reports showing each individual's name, grade, and organization, and by indicat- ing by red underscore all individuals who had exceeded a total integrated dose of 2 R." It is pointed out, however, that most of these records are no longer available (Goetz et al. 1985~. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Reported calibration procedures were found only for the NAG badges. These were described by Gwynn (1952) as follows: "Film badges were calibrated and processed by standard techniques daily and made available by 0800 hours the following day to provide the director of Rad-Safe with the cumulative doses prior to the re-entry of persons into a contaminated area." The Rad-Safe Group con- sisted of one officer plus 18 enlisted men, working in two shifts day and night to issue and process all films. Six radium sources on loan from the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ships were used as calibration sources at the NPG. The LASL badges used on some cloud-sampling personnel also were calibrated against a radium source at Los Alamos and processed at Los Alamos. For processing the NPG badges, Eastman X-ray Developer & Fixer were used. The films were processed in the developer for 5 minutes or for 4.5 minutes with mechanical agitation. A stop bath of acetic acid was used for 10 sec. The films were feed for 10 minutes and then washed for 20 minutes. The densitometer was calibrated with neutral density filters. A memorandum was found in REECo files concerning intercomparisons of NPG and LASL badges (AEC undated) with an unsigned four page summary of film badge discrepancies. Apparently some cloud sampling personnel wore both type of badges for Shots BAKER through HOW. For reasons that were never

6 UNCERTAIN7YANALYSESBY TEST SERIES TUMBLER-SNAPPER 115 uncovered, the NPG readings were consistently higher than the LASL readings by about 45% on average, ranging from about 12% for Shot FOX to 72% for Shot CHARLIE. For Test EASY, both types of badges were exposed mounted on a Masonite phantom and compared to readings obtained with a Victoreen surface chamber. The NPC} badges read about 31 % to 38% high and the LASL badges read 3% to 8% high. Accordingly there appears to be a bias of around +35% for the NPG badges due to energy spectrum differences between the radium emission spectrum and the energy spectrum of the radiation released by the test shots. According to Gwynn (1952), there were some contamination problems. He reported that `'It was found that fine particles of radioactive dust adhered to this covering and that the gamma rays and beta particles emitted by this dust contrite uted to the indicated film badge dose. This film badge was designed to be worn in the individual's pocket. Often, "hot" dust stirred up by winds or vehicles lodged in the pocket and contaminated the film badge cover." Design changes were recommended. (N.B. The badges of some of the exposed personnel were examined at REECo. and no apparent "hot spots" were observed. The darkest type 508 exposed film found had a optical density of about 3.2. No processed type 1290 films were found.) Current Availability of Records Most film badges, some dosimetry log sheets, and most exposure rosters for bow NPG and Desert Rock participants are available in REECo archives at Las Vegas, Nevada. Many Desert Rock films are missing, as are posted exposures on many Desert Rock rosters. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty A GAO report (1987) recommends that the integron readings for the ionization chambers carried on the aircraft of the cloud samplers should be given more weight when such readings appear in conflict with the reported firm badge readings. However, this contention was disputed by reviewers of the GAO report (1987, pp. 76-81~. There is no way of determining the correct ratio between the two readings. Two badges were worn side by side by most of the flight personnel, and their readings represent the best estimate of personnel exposure. The integron readings represent the exposure received by the integron which could be quite different from the exposure of flight personnel. The following tables list the estimated bias and uncertainty at 95% confidence level for various sources of error at the 200 mR level, assuming a lognormal distribution of errors.

116 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Operation TI3MBLER-SNAPPER - (Ground Personnel) Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.5 1.3 Wearing 0.8 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Combined Radiological 1.3 1.4 Environmental 1.2 - 1.2 Overall (Exposure) 1.6 1.5 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 2.1 1.6 Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER (Flight personnel) Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.3 1.3 Weanng 0.9 1.1 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Combined Radiological 1.3 1.3 Environmental 1.1 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.4 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.8 1.5

6 UNCERTAINTYANALYSESBYTESTSERlES TUMBLER-SNAPPER 117 Note that the bias due to the energy spectrum for ground personnel includes an apparent calibration discrepancy between the LASL badges and the N G badges (which read about 35% higher) worn by Ground Personnel and a 10% bias introduced by the brass/cadmium filter used in the LASL badges. Hence for ground personnel, the total bias due to the energy spectrum is 1.35 x 1.10 = 1.5. For cloud samplers (flight personnel) the bias is taken to be about 30% since both badges were worn and the readings were averaged. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following two tables give deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the TUM- BLER-SNAPPER series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for TUMBLER-SNAPPER given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties.

118 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER (Ground personnel) Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.02 (0.00,0.04) 0.05 0.02 (0.01, 0.05) 0.06 0.03 (0.01, 0.06) 0.07 0.03 (0.02, 0.06) 0.08 0.04 (0.02, 0.07) 0 09 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.10 0.05 (0.03, 0.08) 0.12 0.06 (0.03, 0.10) 0.14 0.07 (0.W, 0.11) 0.16 0.08 (0.05, 0.13) 0.18 0.09 (0.05, 0.14) 0.20 0.10 (0.06, 0.15) >0.20 0.48 E * (0.30 E, 0.76 E) where E is the hum badge exposure (A *For individual badge readings in the overlap region (10 - 15 R), the reported loss of accuracy would result in a slight increase in the span of the 95% confidence limits, represented by the substitution of multiplication factors of 0.26 and 0.86. However, there appear to be no individual badge readings in this overlap region for Operation I~UMBLER-SNAPPER.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES-TUMBLER-SNAPPER 1 19 Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER (Flight personnel) Film Badge ~ Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.02 (0.00,0.05) 0.05 0.03 (0.019 0.06) 0.06 0.03 (0.02, 0.06) 0.07 0.04 (0.02, 0.07) 0.08 0.04 (0.03, 0.08) 0.09 0.05 (0.039 0.09) 0.10 0.06 (0.03, 0.09) 0.12 0.07 (0.04, 0.11) 0.14 0.08 (0.05, 0.12) 0.16 0.09 (0.06, 0.14) 0.18 0.10 (0.07, 0.15) 0.20 0.11 (0.07,0.17) >0.20 0.56 E * (0.37 E, 0.83 E) * where E is the film badge exposure (R) *For individual badge readings in the overlap region (10 - 15 R), the reported loss of accuracy would result in a slight increase in the span of the 95% confidence limits, represented by the substitution of multiplication factors of 0.32 and 0.96. However, there appear to be no individual badge readings in this overlap region for Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER.

120 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS . OPERATION IVY Background Operation IVY was conducted in November, 1952 on Enewetak Atoll in the Pacific. The test MIKE was the first acknowledged detonation of a fusion device and test KING was the detonation of a fission weapon. The following lists details of the two Operation IVY detonations. Operation IVY Events Event Date Type Yield (Mt) MIKE 11/01/52 Surface 10.4 KING 11/16/52 Airdrop 0.5 Approximately 11,650 people participated in the operation (Gladeck et al. 1982~. Of these, 2,030 people were badged. There were less than 30 cumulative exposures that exceeded 3 R and the highest exposure was 17.S R (Gladeck et al. 1982~. These exposures exclude that due to fallout. Personnel Exposed The highest exposure was received by an individual performing a search and rescue mission in response to a lost cloud-sampling aircraft following the MIKE test. Type of Film Badge The film badge used at Operation IVY consisted of a Du Pont Type 558 film packet with a 0.020-inch (0.508 millimeter)-thick lead strip covering on both sides. The lead strip was 0.5 inches wide and one inch long on each side of the packet and provided sufficient area to evaluate the film underneath the filter (Maynard 1952~. The Du Pont Type 558 packet contained two films, Type 508 and Type 1290. The former had a range of approximately 0.05 R to 10 R while the latter measured exposures between 10 and 750 R (Brady and Nelson 1985~.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES IVY 121 Each film packet was embossed with a unique number enabling the cross referencing of a film badge packet to its user. Two other special film badges were issued to pilots of aircraft sampling radioactive clouds. One of these badges consisted of the Du Pont Type 553 packet enclosed in the standard Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory film badge holder. This holder provided on both sides a brass fluter, 0.020 inch (0.508 millimeters) thick, an open window, and a cadmium filter, 0.020 inch (0.508 millimeters) thick (Maynard 1952~. The Type 553 packet contained three films, Type 502 measuring exposures 0.03 R to 10 R. Type 510 useful from 5 R to 50 R. and Type 606 used to measure exposures between 10 R and 300 R. The second special badge issued to the pilots was one designed by the National Bureau of Standards. It consisted of a Type 553 packet; the holder was con- structed of 8.25 mm Bakelite wrapped with 1.07 mm of tin and 0.3 mm of lead (Maynard 1952; Ehrlich and Fitch 1951~. A number was x rayed onto the films instead of embossed. The NBS badge was not designed for personnel monitoring but for area monitoring of photons from approximately 0.1 MeV to 11 MeV (Ehrlich 1954). Neither of the special badges was known to have significant limitations. The standard Operation IVY badge was also issued to the pilots and was usually the prime source of data for Weir dose assessment. Badge Issue and Exchange Detailed instructions were prepared for the distribution, development, calibra- tion, and documentation of film badge results. Technician training in these procedures was noted in the reference by Maynard (1952~. Badges were issued at Parry Island located in the southern part of the Atoll. Issue also took place on the USS Rendova for about one day after the MIKE detonation. Pilots and personnel servicing aircraft used to sample the radioactive cloud were issued badges at the Kwajelein airfield. Badges were usually issued on a mission basis and worn for approximately one day. Badges were returned ~ the decontamination center by Rad-Safe monitors who accompanied the reentry parties. Badges also were collected on the flight deck of the USS Rendova following the MIKE test. Calibrations, Processing, and Interpretation Calibrations were performed with either a radium or a cobalt 60 source. No source strength was documented. Exposures were made free in air at a fixed distance from the source with the time being varied to achieve different levels of exposure.

122 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS The frequency of calibrations was not well defined but procedures imply frequent checks, since one calibration film was required for each batch of devel- oped film. Unexposed film accompanied each developing batch to account for base fog. All films were stored in refrigerators kept at temperatures between 40 and 50°F in relatively dry air (Maynard 1952~. Densities were evaluated with an Ansco densitometer. This densitometer had a range from O to 6.0 optical density units. A backup densitometer manufactured by Weston was available, but its range only extended to 3.0. Assignment records detailing which badge number was issued to which par- ticipant were filled out by the Rad-Safe monitors and returned to the processing laboratory with the used badges. Records maintained during the operation in- cluded a personnel exposure history form, a consolidated list of exposures, and processing data sheets. There was no reference to cohort badging in any of the reports regarding Operation IVY. Current Availability of Records Records available at the REECo, Las Vegas, Nevada, include the personnel exposure history forms and the consolidated list of exposures. Most personnel films, but not calibration films, are available. Processing data sheets indicating densities and the conversion to exposure are not available. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty Bias and uncertainty for factors influencing film badge performance for ground personnel and for flight personnel are listed in the following tables. This informa- tion is appropriate for exposures of about 0.2 R and above. Thirteen low exposure films were reevaluated. These films were originally reported to have exposures less than 0.2 R. The base fog was found to be approximately 0.3 but ranged as high as 0.35. The combination of the base fog, film sensitivity and densitometer precision indicates a larger uncertainty in the laboratory bias estimate at lower exposures. Less uncertainty caused by radiological factors exists for higher exposures. Exposures over 5 R were exclusively received by pilots flying through radioactive debris clouds. Four films reported with exposures over 10 R were reexamined and correlated well with reported data. The reproducible and uniform positioning of the pilots in their planes, the consistent placement of badges and protective shielding aprons, and the constant exposure geometry reduced the uncertainty attributed to badge wearing and source geometry components of the radiological factor.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES IVY Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Operation IVY (Ground Personnel) 123 r Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.3 Radiological Spectrum 1.3 1.3 Wearing 0.S 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 - 1.1 Combined Radiological 1.1 1.4 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) l.l l.S Conversion to Deep-Dose 1 2 Equivalent 1.3 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.5 1.6 Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Operation IVY (Flight personnel) Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.3 Radiological Spectrum l.l 1.2 Wearing 0.9 l.l Backssatter 1.1 1.1 Combined Radiological 1.1 1.3 Environmental 1.0 l.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.1 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose 1 2 Equivalent 1.3 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.4 1.5

124 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 17V ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS The uncertainty attributed 'to environmental factors for the higher exposures is less for the same reasons just mentioned. That is, the environment experienced by pilots was not particularly harsh and did not present the same probability for damage as might be expected for badges worn by individuals on boats or on the islands performing certain strenuous activities. The environmental contribution to uncertainty is higher for exposures less than 0.2 R. Some people not expected to receive much exposure may have used badges for longer periods of time. It is reasoned that badges worn for longer times have a higher risk of being affected by environmental conditions. No information exists on exposures received by pilots who were issued the special badges. However, review of performance information for these badges suggests that their bias and uncertainties were not significantly different from the standard badge as it was used during Operation IVY. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following two tables give deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the IVY series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for IVY 'given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings as described in Section S.B under Laboratory Uncer- tainties.

6UNCERTAINTYANALYSESBYTESTSERIES IVY Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation IVY (Ground personnel) 125 Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.06) 0.05 0.03 (0.02, 0.07) 0.06 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.07 0.05 (0.02, 0.09) 0.08 0.05 (0.03, 0.10) 0.09 0.06 (0.03, 0.11) 0.10 0.07 (0.04, 0.12) 0.12 0.08 (0.05, 0.14) 0.14 .0.09 (0.06, 0.16) 0.16 0.11 (0.06, 0.18) 0.18 0.12 (0.07, 0.20) 0.20 0.13 (0.08, 0.21) >0.20 0.67 E* (0.42 E, 1.07E) * where E is the film badge exposure ~) *For individual badge readings in the overlap region (10 - 15 R), the reported loss of accuracy would result in a slight increase in the span of the 95% confidence limits, represented by the substitution of multiplication factors of 0.38 and 1.17. There appeared to be very few individual badge readings in this overlap region for Operation IVY (ground personnel).

126 FILM BADGE DOSIMEI RY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation IVY (Flight personnel) Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MOL) 0.03 (0.00, 0.06) 0~05 0.04 (0.02, 0.07) 0 06 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.07 0.05 (0.03, 0.09) 0.08 0.06 (0.03, 0.10) 0.09 0.06 (0.04, 0.11) 0.10 0.07 (0.04, 0.12) 0.12 0.09 (0.05, 0.14) 0.14 0.10 (0.06, 0.16) 0.16 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.18 0.13 (0.08, 0.20) 0.20 0.14 (0.10, 0.21) >0.20 0.71 E ~(0.48 E, 1.07 E) where E is the film badge exposure (id *For individual badge readings in the overlap region (10 - 15 R), the reported loss of accuracy would result in a slight increase in the span of the 95% confidence limits, represented by the substitution of multiplication factors of 0.43 and 1.19. There appear to be several individual badge readings in this overlap region for Operation IVY (flight personnel). OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Background Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was a series of 11 detonations conducted at the Nevada Test Site CATS) from March 17 to June 4, 1953. The series consisted of seven tower shots, three airdrops, and one detonation of a nuclear artillery shell fired from a 280 mm cannon. This latter detonation is ordinarily designated as an airburst to differentiate it from airdrops or tower detonations.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES UPSHOT-~VOTHOLE 127 Operation I3PSHOT-KNOTHOLE Events Event Date Type Yield (kt) ANNE 3/17/53 Tower 16 NANCY 3/24/53 Tower 24 RUTH 3/31/53 Tower 0.2 DIXIE 4/06/53 Airdrop 11 RAY 4/11/53 Tower 0.2 BADGER 4/18/53 Tower 23 SIMON 4/25/53 Tower 43 ENCORE 5/08/53 Airdrop 27 HARRY 5/19/53 Tower 32 GRABLE 5/25/53 Cannon 15 CLIMAX 6/04/53 Airdrop 61 Personnel Exposed The estimated number of DOD participants was close to 21,000 (Ponton et al. 1982b). These persons were largely involved in Exercise Desert Rock V, con- ducted in conjunction with the UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE tests, and included indi- viduals engaged in troop maneuvers, or who were observers and may have been exposed to both prompt radiation, including neutrons, and subsequent fission product activity following the detonation (Ponton et al. 1982b). About 4,000 military and civilian participants received film badges, with the highest recorded exposure the NTS personnel received amounting to less than 10 R. Type of Film Badge Film dosimetry in Operation I3PSHOT-KNOTHOLE has been documented in a report of radiological safety for the operation (Collison 1953~. Dosime~y was performed with the Du Pont 559 film packet which contained two separate films, Type 502 and Type 606. The former was the more sensitive, with a reported range of 0.02 to 10 R (Brady and Nelson 1985~. The range of the Type 606 was reported as 10-300 R; thus, for this series, there was apparently no region of overlap in the ranges of the two component films. The film packets were purchased for the manufacturer through H Division of Los Alamos Scientific (now National) Laboratory and the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, and were to have a section 1/2 inch wide and 1 inch long covered front and rear with a

128 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS lead strip 0.72 mm thick to minimize energy dependence. However, as initially received from the manufacturer, the lead coverage was 1 inch long on one side, and 1/2 inch on the other. Accordingly, 28,000 of the 35,000 film packets were returned for modification, and presumably these were the packets used in the field. The original badge specifications also called for embossed five digit sequential numbering and enclosure of the film packet in a sealed polyethylene holder 0.005 inch thick, with an alligator clip for attachment to the clothing. There is no indication from later reports or documents that this polyethylene holder was in fact used; rather the available evidence suggests that only the bare film packets with the lead strip were used. Badge Issue and Exchange Issuance and processing of the film badges for the Exercise Desert Rock V was the responsibility of the military, specifically the 9778th Radiological Safety Support Unit (RSSU). An estimated 20% of the participants (about 4,000) were badged. Available documents indicate that individual JTO and Desert Rock partici- pants were issued film badges for Shots ANNIE and NANCY. At the BADGER event, the Marines participating were issued two badges per platoon. For the remaining shots, one badge per platoon was issued to troops who performed similar duties. Badges were normally worn on the trunk, outside the clothing, and were collected at the conclusion of each day for processing that night. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Calibration was carried out in the laboratory under controlled conditions using photons from a cobalt 60 source with a stated size of 83 mg radium equivalent, which would correspond to approximately 83 mCi. Exposures were typically made for a period of one hour at twelve predetermined specific identified loca- tions or stations, which were at distances ranging from 20 to 195.5 cm from the source. The intensity range for these distances was calculated as 17.2 to 1645 mR/h in an internal document dated 3 September 1953. These values are in excellent agreement with calculated intensity values computed using the currently accepted values for the photon intensity from cobalt 60, and a source strength of 83 mCi. Review of the records indicates that calibrations were conducted on at least 24 separate occasions during the months of March to May 1953, apparently on a daily basis during the period of exposure. The standard calibration exposure protocol was 12 individual films, one at each specified calibration location,

6 UNCERTAIN-IYANALYSESBYTESTSERIES UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 129 exposed for one hour. The exposure location, unique identifying number, and net optical density obtained with the Ansco Model 475 densitometer were recorded on individual calibration sheets. On some sheets, the exposure was also recorded. These exposure values differed slightly from the calculated values reported in the 3 September 1953 internal document, being approximately 5% greater. Presuma- bly the recorded values were used in drawing up the calibration curves and in assigning dose, but this is not known for certain. Review of the records of calibration runs suggest that the relationship between film response and exposure was not incongruous, and that background fog levels were not excessive. With the exception of exercise Desert Rock V, processing of film badges collected during the day was carried out each night in the Film Badge Processing Laboratory in the Rad-Safe Building under the direction of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Based on the fragmentary data available, readout was apparently performed with an Ansco Model 475 densitometer and was limited to the portion of the film under the lead skip; five distinct areas under the lead strip were read by the densitometer. Exposure was reported in units of "mr" (milliro- entgen) and should be reasonably representative of the exposure from photon radiations, as the lead strip should provide approximately constant NOD per unit exposure for photon energies as low as about 70 keV up to about 2 MeV. There is nothing in the available records to suggest that calibration, processing, or readout procedures were inadequate or improperly carried out. Films were developed on a daily basis during the post-detonation activities for personnel involved in operations in the vicinity of ground zero; this, coupled with the typical environmental conditions recorded for the Test Site during the period under consideration, obviates adverse effects from temperature and humidity. Current Availability of Records Film dosimetry records for the Desert Rock V activities, in which most of the participants were involved, are lacking. The 82 records that do exist were all from a single listing dated April 9 of Fort Benning troops at Shot NANCY. As agreement between the calculated doses for these troops and the film badge results were excellent, it is likely that there is little error associated with these data (Edwards et al. 1985~. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty Other than the possibility of a systematic calibration error that might account for a 5% overestimate in the assigned dose, as discussed above, there is nothing in the available records to suggest that calibration, processing, readout, or other laboratory procedures were inadequate or improperly carried out, or were respon

130 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 1N ATMOSPHERIC llUCLEAR TESTS sible for the introduction of a measurement bias. Since it cannot be established with certainty that the 5% systematic overestimate did in fact occur, the bias factor (B) is taken to be unity for laboratory conditions. For the 502 film component, accuracy has been stated as + 10% at levels > 400 mR; at lower levels, greater uncertainty was reported, ranging to + 100% at the reported minimum detection level of 10-20 mR. Other data relating to the accuracy of the densitometer and the film were obtained and reported (Brady and Nelson 1985~; the estimates of accuracy based on these data were 1-2% of the exposure for the Type 502 film. For the higher-range Type 606, which was used for levels above 10 R. the reported accuracy is within 2.3 to 16 per cent of the exposure (Brady and Nelson 1985~. These values refer to the calibration and laboratory procedures, and can be used in conjunction with the methodology presented elsewhere in Chapter 5 to obtain an estimate of the uncertainty factor, K, at the 95% confidence level, for the laboratory operations. This factor is estimated as 1.3 and includes the uncertainty with respect to the calibration bias discussed above. Various radiological factors may also introduce bias or uncertainty in the results, as indicated in the table below. Energy dependence may introduce a bias into the interpretation of film badges exposed in the field when compared with calibration exposures made under laboratory conditions to the photon field from cobalt 60. The somewhat lower photon energy distribution in the field, approxi- mately equivalent to an effective photon energy of 0.7 Mev, would produce slightly less darkening (i.e., net optical density) under the filter per unit exposure than the higher energy photons from cobalt 60. This would result in a slight underestimate of the exposure received by the film, which is offset by the slighter over-response to low energy photons; the bias, B. from this source is estimated as 1.0. As the badges were worn on the trunk, body backscatter would produce an increased density per unit exposure as compared with the calibration films; this would result in an overestimate of dose, and the bias from this source is estimated as 1.1. Similarly, location of the film badge relative to the fallout field, which was the primary source of exposure, and the angular-depender!ce considerations of the badge result in a bias towards underestimation of dose and B from these sources which is estimated to be 0.8. No other radiological factors are likely to introduce a significant or measurable bias. The combined bias factor (B) for the radiologi- cal factors is thus 0.9.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES-UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 131 In general, environmental conditions were such Hat no bias would be intro- duced from this source. Similarly, there are no indications that the badge assign- ment or collection procedures introduced bias in the results. Accordingly, for environmental factors, B = 1 and K = 1.1. Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.3 Radiological Spectrum 1.0 1.2 Wearing 0.8 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 0.9 1.3 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 0.9 1.5 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.1 1.5 Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be con- verted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings as described in Section S.B under Laboratory Uncertainties.

132 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPlIERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.04 (0.00,0.08) 0.05 0.05 (0.02, 0.09) 0.06 0.05 (0.03, 0.10) 0.07 0.06 (0.04, 0.12) 0.08 0.07 (0.04, 0.13) 0.09 0.08 (0.05, 0.14) 0.10 0.09 (0.05, 0.15) 0.12 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.14 0.13 (0.08, 0.20) 0.16 0.15 (0.09, 0.22) 0.18 0.16 (0.1 1, 0.25) 0.20 0.18 (0.12, 0.27) >0.20 0.91E* (0.61 E,1.36E)* where E is the film badge exposure al) *For individual badge readings in the overlap region (10 - 15 R), the reported loss of accuracy would result- in a slight increase in the span of the 95% confidence limits, represented by the substitution of multiplication factors of 0.55 and 1.51. There appear to be a few individual badge readings in this overlap region for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. OPERATION CASTLE Background CASTLE was a six-detonation test series in the Pacific Proving Ground (PPG) at Enewetak and Bikini atolls in the northwestern Marshall Islands. The tests were conducted from March to May of 1954. All six detonations were surface bursts of high-yield, thermonuclear devices with yields ranging from 0.1.1 Mt to

6 UNCERTAIN7YAXALYSESBY TEST SERIES CASILE 133 15 Mt. The 15 Mt detonation was the highest yield of any U.S. nuclear weapons test (Martin 1982~. The events of Operation CASTLE are summarized below: Operation CASTLE Events Event Date Location Yield (Mt) BRAVO 3/01/54 Bikini 15.0 ROMEO 3/27/54 Bikini 11.0 KOON 4/07/54 Bikini 0.11 UNION 4/26/54 Bikini 6.9 YANKEE 5/05/54 Bikini 13.5 NECTAR 5/14/54 Enewetak 1.69 Although the six detonations were thermonuclear devices, a significant portion of their energy was due to fission processes. Experiments conducted in conjunc- tion with the detonations measured power and efficiency of the devices and attempted to gauge military effects of the explosions. Approximately 60 percent of the total support requirements were for the effects experiments. Personnel Exposed The tests were conducted by a joint task force of military, civil service, and contractor personnel of the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commis- sion. Of the approximately 12,700 participants in the test series, there were approximately 10,900 personnel who were badged. Personnel expected to be exposed to radiation were initially badged, but several unbadged personnel re- ceived significant radiation doses. The majority of personnel were aboard Navy ships in the test area. Many of the Navy ships received very high levels of fallout contamination on their decks after the first detonation, BRAVO. Personnel who were on islands or atolls downwind from the first detonation were evacuated within a few days of the detonation, and personnel later returned to these areas for brief periods. Prior to the evacuation, several personnel were exposed to very high levels of radiation from fallout contamination. A contingent of cloud-sampling personnel and support personnel were on

134 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS islands not greatly affected by fallout from the detonations. Sampling crews were exposed to radiation from airborne radionuclides during flights, and from con- taminated planes and equipment after their flights. Type of Film Badge The film badge used in CASTLE consisted of a Du Pont 509 Elm packet with film types 502 and 606. These had been selected by the AEC in 1952 to provide the best coverage of the desired exposure range and photon energy range. An area 1/2 x 1 inch on each side of the packet was covered by a lead filter. The falter, 0.028 inches thick, was used to improve energy response of the film. The CASTLE film pack was the same as for Operation TEAPOT and was encased in a plastic covering and an alligator clip for attachment purposes. There is evidence that these packets were not completely waterproof (Perkins 1981~. Limitations of this film badge are presented in Chapter IV of this report. Of importance for this test series are the several exposures which were determined to occur in the overlap range of the two films (10 - 15 R). Badge Issue and Exchange The initial plan for badging personnel was to badge all personnel expected to receive significant amounts of radiation exposure and a representative 10% of other personnel (Martin 1982~. Although there was a need to badge all personnel immediately after the first shot, BRAVO, because of the extensive contamination due to fallout, there were not enough badges available to do this. Additionally, the staffing level of Task Unit 7.1.7, which provided radiological safety support, was insufficient to process a larger number of badges than were available. For shots subsequent to BRAVO, there were more badges available and there was a greater emphasis on personnel monitoring. Nevertheless, all personnel involved in the series were not monitored with individual personnel dosimeters. Individuals performing selected activities were uniformly badged. For ex- ample, all crew members of aircraft expected to fly within 185 km of the shot site at H-hour were badged. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation The primary radiation standard for calibration of films used in CASTLE was radium 226. Cobalt 60 sources were used in some instances, but corrections were applied where necessary to produce results consistent with radium 226 (Perkins 1981~. The low-range film (Du Pont 502) was calibrated from 40 mR to 10 R. and

6 UNCERTAI=YAXALYSES BY TEST SERIES CASTLE 135 the high-range film (Du Pont 606) was routinely calibrated from 10 R to 60 R. with an initial calibration up to 200 R. Calibrations were performed using a calibration range with reproducible exposure geometry. New calibration curves were to have been generated whenever developing solutions were changed and between each shot. Recalibration also was required whenever there were temperature control problems, changes in emulsion, or excessive correction factors. Film badges given a known exposure were used as standards and processed with field badges. Standard films were given an exposure of 500 mR prior to the first shot and stored with unissued film. One standard film was included with each batch of film to be developed (Perkins 1981~. Control films also were processed with each batch. Film badge processing laboratories were air-conditioned. Film badges were to have been stored in a refrigerator at a temperature of 40°F. A desiccant was to have been used in each refrigerator to reduce humidity. Film badge standards and controls were allowed to come to room temperature before development. Current Availability of Records Development was usually done at night, after collection of film badges worn during the day, in three stainless steel tanks containing developing solution, stop solution, and fixer. The solution temperature was to have been kept at 68°F. After development, film badges were washed in running water of the same temperature. All development was done under safelights. Films were read on a Los Alamos densitometer Model FD-1. Film processing and readout technicians were trained by Los Alamos dosimetry personnel prior to the first shot in the senes. Processing laboratories were established on Parry Island and aboard the USS Bairoko prior to the operation. During the operation, there was radioactive contamination of both of these locations in varying degrees. The impact on film dosimetry of high radiation levels due to contamination in these locations was not determined during the operation. Developed films for nearly all personnel dosimeters, personnel exposure ros- ters, individual radiation exposure records, and other hard-copy records are cur- rently stored at REECo in Las Vegas, Nevada. Calibration and control dosimeters have not been found for all batches. Hard-copy exposure records are incomplete in some cases. An analysis of radiation exposures of Navy personnel during operation CASTLE was prepared for the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA 1984~. The principal report describing the operation is CASTLE Series, 1954 (Martin 1982~.

136 FILM BADGE DOSIMEIRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Estimated Bias and Uncertainty The large source of uncertainty (K = 1.~) for environmental effects is a consequence of the high levels of fallout contamination at both field-exposure locations and at badge storage and processing locations. The presence of such contamination can lead to uncertainties in a number of ways, including badge contamination, excessive exposure of controls, exposure of badges prior to issue, and exposure of badges during processing. Estimated Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Operation CASTLE Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.1 1.3 Wearing 0.8 1.3 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 1.0 1.5 Environmental 1.0 1.8 Overall (Exposure) 1.0 2.1 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.3 2.1 Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the CASTLE series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiply- ing by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for CASTLE given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties.

6 UNCERTAI~YAlIALYSES BY TEST SERIES-TEAPOT Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation CASTLE 137 Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.09) 0.05 0.04 (0.01, 0.10) 0.06 0.05 (0.02, 0.11) 0.07 0.05 (0.02, 0.13) 0.08 0.06 (0.03, 0.14) 0.09 0.07 (0.03, 0.16) 0.10 0.08 (0.03, 0.17) 0.12 0.09 (0.04, 0.20) 0.14 0.11 (0.05, 0.23) 0.16 0.12 (0.06, 0.26) 0.18 0.14 (0.07, 0.29) 0.20 0.15 (0.07, 0.32) >0.20 0.77 E * (0.37 E, 1.62 E) * where E is the film badge exposure (O *For individual badge readings in the overlap region (10 - 15 R), the reported loss of accuracy would result in a slight increase in the span of 95% confidence limits, represented by the substitution of multiplication factors of 0.34 and 1.76. There appear to be several badge readings in this overlap region for Operation CASTLE. OPERATION TEAPOT Background Operation TEAPOT was the fifth series of continental U.S. (CONUS) tests and included 14 nuclear detonations and one non-nuclear detonation carried out at the Nevada Test Site COTS) from February 18 to May 15, 1955. The series consisted of 10 tower shots, three airdrops, and one cratering shot detonated at the shallow depth of 67 feet below surface. Two shots-one an air burst and the other a tower shot were detonated on the same day, although at different parts of the Test Site.

138 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Operation TEAPOT Events Event Date Type Yield~kt) WASP 2/18/55 Airdrop 1 MOTH 2/22/55 Tower 2 TESLA 3/01/55 Tower 7 TURK 3/07/55 Tower 43 HORNET 3/12/55 Tower 4 BEE 3/22/55 Tower ESS 3/23/55 Crater 1 APPLE-1 3/29/55 Tower 14 WASP PRIME 3/29/55 Airdrop 3 HA 4/06/55 Airdrop 3 POST 4/09/55 Tower - 3 MET - 4/15/55 Tower 22 APPLE-2 5/05/55 Tower 29 ZUCCHINI 5/15/55 Tower 28 Personnel Exposed Approximately 11,000 personnel participated in the TEAPOT series at NTS, of whom about 8,000, largely military, participated in Exercise Desert Rock VI (Johnson et al. 1986~. Of the remaining 4000 personnel, about half were AEC- affiliated and half DOD-affiliated. Dosimetry was carried out by the 1st NTS and Desert Rock Radiological Safety Support Unit. About 15,000 film packets were used by onsite personnel and 3,264 were used by Air Force personnel stationed at supporting air bases. Exposure records indicate that 56 persons received cumulative exposures over 3.9 R (Collison 1955~. Type of Film Badge The film dosimetry program for Operation TEAPOT is summarized in an AFSWP Report (Collison 1955), the radiological safety report for the operation. Film dosimetry was performed with the Du Pont 559 film packet, also identified as the 502606 film packet for the two different film types it contained. The packet

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES TEAPOT 139 was similar to that used in Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. As was the case in Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, each film badge was provided with a lead strip covering an area of 1/2 inch x 1 inch on both the front and rear of the film packet. The thickness of this lead filter was nominally 0.028 inch (0.72 mm) based on a study of optimum filter thickness by the NBS. For the initial 25,000 packets ordered, the lead filter was found to have a measured thickness of 0.028 + 0.002 inch of lead; for the final 10,000 packets, this thickness was determined to be 0.026 + 0.002 inch. An empirical study of the energy response of the film with different thick- nesses of lead was made by the NBS as reported by Collision (1955~. Three lead thicknesses were studied 0.0311 inch, 0.0283 inch, and 0.0256 inch; these will be identified as the thick, normal, and thin filter, respectively. For photon energies above 300 keV, density differences under the various filter thicknesses were negligible. The dose from photons with energies below 300 keV down to the effective lower-energy cutoff of the filter (approximately 70 keV) was consis- tently overestimated with the thin filter. For the normal thickness filter, the dose was overestimated in the photon energy region of 70 - 95 keV, and underesti- mated for the region 95 - 300 keV. In the energy region of 200 - 300 keV, the error was very small. For the thick filter, the dose was significantly underesti- mated for photon energies below 300 keV. Based on these results, it was decided that if it was necessary to use the additional 10,000 film badges with the thin filters, an appropriate correction would be made. However, given the source term and film-response characteristics, these slight variations in filter thickness should not have resulted in significant errors in dose assessment in the field, probably less than + 10 per cent. As was the case for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, the film badge specifi- cations for Operation TEAPOT also called for embossed five digit sequential numbering. The film packets were sealed in a polyethylene holder 0.005 inch thick, and provided with a double alligator clip for attachment to the clothing. The polyethylene pouch, coupled with the excellent weather conditions and short wearing interval, should obviate any effects attributable to temperature and hu . . . . middy or Immersion In water. The statistical variability of the film badge system was evaluated prior to the start of the operation by selecting one film packet from each box of 100 and exposing it to a predetermined level of 1, 20, or 47 R using a cobalt 60 source reported as standardized by the NBS as having an output of 1.01 R/h + 10% at a distance of 1 meter. The total number of film badges used in this study was 327, about half of which were exposed at the lowest exposure level. The least amount of variability was found with He lowest exposure; the coefficient of variation was found to be 4 per cent. At the 20 and 47 R levels, the coefficients of variation were 8% and 5%, respectively. The excellent results are attributable in pan to the

140 FILM BADGE DOSIMEIRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS exposure levels and source used, as well as to the use of the newly available Los Alarnos Model FD-1 densitometer, which provided virtually absolute precision for density measurements (Collison 1955~. This densitometer replaced the Ansco Macbeth Model 475 densitometer which was previously used. The FD-1 den- sitometer was unaffected by power supply variations and read a much larger area of the film (0.156 in: than the Ansco Macbeth (0.012 ink. Available calibration data indicate that for high-energy photon radiations, the usable exposure range of the films provided in the Du Pont Type 559 badge was approximately 0.02 - 10 R for the Type 502 component and 10 - 300 R for the Type 606 film (Brady and Nelson 1985~. Thus, there was inadequate overlap in the ranges of the two film components. Film badges were stored under refrigera- tion at a temperature of 40°F and removed from storage as needed. However? some bulk issue of badges was made to off-site groups and certain operational training groups, which were charged with the responsibility for individual issue and return. Indian Springs Air Force Base, located adjacent to the Test Site, was issued 500 badges monthly, and given the responsibility for developing, reading and recording of results; it is not known with certainty what procedures were followed by the Indian Springs personnel, but the results do not suggest that there was a systematic error or other differences between the two groups. Badge Issue and Exchange Administrative procedures associated with the issuance of badges, readout, and recording of densities and doses appear to have been carried out well, and with a minimum of error. There is nothing to indicate systematic error in this part of the procedure, nor is there any indication that calibration, processing, or readout procedures were inadequate or improperly carried out. Films were maintained in refrigerated storage until shortly before issuance in the field. Personnel participating in the test were assigned a uniquely numbered film badge by the Dosimetry and Records Section; the film badge number and the assignee were manually recorded on a preprinted standardized form at the time of the assignment. The goal was to badge every test participant, and from a review of the records, it appears that this goal was for all practical purposes at least, if not completely, met. Once the film had been worn in the field, it was returned for processing; the time that the badge was returned was also recorded on the appropriate individual's form as were the exposure assignments. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Film calibration was initially carried out with cobalt 60 sources that had been calibrated by the NBS using both the Ansco Macbeth and Los Alamos FD-1

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES TEAPOT 141 densitometers. Decay correction was based on a half-life of 5.2 y, only slightly different from the currently accepted value of 5.27 y; the error associated with this difference is negligible. Calibration checks were made with each batch of film processed. In March 1955, a comparison of the response of the film packet to photons from cobalt 60 and radium 226 in equilibrium with daughters was done to verify the validity of the cobalt 60 calibration, and a more significant possible source of calibration error was identified. The shapes of the curves of NOD vs. exposure differed for the two sources; for the Type 502 film, the NOD per unit exposure was the same, irrespective of which source was used for exposures of up to about 1 R. Above this level, the two curves diverged, reaching a maximum difference of about 25% at 10 R. the uppermost range of the film. Thus, in the exposure range from about 1 R to 10 R. dose interpretations made from the radium 226 calibration curve would tend to be lower than those made from the cobalt 60 curve, with the maximum deviation of about 25% occurring at about 10 R. Although the reason for this difference was not identified, it is likely that it is related to source-film geometry configurations and scattering. The radium 226 source, because of its broader distribution of energies was probably more repre- sentative of the energy distribution encountered in the field. Nonetheless, the cobalt 60 calibration was the one used to determine dose, and thus it is likely that doses from individual badges with exposures in the region from 1-10 R were slightly overestimated. Since numerous exposures were recorded in the l-10 R region during Operation TEAPOT, it may be appropriate to revise these down- ward somewhat, as indicated by the comparative calibration data for the two sources. From a practical standpoint, however, any such adjustment would affect only a few films and would likely be on the order of 10 per cent or less, and hence is probably unwarranted. A similar divergence of calibration curves was observed with the lower- sensitivity Type 606 film at exposures above about 150 R. However in this case, the NOD per unit exposure for cobalt 60 was greater than that for radium 226 in equilibrium with daughters. This divergence in calibration curves for the Type 606 is of interest only from an academic standpoint, as no personnel exposures were observed in the region of divergence. Although the possibility of using the unfiltered portion of the film for interpre- tation of beta dose was considered, this was apparently not done. Readout was apparently limited to the portion of the film under the lead strip; five distinct areas were read by the densitometer. Exposure was reported in milliroentgen and should be reasonably representative of the exposures from photon radiations, as the lead strip should provide approximately constant NOD per unit exposure for photon energies as low as about 70 keV up to about 2 MeV. A few individuals associated with the University of California Radiation Laboratory (now Lawrence

142 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY [V ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Berkeley and Livermore National Laboratories) participating in shot WASP, which took place on February 18, 1955, were supplied with wrist badges using the Type 559 film dosimeter packet. These persons were civilians, and the wrist badges were used for beta dosimetry, using a natural uranium calibration source supplied by UCRL. Current Availability of Records Exposure records for the badged participants in Operation TEAPOT are avail- able at the DOE records center operated by REECo in Las Vegas, NV. Available records include daily work sheets and calibration records. Estimated Bias and Uncertainb Since the type of film packet and associated fluter used for Operation TEAPOT was the same as that used for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, it is reasonable to assume that the biases and uncertainties associated with radiological factors were the same and certainly no greater than as those associated with t1PSHOT- KNOTHOLE. An improved densitometer was used at TEAPOT, which report- edly reduced the random measurement uncertainty to near zero. However, this would probably not have a discemable effect on the measurement uncertainty. The discussion of uncertainty provided for VPSHOT-KNOTHOLE is also appli- cable to TEAPOT; the estimated bias and uncertainty factors for TEAPOT are summarized in the table below. There is nothing in the available records to suggest that calibration, processing, readout, or other laboratory procedures were inadequate or improperly carried out, or were responsible for the introduction of a measurement bias. Similarly, environmental conditions were such that no bias would be introduced from this source. There are also no indications that the badge assignment or collection procedures introduced bias or other uncertainties in the results. Accordingly, then, for environmental factors, B = 1 and K = 1.1.

6 UNCERTAI~IY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES TEAPOT Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Operation TEAPOT 143 Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.3 Radiological Spectrum 1.0 1.2 Wearing 0.8 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 0.9 1.3 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 0.9 1.5 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.1 1.5 Application of Bias and Uncertainb The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the TEAPOT series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiply- ing by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for TEAPOT given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under laboratory Uncertainties.

144 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation TEAPOT Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) - 0.04 (MDL) 0.04 (0.00,0.08) 0.05 0.05 (0.02, 0.09) 0.06 0.05 (0.03, 0.10) 0.07 0.06 (0.04, 0.12) 0.08 0.07 (0.04, 0.13) 0.09 0.08 (0.05, 0.14) 0.10 0.09 (0.05, 0.15) 0.12 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.14 0.13 (0.08, 0.20) 0.16 0.15 (0.09, 0.22) 0.18 0.16 (0.11, 0.25) 0.20 0.18 (0.12, 0.27) >0.20 0.91 E * (0.61 E, 1.36 E) * where E is the film badge exposure (by *For individual badge readings in the overlap region (10 - IS R), the reported loss of accuracy would result in a slight increase in the span of the 95% confidence limits, represented by the substitution of multiplication factors of 0.55 and l.Sl. There appear to be a few individual badge readings in this overlap region for Operation TEAPOT. OPERATION WIGWAM Background Operation WIGWAM consisted of one test shot in the Pacific Ocean approxi- mately 500 miles southwest of San Diego, California (Weary et al. 1981~. The device was suspended by cable from a barge and detonated at a depth of 2,000 feet in water 16,000 feet deep on 14 May l9SS at 1300 hours Pacific Daylight Time. It was a fission device with a yield of 30 kilotons. The purpose of the test was to determine lethal distances for nuclear effects vs. submerged submarine hulls and

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES WIGWAM 145 to evaluate tactics for delivery of nuclear weapons against deep submerged submarines. Personnel Exposed Approximately 6,800 personnel and 30 ships took part in the Operation, including 6,344 DOD personnel. The projected maximum permissible exposure limit was 3.9 R for the duration of the Operation. Type of Film Badge The film badge used the Du Pont 559 film packet with film component types 502 and 606. Film type 502 had a reported range of 0.02 to 10 R. The minimum detectable level was stated to be 100 mR. Film type 606 had a reported range of 10 to 600 R. (N.B. Highest readings encountered were below 0.5 R). The filter consisted of (1) 0.020-inch cadmium, and (2) 0.04-inch vinyl tape (to facilitate the measurement of beta radiation; however, beta results were not reported). Badge Issue and Exchange Approximately 10,000 badges were issued. All personnel received one badge for the duration of the operation and many whose tasks might expose them to radiation were issued daily badges as well. All badges were identical and were worn on a chain around the neck. Each was sealed against moisture in a polyethylene bag. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation The processing was carried out on the USS Wright. The dosimetry group consisted of one officer and 6 enlisted men. The processing capacity was 1200 badges a day. Of the 25,000 films prepared for the operation, 10,124 were used. The United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory was responsible for the film badge dosimetry quality control. Sources used for calibration were a 1~ Cune cesium 137 gamma source, a 500-mCi radium source. A 50-mCi strontium 90 source (for betas, but beta results were not reported in WIGWAM exposure rosters. Current Availability of Records Rosters listing exposure results for each individual in the different organiza- tions participating in Operation WIGWAM are on file at REECo in Las Vegas, Nevada.

146 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Estimated Bias-and Uncertainty The following table lists the estimated bias and uncertainty at the 95% confi- dence level for various sources of error at the 200 mR level, assuming a lognormal distribution of errors. Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation WIGWAM Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.1 1.2 Wearing 0.8 1.1 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 1.0 1.3 Environmental Effects 1.0 1.2 Overall (Exposure) 1.0 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.3 1.5 Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deem dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the WIG- WAM series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for WIGWAM given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings as described in Section 5.B under laboratory Uncertainties.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES-WIGWAA! Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation WIGWAM 147 Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.07) 0.05 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.06 0.05 (0.02, 0.09) 0 07 0~05 (0.03, 0.10) O. 08 0 06 (0.04, 0.11) 0.09 0.07 (0.04, 0.12) 0.10 0.08 (0.05, 0.13) 0.12 0.09 (0.06, 0.15) 0.14 0.11 (0.07, 0.17) 0.16 0.12 (0.0S, 0.19) 0.18 0.14 (0.09, 0.21) 0.20 0.15 (0.10, 0.23) >0.20 0.77 E (0.51 E, 1.15 E) where E is the film badge exposure (fig There would have been increased uncertainty in the range 10 - 15 R. but there were no exposures at this level.

148 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS OPERATION REDWING Background REDWING was a 17-detonation test series in the Pacific Proving Ground (PPG) from May to July of 1956 Packs 1957~. Eleven of the detonations were conducted at Enewetalc Atoll and six detonations were conducted at Bikini Atoll. Of the total number of detonations, six were on barges in lagoons, three were surface blasts, six were on towers, and two were airdrops. Operation REDWING Events Event Date Type Yield (kt) LACROSSE 5/05/56 Surface 40 CHEROKEE S/21/56 Airdrop Several Mt ZUNI 5/28/56 Surface 3.5 YOGA 5/28/56 Tower * ERIE 5/31/56 Tower * SEMINOLE 6/06/56 Surface 13.7 FLATHEAD 6/12/56 Barge * BLACKFOOT 6/12/56 Tower * KICKAPOO 6/14/56 Tower * OSAGE 6/16/56 Airdrop * INCA 6/22/56 Tower * DAKOTA 6/26/56 Barge * MOHAWK 7/03/56 Tower * APACHE 7/09/56 Barge * NAVAJO 7/11/56 Barge ~ TEWA 7/21/56 Barge 5 Mt HURON 7/21/56 Barge * Not Announced The purpose of the series was to test high-yield fusion devices that could not be tested at the Nevada Test Site. Observers from the press and Civil Defense Officials observed the first two detonations. One of these, an airdrop detonation,

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES REDWING 149 CHEROKEE, was a demonstration that the United States could air-deliver multimegaton-yield fusion weapons from B-52 jet bombers. The yields of only five of the blasts were announced and these ranged from 13.7 kt to 5 Mt. Additional safety precautions were implemented for REDWING as a result of fallout contamination during the earlier CASTLE series. The precautions in- cluded improved fallout-prediction capability, an expanded radiation monitoring program, and lower weapon yields than during the CASTLE series. Personnel Exposed The tests were conducted by a joint task force of military, civil service, and contractor personnel of the Deparunent of Defense (DOD) and the Atomic En- ergy Commission (AEC). This was the first test series in the PPG in which all personnel were monitored for radiation exposure. A total of approximately 14,600 personnel were badged during the series. Of this total there were approxi- mately 1450 Army personnel, 6650 Navy personnel, 2800 Air Force personnel, 250 Marine Corps personnel, 100 civilian DOD contractors, and 3350 AEC personnel or AEC contractors. The majority of personnel were aboard Navy ships in the test area. Army and Air Force personnel were on Enewetak between tests but were on Navy ships during detonations. Cloud samplers and other personnel were on atolls, islands and ships in the area. Approximately 600 personnel received doses exceeding the dose limit for the operation (3.9 R) as a consequence of fallout at Enewetak from the last detonation in the series at Bikini (TEWA). Many of these personnel, however, had been authorized to exceed the limit by the Joint Task Force Commander. Type of Film Badge The DuPont film packet 559 was employed throughout the REDWING series with DuPont Type 502 and Type 606 films in a cellulose acetate holder. After light damage and water damage was detected in a few badges after the initial deployment of six weeks, subsequent film packets were dipped in ceresin wax before sealing. Badge Issue and Exchange A "permanent" badge was issued to all personnel with instructions to wear the badge at all times around the neck. Permanent badges were initially scheduled for exchange at six-week intervals. After light damage and water damage were detected in a few of these permanent badges after six weeks, the exchange interval

150 FILM BADGE DOSlMETRY 1N ATMOSPlIERIC NUCLEAR TESTS was decreased to either three weeks or four weeks, depending on the task group. A total of 40,000 permanent badges were issued to and processed for approxi- mately 14,600 individuals. A "mission" badge also was issued to personnel who were required to enter contaminated areas (i.e., >10 mom. Mission badges were exchanged daily. Approximately 45,000 mission badges were processed. Cohort badging was not performed for any personnel in the REDWING series. Personnel on 15 Navy ships in the PPG at the time of the REDWING series do not have film badge dosimetry records. It is not clear from testing records whether these ships were not present during the shots and personnel on board were not badged or whether the records have been lost. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation The primary radiation standard for calibration of film dosimeters used in REDWING was radium. Cobalt 60 sources were used in some instances, but corrections were to be applied where necessary to produce results consistent with radium exposures. Calibration procedures were the same as those used in the CASTLE series that preceded REDWING. Standard films, having been given a 500 mR exposure prior to the first detonation in the series, were processed with each batch of film badges. Daily batch-control film dosimeters were processed with each batch. Film badges were processed in the Rad-Safe building on Parry Island at Enewetak and in the Rad-Safe building on Enya at Bikini. A backup photodo- simetry trailer was available on the USS Ainsworth, but the extent of use of this facility is not described. Film badge processing laboratories were air-conditioned and film was to be stored under controlled temperature and humidity conditions. Dosimetry support, including processing, was provided by Task Unit 7 of Task Group 7.1. Personnel for TU 7.1.7 were provided by the Army's 1st Radiological Safety Support Unit, supplemented by a small number of Air Force and Navy personnel. In addition, civilians from naval shipyards served in the task unit. Selected photodosimetry personnel were trained at Los Alamos Scientific Labora- tory. All film processing and record posting was done manually. Such operations were subject to many errors which were not always caught by the re-checks. Development was usually performed at night after collection of film badges during the day. Development conditions were to have been strictly controlled, and dosimetry records do not indicate that there were processing-control difficul- ties. Fallout from the last Bikini detonation, TEWA, fell on Enewetak base camp. Because the incident occurred toward the end of the series, some personnel

6 UNCERTAINI Y ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES-REDWING 151 stationed on Enewetak had already returned to the U.S. The remaining Enewetak personnel received from 2.0 to 3.3 R from this incident. The highest exposures were recorded for Air Force flight officers performing cloud sampling. There were twelve officers with radiation exposures which exceeded 10 R. The highest recorded exposure was 16.4 R. Current Availability As stated earlier, dosimeter readings, dose interpretation, data and dosage records were recorded manually. Records included the name, exposure date, amount of exposure (mR), approximate duration of the exposure, and remarks. Records for military and DOD contractor personnel were sent to the units of permanent assignment for those personnel. Records for AEC-controlled and administered personnel were sent to their respective organization e,;posure-rec- ords departments. Most films and all exposure records are available at REECo in Las Vegas, Nevada, for personnel who participated in REDWING, with the exception of personnel aboard 15 Navy ships. Included are 3 x 5-inch film badge issue cards, and 5 x 8-inch individual exposure record cards. As noted earlier, those personnel may not have been present during the tests (Bruce-Henderson et al. 1982), and therefore badging would not have been needed. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty Appropriate laboratory facilities, equipment, and procedures appear to have been used throughout the series. There is no indicated bias from the laboratory operations (B = 1.0~. The contribution to the overall uncertainty in dose measure- ments due to the laboratory is a factor of 1.2 (K = 1.2~. Radiological parameters that could have introduced bias are the spectral de- pendence of the dosimeter, the film badge wearing locaiion/geometry, and backscat- ter and body shielding. Contributions of these to the overall bias are, respectively, 1.1, 0.8, and 1.1. These parameters are estimated to contribute respective factors of 1.2, 1.2, 1.1 to the overall uncertainty. Environmental effects are not judged to be significant, with the exception of the personnel exposures on Enewetak after the TEWA detonation and the badge drainage identified in the first few weeks of the series. The bias associated with environmental effects is judged to be 1.0 (no bias), and the uncertainty is esti mated to be a factor of 1.2. The conversion from measured exposure (R) to dose (rem) at the standard depth has both a bias and uncertainty associated with it. These are, respectively, 1.3 and 1.2.

152 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPlIERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Application of Bias and Uncertainty table: The overall bias and uncertainty are calculated as indicated in the following Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For Operation REDWING Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.1 1.2 Wearing 0.8 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Overall Radiological 1.0 1.3 Environmental 1.0 1.2 Overall (Exposure) 1.0 1.5 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.3 1.5 The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and range of deep-dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the RED- WING series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for REDWING given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section S.B under Laboratory Uncertainties.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES REDWING Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation REDWING 153 Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.07) 0.05 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.06 0.05 (0.02, 0.09) 0.07 0.05 (0.03, 0.10) 0.08 0.06 (0.04, 0.11) 0.09 0.07 (0.04, 0.12) 0.10 0.08 (0.05, 0.13) 0.12 0.09 (0.06, 0.15) 0.14 0.11 (0.07, 0.17) 0.16 0.12 (0.08, 0.19) 0.18 0.14 (0.09, 0.21) 0.20 0.15 (0.10, 0.23) >0.20 0.77 E ~(0.51 E, 1.15 E) * where E is the film badge exposure by) *For individual badge readings in the overlap region (10 - 15 R), the reported loss of accuracy would result in a slight increase in the span of the 95% confidence limits, represented by the substitution of multiplication factors of 0.42 and 1.39. There appear to be several individual badge readings in this overlap region for Operation REDWING.

154 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 11V ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS OPERATION PLUMBBOB Background Conducted at the Nevada Test Site (HITS) from April 24 to October 7, 1957, Operation PLUMBBOB included the 30 nuclear detonation tests summarized in the table below. The series included six safety experiments, conducted to deter- mine if a nuclear reaction would occur should the high explosive components of the device be accidently detonated during storage or transport (DOE 1988~. Largely a joint Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)/Department of Defense (DOD) effort, Operation PLUMBBOB was planned as an integral part of the continuing U.S. program for developing the means to conduct nuclear warfare in defense of the nation. The AEC wanted to test a number of nuclear devices scheduled for early production for the defense stockpile or those important to the design of improved weapons. The DOD used the series to continue its study of military weapons effects and, with Exercises Desert Rock VII and VIII, its training of personnel in nuclear operations. Personnel Exposed More than 10,000 persons participated in Operation PLUMBBOB under the auspices of the AEC (Wilcox 1957~. About 15,000 DOD personnel participated in observer programs, tactical maneuvers, and scientific and diagnostic studies during Operation PLI]MBBOB. Exercises Desert Rock VII and VIII, consisting of training programs, tactical maneuvers, and technical service projects, engaged the largest DOD participation. At shot HOOD, approximately 2,150 Mannes took part in a maneuver involving the use of a helicopter airlift and tactical air support. An estimated 1,144 Army troops (Task Force BIG BANG) were inter- viewed at shot GALILEO to determine their psychological reactions to witness- ing a detonation. The maximum permissible exposure for Desert Rock troops was 5.0 rem of gamma radiation in any Month period, with no more than 2.0 rem to be from prompt radiation. Participants in activities of the AEC Nevada Test Organization ~TO) and the Air Force Special Weapons Center were limited to 3.0 rem for any 13-week period and 5.0 rem for one calendar year. Type of Film Badge All NTO personnel and some official observer groups, with the exception of Desert Rock personnel, were provided with a charge-a-plate (a metal tag bearing a person's name and other identifying information) and a film badge, both attached

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES PLUMBBOB Operation PLUMBBOB Events 155 Event Date Type Yield Act) PROJECT 57 04/24/57 Surface Zero* BOLTZMANN 05/28/57 Tower 12 FRANKLIN 06/02/57 Tower 0.140 LASSEN 06/05/57 Balloon 0.0005 WILSON 06/18/57 Balloon 10 PRISCILLA 06124/57 Balloon 37 COULOMB-A 07/01/57 Surface Zero* HOOD 07/05/57 Balloon 74 DIABLO 07/15/57 Tower 17 JOHN 07/19/57 Air-to-Air Missile About 2 KEPLER 07/24/57 Tower 10 OWENS 07/25/57 Balloon 9.7 PASCAL-A 07/26/57 Slight* STOKES 08/07/57 Balloon 19 SATURN 08/10/57 Tunnel Zero* SHASTA 08/18/57 Tower 17 DOPPLER 08/23/57 Balloon 11 PASCAL-B 08/27/57 Shaft Not announced* FRANKLIN PRIME 08/30/57 Balloon 4.7 SMOKY 08/31/57 Tower 44 GALILEO 09/02/57 Tower 11 WHEELER 09/06/57 Balloon 0.197 COULOMB-B 09/06/57 Surface 0.3* LAPLACE 09/08/57 Balloon 1 FI=AU 09/14/57 Tower 11 NEWTON 09/16/57 Balloon 12 RAWER 09/19/57 Tunnel 1.7 WHITNEY 09/23/57 Tower 19 CHARLESTON 09/28/57 Balloon 12 MORGAN 10/07/57 Balloon 8 ~Safebr experiments

156 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPlIERIC NUCLEAR TESTS to their security badges. Badges issued to NTO personnel were Du Pont 559 film packets consisting of Type 502 (0.02 - 10 R) and Type 606 (10 - 300 R) component films. The badge had 0.028-inch-thick lead filters on both sides, plus open areas, and was contained in a plastic bag. Processing was by Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company (REECo). Different colored tape was used across the plastic bag each month to allow for easy and rapid determination of film badge validity. Camp Desert Rock was two miles south of the main gate of N1S and was under control of the 6th Army. Desert Rock had a different dosimetry program from the one for NTO personnel at NTS. Each person was issued a film badge upon arrival at Camp Desert Rock. The film badges issued during 1957 Desert Rock activities contained Du Pont dosimeter film packets Type 559; these con- tained Type 502 and Type 606 component films. An Eberline model FD3 densitometer was used to read the optical density of the film components. The accuracy was reportedly as good as + 10 percent in the low-density range for each film component; in the crossover region (about 10 roentgens) between the sensi- tive and less sensitive film components, however, accuracy was reportedly + 50 percent. The Desert Rock film packet holder was designed with an open window and a cluster of three metal filters - one aluminum, one copper, and one laminated tin/ lead. The area covered by the foil cluster gave a flat response to gamma rays above about 70 keV. The open-window area of the badge responded to beta particles and gamma rays of all energies. Thus, if the low-energy component of the gamma source was small, the difference between the density change in the open window and the filtered area gave a crude estimate of the beta dose. Badge Issue and Exchange Badges were exchanged for on-site NTO personnel on a monthly basis and upon return from a mission in a radiation area. Federal Services Incorporated (FSI, an AEC contractor providing security-guard services) guards assisted in the film badge program by checking all personnel prior to entry into forward areas for possession of a valid film badge. IBM cards corresponding to numbered film badges were stamped (using the individual charge-a-plate) at the time of film badge issue. The cards were used to tabulate individual exposures and prepare the following reports: . Daily exposure · Weekly summary Quarterly summary · Daily over 2 R Weekly over 2 R

6 UNCERTAIN-IYA1VALYSES BY TEST SERIES PLUMBBOB 157 These on-site dose reports were used by NTO supervisors to control each individual's accumulated exposure. The weekly summary reports at the end of the operation listed the accumulated exposures of more than 10,000 NTO person- nel. A total of 74,500 NTO film badges were processed during PLI3MBBOB (Wilcox 1957~. At Desert Rock, dosimetry teams from the Nucleonics Branch, Lexington Signal Depot, Lexington, Kentucky, processed and developed film badges in two specially equipped vans. The Radiological Safety Section, Camp Desert Rock, maintained dosimetry records, which were forwarded to Lexington Signal Depot, Lexington, Kentucky, and were later provided to the Anny staff. The references do not specify a definite turn-in time for film badges. The issue and accession dates (date on which the film badge dose was recorded) shown in the Lexington records span varying time periods so a single-shot exposure cannot always be determined. Approximately 33,000 film badges were developed during Desert Rock VII and VIII. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Both NTO and Desert Rock had well-trained technicians and used standard calibration and processing procedures. Calibration sources employed cobalt 60, and were calibrated within the last few years by NBS. For example, the Office of Test Operations (OTO) source was NBS-calibrated in 1954 and was rotated during film packet calibrations. NBS-calibrated it-meters also were used to determine calibration exposures redundantly, and calibrations were performed for each new manufacturer's batch of film packets (about 25,000 film packets per batch). Two control and five calibration standard films were processed with each batch of personnel films (about 280 films per OTO batch). Desert Rock used two control films, but the number of standards processed with each batch is unknown. The developing temperature for both processors was 68 degrees F + 0.5 degrees. OTO dosimetry personnel performed cross-calibrations with Desert Rock, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), University of California Radiation Labm ratory (UCRL), and Sandia Laboratory (SL). Cross-calibrations were required because some Desert Rock personnel, who had NTS security badges, and large contingents of LASL, UCRL, and SL personnel wore OTO film badges while at NTS. REECo also performed several film badge radiation exposure studies during 1957. Current Availability of Records Extensive PLUMBBOB dosimeter records are in archives at REECo in Las Vegas, Nevada. Included are all developed personnel dosimetry films, issue cards, dosimetry processing log sheets, and numerous alphabetical and organiza

158 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPlIERIC NUCLEAR TESTS tional exposure reports. Calibration data for all PLUMBBOB personnel film dosimetry also are available. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty Bias and uncertainties for PLUMBBOB exposures greater than 200 mR are listed in the following table: Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation PLUMBBOB Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.1 1.2 Wearing 0.8 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Combined Radiological 1.0 1.3 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.0 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.3 1.5 Because NTO and Desert Rock dosimetry programs were cross-calibrated, and procedures of both groups were standardized and implemented by well-trained technicians, the above B and K values apply to results of both dosimetry pros grams. Operation PLUMB BOB film dosimetry is considered optimum for the atmospheric test series in that great care was taken in every phase of the program as thoroughly documented in the REECo archival records. Studies were con- ducted, statistics compiled, and reports written to demonstrate the reliability of dosimetry results. In addition, physical factors including environmental and other conditions were such as to have little impact. Thus, the bias and uncertainty values listed are equal to or better than those for other test operations.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES PLUMBBOB 159 Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deem dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the PLUMBBOB series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for PLUMBBOB given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties. Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation PLUMBBOB Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.07) 0.05 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.06 0.05 (0.02, 0.09) 0.07 0.05 (0.03, 0.10) 0.08 0.06 (0.04,0.11) 0 09 0~07 (0.04, 0.12) 0.10 0.08 (0.05, 0.13) 0.12 0.09 (0.06, 0.15) 0.14 0.11 (0.07, 0.17) 0.16 0.12 (0.08, 0.19) 0.18 0.14 (0.09, 0.21) 0.20 0.15 (0.10, 0.23) >0.20 0.77 E (0.51 E, 1.15 E) where E is the film badge exposure (R3 Additional uncer~nn,, in the overlap range of 10 - 15 R could have existed; however, no film badge exposures in this range occurred during PLUMBBOB

160 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS OPERATION HARDTACK I Background The HARDTACK I test series was conducted at Enewetak and Bikini Atolls and near Johnston Island in the Pacific doing l95g. From April 28 through August 18, 34 nuclear test detonations were conducted for weapons-related pur- poses and one as a safety experiment, including 26 nuclear devices on barges, four tests on the ground surface, two detonations underwater, two devices carried high above the earth by rockets, and one device carried aloft by a balloon. The highest nuclear yields announced were 8.9 and 1.37 megatons. Two other announced yields were 18 kilotons and less than 20 kilotons, two other yields were in the megaton range, and the remaining HARDTACK I test yields were unannounced (DOE 1988~. The table below is a summary of HARDTACK I tests. Personnel Exposed Fallout had exposed unbadged participants in the Pacific during Operation CASTLE in 1954. As a result, an attempt was made to badge all participants during the 1956 REDWING Operation in the Pacific, and this policy was contin- ued during HARDTACK I. About 18,000 individuals were badged during HARDTACK I, and about 62,000 personnel film badges were issued and processed. Exposure information also was recorded and reported (Jacks et al. 1958~. Highest exposed participants were cloud-sampling aircraft pilots and their crews and experiment-recovery personnel, including radiation-monitoring personnel who preceded and accompa- nied them. Exposures were authorized up to 20 R for some individuals involved in cloud-sampling operations (Dunning 1958~. Type of Film Badge The personnel film badge used during HARDTACK I consisted of a Du Pont 559 packet with Type 502 low-range (0.02 R - 10 R) and Type 834 high-range (5 R - 800 R) components, a 0.028-inch-thick lead strip wrapped around the packet to cover an area one-half inch wide by one inch long on each side, ceresin wax covering the packet after dipping, and rigid polyvinylchloride case holding the packet. The purpose of the wax dip and sealed case was to protect the films from moisture so that they might be worn for several months, if necessary, with- out moisture damage to the emulsions. During HARDTACK I, "badges were in use as long as six months with no significant failure observed" (Jacks et al. 1958~. Limitations of the film badge used were spectral response, angular response, shielding by the body, backscatter from the body, and environmental effects. Spectral-response limitations were discussed in parts 2.F and 4.A of this report,

6 UNCERTAWIY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES HARDTACK I Operation HARDTACK I Events 161 Event Date Type Yield YUCCA 04/28/58 Balloon CACTUS 05/05/58 Surface 18 kt m 05/11/58 Barge Bl)~RNlTr 05/11/58 Barge KOA 05/12/58 Surface 1.37 Mt WAHOO 05/16/58 Underwater HOLLY 05/20/58 Barge NUTMEG 05/21/58 Barge YELLOWWOOD 05/26/58 Barge MAGNOLIA 05/26/58 Barge TOBACCO 05/30/58 Barge SYCAMORE 05/31/58 Barge ROSE 06/02/58 Barge UMBRELLA 06/08/58 Undenvater MAPLE 06/10/58 Barge ASPEN 06/14/58 Barge WALNUT 06/14/58 Barge LINDEN 06/18/58 Barge REDWOOD 06/27/58 Barge ELDER 06/27/58 Barge OAK 06/28/58 Barge 8.9 Mt HICKORY 06/29/58 Barge SEQUOIA 07/01/58 Barge CEDAR 07/02/58 Barge DOGWOOD 07/05/58 Barge POPLAR 07/12/58 Barge SCAEVOLA* 07/14/58 Barge < 20 kt PISONIA 07/17/58 Barge JUNIPER 07/22/58 Barge OLIVE 07/22/58 Barge PINE 07/26/58 Barge TEAK 08/01/58 Rocket Megaton range QUINCE 08/06/58 Surface ORANGE 08/12/58 Rocket Megaton range FIG 08/18/58 Surface * Safety experiment

162 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPlIERIC NUCLEAR TESTS and photon-energy-response variations under the lead fluter used with the Du Pont 559 packet can be quantified. Use of this filter over the film packet resulted in a reasonably uniform film response to photons with energies above about 40 keV. Over-response to photon energies less than 100 keV in a scattered fission and activation-product spectrum would result in a positive bias in exposure determi- nation. Other bias considerations are over-response when exposure was from the sides of the badge, under-response when exposure was through the body to a badge worn on the chest, and frontal exposure of the badge as it was calibrated. Backscattering of photons from the body, both through the lead filter and under filter edges is another bias consideration. While the HARDTACK I radiological safety report Packs 1958~. stated that film badges could be worn for six months with no significant failure observed, heat and ageing could be expected to cause some environmental damage, increas- ing with the time that film badges were worn or not returned. Damage of this type causes increased optical density with accompanying overestimates of exposure. Thus, exposures reported for HARDTACK I probably were higher than actual personnel exposures if film badges were worn for extended periods of time. Increased film optical density caused by environmental damage during HARD- TACK I resulted in a positive bias. Remaining limitations of film badges related to field use include various types of physical damage to the film packets. The hard plastic case protected against most of these. Film-component overlap limitations were discussed in Section 4.D. Figure 44 shows that selection of the Types 502 and 834 components essentially solved the overlap problems with previously used film component types. The response- curve slope in the overlap region of Figure 44 changes very little, compared to other film type combinations, indicating little change in uncertainty for exposures in the overlap range. Badge Issue and Exchange A single film badge wearing system was used during HARDTACK I aTF-7 1958a). Film badge wearing instructions were: '`The film badge will be worn at all times. In addition, badges will be exchanged after each entry into a contami- nated area (exceptions will be made in the case of continuing-access permits). Lost badges should be reported immediately to TU-6. On return to home station badges will be fumed in as part of the EPG check-out procedure." All badges were called in at 60-day intervals Jacks 1958a). Additional instructions for Task Group (TG) 7.1 during HARDTACK I were "Each individual in the Task Group will be issued a film badge that is to be worn at all times. Dog-tag chains will be provided for a convenient means of wearing the badges. If preferred, individuals may attach the film badges to the security badge rather than using the dog-tag chain." (Jacks 1958a).

6 UNCERTAI~IY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES HARDTACK I 163 From April 1 to August 20, 195S, TG7.1 was responsible for radiological safety at the Enewetak Proving Ground (EPG) (AEC 1958; JTF-7 1958b). On April 18, 195S, a message was sent from CJTF 7 to all task groups stating "All personnel in the Enewetak Proving Ground are required to wear a film badge commencing 0600 21 April" (Richie 195X). Film badge exchange began the first two weeks of April 1958 at both mess hall exits and at the Rad-Safe Center Building on Elmer Island (Jacks 1958b). All personnel within EPG were pro- vided with an addressograph (charge-a-plate) identification plate and a film badge. Film badges were exchanged bimonthly or upon return from a mission into a contamination area (AEC 1958) TG7.12., TU 6 issued film badges, associ- ated record cards, and instructions concerning issue and wearing of film badges, and completed a record card for each individual. Record cards were sent to all ships and units of TG7.3 (CJTF-7 19583. IBM cards corresponding to the numbered film badges were stamped using the charge-a-plates at the time the film badge was issued (AEC 1958~. After issuing the film badge, the personnel identification information and film badge number were manually punched into IBM cards, which were used with an IBM 704 EDPM, and the information was stored on magnetic tapes. After film badges were processed, punched IBM cards from the FS-3 (see next section) were used to post dosimetry records on the IBM 704. This system reduced the human errors encountered during prior, fully manual posting operations. Identical film process- ing stations were established at Enewetak and Bikini Atolls for issuing, receiving and processing film badges. All records of the transactions performed at Bikini were forwarded by IBM data transceiver to Enewetak where a consolidation of information from both Atolls was made and data stored on tapes, using the IBM 704. New total-dosage information compiled by the 704 was then transmitted back to Bikini by data transceiver, where a duplicate file was maintained for daily use Packs 19583. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Calibration of film badges during HARDTACK I was in accordance with Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory procedures and included use of a cobalt 60 source and a recently NBS-calibrated it-meter, constant time-vanable distance calibra- tion exposures, and front-to-back film badge calibration to check for this possible variation in exposure results. The cobalt 60 source output was 8.67 R/h at 50 centimeters on 25 April 1958. Master calibration curves were prepared, and control and standard films were developed with each batch of personnel films. HARDTACK I calibration curves were checked for accuracy every two weeks (Minkkinen 1959~. Film development was under carefully controlled and timed conditions at a temperature of 68 + 0.5°F.

164 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Personnel from the Army's 1st Radiological Safen,r Support Unit were trained in dosimetry procedures at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory before HARD- TACK I. The Eberline Instrument Corporation Film Badge Evaluation and Recording System, FS-3, was used in production during HARDTACK I for the first time. The system included an Eberline FD-II densitometer and a curve follower which electronically converted net optical density measurements to exposure. The curve follower provided the signal which operated an IBM Summary Punch. Thus, net optical density from the densitometer was automati- cally punched into an IBM card as exposure Jacks 1958~. Current Availability of Records Numerous exposure rosters for HARDTACK I are in storage at Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co. (REECo) in Las Vegas, Nevada. Most of the developed films from HARDTACK I also are at REECo. Holmes and Narver 5x8-inch-card exposure records and film badge issue envelopes for personnel film badge dosimetry during non-operational periods during 1958 in the Pacific are stored at REECo. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty Bias and uncertainties for HARDTACK I film badge exposures greater than 200 mR are listed in the following table: Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) For HARDTACK I Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.1 1.2 Wearing 0.8 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Combined Radiological 1.0 1.3 Environmental 1.2 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.2 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.5 1.5

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES HARDTACK I 165 Spectral film emulsion over-response in the low-energy photon region below 100 keV for scattered fission and activation product photons could result in a dose overestimate of a few percent, making the spectrum bias of 1.1 somewhat conser- vative. However, considering that variations in the balancing geometry and backscatter biases essentially would not change the combined radiological bias of 1.0, slight differences in any of these biases are unimportant in the overall dose- bias result. Environmental bias of 1.2 for the hot, humid Pacific area test operations should be considered normal compared to a normal environmental bias for drier conti- nental operational conditions of 1.0, or even 1.1 if badges had been worn for long time periods, as they had been in some Pacific operations. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deem dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the HARDTACK I series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for HARDTACK I given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under laboratory Uncertainties.

166 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TE=S Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation HARDTACK I Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.06) 0.05 0.03 (0.02, 0.07) 0 06 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.07 0.05 (0.03, 0.08) 0.08 0.05 (0.03, 0.09) 0.09 0.06 (0.04, 0.10) 0.10 0.07 (0.04, 0.11) 0.12 0.08 (0.05, 0.13) 0.14 0.09 (0.06, 0.15) 0.16 0.11 (0.07, 0.16) 0.18 0.12 (0.08, 0.18) 0.20 0.13 (0.09, 0.20) >0.20 0.67 E (0.44 E, 1.00 E) where E is the hum badge exposure (R) Use of the Type 834 film component to replace the Type 606 essentially solved the overlap problem previously experienced in the 10 - 15 R range (see Section 4.D). OPERATION ARGUS Background ARGUS was a secret test operation conducted in and above southern Atlantic Ocean areas during August and September of 1958. Three nuclear warheads on missiles were detonated in the upper regions of the atmosphere with yields between 1 and 2 kt as shown in the following table (DOE 1988~.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES ARGUS Operation ARGUS Events 167 Event Date Type Yield~kt) ARGUS I 08/27/58 Rocket 1-2 ARGUS II 08/30/58 Rocket 1-2 ARGUS III 09/06/58 Rocket 1-2 Nine U. S. Navy ships of Task Force 88 conducted these tests, including the missile mals ship USS Norton Sound (AVM-1), which launched the nuclear weapons. ARGUS was conducted to test the Christofilos theory, which stated that high-altitude nuclear detonations would create a radiation belt in the upper re- gions of the atmosphere. This belt of electrons could have important military implications regarding effects on electronic systems of military hardware. A charged-particle shell was created, demonstrating the validity of the theory and also the predicted effects (Jones et al. 1982~. Personnel Exposed Task Force 88 included about 4,500 participants on nine ships. Because the detonations were in the upper regions of the atmosphere, there was no possibility of task-force personnel being exposed to radioactivity from the tests Jones et al. 1982~. Type of Film Badge There is some uncertainty regarding the type of film badge used. Although Lexington Signal Depot provided and processed the film badges, Lexington (now Lexington Blue Grass Depot) cannot now locate the badging records of any ARGUS participants. It can be assumed that the four-element Lexington badge issued at Camp Desert Rock during Operation PLUMBBOB and the Du Pont packet with Type 502 and Type 606 components were used at ARGUS because this badge and at least the Type 502 component were used at Lexington during August and September of 1958 (Abney 1989) and because the 559 packet with Type 502 and 606 components had been used during previous nuclear test series.

168 Badge Issue and Exchange FILM BADGE DOSIMEIRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Security aspects of ARGUS resulted in a decision not to reveal to most personnel of the task force that nuclear testing was involved in their operations. A sufficient number of film badges (4,000) had been procured from Lexington Signal Depot to badge each individual on the seven ships near the launch location, should circumstances warrant such issue. The badges were distributed, however, only to those individuals who already were aware of the nuclear tests, including pilots of observation aircraft and USS Norton Sound personnel handling nuclear warheads. Film badges also were placed surreptitiously in exposed topside locations to remain for a period of six hours before and six hours after each test, 10 film badges per ship per test. Finally, "control" film badges were located in "radiation-free areas within ships". According to the Lexington Signal Depot report, 21 of the 264 film badges distributed showed some indication of radiation exposure. The highest indicated dose was 0.025 rem, and this result was from a `'control" badge. The highest dose recorded for an individual was 0.010 rem. It was concluded that no radiation dose was received by task force personnel as a result of the nuclear detonations. Following a snowfall some seven hours after the first detonation, the USS Norton Sound reported detecting radiation intensity of 0.27 R/h at one location on deck. Because the detonation occurred very high above the surface, it was concluded that the reading was spurious, or at least not connected with Task Force 88 operations (Muslin 1959~. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Because the film badges were provided and processed by Lexington Signal Dept, it can be assumed that the same procedures used at Camp Desert Rock during Operation PLUMBBOB in 1957 were used for ARGUS films. Current Availability of Records Lexington Blue Grass Depot was contacted previously (Jones et al. 1982) and recently (Abney 1989) with the same result. Lexington cannot identify records as being for ARGUS. This probably is a consequence of security classification precautions taken prior to and after ARGUS. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty The question of bias and uncertainties is moot, considering the conclusion that no radiation dose was received as a result of the ARGUS nuclear detonations.

6 UNCERTAINI-Y ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES - HARDTACK ~ 169 The only uncertainty appears to be whether a radiation source aboard a ship caused the maximum indicated personnel film badge dose of 0.010 rem and control film badge dose of 0.025 rem, or whether the indications of exposure from 21 of the 264 film badges were spurious and below the minimum reportable exposure with that particular film badge. OPERATION HARDTACK II Background Operation HARDTACK II was a series of 37 tests performed at the Nevada Test site (NTS) in the fall of 1958. It was the last nuclear weapons testing conducted before the United States began a unilateral nuclear-test moratorium that lasted until 1961. The table below lists the tests of Operation HARDTACK II. The operation was administered by the Atomic Energy Commission; also participating were the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Nineteen tests were related to weapons development and evalu- ation. The remainder were safety experiments that evaluated whether an acciden- tal nuclear detonation could occur during transportation or storage of each type of nuclear device. Personnel Exposed About 7,650 people participated in the HARDTACK II test series (REECo 1958~. All personnel who entered NTS during 1958 were required to wear film badges attached to their security badges, and security guards at each gate assured that the badge was valid for the particular month. Badges were exchanged monthly and upon exit from radiation areas if exposure of 100 mR or more was suspected. The highest accumulated exposure during the operation was 10.9 R (Ponton et al. 1982c; REECo 1958~. Type of Film Badge The Du Pont Type 559 film packet was the film badge used during Operation HARDTACK II. The packet contained a Type 502 film (0.02 R to 10 R) and a Type 834 film (5 R to 800 R). The packet had a 0.028-inch (0.711 millimeter)- thick lead strip, 0.5 inches wide by 1.0 inch long on the front and back surfaces. The packet and filter were enclosed in a polyethylene bag 0.004 inches thick, with a colored tape over the opening which indicated monthly validity.

170 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Operation HARDTACK II Events Event Date Type Yield(kt) Weapons Tests EDDY 09/19/58 Balloon 0.083 MORA 09/29/58 Balloon 2 TAMALPIAS 10/08/58 Tunnel 0.072 QUAY 10/10/58 Tower 0.079 LEA 10/13/58 Balloon 1.4 HAMILTON 10/15/58 Tower 0.0012 LOGAN 10/16/58 Tunnel 5 DONA ANA 10/16/58 Balloon 0.037 RIO ARRIBA 10718/58 Tower 0.090 SOCORRO 10,,22/58 Balloon 6 WRANGELL 10/22/58 Balloon 0.115 RUSHMORE 10/22/58 Balloon 0.188 SANFORD 10/26/58 Balloon 4.9 DE BACA 10/26/58 Balloon 2.2 EVANS 10/29/58 Tunnel 0.055 MAZAMA 10/29/58 Tower * HUMBOLDT 10/29/58 Tower 0.0078 BLANCA 10/30/58 Tunnel 22 SAME FE 10/30/58 Balloon 1.3 *Slight or no measurable yield. Badge Issue and Exchange Table continues on following page The film badge program was conducted by the Radiological Safety Division of the NTS operations contractor, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc. (REECo). The Division continued year-round issue and collection procedures that had been implemented January 1, 1957. The issue and collection procedures included use of an identification plate and color-coded film badges. Identification data, including name, NTS number and organization code, were stamped on IBM issue cards with numbers corresponding to embossed numbers on the films being issued. Colors corresponded to monthly

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES-HARDTACKII Operation HARDTACK II Events (Continued) 171 Event Date Type Yield (kt) Safety Expenments OTERO 09n3/58 Shaft 0.038 BERNALILLO 09/17/58 Shaft 0.015 LUNA 09pl/58 Shaft 0.0015 MERCURY 09/23/58 Tunnel * VALENCIA 09/26/58 Shaft 0.002 MARS 09/28/58 Tunnel 0.013 HIDALGO 10/05/58 Balloon 0.077 COLFAX 10/05/58 Shaft 0.0055 NEPTUNE 10/14/58 Tunnel 0.115 VESTA 10/17/58 Surface 0.024 SAN JUAN 10n0/58 Shaft * OBERON 10/22/58 Tower * CATRON 10/24/58 Tower 0.021 JUNO 10n4/58 Surface 0.0017 CERES 10126/58 Tower 0.0007 CHAVES 10127/58 Tower 0.0006 GANYMEDE 10/30/58 Surface * TITANIA 10/30/58 Tower 0.0002 *Slight or no measurable yield. issue periods and facilitated collection of unreturned badges. Film badges were attached to security badges and guards would not allow passage through the main gate or gate to the forward areas unless the film badge was valid for the current month. Badges were issued at He main gate in Camp Mercury, and at the site Control Point by REECo Rad-Safe staff Air Force personnel issued badges sum plied by REECo at Indian Springs and Kirkland Air Force Bases. All persons entering the test site wore film badges. Pilots and crews used for cloud tracking and sampling, and other Air Force personnel working with radio- active cloud samples or contaminated planes, also wore film badges. Film badge records were maintained by REECo. IBM cumulative exposure

172 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY me ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS reports were prepared each night to include results of all film badges processed for the day. These reports were at Rad-Safe stations the next morning to be consulted before personnel were allowed to enter radiation areas and receive more exposure. This helped to prevent cumulative exposures from exceeding the guides of 3 rem per calendar quarter and 5 rem per calendar year. Monthly, quarterly, and annual exposure reports were prepared for each of several hundred organizations at NTS. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Calibration, processing, and evaluation procedures had been implemented by REECo beginning in July 1955, and were used in the 1957 PLUMBBOB opera- tion. These were continued during operation HARDTACK II. Films were calibrated with a rotating cobalt 60 source to compensate for potential nonuniformity of the radiation field produced by the source. Calibration exposures were determined with NBS-calibrated it-meters. Calibration standard fUms were processed daily with each batch of personnel films processed. Also included were unexposed films to account for base fog (REECo 1958~. After developing and drying, films were analyzed with an Eberline Model FD-II densitometer. The net optical density under the lead filter was used to de- termine the whole-body exposure. The total number of films developed during HARDTACK II was 16,624 with a maximum one day total of 1,128 (REECo 1958~. Current Availability of Records The collection of HARDTACK II dosimetry films and records available at REECo in Las Vegas, Nevada, is essentially complete. The only records which have not been kept are some of the daily and monthly IBM reports. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty The film badge program at the NTS had served previous operations. Experi- enced staff and proven methods minimized the number and types of problems. The table shown below presents estimates of bias and uncertainty for exposures greater than 0.2 R. Uncertainty and bias estimates increased for lower exposures. Performance of the 502 film was examined in a REECo report (1957~. The

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES HARDTACK II 173 report noted decreased relative precision at low exposures. Considering that most low exposures were assessed from badges worn for a month, additional variations probably arose from wearing and environmental factors. Overalls the film badge uncertainties for Operation HARDTACK II were among the lowest of the atmospheric testing program. Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation HARDTACK II Source B K Laboratory I.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum l.1 1.2 Wearing 0.8 1.1 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 1.0 1.3 Environmental 1.0 l.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.0 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (I)eep-Dose Equivalent) 1.3 1.4 Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the HARDTACK II series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for HARDTACK II given above. Read- ings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section S.B under laboratory Uncertainties.

174 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPlIERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation HARDTACK II Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.07) 0 05 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.06 0.05 (0.03, 0.08) 0.07 0.05 (0.03, 0.09) 0.08 0.06 (0.04, 0.10) 0.09 0.07 (0.04, 0.11) 0.10 0.08 (0.05, 0.12) 0.12 0.09 (0.06, 0.14) 0.14 0.11 (0.07, 0.16) 0.16 0.12 (0.08, 0.18) 0.18 0.14 (0.10, 0.20) 0.20 0.15 (0.11, 0.22) >0.20 0.77 E (0.55 E, 1.08 E) where E is the film badge exposure (my Use of the Type 834 film component to replace the Type 606 essentially solved the overlap problem previously experienced in the 10 - 15 R range (see Section 4.D). OPERATION DOMINIC I Background Operation DOMINIC I took place in the Christmas and Johnston Island areas and at other locations in the Pacific. Of 36 test detonations, 29 were airdrops, six were on rockets, and one was a depth charge underwater. The highest yield was listed as "megaton range", the next highest as "low megaton" (one to several Mt). The remainder were "intermediate" yield (20 to 1000 kt for Operation DOMINIC D, low yield (less than 20 kt), or the yields were unannounced (DOE 1988~. The table below is a summary of DOMINIC I nuclear detonation tests.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES DOMINIC I Operation DOMINIC I Events 175 Event Type Yield ADOBE 04/25/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt AZTEC 04/27/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt ARKANSAS 05/02/62 Airdrop Low megaton FRIGATE BIRD 05/06/62 Rocket YUKON 05/08/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt MESILLA 05/09/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt MUSKEGON 05/11/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt SWORDFISH 05/11/62 Underwater <20 kt ENCINO 05/12/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt SWANEE 05/14/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt CHETCO 05/19/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt TANANA 05/25/62 Airdrop <20 kt NAMBE 05/27/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt ALMA 06/08/62 Airdrop <20 kt TRUCKEE 06/09/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt YESO 06/10/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt HARLEM 06/12/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt RINCONADA 06/15/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kit DULCE 06/17/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt PETIT 06/19/62 Airdrop <20 kit OTOWI 06/22/62 Airdrop 20 to 1000 kt BIGHORN 06/27/62 Airdrop Megaton range BLUE S TONE 06/30/62 Airdrop Low megaton Personnel Exposed Because all of the DOMINIC I tests, except the underwater test, were high- altitude airbursts, little or no fallout resulted and no residual radioactivity re- mained at surface ground zero, except for a radioactive pool of water after the underwater test Film badge readings thus were generally low, wi~ maximum exposures being reported for cloud-sampling pilots and crews, Navy personnel on the USS sioux who sampled the radioactive water pool, personnel who retrieved instrumentation pods and rocket nosecones, and Rad-Safe monitors. An attempt was made to monitor all participants who had- a potential for exposure, in a con- tinuation of REDWING and HARDTACK I film badging policies. About 25,300

176 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY TV ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS individuals were film badged. About 3,000 participants on remote islands, however, who were manning radiation detection instruments or conducting ex- periments at a distance from the tests, were not badged (Berkhouse et al. 1983b). About 43,000 film badges were used. Two dosimetry sections processed about 33,000 badges. The remaining approximately 10,000 badges were processed at the Nevada Test Site Rad-Safe laboratory after DOMINIC I (Mudgett 1964; Brady 1982~. Type of Film Badge The film badge design used in DOMINIC I was the same as in HARDTACK I, a Du Pont packet with a 0.028-inch-thick lead filter dipped in wax and sealed in a rigid PVC holder. The DuPont packet, however, was not the 559 with Type 502 and 508 components, but the 556 with Type 508 (0.02 - 10 R) and Type 834 (5-800 R) components. The badge was designed to be moisture-resistant, and it apparently functioned as intended during HARDTACK I. Near the end of DOM- INIC I, however, sealing of the case was found to be defective, and some badges exhibited considerable excess film optical density from moisture damage (Knipp 1963~. In addition, some 100 films were damaged when a band saw used to cut open the film badge cases nicked the film packets, causing light leaks and resulting in considerable excess optical density (Brady 1982~. Other limitations of the film badge used during the two test series were spectral response, angular response, shielding by the body, and environmental effects not discussed above. These limitations were discussed under Type of Film Badge and Estimated Bias and Uncertainty in the section on HARDTACK I, and the same bias and uncertainties apply to DOMINIC I, with certain exceptions involving environmental effects. While the HARDTACK I radiological safety report stated that film badges could be worn for six months with no significant failure observed, examination of DOMINIC I films showed some environmental damage, increasing with the time film badges were worn or not returned. A large number of DOMINIC badges were worn or not returned for long periods of time, up to three or more months. This damage could be attributed to heat and emulsion ageing, also observed with badges used in continental desert environment tests, where humidity and moisture are not the problems. Damage of this type causes increased optical density with accompanying overestimates of exposure. Considering that only participants in the four categories previously mentioned should have had positive film badge readings, it is likely that almost all other reported exposures were the result of environmentally damaged film badge emulsions. Remaining limitations of film badges related to field use include various types of physical damage to the film packets. As in HARDTACK I, most of these were

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES DOMINIC I 177 avoided by use of the hard plastic case protecting the film packets. Only the band- saw damage observed for a small percentage of DOMINIC I packets appears to be a problem not easily dealt with by investigation of individual exposure conditions. Film-component overlap limitations were discussed in Section 4.D. Figure 44 shows that selection of the Type 502 and 834 components essentially solved the overlap problems with previously used film-component types. The response- curve slope in the overlap region of Figure 44 changes very little, compared to other combinations, indicating little change in uncertainty for exposures in the overlap range. Badge Issue and Exchange Two dosimetry sections were required for the DOMINIC I Operation. One was at Christmas Island and the other in Honolulu, Hawaii. The Dosimetry section on Christmas Island was responsible for firm processing for the Johnston Island site and Barbers Point personnel (Knipp 1963~. Film badge support locations and their functions for DOMINIC I were as follows: Christmas Island: Film-badge issue and collection Photodosimetry services Johnston Island: Film-badge issue and collection Honolulu: Photodosimetry services Nevada Test Site: Photodosimetry services (Mudgett 1964; Knipp 1963) 04/25/62-07/11/62 06/03/62-11/03/62 03/15/62-11/10/62 11/07/62-01/30/63 DOMINIC I Radiological Safety Regulations, Annex J to Op Plan 2-62 (Star- bird 1962), stated that "All task-force personnel will be required to wear film badges. Certain cases may arise, such as outlying stations, where such a require- ment may not be practical." The regulations also stated that "all persons in aircraft at shot time, or at subsequent times, shall wear film badges when engaged in operations in or near the cloud or RADEX (radiation exclusion area) track." Badge issuance was relatively complete; that is, almost all individuals who could be considered participants were badged. Personnel on remote islands

178 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPlIERIC NUCLEAR TESTS providing support at a distance from the tests were not issued film badges. On Christmas Island, Task Group 8.4 (Air Force personnel) assisted in film badge issue and return. This task unit was responsible for issuing firm badges to sampling aircrew mission members (including pilots, crew, and ground person- nel). After each mission, Task Group 8.4 would collect all film badges used on the mission and return them to the JTE-8 dosimetry section for development (they were processed within 6 hours). Badges also were exchanged weekly for all 8.4 personnel exposed to radiation. Task Group TO 8.4 also maintained a record which listed all Task Group 8.4 personnel exposed to ionizing radiation. Ap- proximately 2,500 film badges were issued by this task group. Near the end of the operation, the Christmas Island photodosimetry operation was closed and relo- cated with the Honolulu group (Knipp 1963~. Dosimetry record cards (5x8-inch cards) were prepared in the Honolulu sec- tion. Approximately 20,000 Sx8-inch dosimetry cards were typed and initial doses posted (Knipp 1963~. Use of the charge-a-plate identification system adopted for previous Pacific test series was initiated after the DOMENIC 1 operation began (Mudgett 1964~. The Honolulu Photodosimetry section was closed November 1, 1962 (Allen 1962; Rueter 1962~. Photodosimetry equipment and both unexposed and exposed films were sent to the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for completion of processing and posting of exposure records. The NTS photodosimetry section processed am proximately 10,000 film badges and posted approximately 30,000 records. These records then were finalized and coded for ADP (automatic data processing) keypunching. These dosimetry records were retained by Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Incorporated (REECo) (Brady 1982~. Calibration, Processing, and Interpretation Calibration of film badges during DOMINIC I was in accordance with the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory procedures and included use of a cobalt 60 source, a recently NBS-calibrated it-meter, and constant time-variable distance calibra- tion exposures. Master calibration curves were prepared, and control and stan- dard films were developed with each batch of personnel films. Film development was under controlled and timed conditions at a temperature of 68 + 0.5°F (Lit- tlejohn 198Sc). During DOMINIC I, Joint Task Force ~ was responsible for radiological safety. George Littlejohn of Los Alamos trained the RSSU dosimetry personnel and developed films at the Christmas Island Facility with assistance from Holmes and Narver (the AEC support contractors personnel. Mechanical difficulty with the curve follower first used in HARDTACK I prevented its use during DOM

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES DOMINIC I 179 INIC I, and the REDWING procedure of manually posting film badge results on Sx8-inch cards for each individual was resumed. Eberline FD-II densitometers were used at both the Christmas Island and Honolulu, Hawaii, facilities. Current Availability of Records Stored in the archives of REECo at Las Vegas, Nevada, are processed films from DOMINIC I film badges, 5x8-inch card individual exposure records, NavMed 1432 forms listing personnel and their exposures by film badge on specific ships, an alphabetical summary report of DOMINIC I participants and their exposures, for about 75 percent of the film badges issued, supplementary reports for the remaining 25 percent of the film badges processed at N1S, and organizational reports listing data from both the summary and supplementary reports. Esimated Bias and Uncertainty Estimated bias and uncertainties for DOMINIC I film badge exposures greater than 200 mR are listed in the following table. Also included are overall B and K for exposure, B and K for conversion to dose, and overall B and K for dose. These B and K values, however, apply to only some of the DOMINIC I film badge results, as discussed after the table. Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation DOMINIC I Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum 1.1 1.2 Wearing 0.S 1.2 Backscatter 1.1 1.1 Total Radiological 1.0 1.3 Environmental 1.2 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.2 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.5 1.5 1

180 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPIlERIC NUCLEAR TESTS The environmental bias of 1.2 expresses a normal positive bias for environ- mental damage in the Pacific' not related to radiation exposure. While sealing of the film badge cases used during HARDTACK I apparently was adequate, and the bias of 1.2 applies, sealing of the cases for DOMINIC I was not adequate. Sealing failure resulted in moisture damage, and, together with long wearing periods and long times before processing, resulted in a large number of film badges which indicated exposure when no exposure had occurred. DOMINIC I film badge exposures should be related to known activities of the wearers. If an individual was not in a cloud-sampling and crew unit, not on the ship (USS Sioux) that sampled water from the radioactive pool, not involved in recovering instrument pods, nosecones, or other contaminated or activated material, or not a Rad-Safe monitor, then any indicated film badge exposure was likely to have been caused by environmental damage. The above B'and K, then, apply primarily to film badge results of personnel who were in categories of pamcipants that may have been exposed to gamma radiation, and thus whose film badges were exchanged more frequently than the majority. Light damage from the band saw used to open film badge cases apparently occurred in DOMINIC I. Less than 100 badges were involved, and most of these have been reevaluated to verify reductions in exposure previously made by 1st RSSU personnel. All of the apparent exposures caused by band-saw damage light leaks have been verified as reduced to less than 3 R. except for about six film badges worn on the ship which was sampling water from the radioactive pool. Application of Bias and Uncertainty The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the DOM- INIC I series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for DOMINIC I given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings, as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties.

6 UNCERTAI~IY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES DOMINIC 11 181 Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation DOMINIC I Film Badge Best Estimate ofDeep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Ddse Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) O.03 (0.00, 0.06) 0~05 0.03 (0.02, 0.07) 0.06 0~04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.07 0.05 (0.03, 0.08) 0.08 0.05 (0.03, 0.09) 0.09 0.06 (0.04, 0.10) 0.10 0.07 (0.04, 0.1 1) 0.12 0.0X (0.05, 0.13) 0.14 0.09 (0.06, 0.15) 0.16 0.11 (0.07, 0.16) 0.18 0.12 (0.08, 0.18) 0.20 0.13 (0.09, 0.20) >0.20 0.67 E (0.44 E, 1.00 E) where E is the film badge exposure (my Use of the Type 834 film component to replace the Type 606 essentially solved the overlap problem previously experienced in the 10 - 15 R range (see Section 4.D). OPERATION DOMINIC II Background Operation DOMINIC II (named Operation SUNBEAM by DOD) was con- ducted during mid-July at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Four weapons were detonated to obtain data about the effects of low-yield explosions. Ancillary experiments were performed to evaluate the ability to detect nuclear detonations in foreign countries. This Operation was comprised of the four tests listed below. Associated with Little Feller I was a military maneuver, Exercise IVY FLATS. This exercise

182 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS centered on the test of a Davy Crockett weapon fired from a mobile rocket launcher under simulated tactical conditions. Operation DOMINIC II Events Event Date Type Yield(kt) LITTLE FELLER II 07/07/62 Surface Low* JOE BOY 07/11/62 Surface 0.5 SMALL BOY 07/14/62 15-foot tower Low* LITTLE FELLER I 07/17/62 Surface Low* *Low is less than 20 kt Personnel Exposed The actual number of people involved in conducting the Operation is unknown and difficult to reconstruct because all persons at the NTS wore film badges. Other nuclear testing programs were ongoing at NTS concurrent with Operation DOMINIC II. Many personnel from the Atomic Energy Commission and its contractors supported these programs and are not uniquely associated with one operation. The films and records are stored by process date and not by operation. Over 200,000 film badges were processed at NTS during 1962 for a permanent work force of several thousand personnel, and for transients of an equal or greater number. Approximately 3000 DOD-affiliated personnel participated in the DOMINIC II operation. The highest exposure received at NTS during the DOMINIC II operational period was 5.8 R. Type of film Badge The film badge for Operation DOMINIC II was the standard badge used at the NTS during 1962. Also used during Operation HARDTACK II, the badge consisted of a Du Pont Type 559 film packet containing Type 502 and Type 834 components with 0.028-inch-thick lead strip covering part of the front and back surfaces. The badge was enclosed in a polyethylene bag, 0.004 inches thick.

6 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES ~ DOMINIC II 183 The U.S. Army created a separate radiation safety program for IVY FLATS within the NTS program. REECo provided technical support which included radiation-safety training, film badges, and instruments. All IVY FLATS par~tici- pants wore the NTS film badge. Records were established for all issued badges. Upon issue of film badges, individual IBM identification cards aided the process of relating a person to a film badge number. Badge Issue and Exchange The procedures for issuing and exchanging film badges were the same as those that had been used since 1957. The Radiological Safety Division of REECo, the site operating contractor, supervised all aspects of the- film badge program. Key to the issuance and exchange program was the union of the film badge with the security badge. Security officials were instructed to verify that an appropriate film badge was worn as an individual passed through various check points at the test site. Identification of the film badge was coded by an identifica- tion plate and colored tape. Different colors signified different monthly issue periods. Film badges were issued at the main gate and the site control point by REECo staff. Participants in Exercise IVY FLATS were issued badges by Army person- nel under the REECo Rad Safe Program. Air Force personnel issued badges supplied by REECo at Indian Springs and Kirtland Air Force Bases only to pilots, crew or others whose duty could result in exposure to radiation. Badges were collected after entry to a radiation area, or if an exposure greater than 0.1 R was suspected. Badges were processed the evening of their collection so that exposure record cards could be updated by the next day. These cards were reviewed when permits were granted for access to radiation areas. Calibration, Processing, and interpretation Calibration, processing and evaluation procedures had been implemented by REECo in 1955 and had continued during the 1957 PLUMBBOB, 1958 HARD- TACK II, and interim operations at the NTS. These were continued during Operation DOMINIC II. Films were calibrated with a cobalt 60 source. Cali- brated films were processed with each developed batch of films worn by opera- tion participants, as were two unexposed control films to account for base fog (REECo 1958~. After developing and drying, films were analyzed with an Eberline Model FD-II densitometer. The film net optical density under the lead filter was used to determine whole body exposure.

184 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS Current Availability of Records All films, issue cards, and exposure records for the 'DOMINIC II Operation period are stored at the REECo/DOE repository in Las Vegas. Estimated Bias and Uncertainty The film badge program at the NTS had served previous operations. Experi- enced staff and proven methods minimized the number and types of problems. The table below presents bias estimates and uncertainties for exposures greater than 0.2 R. 'The performance of the 502 film was 'examined in a REECo report (1957~. Laboratory reproducibility was good. The report noted decreased relative preci- sion at low exposures. As discussed previously under DOMINIC I, use of the Type 502 and Type 834 film components t essentially solved the overlap problem (See Figure 44~. Unlike some other operations, additional uncertainties from long wearing periods and environmental factors were not significant because the operation was of short duration and moisture damage was not a problem. The number of one-day participants in IVY FLATS also minimized the impact of environmental effects that would be more likely to affect monthly badges. Film badges were exchanged when personnel exited radiation areas and exposures of 100 mR or more were expected. Otherwise, badges were exchanged monthly. Overall, film badge uncertainties for Operation DOMINIC II were among the lowest of the atmospheric testing program. Bias (B) and Uncertainty (K) for Operation DOMINIC II Source B K Laboratory 1.0 1.2 Radiological Spectrum '1.1 1.2 Wearing 0.8 1.1 - Backscatter 1.1 - 1.1 Total Radiological 1.0 1.3 Environmental 1.0 1.1 Overall (Exposure) 1.0 1.4 Conversion to Deep-Dose Equivalent 1.3 1.2 Overall (Deep-Dose Equivalent) 1.3 1.4

6 UNCERTAIN-I Y ANALYSES BY TEST SERIES DOMINIC II Application of Bias and Uncertainty 185 The following table gives deep-dose equivalent values and ranges of deep- dose equivalents within the 95% confidence limits resulting from application of the above overall bias and uncertainty factors to film badge readings in the DOM- INIC II series. Film badge readings above 0.2 R may be converted by multiplying by the factors in the last line of the table, which were obtained from the overall bias and uncertainty factors for DOMINIC II given above. Readings below 0.2 R may be converted by reading directly from the table; these values allow for additional laboratory uncertainty for low readings as described in Section 5.B under Laboratory Uncertainties. Deep-Dose Equivalent and 95% Confidence Limits for Operation DOMINIC II Film Badge Best Estimate of Deep- 95% Confidence Limits for Exposure Dose Equivalent Deep-Dose Equivalent (R) (rem) (rem) 0.04 (MDL) 0.03 (0.00,0.07) 0.05 0.04 (0.02, 0.08) 0.06 0.05 (0.03, 0.08) 0.07 ~0.05 (0.03, 0.09) 0.08 0.06 (0.04, 0.10) 0~09 0.07 (0.04,0.11) 0.10 ~0.08 (0.05, 0.12) 0.12 0.09 (0.06, 0.14) 0.14 0.11 (0.07, 0.16) 0.16 0.12 (0.08, 0.18) 0.18 0.14 (0.10, 0.20) 0.20 0.15 (0.1 1, 0.22) >0.20 0.77 E (0.55 E, 1.08 E) where E is the film badge exposure (R) Use of the Type 834 film component to replace the Type 606 essentially solved the overlap problem previously experienced in the 10 - 15 R range (see Section 4.D).

Next: 7 Conclusions »
Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $55.00
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

During the 18-year program of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons (1945-1962), some of the 225,000 participants were exposed to radiation. Many of these participants have been experiencing sicknesses that may be test-related. Currently, test participants who had served in military units have pending over 6,000 claims for compensation at the Department of Veterans Affairs. This study presents improved methods for calculating the radiation doses to which these individuals were exposed, and are intended to be useful in the adjudication of their claims.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!