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12 CAPTA Final Report Methodology This CAPTA methodology employs a consequence-driven approach. This methodology begins with the user setting consequence thresholds for the first three of the four consequence areas: · Potentially exposed population · Property loss · Mission disruption Adverse social impact is not addressed explicitly, but the user may see this as extremely impor- tant for some assets and thus consider the adverse social impact to be sufficient cause for the asset to be classified as "critical" for resource allocation purposes. This initial focus on consequences guides the user to focus on outcomes rather than particu- lar assets or threats. Users need not know the cause for the loss or the scenario that led to the loss. The consequence-driven methodology evolved from a desire to limit required inputs to infor- mation accessible to users which, to the extent possible, is objective in nature. The focus is the loss of use of the asset or assets. Assumptions The consequence-based CAPTA methodology makes common sense assumptions about var- ious asset classes, threats and hazards, and countermeasures. The default values and assumptions embedded in the methodology are transparent and, in most cases, users have the opportunity to modify them to reflect local values. The CAPTA guide and tool recognize other guidance that covers the range of routine hazards or threats to transportation infrastructure and assets, such as equipment breakdowns, derail- ments, utility disruptions, criminal acts, and medical emergencies. The experience of transporta- tion operators in handling these minor incidents is already addressed in handbooks, manuals, and industry standards that are readily available. Wherever possible, references to these materials are noted in the text. Many are located at www.trb.org/securitypubs/. The following list contains individual examples of such materials: · TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525, Volume 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure (1). This guide focuses solely on tunnel assets. · "A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Pro- tection" (2). This document develops guidelines for assessing and mitigating vulnerabilities among highway assets. · "Risk Based Prioritization of Terrorist Threat Mitigation Measures on Bridges" (3). This guide, developed by FHWA, provides a standardized, detailed method to assess the vulnerabilities of specific bridge components. · NCHRP Report 526: Snow and Ice Control: Guidelines for Materials and Methods (4). · NCHRP Report 525, Volume 6: Guide for Emergency Transportation Operations (5). The CAPTA methodology makes the following additional assumptions: · The user takes the information provided by CAPTA as a capital budgeting prioritization tool, not as an asset-specific assessment tool. The CAPTA process delineates assets or asset classes that are of high consequence to the user. This high-level delineation will allow the user to set aside budgetary resources on a rough order of magnitude. The user will then need to apply an asset-specific tool to discern how to use any resources provided to the high-consequence assets.