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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Part I - CAPTA Final Report." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14183.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

CAPTA Final Report P A R T I

Background The CAPTA effort is a continuation of efforts begun following the attacks of September 11, 2001. That event prompted a series of risk assessment and management projects initiated through the cooperative research programs managed by the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies. Several risk management guides were prepared independently and were aimed at either state transportation agencies that own or operate specific assets, or at specific asset classes within the transportation system. They included guides to assess risk and vulnerability for highway assets, ferries, tunnels, and bridges. These asset-specific guides pro- vide valuable, current information to owners and operators. This multimodal guide builds upon these prior mode-specific efforts. Much of the transportation-focused risk assessment and risk management guidance avail- able today is asset or threat specific. These approaches to risk management have the following characteristics: • The analysis focuses on a specific asset or a select group of assets. • The approaches assume or require substantial knowledge of likely threat/hazard scenarios. • The approaches consider many possible scenarios that might disrupt transportation assets. These guides often require knowledge that the user may not possess or easily obtain and are typically specific to one transportation mode or asset class, such as bridges or tunnels. They are not designed to compare transportation assets across transportation modes, such as would be the case with vehicle fleets and tunnels. CAPTA, a strategic tool used to compare modes on an equitable basis for budgetary decisions, expands the tools available to transportation agencies to define their needs and determine an optimal distribution of funds. The CAPTA methodology provides a foundation for capital requests based on objective, transparent, defensible data and analysis. These well-thought-out requests made to a legislature or in response to a federal request for grant proposals will help transportation agencies acquire additional funding on the merits of the argument for assets that need resources. The CAPTA methodology helps manage internal resource allocation deci- sions among multiple modes by providing a means for analyzing needs through an equitable and transparent process that is applied consistently to all assets. The CAPTA methodology is designed primarily to be applied by practitioners at the state level. The spreadsheet through which CAPTA is implemented may be used separately, apart from this document. Part I of this report provides an overview of why this product was developed and the development process. The model is expected to be tested and improved through use. 7 C H A P T E R 1 Project Rationale and Approach

Overview of the CAPTA Methodology The CAPTA methodology provides a key advance in surface transportation risk assessment. CAPTA provides users with a capital planning and budgeting tool, used as a strategic point of departure for resource allocation decisions. It is intended as the first step undertaken by an agency in formulating risk allocation decisions. CAPTA enables an executive to base allocation decisions on objective data about assets and match that data to a consequence threshold set by the agency. This capability not only guides budgeting decisions, but can also direct decision makers toward assets and asset classes that merit further attention or study. CAPTA is intended for use by senior managers whose jurisdiction extends over multiple modes of transportation, multiple asset classes, and many individual assets. This methodology provides a means for moving across transportation assets to address system vulnerabilities that could result in significant losses given the threats and hazards of greatest concern. These losses, or consequences, could be casualties, loss of property, failure to provide services to the public successfully, or loss of public confidence in the use of existing infrastructure and facilities. These four areas of loss all represent risk to the transportation system. The level of risk that is of con- cern to the transportation owner/operator is explicitly brought forward through this process. CAPTA provides a transparent means of ranking assets relative to one another, avoiding reliance on subjective judgments wherever possible. CAPTA is consequence driven. This methodology begins by asking the transportation owner/operator to set an initial consequence “threshold,” indicated by the level of losses at which additional resources would likely be required. Subsequent analysis is completed iteratively by identifying (1) assets where losses would exceed the consequence threshold and (2) the coun- termeasures that could avoid or reduce the consequences. Users may choose to change the consequence threshold to focus resources on the highest consequence assets or vary thresholds among transportation modes to reflect variations in authority or responsibility for different modes or asset classes. This approach is ideally suited to the strategic, high-level planning under- taken by an executive with budgetary discretion. The executive faced with deciding where and how to spend funds can arrive very quickly at the most logical choices based on agency priorities and the characteristics of the assets. The process begins with the question of “What adverse consequences do I consider beyond our ability to handle through our normal operations and capital investments?” and then asks the user to indicate the types of threats and hazards of concern that might cause such losses. The user is not, however, expected to know all of the characteristics of potential threats and hazards (e.g., severity, frequency, capability, intent, and motivation). A consequence-based approach to capital allocation diverges from traditional risk management strategies in that it does not attempt to assess the likelihood of an event explicitly. In essence, the consequence-based approach assumes that if a decision maker perceives an event to be possible, and if the consequences are sufficiently severe, the decision maker must consider alternatives for avoiding or minimizing consequences should the event take place. The consequence-based approach is strategic, beginning with how an asset has been adversely affected regardless of why or how it became disabled. CAPTool allows senior managers to move through multiple iterations quickly by setting con- sequence thresholds for losses at levels that reflect levels of responsibility and available resources. The consequence threshold may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and among individual managers, depending on individual tolerance. Reasonable ranges of consequences are provided to guide the user in each of the following four consequence areas: • Potentially exposed population • Property loss 8 CAPTA Final Report

• Mission disruption • Social/cultural disruption The CAPTA methodology, as implemented in a spreadsheet (CAPTool), contains exam- ples and default values to assist the user in choosing consequence thresholds, identifying existing means for avoiding adverse consequences, choosing countermeasures that fill gaps in coverage, winnowing those choices through a cost analysis, and then packaging them for implementation. Basic Definitions The basic concepts of risk management combine an understanding of what makes an asset susceptible to damage from a hazard and an understanding of what makes an asset attractive to attack by people intent on malicious action. These vulnerabilities to attack and/or failure likely trigger a consequence composed of the loss of use of that asset and the loss of the benefit that accrues to users from the use of that asset. Traditional approaches to risk assessment typi- cally represent the frequency and severity of threats (intentional events) and hazards (natural or unintentional events) into a single factor in the general risk equation. Figure 1 illustrates the interaction of an asset with the elements of threat or hazard, vulnerability, and consequences (defined below): • Target/Asset. Persons, facilities, activities, or physical systems that have value to the owner or society as a whole. • Threat/Hazard. The potential natural event, or intentional or unintentional act, capable of disrupting or negatively impacting an asset. In the case of natural events, the hazard is the frequency and magnitude of a potentially destructive event. Hazards can be expressed in probabilistic terms where data are available. • Consequences. The loss or degradation of use of an asset resulting from a threat or hazard. Consequences may also be determined by loss of life (casualty). Mission-related consequences include destruction or damage causing real loss or reduction of functionality. Consequences grow as a function of an asset’s criticality. However, a critical asset may be damaged without total loss of functionality. • Vulnerability. A weakness in asset design or operations that is exposed to a hazard or can be exploited by a threat resulting in negative consequences. Specific hazards or threats may Project Rationale and Approach 9 Figure 1. Elements of risk management against hazards and threats.

expose or exploit different vulnerabilities. Note that an asset may be susceptible to hazards or threats that may increase its vulnerability, such as having publicly accessible information (e.g., drawings, schedules, secure areas) that could assist a terrorist in planning and executing a successful attack. Risk is a function of likelihood (hazard or threat plus vulnerability) and consequences of an adverse event affecting an asset and related stakeholders. It is represented in the following function: Where: Risk = the quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss that considers both the prob- ability that a hazard or threat will cause harm and the consequences of that event. T = hazard or threat in terms of likelihood or probability of occurrence of a specific hazard or threat, characterized by relevant dimensions (e.g., magnitude, strength). C = a measure of the consequences of damage, destruction, or other functional losses to a critical asset resulting from a natural or unintentional event or deliberate attack. V = a measure of relative susceptibility to the consequences of a hazard or threat. The specific quantitative relationship among the variables in the risk equation depends on how the factors are developed and expressed. Consequences and vulnerability of assets can be judged on a relative scale with upper and lower bounds or through analytical models that assess asset criticality in terms of potential casualties, economic impacts, or physical or operational vul- nerabilities; the probability of a terrorist attack is difficult to estimate in more than qualitative terms and may change over time based on changes in the intent and capability of the attacker and the political/cultural context that may make a particular asset more or less attractive to the terrorists at different points in time. As discussed below, the CAPTA methodology simply asks users to identify hazards and threats of greatest concern and does not require an estimate of like- lihood. Consequently, it does not attempt to provide a formal expression of “risk” as described in the risk equation shown above. Conversely, the CAPTA methodology assumes that the user is sufficiently knowledgeable of the potential hazards and threats to make an informed decision regarding which should be included in the analysis. Many of the approaches that emerged following the attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon attempted to apply risk assessment models that require estimates of likelihood and severity for threats and hazards of interest. These approaches gener- ally used subjective estimates of the threat likelihood or of the factors that contribute to likeli- hood (e.g., target value, threat capability, probability of detection) to determine a probability of successful attack (PSA). After reviewing these methods, the project team concluded that the level of uncertainty in these estimates is so great as to cause the team to question their utility in resource allocation, especially when specialized threat expertise is unavailable and the nature of the threat is likely to change in response to changes in the local, national, or global context. Countermeasures programs reduce risk by reducing the likelihood of or vulnerability to an attack or by reducing the consequences associated with a hazard or intentional attack that exploits these vulnerabilities. Risk Management Taxonomy The taxonomy of risks to multimodal transportation systems in terms of threats and hazards, shown in Figure 2, aids in understanding the nature of hazards (that may be natural and/or unin- tentional) or threats (that are intentional), their extent, and the potential strategies for managing Risk = f T C V( , , ) 10 CAPTA Final Report

risks or mitigating consequences. The taxonomy suggests that while any of the three types of events of interest can result in highly undesirable consequences, their mitigation is not identical. Risk management for natural events relies upon historical data. These sources include meteo- rological and seismic readings, which provide sufficient evidence of the frequency and severity of events over multiple decades. Historical data also allow a reasonable understanding of the potential consequences to transportation assets and activities. Because the frequency and severity of natural events is, for the most part, uncontrollable, risk management strategies involve • Design decisions that avoid such events or endure their effects (including where facilities are located); • Response preparation (i.e., planning, equipping, training, and exercising); • Monitoring both trends and rapidly evolving circumstances (e.g., weather patterns, seismic activity); • Warning; • Evacuation; and • Recovery. Unintentional events lead to significant adverse consequences. There are actuarial data regard- ing the frequency, nature, and other characteristics of these events from which countermeasures can and have been developed. Approaches to mitigating the consequences include reducing the frequency, the consequence, or both through re-design, more effective regulation and enforce- ment, and safer operations. Operational measures include better training and more robust response preparation and recovery implementation. Intentional events such as attacks and crime involve a threat that actively responds to risk man- agement strategies and countermeasure implementation. Active threats are constantly seeking to increase the probability that their attack is successful. Risk management for intentional events draws upon many of the approaches used in the other two types of events, enhanced by intelligence gathering, operational security, and a well-planned and -executed response. The response, includ- ing both rescue and law enforcement, needs to take into account the possibility of secondary attacks on response forces or elsewhere while first responders are diverted. Project Rationale and Approach 11 Figure 2. Taxonomy of threats and hazards for multi-modal transportation systems.

Methodology This CAPTA methodology employs a consequence-driven approach. This methodology begins with the user setting consequence thresholds for the first three of the four consequence areas: • Potentially exposed population • Property loss • Mission disruption Adverse social impact is not addressed explicitly, but the user may see this as extremely impor- tant for some assets and thus consider the adverse social impact to be sufficient cause for the asset to be classified as “critical” for resource allocation purposes. This initial focus on consequences guides the user to focus on outcomes rather than particu- lar assets or threats. Users need not know the cause for the loss or the scenario that led to the loss. The consequence-driven methodology evolved from a desire to limit required inputs to infor- mation accessible to users which, to the extent possible, is objective in nature. The focus is the loss of use of the asset or assets. Assumptions The consequence-based CAPTA methodology makes common sense assumptions about var- ious asset classes, threats and hazards, and countermeasures. The default values and assumptions embedded in the methodology are transparent and, in most cases, users have the opportunity to modify them to reflect local values. The CAPTA guide and tool recognize other guidance that covers the range of routine hazards or threats to transportation infrastructure and assets, such as equipment breakdowns, derail- ments, utility disruptions, criminal acts, and medical emergencies. The experience of transporta- tion operators in handling these minor incidents is already addressed in handbooks, manuals, and industry standards that are readily available. Wherever possible, references to these materials are noted in the text. Many are located at www.trb.org/securitypubs/. The following list contains individual examples of such materials: • TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525, Volume 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure (1). This guide focuses solely on tunnel assets. • “A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Pro- tection” (2). This document develops guidelines for assessing and mitigating vulnerabilities among highway assets. • “Risk Based Prioritization of Terrorist Threat Mitigation Measures on Bridges” (3). This guide, developed by FHWA, provides a standardized, detailed method to assess the vulnerabilities of specific bridge components. • NCHRP Report 526: Snow and Ice Control: Guidelines for Materials and Methods (4). • NCHRP Report 525, Volume 6: Guide for Emergency Transportation Operations (5). The CAPTA methodology makes the following additional assumptions: • The user takes the information provided by CAPTA as a capital budgeting prioritization tool, not as an asset-specific assessment tool. – The CAPTA process delineates assets or asset classes that are of high consequence to the user. This high-level delineation will allow the user to set aside budgetary resources on a rough order of magnitude. The user will then need to apply an asset-specific tool to discern how to use any resources provided to the high-consequence assets. 12 CAPTA Final Report

– The user follows analysis using CAPTA with an asset-specific assessment tool, which may include conducting a full engineering assessment that takes into account facility-specific conditions. • Nuclear hazards or threats are not addressed. These catastrophic threats require mitigation and response measures that are beyond the capacity of a transportation agency. • Cyber threats are not addressed. The evolving nature of cyber threats to the operating and con- trol systems of a transportation agency are best addressed by commercial vendors. Standard practice for any agency is to have a robust, up-to-date cyber security plan. • Routine inspection and maintenance issues are not addressed. These operational measures typically do not require high-level strategic capital allocation measures. • The user has available basic data about the assets to be considered under CAPTA, including physical features, cost, and typical usage of an asset. The information requested in the CAPTA Tool, or CAPTool, was specifically designed to incorporate data known to be readily available to transportation agencies. The project team confirmed the widespread availability of these data. • CAPTA will not provide a cost–benefit analysis for any countermeasure. Cost data for coun- termeasures applied for risk mitigation may be quantified. Benefit data, however, are based largely on assumptions regarding the effectiveness of a countermeasure in avoiding or miti- gating the effects of an event. Moreover, these assumptions may be about an adverse event that may never have occurred, and is unlikely to occur. Such assumptions are most common for intentional acts and for operational measures arrayed against a range of threats. Engineered measures have a more reliable data record on which to base an estimate of benefit; however, such tools must be based on a specific measure for specific asset analysis. This kind of specific tactical analysis is beyond the scope of the CAPTA methodology, and any user wishing to pursue such an analysis may benefit from using an asset-specific risk tool. Defining the Problem and Implementing the Solutions The loss of a high-consequence transportation asset could result in casualties, billions of dollars worth of direct reconstruction costs, economic losses, and mission failure for responsible agencies. However, resources do not exist to safeguard every asset owned or operated by an agency. CAPTA attempts to bridge this gap, providing a transparent means to prioritize multimodal assets for resource allocation. Making transportation systems safe and secure is a complex problem that requires balancing mobility, access, and personal freedom with access control, intelligence gathering, screening, and other means. This guide and accompanying computer-based tool provide a resource that transportation own- ers and operators can use in addressing this challenging problem. The most critical element of suc- cess for the CAPTA product is to place the tool in the hands of concerned users so that they can be more effective in evaluating multiple modes of transportation. Transportation industry associations and professional organizations are the natural choices for disseminating this approach. Agencies and associations critical to disseminating this new methodology include those listed in Table 2. Risk and Consequence CAPTA focuses on an explicit challenge to agency management in its planning and budgeting activities. CAPTA encompasses the set of risks flowing from natural hazards and unintentional or intentional events that are not already part of mainstreamed design and standard operational practices. Recent terrorist threats and major natural disasters have stimulated concern over the wide range of risks faced by transportation modes. CAPTA emphasizes the potentially severe consequences from such major events and is an effort to further mainstream risk and security Project Rationale and Approach 13

procedures in an agency, as is already the case for worker safety, traffic incident management, and routine weather events such as snow and ice storms. CAPTA’s risk management process focuses on specific threats and hazards with the following characteristics: • These threats and hazards can cause significant damage to transportation assets and mission or loss of life. • Designed/engineered and operational measures to reduce the risk of these threats and hazards are not yet “mainstreamed” in conventional transportation agency practice. • Reasonable and practical consequence-reducing countermeasures to these threats and hazards are available. In keeping with the above approach, CAPTA uses consequence thresholds (for life, property, and mission) to focus risk management only on asset and hazard or threat combinations that merit risk reduction investment at the program planning level. CAPTA defines transportation hazards or threats and the asset classes included in this analysis at generalized levels. These inter- pretations relate both to their potential for significant consequences and to the applicability of countermeasures. This generalization allows the user to move quickly to the issues that are of primary concern regardless of transportation mode, location, or use. This approach relieves the user of the burden of estimating probabilities related to specific threats and hazards or the like- lihood that specific assets are affected. The countermeasure-oriented database relates potential countermeasure strategies directly to consequences and assets. The modest level of effort involved in using CAPTA is intended to encourage mainstream- ing an integrated, high-level, all-hazard, NIMS-responsive, multimodal risk management process into major transportation agency programs and activities. CAPTA also provides the departure point for applying asset-specific vulnerability assessment and countermeasure guides for asset-specific design and cost estimation. Institutional Context for Risk Management The guide does not yield designs or design specifications, but acknowledges sources for more detailed asset-specific countermeasure guidance that exists for each mode. These sources include • The United States Coast Guard (DHS) for maritime assets; • The Office of Grants and Training (DHS) and the Federal Transit Administration (U.S.DOT) for transit; 14 CAPTA Final Report Table 2. Transportation agencies/associations and audiences to whom they can disseminate CAPTool. Agency or Association Audience AASHTO and American Railway Engineering and Maintenance Association (AREMA) State departments of transportation (DOTs), county highway departments, local transportation authorities, and railroads American Public Transportation Association (APTA) Transit agencies U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S.DOT) Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Port authorities, turnpike authorities, and bridge and tunnel authorities American Underground Construction Association (AUA), American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) Membership

• The Transportation Security Administration (DHS) for general aviation; and • The Federal Highway Administration (U.S.DOT), state DOTs, and the NCHRP for highways, bridges and tunnels. Risk management decisions require different information and analysis depending upon the nature of the decision, the organizational level at which the decision is made, and the agency or entity making the decision. Multimodal transportation systems typically cross agency and juris- dictional boundaries, and multiple entities are often involved in managing and operating the facilities or systems. As illustrated in Figure 3, state DOTs work within the context of state and federal funding sources, multiple response agencies, and multiple local authorities. They must be capable of both justifying capital resource requests and allocating existing resources wisely. The guide is intended to assist state DOTs and others in both of these areas. Figure 3 does not show specific authorities or a chain of command because of the differences among jurisdictions. It illustrates the complexities of seeking and allocating resources when mul- tiple agencies and jurisdictions have interests in preparing for and responding to hazards and threats. What is most important about these relationships is that risk management decisions must be coordinated across multiple agencies and jurisdictions if they are to result in the efficient use of the limited resources available at federal, state, regional, and local levels of government. The data model developed to support the CAPTA is the integrating mechanism among multi- ple modes and the variety of assets, hazards, and threats associated with these modes. The CAPTA model provides the user with a convenient interface for accessing the data used to implement the methodology. Project Rationale and Approach 15 US Department of Transportation US Department of Homeland Security Regional Emergency Management Entities State Governor’s Office State Emergency Management State & Local Authorities (road, transit, rail, etc.)State DOTs (some withmultimodal scope) Figure 3. Government levels for risk management resource allocation decisions.

Alternative Approaches The CAPTA methodology reflects a development path guided by user requirements and current practice in risk assessment. Candidate alternative approaches that were considered but ultimately found unusable or unsustainable are summarized below. Subjective Weighting of Threats or Hazards versus Asset Scoring Many existing risk assessment methods require extensive weighting schemes to achieve rela- tive ranking of threats or hazards and assets. These weight schemes are initiated by gatherings of agency subject matter experts with the institutional knowledge to judge what assets may need mitigation from what threats or hazards. The process is subjective, with rankings subject to influ- ence by institutional biases and parochial thinking. Initial efforts of the project team focused on this type of process but restricted the expert input needed to perform the analysis. This approach proved to be more complex and to require more data than was desired by the NCHRP project panel. After discussing this option, the project team and the panel chose to move the approach towards transparency and objective data inputs, relying on expert judgments as little as possible. Cost–Benefit Analysis for Countermeasures The project team initially sought ways to include an objective cost–benefit analysis of candi- date countermeasures as part of the methodology. This conflicted directly with the panel’s and project team’s intentions to keep the model a high-level executive decision tool. A high-level model such as CAPTA lacks the detailed data for a credible cost–benefit assessment. More important, the effectiveness of countermeasures against intentional attacks is speculative at best because of the responsive and reactive nature of postulated threats. The project team, therefore, chose to provide cost information for countermeasures deemed generally useful in countering identified hazards and threats but chose not to quantify the change in risk associated with specific counter- measures. This decision was reached with the knowledge that one type of countermeasure, those applicable to natural hazards, does have quantifiable benefits because frequency and severity can be derived from actuarial data. For example, if based upon historical data, a blizzard is likely to affect a geographical area twice per season on average, the expected number of ticket holders and riders along affected rail lines can be estimated. Implementing a snow and ice melting system along the track, at a known cost, can be compared to potential lost revenue, and investments can then be made accordingly. In cases such as this, the factors needed to perform a cost–benefit analysis are known with adequate preci- sion, including the capital and operating costs, the benefit (in terms of expected revenue recovered), and the frequency of the event. 16 C H A P T E R 2 CAPTA Development Path

Quality data and quantifiable benefits did not exist for the full range of threats, hazards, and mit- igation measures examined within CAPTA. The project team eventually concluded that any attempt to include a cost–benefit analysis in the methodology would result in a model that most state DOTs and transportation agencies could not or would not administer without external assistance. Development of the CAPTA Methodology CAPTA Within the Context of Existing Risk Assessment Literature CAPTA evolved from “A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Iden- tification and Protection” and incorporates lessons learned since that document was published in 2002 (2). In subsequent years, federal agencies and other transportation authorities have brought ground-level experience into the application of risk management and assessment products, and excellent guides that focus on assets associated with specific modes have been introduced. These mode-specific guides were examined during the design of this multimodal guide, and elements of those previous guides influenced the development of CAPTA. The initial objective of this guide was to update the previously referenced 2002 Guide, pub- lished shortly after the September 11th attacks. That effort was the first to help transportation agencies prioritize critical and vulnerable assets, focusing exclusively on highway assets and pri- marily on vulnerabilities to intentional attacks on highway-related infrastructure. During consultation, the NCHRP project panel and the project team agreed to simplify the approach and focus more on the consequences of an event rather than the cause of the event. This approach is closer to the reality of a transportation operation. In this, the operator is very con- cerned about the loss of use of assets and systems and less concerned about how they came to be disrupted. The operator knows whether or not an asset or system is functioning properly and, if it is not, the operator’s primary concern is how quickly it can become operational. The causes for the disruption are normally apparent after post-event investigation. In light of this transportation reality, the CAPTA methodology begins with the consequences resulting from the loss or significant degradation of an asset or mode. Compared to previous assessment methodologies, this loss of use factor closely parallels criticality, although it places less emphasis on vulnerability assessment, because that tends to be more asset specific. The definition of consequence is designed to help owners and operators to answer the questions “What are the outcomes (consequences) that concern me most? What worries me most?” Figure 4 demonstrates the role of the CAPTA methodology. CAPTA is the first step in a multi- step approach to risk assessment and consequence management in the transportation environment. Based on the results of the CAPTA application, the user would proceed to asset- or mode-specific assessment methodologies that could be used to determine more specific vulnerabilities and mitigation measures. The simplifications of the CAPTA model make possible a useable tool for planning and bud- geting purposes. The tool can yield resource estimates that can be varied based on variations in consequence thresholds. CAPTA helps users minimize resource needs through integration with existing risk reduction practices. This synergy is achieved by allowing users to give priority to adding incremental or multipurpose capital measures for moderate- to high-consequence, moderate- frequency events, and implementing temporary operational measures for high-consequence, low-frequency events. The effort by agencies to dedicate resources is often predicated by the con- fluence of expected consequences and the likelihood (frequency) of occurrence. In other words, standard operating procedures are ordinarily sufficient to handle low-frequency, low-consequence events; however, escalating potential consequences require significantly greater dedication of resources to mitigate or prevent. CAPTA Development Path 17

The decision of when to deploy an operational measure rather than build or install a capital asset is difficult to ascertain. CAPTA attempts to ease that decision by providing a prioritization system for all assets based on the intuitive thresholds for consequence set by the user and the funding available. Testing During development, the CAPTA methodology was demonstrated to transportation officials in Virginia, Maryland, Kansas, and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) in Boston. There, as with other jurisdictions, the methodology was well received and noted as being the missing link between asset-specific risk assessment methodologies and capital budget prioritizations. CAPTA and the Data Model CAPTA consists of a written document that describes the methodology (Part II of this report) and an electronic spreadsheet, CAPTool (available on the TRB website: www.trb.org/news/blurb_ detail.asp?id=9579), that contains the user interface and the data model. These components work together to increase users’ knowledge and their ability to work through the methodology efficiently. CAPTool manages the interaction between user preferences and prescribed definitions of con- sequences, threats and hazards, assets, and countermeasures using static displays. The data model contains all the formulae, definitions, and parameters needed to use CAPTA. Part II of this report contains a step-by-step CAPTool user guide to move the user through the electronic spreadsheet model. The references and diagrams help the reader understand the interactive data model. Figure 5 illustrates the interaction between user inputs, the assessment methodology, and the countermeasures database. 18 CAPTA Final Report Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) Surface Transportation Security, Volume 6: Guide for Emergency Transportation Operations (NCHRP Report 525 Volume 6) TCRP Report 86 Volume 11 Security Measures for Ferry Systems NCHRP 20-59(23), A Guide to Emergency Response Planning at State Transportation Agencies DHS Special Jurisdictions (DHS) Transportation Security, Volume 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure (NCHRP Report 525 Volume 12) Report To Congress On Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation, (FHWA/DHS) Other Asset, Mode, Threat, Hazard, or Sector Specific Guidance 2002 AASHTO Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection Figure 4. CAPTA relationship to asset-specific guides.

The data model allows the user to repeat the six-step process quickly and repeatedly. The inclusion of data, formulae, and definitions provides a consistency of thought and application of CAPTA by any user. Key Model Components The CAPTA risk management methodology and supporting database emanate from a set of definitions and classifications relating to consequence; consequence-related threats and hazards; threatened assets; and relevant, possible countermeasures. As a high-level budgeting tool, there is a trade-off between level of detail and CAPTA utility. More detailed analysis is intended to occur in conjunction with asset-specific tools. Taxonomy Level of Detail and Desegregation CAPTA draws on previous experience in applying risk management methods for various modes, including the experiences of the authors. The focus of existing methods (previously dis- cussed) allowed CAPTA to move in a different direction with the following key features: • CAPTA uses consequence thresholds to limit the risk relevant to threats or hazards, assets, and countermeasures. For example, a moderate consequence threshold concerning the replace- ment cost of an asset eliminates the need to consider threats and assets that cannot combine to achieve a substantial monetary value. • CAPTA classifies assets at a high generic level, through asset classes in which a single class can represent assets present in multiple modes. For example, an administrative and support facil- ity can be found in transit, road, general aviation, and ferry modes of transportation. • Threats and hazards are limited to – Those not currently institutionalized within an agency. Institutionalized hazards include mechanical failure, crashes, and ordinary weather events; – Those expected to have a significant casualty, property damage, or long-term (25+ hours) mission impact; CAPTA Development Path 19 Master Countermeasures Data Base Description of generic countermeasures considered effective in mitigating risks by asset class, hazard or threat, and consequence. Risk Management Methodology Six step methodology implemented using Microsoft Excel® spreadsheet to capture inputs and display intermediate outputs User Inputs Asset Classes of Interest Threats/Hazards of Concern Consequence Thresholds Asset Attributes within Classes Countermeasure Selection Candidate Countermeasure Configurations List of selected countermeasures that will reduce risks to asset classes of interest against threats/hazards of concern to avoid exceeding specified consequence threshold Description of selected countermeasures including rough order of magnitude costs and selected functional characteristics Potential Countermeasures Consolidated User Inputs Countermeasure attributes Candidate Countermeasures User Inputs Figure 5. CAPTA data model environment.

– Those that may present currently unbudgeted liabilities. Institutionalized hazards, miti- gated by a highly advanced state of practice, are not included; and – Those that have already occurred or are likely to occur to a transportation operator. These include events that would impact the owner’s planning and budgeting. The material that follows describes the taxonomies built into the methodology and database. Relevant Consequences CAPTA examines risk beginning with consequence. The consequence threshold is a linchpin for use of CAPTA in capital allocation decisions. Establishing a consequence threshold for plan- ning and resource allocation purposes rather than focusing on assets, specific hazards, or threats simplifies the risk management process. This focuses attention on significant, relevant assets, eliminating from further consideration those assets or asset classes whose loss of use would not exceed consequence thresholds, regardless of the hazard or threat. The user may then focus on high-consequence assets that may experience multiple hazards or threats. The consequence threshold identifies assets or asset classes to be included and the extent to which the hazards and threats identified in Step 1 are retained in the assessment. Consequence thresholds are not consistent throughout the United States. Regional and local vari- ation in tolerance to risk, social or funding priorities, and the owners’ institutional experience com- bine to provide different levels of risk acceptance. This history and these individual experiences are reflected in the users’ choice of what consequences they choose to use in their assessment. It is not expected that thresholds for potentially exposed population (casualty), property loss, or mission dis- ruption would be the same for urban systems versus rural communities, or for transit systems with rail services versus bus-only agencies. CAPTA provides objective data points and formulae to set consequence thresholds, limiting users’ subjective inputs to achieve consistency. These consistent results allow for clearer interpretation during planning and budgeting processes. The consequence threshold is the planning factor used to set the level of consequences at which the decision maker or agency assumes greater responsibility for managing the risk. Thresholds represent the point at which either the potential casualties, property loss, mission disruption, economic disruption, and/or public reaction is such that the responsible agency must consider allocating resources above and beyond those typically included in operating budgets to prevent or mitigate the effects of the hazard or postulated threat. CAPTA consolidates consequences along four key areas: • Potentially Exposed Population (fatalities and injuries). This consequence is the surrogate for casualties; it is concerned with the number of people who may become casualties. Occu- pancy limits, or capacity, is a surrogate data point for this category. • Property Loss. This concerns the cost to repair or rebuild a damaged or destroyed structure. These monetary estimates are standardized unit cost estimates based upon square or linear footage of an asset, or an amount provided by the user for specially designed structures such as a cable stay bridge. • Mission Disruption. This concerns the adverse impact on the transportation system due to the loss of the functionality of an asset. Because they indicate the redundancy of the road and rail networks, detour lengths to and from a disabled asset are used as a surrogate for mission disruption level. Detour length is readily available in current agency databases for bridges and tunnels. Transit facilities are assessed using ridership levels of an asset. • Social Effects. The social consequence reflects how the population might respond to the event through significant behavioral changes. These behavioral changes may include fear of travel or avoidance of a transportation mode or route. Fear and avoidance of transportation modes will lead to a decrease of commercial activity. There may also be adverse reaction by the pub- lic to the imposition of security measures, such as personal searches, needed to prevent a dis- ruption or mitigate the effects of a disruption. CAPTA does not determine this consequence 20 CAPTA Final Report

directly, but provides a manual opportunity for the user to input an asset for consideration. The manual entry is left to the users, as only they can know local conditions, mood, and the emotional appeal of an asset, such as a landmark bridge. Selection of thresholds is an iterative process, given the high cost of some measures and scarce resources in transportation agencies. The CAPTA methodology encourages the user to move back and forth through the steps to examine the effects of different consequence threshold lev- els and the various measures available to mitigate the consequences of an event. The selection of a certain threshold for potentially exposed population, property loss, or mis- sion disruption does not explicitly suggest that losses below this level are unimportant or incon- sequential. Threshold consequences should be chosen in relation to resources available to the agency to respond to the threat or hazard, replace or repair damaged or destroyed property, or complete the mission of moving people and goods to and from destinations. The selection of proper threshold consequence levels in CAPTA will allow users to identify a result (consequence) beyond which additional investments in countermeasures are required. Relevant Threats and Hazards Risk management is not new to transportation system owners and operators. State DOTs, transit operators, bridge and tunnel authorities, seaport and airport authorities, ferry operators, railroads, and state and local public safety agencies all have experience in handling risks to their assets. The localized independence of these owners ensured that there has been a difference in both planning for risk and formalizing risk management. These major disruptions may be inten- tional to produce terror or the result of a natural disaster. Figure 6 illustrates threats and hazards as a risk management spectrum in terms of the mag- nitude of consequence, the current level of preparedness, and the degree of coordination needed CAPTA Development Path 21 Source: SAIC (2). Increasing Consequence Figure 6. Range of threats and hazards to multimodal transportation systems.

to address these risks. The figure implies that, as the severity of the event increases (to the right) the frequency of the event decreases. Frequent hazards, such as major snowstorms, have a rou- tine response borne of regular implementation. Force majeure events such as earthquakes, hur- ricanes, and terrorist acts are at the less frequent but more complex end of this spectrum and result in mass casualties, significant property loss, and broad-based economic disruption. This last category also represents a special danger due to the infrequency of such events and a lack of institutional memory concerning how to handle them. Balancing frequent, routine events with less frequent, severe events, many transportation agencies struggle to integrate risk assessment and strategic security with other conventional agency activities into an institutionalized program. Current institutionalized activities include developing policies and protocols to handle traffic incidents, crime, and probable natural events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods. They also include institutional knowledge and the experience of personnel, which contribute to the mainstreaming or routinization of the tasks. The agencies face a challenge in establishing a program to incorporate consequence-based assess- ment as part and parcel of an agency program, allowing objective budgetary allocation. 22 CAPTA Final Report

Asset Categories CAPTA distills the modes and asset classes found in the transportation field to a manageable yet reasonably comprehensive number. Individual vehicles are not included as a separate asset class. Individual mobile assets are vulnerable to many threats and hazards, all of which have been well documented and analyzed. There are known conventional countermeasures that can be applied by owner-operators to increase the safety of a vehicle or the security of a rail car. Emerging technolo- gies that increase the safety and security of the individual vehicle continue to evolve. Assets and asset classes are aggregated into eight major asset categories: road bridges, road tun- nels, transit/rail bridges, transit/rail tunnels, transit/rail stations, administrative and support facilities, ferries, and fleets. Road Bridges Road bridges include any aerial structure designed to carry vehicular traffic across a body of water or land. This category is most effective when used to capture structures whose length spans greater than one beam. Structures that can not be readily replaced or repaired by existing agency maintenance personnel should be included. Road Tunnels Road tunnels include all bored, mined, or immersed tunnels that convey rubber tire vehicles, buses, and trucks. Road tunnels may be aggregated by length, although subaqueous tunnels should be named separately. Transit/Rail Bridges The transit/rail bridges category is intended to capture all raised aerial structures designed to carry rail rolling stock. The assumption is that a rail vehicle could not be readily rerouted around a stricken structure, and neither repair nor replacement could be readily achieved. Transit/Rail Tunnels A transit system with a major rail capability is likely to have an extensive network of tun- nels. Care should be given to collect the network into classes of tunnels for evaluation in CAPTA. Similarities in building type, length, or other characteristics should allow an aggregation. Subaqueous tunnels should always be named in CAPTA, not entered as part of a class. The expected unique characteristics and high cost of a subaqueous tunnel merit specific consideration in CAPTA. 23 C H A P T E R 3 CAPTA Components

Transit/Rail Stations Transit or rail stations can be aggregated into classes to ease consideration in CAPTA. Length of platform, capacity, and building type can serve as common characteristics for a class. High capacity or transfer stations handling a high percentage of ridership may be entered as single assets. Administrative and Support Facilities This category is intended to capture all fixed asset facilities a transportation operator may own or operate, with the exception of transit or rail stations. The fixed facilities in this category may range from executives’ offices to airside passenger terminals. Particular attention may be given to the following examples of fixed facilities: • Operations Control Center. Any facility designed, constructed, and equipped with systems intended to monitor and control the transportation environment and the movement of vehicle and rail traffic over and through a transportation section. • Substation. Any facility specifically designed to transfer power or water, or provide sewer con- nections between the transportation system and the central utility building. The substation is connected to the utility building and the transportation system via distribution channels but is not the primary source of power, water, or other resources. • Utility Building. Any facility specifically designed to provide power to the transportation sys- tem. This facility is operated continuously to achieve its mission, and is connected to both sub- stations and the transportation system through a distribution channel. A utility building may also be designed to provide water or sewer removal from the transportation infrastructure (e.g., using pumps, drainage). Ferries This category is intended to capture any passenger-loaded vessel. The size of the vessel does not matter. In the rare cases where ferries constitute a significant portion of the transportation agency’s passenger capacity, an effort should be made to separate the vessels into classes. Fleets Fleets may encompass any regularly used individual passenger vehicle. The most common assets in this category will be buses and passenger transit/rail cars. The base unit for this category is one asset, whereby a train may consist of four to six individual fleet cars. The similarities of fleet vehicles readily lend themselves to groupings into classes. Hazards/Threats All hazards or threats to a transportation system are intentional, unintentional, or a natu- ral hazard. An unintentional hazard describes an action of which there was no predetermined intent to adversely impact the transportation, its users, or associated infrastructure. The sources of an unintentional hazard may be human, but human involvement is not wholly necessary and may be only incidental to the hazard presented by an inanimate object or acts of nature. Unintentional hazards are common to a transportation system. Such hazards include fire, power loss, or equipment breakdown. Unintentional hazards also include structural failure. Many unintentional hazards impact the safety of the below-grade transportation asset, employees, and passengers. An intentional threat is one emanating from the deliberate intent of a person or group to dis- rupt the transportation asset. Normally, this deliberate intent cannot be replicated in nature or through a series of organic happenstances. Intentional threats directly affect the security of the 24 CAPTA Final Report

asset. Intentional threat events, such as introducing an explosive or chemical agent, present an uncertain and threatening element into the system. Any explosive or chemical agent has the capacity to wreak havoc upon the transportation system and close it down for an extended period. These disruptions are second to the loss of life and injuries that may result from the successful delivery of a primary threat. Historical evidence shows that key decision-making factors in plotting the location of a terrorist attack are the aggressors’ ability to inflict personal damage and the ability to generate publicity. Hazards or threats that will adversely affect the normal operation of a transportation asset and its associated infrastructure are listed in Table 3. Hazards or threats have the potential or proven capability to close a transportation system or to deprive transportation customers of the beneficial use of the facility. The hazards or threats are intended to include categories applicable to highway, rail, air, and water transportation systems. However, the needs of these modes are not exact, and neither are their points of vulnerability and access. All hazards or threats used in the CAPTA process constitute an actual or postulated event. All hazards or threats considered in depth are capable of disrupting an asset or mode of transportation for an extended period lasting greater than 25 hours. These severe events are outside the realm of hazards or threats that a transportation operator routinely handles, such as equipment break- down, utility disruptions, criminal acts, and medical emergencies. The experiences of trans- portation operators in handling these minor incidents are available in learned lessons handbooks and procedural reference materials. Where possible, additional reference material concerning these minor hazards or threats has been noted in this report. Events that are unlikely and extraordinary have also been excluded. These include highly unlikely aggressive events such as a nuclear detonation. Extraordinary airborne hazards or threats are excluded because of the remote likelihood of such an event targeting a transportation asset, CAPTA Components 25 Intent Threats/Hazards Small explosive devices (fewer than 250 lbs TNT or equivalent) Large explosive devices (greater than 500 lbs TNT or equivalent) Chemical/biological/radiological agents Intentional Criminal acts Fire Power loss Equipment breakdown Structural failure Unintentional Hazardous Material Flood Earthquake Extreme weather Natural Mud/Landslide Table 3. Hazards or threats to transportation assets across multiple modes.

and the diminished likelihood of the success of such a threat. The hazards or threats discussed in detail are those with a reasonable probability of occurring, or those emanating from available intelligence. There is no guarantee that a transportation operator would face one of these hazards or threats by itself, or in conjunction with another hazard or threat. All transportation operators would find difficulty responding to multiple or coordinated attacks. Manpower and resource limitations would require a triage of priorities in the multiple scenario attack. The greatest asset in preparing for a coordinated, multisite, or multiphased attack would be for a transportation operator to have accurate intelligence that allows time for adequate prepa- ration. This intelligence is extraordinarily difficult to obtain. The transportation operator may in turn accept the possibility of multiple attacks by assembling deterrence, response, and miti- gation measures for the specified scenarios. Taken individually, the scenarios can be prepared for by assembling an adequate defensive posture for all. Recommendations discussed later in this report will outline actions that can improve the defensive posture of the transportation system across several hazards or threats. As an example, if the transportation operator has prepared for an attack on the control center, then the operator is in the best position to withstand an attack on both the control center and on another transportation asset. There are eleven major category groupings for hazards or threats in the CAPTA methodology. All categories have the capability to disable a transportation system for an extended period. The categories are further grouped by intentionality. Some categories, such as fire, may be intentional or unintentional, but have been grouped according to which is more likely to occur. These categories are known or postulated to rail, waterborne, and vehicular transportation. To varying degrees, these cases have occurred in the United States; they will present themselves again. Their capability to disrupt a transportation system is proven; however, their detrimental effects upon the transportation system, equipment, and users may be remediated. Intentional Threats Explosive devices and the introduction of chemical/biological/radiological agents are prohib- ited and defined under United States Code Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B. The destructive powers of various explosive devices are explained in Table 4. Introduction of Small Explosive Devices Small explosive devices contain fewer than 250 lbs of TNT or equivalent. Delivery is by one to five persons transporting the payload. Introduction of Large Explosive Devices Large explosive devices contain greater than 500 lbs of TNT or equivalent. The method of delivery is either by vehicle or through multiple persons acting in concert to transport the payload. Introduction of Chemical/Biological/Radiological Agents Chemical/biological/radiological (C/B/R) agents are gases, liquids, or solids introduced with the intent of causing physical harm or property loss. Criminal Acts This lower intensity threat represents the range of illegal activities as defined by federal code, state statute, or local ordinance. Examples of criminal acts include handgun violence and illegal discharge of hazardous waste. 26 CAPTA Final Report

Unintentional Hazards Fire Fire sources may be disparate and triggered by any combination of flammable material and ignition. Fire may result from happenstance and does not require an intentional act to occur. Fire, or the pre-fire hazard of smoke, will immediately have a negative impact upon all trans- portation assets by inducing the evacuation of persons and equipment within the structure and surrounding areas. Fire and smoke will decrease visibility to unsafe levels, precipitate collision of vehicles and equipment, and cause personal injury. A fire controlled by firefighting may still result in smoke and water damage at a level sufficient to render a transportation asset unfit for use or occupancy. Structural Failure Structure failure refers to any decrease in the physical integrity of the transportation asset to bear the weight required to carry passengers or freight. The loss of physical integrity requires the asset to be inspected by the transportation owner and major repairs to be completed before it can be reopened for beneficial use by the public. CAPTA Components 27 Threat Description Explosives Massa (TNT equivalent) Building Evacuation Distanceb Outdoor Evacuation Distancec Pipe Bomb 5.0 lbs 2.3 kg 70 ft 21 m 850 ft 259 m Suicide Belt 10.0 lbs 4.5 kg 90 ft 27 m 1,080 ft 330 m Suicide Vest 20 lbs 9 kg 110 ft 34 m 1,360 ft 415 m Briefcase/ Suitcase Bomb 50 lbs 23 kg 150 ft 46 m 1,850 ft 564 m Compact Sedan 500 lbs 227 kg 320 ft 98 m 1,500 ft 457 m Sedan 1,000 lbs 454 kg 400 ft 122 m 1,750 ft 534 m Passenger/Cargo Van 4,000 lbs 1,814 kg 640 ft 195 m 2,750 ft 838 m Small Moving Van/ Delivery Truck 10,000 lbs 4,536 kg 860 ft 263 m 3,750 ft 1,143 m Moving Van/ Water Truck 30,000 lbs 13,608 kg 1,240 ft 375 m 6,500 ft 1,982 m Semi-trailer 60,000 lbs 27,216 kg 1,570 ft 475 m 7,000 ft 2,134 m aBased on the maximum amount of material that could reasonably fit into a container or vehicle. Variations possible. bGoverned by the ability of an unreinforced building to withstand severe damage or collapse. cGoverned by the greater of fragment throw distance or glass breakage/falling glass hazard distance. These distances can be reduced for personnel wearing ballistic protection. Note that the pipe bomb, suicide belt/vest and briefcase/suitcase bomb are assumed to have a fragmentation characteristic that requires greater standoff distances than an equal amount of explosives in a vehicle. Source: Protection of Assets Manual (7). Table 4. High explosives danger and evacuation distances.

Structural failure may be sudden or gradual. The scope of this hazard or threat may be minimal, such as a crack in the wall requiring remediation or a pavement ripple requiring the temporary relocation of traffic. Integrity loss may also be catastrophic, resulting in total collapse or flooding of a structure, wreaking widespread loss of assets and loss of life. Despite the best efforts of engineering and maintenance, the potential hazard or threat of a structural failure will always exist. There is no known method to guarantee that a structure will never fail or deteriorate. Proper design, construction, and maintenance may drastically decline the likelihood of a sudden failure; however, unseen geotechnical or aquatic forces may go undetected by asset owners. Inconsistencies and lapses in the design, construction, and maintenance of an asset may collude to create the conditions for a sudden structural failure. Hazardous Materials Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) may be in liquid, solid, or gaseous form. The quantity of material introduced may be minimal but cause a hazard to users of the transportation system. Hazardous materials include common industrial cleaners used by transportation workers and canisters of pepper spray set off by transit users. In both circumstances, it is unlikely that the maintenance worker or the commuter entered the transportation system with the intent of discharging material into the air. Materials may also include hazardous liquid, which include debris or waste products moved into the transportation system by a vehicle, truck, or rail car. All hazardous materials require specialized remediation that will close a roadway or transit segment to allow processing. Natural Hazards Flood Flooding of an asset is the condition of excessive water inflow that exceeds the engineered pumping capacity and causes a hazard or threat to persons and property. Flooding is typically caused by a calamitous weather event; however, it may be caused by defective pipeline transfer. Earthquake An earthquake is a seismic anomaly that weakens the fitness of a structure to standards less than those designed and intended by the owner. The earthquake will present a hazard to trans- portation users while it is occurring, because of flying debris and geotechnical instability. The earthquake may present a hazard upon its conclusion by weakening assets such that they are no longer usable. Extreme Weather This category includes all means and methods of extreme wind, rainwater, snow, ice, or other act of God that is unusual for its ferocity. An extreme weather event will be characterized by • Exhaustion of all available equipment previously assembled for remediation; and • Exceeding of all planning thresholds in place at a transportation agency for the conditions of snow, ice, wind, water, and other acts of God. This characteristic would normally include exceeding the “100-year storm” guidance gathered through observation. Mud/Landslide The decrease in soil properties, undermined by water or geotechnical shift may prompt the sudden massive movement of soil causing actual or potential harm to persons and property. The most common historical data in this category involve soil shifts onto roadways or rail facilities because of wet conditions. 28 CAPTA Final Report

Consequence Threshold A critical determinant in CAPTA is the capacity of an asset to exceed the threshold consequence levels determined by the user. Presented in Table 5, and implemented in the CAPTool spreadsheet model, these consequence thresholds are surrogates and equations used to determine if an asset or asset category exceeds the threshold and will be included in further analysis as a high-consequence asset. The equations in Table 5 are derived from information provided in publications from known sources, such as standards and guidance promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association (e.g., NFPA 101: Life Safety Code® (8) and NFPA 130: Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail (9)); the applied expert knowledge of practitioners; and available cost data provided by professional engineers from Parsons Brinckerhoff. The distinct differentiation between potentially exposed populations (PEP), property, and mission is highlighted within the equation box. This series of equations is used to determine if an asset exceeds a threshold requirement and will be considered for countermeasure application. CAPTA Components 29 Table 5. Threshold consequence determination. Asset Potentially Exposed Population Equation Property Equation Mission Equation Road Bridges Separated into primary direction and secondary direction—for each, if vehicles/lane > 2400, assume 40 vehicles/ 1000 ft. Otherwise assume 7.5 vehicles/ 1000 fta $20,000/lf (ADT) (detour length) 75th, 85th, 95th percentile as thresholds relative to typical bridge inventory (Example is based on the National Bridge Inventory) Road Tunnels Separated into primary direction and secondary direction—for each, if vehicles/lane > 2400, assume 40 vehicles/ 1000 ft. Otherwise assume 7.5 vehicles/ 1000 fta $100,000/lf User input for criticality Transit/Rail Station 4 (maximum capacity of rail cars)b Below ground = critical User input if transfer station is critical Transit/Rail Bridge 2 (maximum capacity of rail cars)b $15,600/lf User input percentage of ridership that regularly use this transit/rail transportation asset Transit/Rail Tunnel 2 (maximum capacity of rail cars)b $40,000/lf User input percentage of ridership that regularly use this transit/rail transportation asset Administrative & Support Facilities 1 person/175 sq ftc $210/sq ft Never critical unless so designated by user Ferries Maximum capacity of ferry User input Never critical unless so designated by user Fleets Maximum occupancy of one fleet vehicle Average cost per vehicle maximum number of vehicles Never critical unless so designated by user a Derived from the Highway Capacity Manual (10). b Derived from NFPA 130: Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail (9). c Derived from NFPA 101: Life Safety Code (8).

The judgments expressed within the equation box represent evaluation by the project team of current expert guidance principles for traffic engineering, transit rail safety, NFPA guidelines, and the cost estimates of professional engineers specific to this study. There are three special inclusions within the threshold equation, for which strict numerical evaluation was not the logical process to follow. These inclusions were weighted by • Scarcity of consistent national data, and • Unique characteristics of the asset category. The affected asset categories were transit/rail stations and ferries: • Transit/Rail Stations. While the PEP threshold was derived from NFPA standards, and a model cost for an aboveground station can be configured, no such clear and consistent cost data exist for below-grade or transfer stations. Below-grade and transfer stations are far more unique, and affected by the character of the soil, land, and space they occupy. Current regu- lation and prohibitive costs indicate that all below-grade stations are critical, as they are not easily replaced from a financial or engineering perspective. • Ferries. Ferries operated by a state agency are not commonplace. They provide substantial contribution in Alaska, Washington, and selected communities, but do not form the back- bone of service in a majority of states. The choice of a ferry vessel varies widely, dependent on use, cost, and choice of the responsible agency. The wide variety eliminates any reasonable and consistent common cost elements. High-Consequence (Critical) Assets CAPTool requires the user to input assets and asset classes to be considered for analysis. The data needed for CAPTool should be readily obtainable from agency records. Data typi- cally includes annual average daily traffic, length, travel lanes, construction type, occupancy of rail cars, and ferries. The data for each asset must be entered to allow CAPTool to process the asset. CAPTool performs calculations matching user-designated thresholds with asset characteris- tics to assemble a list of high-consequence (critical) assets. These assets are sensitive to the user inputs and will be considered in CAPTA for further evaluation by a tactical guide. The assets drawn into the list of high consequence will ultimately be treated with countermeasures to gauge an understanding of resources required to decrease the risk of that asset exceeding the threshold for adverse consequences. The list of high-consequence assets can be redrawn by the user by returning to the threshold choice portion of CAPTool and altering the levels. The flexibility of CAPTool allows the user to evaluate different levels of threshold for asset classes. This ability to assess different levels of con- sequence can be repeated as often as the user chooses. Countermeasures When utilizing these recommendations, one must recognize that most mitigation counter- measures span between two extremes. One extreme is to prevent all damage at enormous cost, and the other extreme is to spend nothing and risk enormous damage. Transportation owners, operators, and engineers must make balanced decisions in selecting countermeasures for their facilities—preferably to risk an acceptable level of damage at a reasonable cost. However, finding this balance becomes more complicated when considering possible loss of human life, for which it is extremely difficult if not impossible to assign a value. 30 CAPTA Final Report

CAPTA allows the user to organize a vast assembly of assets to discern those more deserving of mitigation measures. CAPTA separates assets and asset classes based upon their degree of consequence. This organized list can then be treated with any of a selection of measures that span a wide spectrum of cost, applicability, and potential effectiveness. The CAPTool does not prescribe any definitive cost–benefit analysis to any countermeasure. The CAPTA model will allow the user to select measures and evaluate their cost and applicability. The model also allows the user to consider various combinations of countermeasures that could be deployed within given budget constraints. While preparing budgets for design engineering countermeasures, one must be careful to include the costs associated with local labor, materials, and professional services. The cost of a design change is very specific to individual assets, and there is no attempt in CAPTA to provide more than a general estimate. The relative effectiveness and order of magnitude cost ratings in the countermeasures diction- ary are based on engineering judgment and past project experience. They make use of a number of parameters, including the assets characteristics, construction type, construction materials, and impact to the operation of the asset. The relative effectiveness and cost estimates provided in CAPTA can be used for general guidance. Examination of specific measures for an asset should be undertaken locally, by staff with institutional, engineering, and tactical expertise. Local staff may avail themselves of the many NCHRP/TCRP guidance documents. Countermeasures are assembled in the countermeasures dictionary. This dictionary is built into the CAPTA electronic model. The dictionary is assembled with categories along the left col- umn and individual measures assembled along the horizontal axis. The concepts upon which the countermeasures are arrayed include prediction, deterrence deflection, detection, interdiction, response preparedness, and design engineering. Prediction This countermeasure concept revolves upon possessing prior knowledge that a threat or hazard may be introduced to your assets or infrastructure. In the matter of natural events, sophisticated systems exist to analyze and interpret the physical world. Great amounts of historical data are also available to assist in determining the likelihood of a natural calamity. To attempt to predict a threat requires an intelligence-gathering infrastructure, or access to intelligence agencies that may possess information relevant to transportation assets. Unintentional hazards generally are not predictable, but rather are spontaneous and random. Deterrence Deflection This category is based upon a sure strategic objective: making an asset so difficult to disrupt, or making the effort so costly to the intentional attacker, that any disruption is not attempted. This may also include the owner/operators’ ability to present their asset as impervious to intentional harm such that the attacker is diverted to explore another target. The concept of deterrence is not usable against natural hazards. Extreme weather, earthquakes, floods, and other acts of nature cannot be deterred. Detection This concept centers on the ability of the owner/operator to recognize that a hazard or threat to the asset exists and be able to communicate that actual or perceived hazard or threat to responders. This category is based upon those measures implemented to learn of a disruptive event. The CAPTA Components 31

methods, techniques, technology, and personnel deployed to learn of a pending or actual inci- dent may vary based upon local conditions. The means of detection may range from the physi- cal, using sensors and implanted devices, to the operational, including analysis of intelligence gleaned from various sources. The act of detection extends to natural disasters and other unintentional events as clearly as to those of nefarious origin. Use of technology to pinpoint an unusual weather event or a faulty pump that may flood a roadway is as applicable to detecting a hazard as the police officer on fixed post at the portal inspecting cargo and discovering an explosive. Interdiction This category is based upon the asset owner/operator’s ability to meet a hazard after it has begun the delivery process. The asset owner/operator should have pre-established personnel and material resources that may immediately be deployed upon learning of the hazard, which may be approaching, at the target, or in the process of being delivered. Interdiction most normally applies to intentional acts of disruption, such as an attacker or saboteur entering the asset. Inter- diction is a less applicable strategy in dealing with natural weather events or spontaneous hazards such as equipment fires. Response Preparedness This category identifies measures designed to lessen the impact or disruption of any success- fully delivered hazard or the concept of lessening the consequence of a successfully delivered haz- ard or threat. The wide-ranging measures that fall into this category include both strategic efforts requiring forethought and planning and tactical efforts conducted by on-scene responders. Longer range strategic efforts to mitigate the disruption to an asset involve elements such as plan- ning, emergency preparedness, pre-staged equipment, training, improving response capabilities, and establishing communication channels. All require effort and resources well in advance of a potential or actual hazard. The planning and preparation components are key tools of successful mitigation measures. The owner/operator’s ability to predict a range of possible disruptions, prepare the necessary drawings and specifications, and coordinate a set of responses can mitigate a series of adverse consequences. Planning and preparation generally include • Institutional arrangements and plans, including memoranda of understanding; • Communications/public outreach plan; • Interdiction plans for intentional acts; • Security plans; • Continuity of operations plan; • Emergency response and recovery plan; • Agency preparedness plan; • Agency mobilization plan; • A drill and exercise guide; and • Personal preparedness plans (for responding employees). The sum of these components is to allow the transportation operating agency to prepare and respond to any disruption as one unified body, well-versed enough in the plans that they have practiced to facilitate last-minute, on-the-spot alterations. Strategic mitigation may also be accomplished by the implementation of measures impervious to the impact of the hazard or threat deployed. The ability to withstand a hazard or threat is achieved through physical improvements to an asset. 32 CAPTA Final Report

Tactical efforts include an emergency response to the scene at the time of disruption. Rescue of persons, traffic diversions, and activating backup equipment can restore the asset’s operations. The ability to mitigate the consequence of a hazard or threat by preparedness or response depends upon the institution’s ability to have well-planned and executed operational measures in place. These measures will likely include the involvement of personnel and agencies beyond the jurisdiction of the transportation owner/operator. The need for advanced planning and tac- tical coordination is crucial for the success of response preparedness if it is to be employed as a mitigating measure against all hazards. Design/Engineering Designed/engineered measures are permanent alterations or additions to an asset requiring substantial investment and expertise. Engineered solutions typically require capital investment and planning. Many engineered measures will extend the usable life of the asset. General Countermeasure Attributes For purposes of application in this guide, the countermeasures have been classified and evaluated to support selection in conjunction with consequence avoidance on an asset and hazard or threat basis. The countermeasures dictionary and effectiveness rating provide a broad range of measures in 32 general categories. Appendix C presents key characteristics, and Appendix D indicates effec- tiveness. This information has been incorporated into the database used in the guide. Three of the key countermeasure characteristics follow: • Countermeasure Function. Functions are the classification that indicates what the measure will do. Risk management addresses the complete array of threats and hazards—although as indicated above, not all functions apply equally to given threat/asset/consequence combina- tions. The six basic functions of countermeasures (predict, deter, detect, interdict, response preparedness, and design/engineering) and their definitions are found in Table 6. • Cost. Due to the high-level application of this guide, only general estimates of expenditure are provided. The costs are per unit of countermeasure: either a rough estimate of the piece of equipment necessary, or the cost of one person to perform a service. The cost numbers were drawn from construction estimating publications, such as RS Means, and author experience. • Implementation Focus. Some countermeasures by their nature are applicable on an asset- specific basis whereas others may be applicable on a system- or area-wide basis with a multi- purpose focus (area-wide). Countermeasures may also be effective on a temporary deployment basis and can be redeployed to other areas or assets upon short notice. Surveillance measures are a firm example of this last focus category. Countermeasure implementation also includes the multipurpose potential of the component measure. The ability of a measure to have another positive effect upon the asset, or asset class, is noted. A common example is CCTV, which may be used to monitor traffic, detect intrusion, and provide information to responders. Countermeasures were assessed to determine their multipurpose potential outside of duty to increase the safety and security of transportation. Many countermeasures have dual uses to sup- port the transportation owner/operator in achieving its mission. A measure that can protect an asset is likely to extend the usable life of the asset. A closed circuit television (CCTV) system can detect disruptions and provide real-time information on vehicular movement. The inclusion of this category in the tables is meant to assist users in choosing their counter- measures. Multipurpose potential may change the prioritization of countermeasures. For exam- ple, some mitigation measures can decrease maintenance and increase the usable life of the structure. Use of such measures could lead to significant cost savings over the life of the structure. CAPTA Components 33

The identification of multipurpose potential is based upon realistic expectations of what may be done with the countermeasure. Potential purposes include • Pedestrian safety, • Traffic surveillance, • Public assurance, • Anti-theft, • Anti-trespassing, • Detection of unqualified employees, • Decrease of maintenance, • Increase of usable life of system, • Erosion protection, • Protection of data integrity, • Protection of investment in data systems, and • Dock scheduling (for shipping). 34 CAPTA Final Report Table 6. Countermeasures functions. Functions Description Prediction This function involves the establishment of an intelligence-gathering organization, including an analysis capability able to determine the probability, place, and time of a likely disruptive event. The function also includes the ability to communicate both to an organization the accurate prediction of an event that may disrupt the plan and to the asset to prepare an operational defense. Deterrence This function applies mainly to intentional threats. The asset owner prevents the attack by reducing the aggressor’s real or perceived likelihood of success in carrying out a successful attack on or disruption of an asset of interest. This function can be accomplished in several ways. The first is to instill in the aggressor the belief that the asset owner is able to strike back so overwhelmingly that an aggressor fears retribution for their actions and chooses to move off the target asset. Another is to ensure that the functional capability of the asset is sufficiently robust (through protection or redundancy) such that a disruptive event would have minimal adverse consequences. Additionally, the owner may create uncertainty in the mind of the aggressor through random checks and partial but undisclosed security measures, reducing the aggressor’s confidence in carrying out a successful attack and, perhaps, preventing the attack or diverting it to a less critical asset. Detection The asset owner possesses the means to detect when a disruptive event is occurring and is able to communicate this information to an appropriate response capability (e.g., law enforcement, private security patrol). Detection may occur through sensing technologies or physical observation. Interdiction The asset owner possesses the means to respond immediately to a hazard or threat with sufficient force to alter or prevent the introduction of the hazard or threat. Response Preparedness The asset owner possesses policies, plans, and procedures necessary to mitigate a hazard or threat that has been introduced. These may include training to discern a hazard or threat in the asset environment and actions to communicate the information to specially trained personnel. Plans and procedures may also include practiced actions that may be undertaken after the introduction of a hazard or threat. Design/ Engineering Designed and engineered durable solutions to mitigate a hazard or threat that has been introduced and delivered to an asset. These include engineered solutions intended to strengthen an asset to assure its ability to withstand a delivered hazard or threat.

Following the application of countermeasures to the high-consequence assets, the user may assemble a summary report by asset class or in total of all asset classes. The report will list the relevant risks, threshold selections, number of critical assets, expenditure by countermeasure class, and summary totals of resources required by countermeasure category. This summary can be saved to a hard drive, or printed for reference. The results summaries provide a snapshot of multimodal risk, consequence thresholds, and chosen measures to mitigate the exceeding of those thresholds. This snapshot can be compared to later iterations of CAPTA as the user makes different choices of threshold or selects different assets to be included. Part II portrays examples of the results summary. The results summary is the most visual and iterative aspect of the process. The user can re-enter the model to choose different thresholds that alter the results. Alterations may occur due to increased tolerance for adverse impacts or changes in the levels of allocated resources. 35 C H A P T E R 4 Results Summary

The CAPTA methodology is intended to help users identify high-consequence assets across multiple modes in their jurisdiction. It is a high-level examination of different assets assessed across an equal plane. The CAPTA system, when applied properly, is capable of providing an effec- tive capital budgeting tool to a transportation executive. The ability of the user to move quickly through the CAPTA system, and repeat the process using different consequence thresholds, yields a list of high-consequence assets meriting further attention. This method of assessing conse- quence and mitigation is time saving and efficient. CAPTA provides a flexible tool to match user risk levels and provides a cohesive first step in the analysis of assets. CAPTA provides the user with a means to mainstream a security program covering all haz- ards and threats. The institutionalization of resource allocation will promote the entrenchment of a sustainable security policy within an agency. Part I provides the underpinning of the methodology displayed and is intended to • Establish CAPTA as a capital budgeting tool; • Allow general comprehension of the system; • Explain how the CAPTA system is integrated into the existing environment of risk assessment and vulnerability documents; • Define the major terms, steps, assumptions, and equations of CAPTA; and • Identify the primary users of the CAPTA system. Users of the system will use Part II, CAPTool User Guide, and the accompanying electronic model to conduct their analyses. They may refer to Part I for deeper understanding of why a step was formed, or how an equation affects the outcomes. 36 C H A P T E R 5 Conclusion

1. Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc., Science Applications International Corporation, and Inter- active Elements Incorporated. TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525: Transportation Security, Volume 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, DC, 2006. 2. Science Applications International Corporation. “A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Criti- cal Asset Identification and Protection.” AASHTO, Washington, DC, 2002. security.transportation.org/ ?siteid=65&pageid=1363 3. Ray, J. C., “Risk Based Prioritization of Terrorist Threat Mitigation Measures on Bridges.” Journal of Bridge Engineering, Vol. 12, No. 2, March/April 2007, pp. 140–146. 4. Blackburn, R. R., K. M. Bauer, D. E. Amsler, Sr., S. E. Boselly, and A. D. McElroy. NCHRP Report 526: Snow and Ice Control: Guidelines for Materials and Methods. Transportation Research Board of the National Acad- emies, Washington, DC, 2004. 5. Lockwood, S., J. O’Laughlin, D. Keever, and K. Weiss. NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 6: Guide for Emergency Transportation Operations. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, DC, 2005. 6. Contestabile, J. “Taking Action on Interoperability.” Presented to the AASHTO Special Committee on Transportation Security, Orlando, FL, September 17–20, 2006. 7. Knoke, M., Ed. Protection of Assets Manual, ASIS International, 2004. 8. NFPA 101: Life Safety Code®. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2006. 9. NFPA 130: Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2007. 10. Highway Capacity Manual. TRB, National Research Council, Washington, DC, 2000. 37 References

During the assembly of the CAPTA model, field tests were held with a combination of state transportation agencies and transit agencies. The tests were conducted to review the functionality of the model, the logic of the methodology, and the usefulness of the results. The agencies were expected to help the project team stress the system by inputs or demands. Recommendations from the field test did make their way into the model. These improvements included • Establishing a basic model and an enhanced model (Maryland DOT), and • Including ridership levels within the threshold equations for transit assets (Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority–Boston). The input from the participating agencies—the Maryland Department of Transportation, Virginia Department of Transportation, Kansas Department of Transportation, and the Mass- achusetts Bay Transportation Authority—was a tremendous influence and assistance to the completion of this product. The instructions provided to field test participants are included below. Purpose of Model The Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) project was funded through the Transportation Research Board’s National Cooperative High- way Research Program (NCHRP). The guide provides detailed instruction on assessing the risks to transportation assets using a consequence-based approach. The guide enables users, typically state transportation authorities, to evaluate all modes of transportation consistently based upon an initial threshold for adverse consequences set by the user. The guide offers an objective, robust means to evaluate all assets under a user’s jurisdiction and requires minimal data to ease in its application. The guide presents an asset protection methodology (CAPTA) that has been implemented as a computer-assisted tool using Microsoft® Excel, which pro- vides a data and graphical means to interact with the consequence-driven multimodal asset protection model. CAPTA assists the user in evaluating the relative appropriateness of dedicating resources to an asset or a class of assets. The consequence-based methodology employed in CAPTA begins with the user setting an initial threshold for adverse consequences, indicating the point at which additional investments may be needed to mitigate consequences or reduce the likelihood of an event. CAPTA moves from there to anticipated consequences associated with hazards and threats to each asset or asset class under consideration. CAPTA allows users to compare dissimilar assets such as transit tunnels, highway bridges, buildings, and ferry boats. The tool also allows users to 38 A P P E N D I X A Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) Test Preparation

Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) Test Preparation 39 address consequences regardless of the events that precipitated them, including such dissimilar causes as explosions or extreme weather. The guide provides detailed instructions for use of the asset protection methodology (CAPTA), which is the centerpiece of the field test. The Microsoft® Excel implementation is designed for easy data entry and report generation. Purpose of Field Test CAPTA is being demonstrated in the field using data provided by state transportation agencies. The test is to affirm the logic of the methodology, the ease of use of the tool, and the consistency between the inputs required and the outcome products. The field test is also a useful platform for agency feedback concerning the methodology and the tool. The consultant team desires to make the tool as easy to use as possible, and encourages advice from agency practitioners. Overview The CAPTA field test is consultant led, with inputs from the state agency. The consultant will input the necessary data supplied by the state agency prior to meeting. The test is expected to last between 4 and 5 hours. The state agency will be tasked to provide inputs concerning their consequence thresholds. These choices are expected to be different between jurisdictions. The state agency is also expected to provide information on assets or classes of assets they wish to submit for consideration under this methodology. State Agency Preparation Prior to the Field Test Prior to using CAPTA, the user should assemble the following data concerning multimodal assets under agency jurisdiction: 1. A list of assets previously designated as critical or potentially critical by the transportation agency. This list of named assets should be broken out by the following asset categories: • Road bridges/tunnels • Transit/rail stations • Transit/rail bridges/tunnels • Buildings • Ferry boats • Fleets of vehicles OR 2. Gather a list of all assets under jurisdiction and break them out by the following categories: • Road bridges/tunnels • Transit/rail stations • Transit/rail bridges/tunnels • Buildings • Ferry boats • Fleets of vehicles (e.g., all 45 passenger buses)

40 CAPTA Final Report Following the assembly of named assets from either of the groups described above, collect data for each asset as noted in Table A-1. The data solicited in Table A-1 is required to take full advan- tage of CAPTA. CAPTA can accommodate data in spreadsheet format. Common sources for these data are the following documents or databases: • The National Bridge Inventory (NBI) • Transit vehicle occupancy guidelines as established by the manufacturer • Building occupancy permits and applications • Maritime occupancy permits designated by the federal or state government • Purchasing records relating to transit or fleet vehicles • Institutional memory Table A-2 shows an example of a data set for road bridges and tunnels collected for use with CAPTA. Road Bridges/Tunnels ADT Length (ft) Lanes Detour (mi) Type User-Input Price (Only for Other (i.e. Cable-Stay)) Transit/Rail Stations Max Car Occupancy Below Ground? Transfer Station? Transit/Rail Bridges/Tunnels Max Car Occupancy Type Sq. Footage Building Sq. Footage Replacement Cost (if known) Occupancy (if known) Ferry Max Occupancy Max Vessels Fleet Max Vehicles Max Occupancy/ Vehicle Avg Cost/Vehicle Road Bridges/Tunnels Asset ID ADT Length (ft) Lanes Detour (mi) Type User-Input Price (Only for Other [i.e. Cable-Stay]) Bridge Class A (25 ea) 65000 3200 4 15 Concrete Bridge Class B (100 ea) 25000 120 4 5 Concrete Bridge Class C (5 ea) 125000 2750 10 2 Steel Interstate Bridge X 203680 14429 8 58 Steel Interstate Bridge Y 173000 9049 6 58 Steel Interstate Bridge Z 174878 1289 8 14 Concrete Broad St 104000 131 6 0 Concrete Mayfair 104000 3520 2 13 Steel Cianci 180000 2245 2 1 Other $1,000,000,000 Table A-1. Data detail to be collected by state agency. Table A-2. Example of data collection for each asset.

Existing Countermeasures in Place Across Transportation Assets Countermeasure List Prior to the field test, the state agency user will need to have a general awareness of the measures currently deployed upon transportation assets. CAPTA includes the following common preventive, protective, and response measures for consideration. The state agency user can add other named specific measures for consideration. Prior knowledge of the measures already in place across the transportation modes will allow the tool to present “gap” opportunities and strategies not already considered by the agency. The tool contains inputs for the following classes of countermeasures: • Lighting • Explosive Detection • Barriers & Berms • Established Clear Zones • Fences • Visible Signs • CCTV • Seismic Retrofitting • Intrusion Detection Devices • Fire Detection & Suppression • Physical Inspection of Asset • Encasement, Wrapping, Jacketing • ID Cards • Patrols • Biometrics • WX/Seismic Information Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) Test Preparation 41 • Background Checks • Intelligence Networking • Metal Detectors • HAZMAT Mitigation • Restricted Parking • Security Awareness Training • Random Inspections • Emergency Response Training • Visible Badges • Emergency Evacuation Planning • Limited Access Points • Planned Redundancy (e.g., detours) • Visitor Control & Escort • Public Information and Dissemination • Locks • Chemical Detector Data Transmission Following the assembly of the requested data in a Microsoft® Excel–compatible format, it may be transmitted to the consultant for entry prior to the field test. State Agency Participation During the Field Test Significant Hazards/Threats Likely to be Experienced by the State Agency The user will be asked to designate which hazards and threats are of concern to the agency. These choices may be guided by experience, intelligence warnings, geographical contours, or concurrent planning activities. The categories of hazards and threats addressed in CAPTA are listed in Table A-3; users will have the opportunity to add to this list. Array of Hazards and Threats Against the Six Major Transportation Modes The state agency user is asked to decide if a chosen threat is likely to have an adverse effect on the selected transportation mode. These decisions are intended to reflect only the hazard

or threat relevant to transportation modes that are present in the agency’s jurisdiction. The choices should be based on experience, intelligence warnings, geographic contours, and concurrent planning practices of the agency. The state agency user will answer “yes” or “no” for each combination of threat or hazard and transportation mode. An example is provided in Table A-4. Consequence Thresholds The state agency user will be asked to designate initial levels or “thresholds” where significant investments beyond normal capital budgets and operating and maintenance would be justified in order to reduce the likelihood of the event or mitigate the consequence. These consequence thresholds require judgments in the following areas: • Potentially Exposed Population: Threshold for the potential number of persons adversely affected by a hazard or threat. This is an objective observation. • Property Damage: Threshold for the financial cost of replacing a lost asset. This is an objec- tive observation. • Mission Importance: Threshold for the extent to which an asset is vital to the operation of the transportation system. This may be a subjective observation. The consequence threshold choices are mapped between defined data points as determined by the user. Table A-5 is provided with illustrative data. The explanations provided in the far right column are intended to assist the user in reaching a decision. Note that the “Mission Importance” threshold levels are set based on national bridge data. Figure A-1 shows isoquants for ADT*Detour Length, illustrating combinations of these two data elements that result in the same product; Figure A-2 shows the distribution of this product for US bridges. Note that 75%, 85%, and 95% are used as alternative threshold levels for establish- ing consequence thresholds. 42 CAPTA Final Report THREATS Small Explosives Large Explosives Chemical Biological Radiological Criminal Acts UNINTENTIONAL HAZARDS Fire Structural Failure HAZMAT NATURAL HAZARDS Flood Earthquake Extreme Weather Mud/Landslide ADDITIONAL User Entered 1 Table A-3. List of threats/ hazards.

Countermeasures The state agency user will be asked to enter information concerning the current state of preventive, protective, or readiness measures. The user will also be asked to provide inputs to the type of measures desired, and will also be given the opportunity to amend the programmed costs to reflect local influences. CAPTA provides likely choices for countermeasures against the identified threats and hazards. The state agency user is allowed to amend these choices and the unit costs to receive a more accurate picture of their assets. Countermeasure Intentions Table A-6 lists the decision points the user will need to address before proceeding through the countermeasure section. They are provided here as a reference and to encourage thought and discussion by the state agency prior to the CAPTA field test. Countermeasure Cost CAPTA provides unit costs for all of the named countermeasures. After the input of user decision and credit given for the measures already in place, CAPTA generates reports providing financial information on the cost of measures intended to mitigate the chosen consequences. The accuracy of the financial picture is dependent upon unit costs in line with the local area. The estimates provided in CAPTA are based upon construction estimation tools, with the acknowl- edgement that there is cost variation from region to region. The agency user has the ability to change any of the unit costs. Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) Test Preparation 43 Threats/Hazards Road Bridges/ Tunnels Transit/Rail Stations Transit/ Rail Bridges/ Tunnels Building Ferry Fleet Threats SCE Y Y Y Y Y Y LCE Y Y Y Y Y Y CBR N N N N N N Criminal Acts N N N N N N Unintentional Hazards Fire N N N N N N Struct. Failure N N N N N N HAZMAT N N N N N N Natural Hazards Flood N N N N N N Earthquake Y N N Y Y Y Extreme Weather Y N N N N N Mud/Landslide N N N N N N Additional User Entered 1 N N N N N N User Entered 2 N N N N N N Table A-4. Hazards/threats arrayed against transportation modes.

44 CAPTA Final Report Category Critical Threshold Explanation Potentially Exposed Population 500 PEP Threshold Property Damage $500,000,000 Replacement Cost Mission Importance Level III Percentile for ADT * Detour Length Level I 29,000 Level II 68,000 ROAD BRIDGE/TUNNEL Level III 241,000 The default threshold values for ADT * detour length are taken from the 75th, 85th, and 95th percentiles for the bridges nationally. If these are inappropriate for your state, enter different values in the appropriate fields to the left. Potentially Exposed Population 100 PEP Threshold Property Damage Yes Do you consider below-ground stations to be property-critical? TRANSIT/RAIL STATION Mission Importance Yes Do you consider transfer stations to be mission-critical? Potentially Exposed Population 100 PEP Threshold Property Damage $100,000,000 Replacement Cost TRANSIT/RAIL BRIDGE/TUNNEL Mission Importance Yes Does at least 25% of the working population utilize rail/transit transportation? Potentially Exposed Population 100 PEP Threshold BUILDING Property Damage $100,000,000 Replacement Cost Potentially Exposed Population 100 PEP Threshold FERRY BOATS Property Damage $100,000,000 Replacement Cost Potentially Exposed Population 100 PEP Threshold TRANSIT FLEETS Property Damage $100,000,000 Replacement Cost Table A-5. Consequence threshold example. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 25,000 50,000 75,000 100,000 125,000 150,000 175,000 200,000 ADT (vehicles/day) D et ou r L en gt h (K M) 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 800,000 900,000 1,000,000 Figure A-1. Isoquants for ADT*detour length.

Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) Test Preparation 45 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 800,000 900,000 1,000,000 ADT*Detour Length Cu m m ul at iv e Pe rc en ta ge o f B rid ge s N at io na lly 75% < 29,000 85% < 68,000 95% < 241,000 Figure A-2. Cumulative distribution of ADT*detour length for all U.S. bridges. PREDICT Is prediction a desirable countermeasure function? DETER Is deterrence a desirable countermeasure function? DETECT Is detection a desirable countermeasure function? INTERDICT Is interdiction a desirable countermeasure function? RESPONSE PREP. Is response preparedness a desirable countermeasure function? DESIGN/ENGINEERING Are countermeasures related to design/engineering desirable? AREA-WIDE AND ASSET- SPECIFIC Do you wish to consider only area-wide countermeasures, only asset-specific countermeasures, or both? TEMPORARY/REDEPLOYABLE Do you wish to consider temp/redeployable countermeasures? MULTIPURPOSE POTENTIAL Are you willing to consider countermeasures that are NOT multipurpose? BASIC AND ENHANCED Do you wish to consider only basic countermeasures, only enhanced countermeasures, or both? THREAT RESPONSIVE Do you wish to consider threat responsive countermeasures? (Answer "N" if you only want permanent countermeasures.) MAX UNIT COST (X1000) What is the maximum per unit countermeasure cost you are willing to pay? Table A-6. Decision points.

Post Field Test Following the one-on-one session between the consultant and the state agency user, the user will retain a copy of the data model and the reports generated. The user is free to use the data model independent of the consultant. Copies of the reports and relevant notes will be taken by the consultant. The agency user is welcome at any time to recommend alterations to the data model that may improve ease of use. The information gleaned from the field test will be assessed by the consultant for possible inclusion into the final data model to be presented to the NCHRP 20-59(17) panel. 46 CAPTA Final Report

Attendees: Kevin Duffy–SAIC John Contestabile–MDOT Matthew Basset–MDOT Summary of Activity On October 17, 2007, a pilot test of the CAPTA methodology was conducted with the Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT). This pilot test was conducted using asset data supplied by MDOT. MDOT had previously been provided with a pilot test schedule depicting the content of the test and the anticipated feedback. Utilizing the data provided, MDOT was led through the fourteen-step process. As designed, CAPTA winnowed the data fields via user-selected consequence thresholds. The summary report listed assets and asset classes that were likely to be of value to the agency. User Feedback The MDOT users suggested the alterations, additions, and modifications to the CAPTA model that are listed in the table on the following page. These are represented in the center column. The right column indicates the status of the comment after discussion by the project team. Summary Result The MDOT pilot test site was intentionally chosen due to the state’s high degree of involve- ment in the asset vulnerability area and because Maryland is one of the few states in which the DOT controls all transportation aspects, including airline terminals. The lengthy comment and recommendation list from Maryland was expected. Some com- ments, such as #1–#7 were planned for the final revision of the CAPTA model. Comment #14 was intriguing, as the same issue had been discussed by the project team and tabled pending completion of the pilot tests. 47 A P P E N D I X B Summary Report for the CAPTA Pilot Test with Maryland DOT, October 17, 2007

No. Comment Description Current Status 1 Need to relate and make consistent all screen backgrounds and colors. Recommended screen colors of grey background, yellow categories, such as in slide labeled Results Summary. Accept 2 Need to install pop up screens (comments) to explain all terms in the spreadsheets. They would appear when then the cursors passed over it and then disappear when the cursor moved on. Accept 3 Need to spell out all cells rather than use shorthand or just letters. Desired to see whole screen being used. Accept 4 Need to use consistent orientation of threat/hazards and asset categories. Either assets always appear on x plane or the y plane. Currently, they change from sheet to sheet. Accept 5 Need to insert directions box in a consistent place across sheets, such as always placing them in the top left corner. Accept 6 Add a line to instruction boxes noting purpose of screen. Accept 7 Need to array all buttons along top right of screen. Accept 8 Add mission importance toggle to Ferries, Buildings, and Fleets. Recommendation has merit based on fact that some agencies have only bus fleets to operate, with limited hard infrastructure. Accept 9 Add asset category for “Operations Control Centers” to move them apart from plain office buildings. Accept 10 Clarify the definition of mission importance as importance to agency or to state. This change can be explored in the paper writeup. Accept 11 Buildings should be broadened to include airport terminals. Accept 12 Consider CAPTA for use by State Homeland Security Administrators seeking a way to determine funding across modes. Accept 13 Change colors for countermeasure effectiveness. Use red for highly effective and orange for medium effective. Accept 14 Break CAPTA into two sections. The first piece would move the user through only the following screens: 1. Relevant Risks 2. Threshold 3. Yellow input tabs 4. Critical Assets 5. CM Opportunity 6. Results Summary All others can be reached through user pressed buttons, if they choose to go into that amount of detail. The idea is that the user does a quick run through of the CAPTA, accepting all of the calculations we have embedded in the system. After this first pass, they can then go back and tinker with the explanations. All Accept 48 CAPTA Final Report

Attendees: Kevin Duffy–SAIC Chief Paul MacMillan–MBTA Transit Police Department Lt. Lewis Best–MBTA Transit Police Department Sean McCarthy–OCC John Hogan–Operations Gerard Ruggiero–Safety Summary of Activity On November 16, 2007, a pilot test of the CAPTA methodology was conducted with the Mas- sachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). This pilot test was conducted using asset data supplied by MBTA, including a critical asset list previously generated. MBTA had previously been provided with a pilot test schedule depicting the content of the test and the anticipated feedback. Using the data provided, MBTA was led through the recently reformulated six-step process. This process was designed after the Maryland Department of Transportation pilot test, with the CAPTA broken into a “Basic” and “Enhanced” model. The Enhanced model provides the user with greater opportunity for inputs into cost and other assumption areas. As designed, CAPTA winnowed the data fields via user-selected consequence thresholds. The summary report listed assets and asset classes that were likely to be of value to the agency. There were no assets thought to be of value that did not appear on the summary lists. User Feedback The MBTA users proposed comments, alterations, additions, and modifications to the CAPTA model that are listed in the table on the following page. These are represented in the center column. The right column indicates the status of the comment after discussion by the consultant team. Summary Result The MBTA pilot provided great encouragement that CAPTA can be used effectively by a tran- sit agency. The ease with which the attendees used the model and the digestible terms aided the transference of this tool. The success of the test assists in broadening the range of the methodol- ogy beyond highway agencies. 49 A P P E N D I X C Summary Report for the CAPTA Pilot Test with MBTA, November 16, 2007

50 CAPTA Final Report No. Comment Description Current Status 1 Is there value in including the 75 th , 85th, and 95th traffic percentiles on road traffic threshold model? Accept, see comment #2 2 Is there value in having the road bridge and tunnel category appear at all for transit study? Accept. Programmer is working to ensure that unnecessary categories drop off. 3 Appreciative of using objective numbers to reach final list of assets rather than subjective opinion. Accept 4 Does/Can the CAPTA system incorporate utilities and non-agency controlled assets? CAPTA does not currently account across sectors. This issue will be presented to the panel as a recommended topic for further work. 5 What does the 25% of total population riding transit mean? How can we discover that number? Recommend using percentage of ridership, as different assets carry proportionally greater numbers of riders that other assets. This recommendation to be discussed by project team for implementation mechanisms. 6 Will CAPTA be used as a basis of funding? Unknown at this time.

Attendees: SAIC: Kevin Duffy and Michael Smith VDOT Operations and Security Division: Mike Washburn Donna Pletch Byron Marshall Paul Szatkowski Summary of Activity On February 13, 2008, a pilot test of the CAPTA methodology was conducted with the Virginia Department of Transportation Operations and Security Division. The pilot test was conducted using asset data provided by VDOT. Both Kevin Duffy and Michael Smith signed non-disclosure agreements regarding protection of potentially security sensitive information about VDOT assets used in the pilot test. For the purposes of the pilot test, the VDOT Operations and Security Divi- sion provided information on a total of 67 assets representing a range of Virginia’s transportation infrastructure, including bridges (rural, urban, Interstate, and arterial), tunnels (including both sub-aqueous and bored or cut-and-cover tunnels), administrative and support facilities (admin- istrative buildings, TMCs, etc.), and ferry boats. This range of asset classes and individual assets were selected primarily to demonstrate how the CAPTA methodology works and to discover any problems with either the fundamental approach of the methodology or the functioning of the CAPTool Microsoft® Excel spreadsheet model used to implement the methodology rather than to identify critical assets for VDOT and potential countermeasures for VDOT. The methodology was demonstrated using the selected assets, allowing VDOT participants to select hazards and threats of interest and set consequence thresholds for each asset class. VDOT participants offered suggestions and agreed to review the tool and provide comments to the study team. User Feedback During the course of the pilot site demonstration, several observations were made that required either enhancements or corrections to the CAPTool spreadsheet used to implement the model. The VDOT participants provided feedback following the demonstration as follows: The Virginia Department of Transportation participated with a pilot review of the MRAM (now CAPTA). VDOT provided data to the design team and provided comments during the review. The CAPTA tool is effective for storing, sorting, and managing the details of critical infrastructures. Direct 51 A P P E N D I X D Summary Report for the CAPTA Pilot Test with the Virginia DOT, February 13, 2008

52 CAPTA Final Report downloads of information to populate the CAPTA tool would be very beneficial. CAPTA allows users the flexibility to adjust the importance of a facility and expand key criteria. CAPTA has a feature to estimate the benefits of mitigation strategies. This feature would require frequent updates for cost figures. Furthermore, this feature may or may not incorporate unique infra- structure requirements that could impact the strategy’s cost or usefulness, i.e., harsh maritime climates, environmental restrictions, interference, etc. The labor impact of analyzing and updating, on a state prospective, for such detail is unknown. Following the pilot test, the study team found additional corrections and improvements in either the performance or presentation of the tool. These are listed below along with action taken to address them. Summary Result The VDOT pilot test confirmed the usefulness of the CAPTA methodology and CAPTool, the related computer-based spreadsheet. The pilot test provided an opportunity to discover several errors in the spreadsheet model as well as several enhancements that will improve the performance of the spreadsheet model, the user interface, and the presentation of the results. No. Comment Description Current Status 1 Correct error in cost estimator for Ferry assets. Accepted 2 Ensure that Manual Override feature is properly implemented and explained. Accepted 3 Revise color scheme to support B&W printing. Accepted 4 Change Highway Bridge mission threshold from “Level I”, etc. to “Demand Percentile I”, etc. Accepted 5 Add 2 more rows to Summary that contain total # of countermeasures selected, total # of unique countermeasures. Accepted 6 Place icons on each page of the spreadsheet to show progress through the six-step process. Accepted

AASHTO—American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ADT—Average Daily Traffic APTA—American Public Transportation Association AREMA—American Railway Engineering and Maintenance Association ASCE—American Society of Civil Engineers AUA—American Underground Construction Association CAPTA—Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies CAPTool—Costing Asset Protection Tool CCTV—closed circuit television DHS—Department of Homeland Security DOT—Department of Transportation (state) HAZMAT—hazardous material IAEM—International Association of Emergency Managers NCHRP—National Cooperative Highway Research Program NFPA—National Fire Protection Association NIMS—National Incident Management System PEP—Potentially Exposed Population TCRP—Transit Cooperative Research Program U.S.DOT—United States Department of Transportation 53 A P P E N D I X E List of Acronyms

Risk Assessment Terms Risk—The quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss that considers both the proba- bility that a hazard or threat will cause harm and the consequences of that event. Target/Asset—Persons, facilities, activities, or physical systems that have value to the owner or society as a whole. Threat/Hazard—The potential natural event or intentional or unintentional act capable of disrupt- ing or negatively impacting an asset. In the case of natural events, the hazard is the frequency and magnitude of a potentially destructive event. Hazards can be expressed in probabilistic terms where data are available. Consequences—The loss or degradation of use of an asset resulting from a threat or hazard. Con- sequences may also be determined by loss of life (casualty). Mission-related consequences include destruction or damage causing real loss or reduction of functionality. Potential for consequences grow as a function of an asset’s criticality. However, a critical asset may be dam- aged without total loss of functionality. Vulnerability—A weakness in asset design or operations that is exposed to a hazard or can be exploited by a threat resulting in negative consequences. Specific hazards or threats may expose or exploit different vulnerabilities. Note that an asset may be susceptible to hazards or threats that may increase its vulnerability, such as having publicly accessible information (e.g., drawings, schedules, secure areas) that could assist a terrorist in planning and executing a successful attack. Consequence Threshold—The planning factor used to set the level of consequences at which the decision maker or agency assumes greater responsibility for managing the risk. Consequence Categories Potentially Exposed Population (fatalities and injuries)—This consequence is concerned with the number of people who may become a casualty. Occupancy limits, or capacity is a surrogate data point for this category. Property Loss—This concerns the cost to repair or rebuild a damaged or destroyed structure. These monetary estimates are standardized unit cost estimates based upon square or linear footage of an asset, or an amount provided by the user for special designed structures such as a cable stay bridge. Mission Disruption—This concerns the adverse impact on the transportation system due to the loss of the functionality of an asset. Implying the redundancy of the road and rail networks, detour lengths to and from a disabled asset are used as a surrogate for mission disruption level. Detour length is readily available in current agency databases for bridges and tunnels. Transit facilities are assessed using ridership levels of an asset. 54 A P P E N D I X F Glossary of Terms Used in CAPTA

Social/Cultural Disruption—The social consequence reflects how the population might respond to the event through significant behavioral changes. These may include fear of travel or avoid- ance of a transportation mode or route. Fear and avoidance of transportation modes will lead to a decrease of commercial activity. There may also be adverse reaction by the public to the imposition of security measures, such as personal searches, needed to prevent a disruption or mitigate the effects of a disruption. Major Asset Categories Road Bridges—Any aerial structure designed to carry vehicular traffic across a body of water or land. This category is most effective when used to capture structures whose length spans greater than one beam. Road Tunnels—All tunnels bored, mined, or immersed that convey rubber tire vehicles, buses, and trucks. Transit/Rail Bridges—All raised aerial structures designed to carry rail rolling stock. Transit/Rail Tunnel—A transit system with a major rail capability is likely to have an extensive network of tunnels. Transit/Rail Station—Classes of access rail transit points in CAPTA. Length of platform, capacity, and building type can serve as common characteristics for a class. Administrative and Support Facilities—Fixed asset facilities a transportation operator may own or operate, with the exception of transit or rail stations. The fixed facilities in this category may range from offices of executives, to airside passenger terminals. Ferry—All watercraft used in the regulated transportation of passengers and vehicles for a sched- uled service. The size of the vessel does not matter. In the rare cases where ferries constitute a significant portion of the transportation agency’s passenger capacity, an effort should be made to separate the vessels into classes. Fleet—Regularly used individual passenger vehicle. The most common assets in this category will be buses and passenger transit/rail cars. The base unit for this category is one asset, whereby a train may consist of four to six individual fleet cars. The similarities of fleet vehicles readily lend themselves to groupings into classes. Threats (Intentional Actions) Small Explosive Devices—Explosive materials containing less than 250 pounds of TNT or equiv- alent. Delivery is by means of one to five aggressors transporting the payload. Large Explosive Devices—Explosive materials containing greater than 500 pounds of TNT or equivalent. The method of delivery is either by vehicle or through multiple persons acting in concert to transport the payload. Chemical/Biological/Radiological (C/B/R) agents—Gases, liquids, or solids introduced with the intent of causing physical harm or property loss. Criminal Acts—Lower intensity threats representing the range of illegal activities as defined by federal code, state statute, or local ordinance. Examples of criminal acts include handgun vio- lence and illegal discharge of hazardous waste. Unintentional Hazards Fire—Sources may be disparate and triggered by any combination of flammable material and ignition. Fire may result from happenstance and does not require an intentional act to occur. Fire, or the pre-fire hazard of smoke, will immediately have a negative impact upon all trans- portation assets by inducing the evacuation of persons and equipment within the structure Glossary of Terms Used in CAPTA 55

and surrounding areas. Fire and smoke will decrease visibility to unsafe levels, precipitate col- lision of vehicles and equipment, and cause personal injury. A fire controlled by firefighting may still result in smoke and water damage at a level sufficient to render a transportation asset unfit for use or occupancy. Structural Failure—Any decrease in the physical integrity of the transportation asset to bear the weight required to carry passengers or freight. The loss of physical integrity requires the asset be inspected and major repair be completed prior to its reopening for beneficial use by the public. Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT)—Liquid, solid, or gaseous materials for which the quantity of material introduced may be minimal but that cause a hazard to users of the system. Hazardous materials include common industrial cleaners used by transportation workers and canisters of pepper spray set off by transit users. In both circumstances, it is unlikely that the maintenance worker or the commuter entered the transportation system with the intent of discharging material into the air. Materials may also include hazardous liquid, which include debris or waste products moved into the transportation system by a vehicle, truck, or rail car. For CAPTA purposes, hazardous materials require specialized remediation that will close a roadway or transit transportation to allow processing. Natural Hazards Flooding—The condition of excessive water inflow to an asset exceeding the engineered pumping capacity, and causing a hazard or threat to people and property. Flooding is typically caused by a calamitous weather event; however, it may be caused by defective pipeline transfer. Earthquake—A seismic anomaly that weakens the fitness of a structure to standards less than that designed and intended by the owner. The earthquake will present a hazard to transportation users while it is occurring, due to flying debris and geotechnical instability. The earthquake may present a hazard upon its conclusion by weakening assets such that they are no longer usable. Extreme Weather—All means and methods of extreme wind, rainwater, snow, ice, or other act of God that is unusual for its ferocity. An extreme weather event will be characterized by the exhaustion of all available equipment previously assembled for remediation and the exceed- ing of all planning thresholds in place at a transportation agency for the conditions of snow, ice, wind, water, and other acts of God. This characteristic would normally include exceeding the “100-year storm” guidance gathered through observation. Mud/Landslide—The sudden massive movement of soil causing actual or potential harm to person and property, prompted by water or geotechnical shift. The most common historical data in this category involves soil shifts onto roadways or rail facilities because of wet conditions. 56 CAPTA Final Report

Transportation Research Board of the National Academies Asset-Specific Guidance • The full series of transportation-related security and risk management documents currently published by the National Academies, the TRB, and AASHTO are available at www.trb.org/ SecurityPubs. • “A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protec- tion.” AASHTO, Washington, DC, 2002. Available at security.transportation.org/?siteid= 65&pageid=1363. • “A Guide to Updating Highway Emergency Response Plans for Terrorist Incidents.” AASHTO, Washington, DC, 2002. Available at security.transportation.org/?siteid=65&pageid=1363. • NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 3: Incorporating Security into the Transportation Planning Process. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2005. Available at www.trb.org/news/blurb_detail.asp?id=5028. • TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Security, Volume 10: Hazard and Security Plan Workshop: Instructor Guide. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2006. Available at www.trb.org/news/blurb_detail.asp?id=5733. • NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security/TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Security, Volume 8: Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning Guidelines for Transportation Agencies. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2005. Available at www.trb.org/news/blurb_detail.asp?id=5612. • NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 1: Responding to Threats: A Field Personnel Manual. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2004. Available at www.trb.org/news/blurb_detail.asp?id=4425. • NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 2: Information Sharing and Analysis Centers: Overview and Supporting Software Features. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2005. Available at www.trb.org/news/blurb_ detail.asp?id=4556. • TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Security, Volume 11: Security Measures for Ferry Sys- tems. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2005. Available at www.trb.org/news/blurb_detail.asp?ID=6068. • TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525: Transportation Security, Volume 12: Making Transporta- tion Tunnels Safe and Secure. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2007. Available at www.trb.org/news/blurb_detail.asp?ID=7221. 57 A P P E N D I X G Recommended Further Reading

58 CAPTA Final Report United States Department of Homeland Security • Office of Domestic Preparedness. Information at all levels of emergency preparedness avail- able at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp. • The National Incident Management System. Available at www.nimsonline.com/. • The National Response Plan. Available at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_ 0566.xml. • Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101. Available at www.fema.gov/about/divisions/cpg.shtm. • The National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Available at www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/ editorial_0827.shtm. • Continuity of Operations Guidance and Assessment. Available at www.fema.gov/government/ coop/index.shtm. • Lessons Learned Information Sharing website (password required): www.llis.dhs.gov/. • Personal Preparedness for Emergencies: www.ready.gov/. • State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program Special Needs Jurisdiction Tool Kit, Office of Domestic Preparedness 2003. This document has restricted access. • Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model. See “The Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model: Applying the Latest Risk Assessment Techniques to Maritime Security,” Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council, Vol. 64, No. 1, available at homeport.uscg.mil/. • Transportation Security Administration. Security clearances for selected state DOT employees, contact Julie Otto at 571-227-3609 or julie.otto@dhs.gov. United States Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration • Office of Operations, Information on Emergency Transportation Operations (ETO). Available at ops.fhwa.dot.gov/opssecurity/index.htm. • Office of Operations, Information on transportation security funding. Available at ops.fhwa. dot.gov/opssecurity/funding/.

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Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) Get This Book
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TRB’s National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 15: Costing Asset Protection: An All-Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) is designed as a planning tool for top-down estimation of both capital and operating budget implications of measures intended to reduce risks to locally acceptable levels. CAPTA supports mainstreaming an integrated, high-level, all-hazards, national incident management system-responsive, multimodal, consequence-driven risk management process into transportation agency programs and activities.

The guide is supplemented online with a downloadable Microsoft® PowerPoint slide show and CAPTool, a spreadsheet tool for implementing the CAPTA methodology. A help file is also available online.

NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security is a series in which relevant information is assembled into single, concise volumes—each pertaining to a specific security problem and closely related issues. The volumes focus on the concerns that transportation agencies are addressing when developing programs in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks that followed. Future volumes of the report will be issued as they are completed.

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