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30 CAPTA Final Report The judgments expressed within the equation box represent evaluation by the project team of current expert guidance principles for traffic engineering, transit rail safety, NFPA guidelines, and the cost estimates of professional engineers specific to this study. There are three special inclusions within the threshold equation, for which strict numerical evaluation was not the logical process to follow. These inclusions were weighted by Scarcity of consistent national data, and Unique characteristics of the asset category. The affected asset categories were transit/rail stations and ferries: Transit/Rail Stations. While the PEP threshold was derived from NFPA standards, and a model cost for an aboveground station can be configured, no such clear and consistent cost data exist for below-grade or transfer stations. Below-grade and transfer stations are far more unique, and affected by the character of the soil, land, and space they occupy. Current regu- lation and prohibitive costs indicate that all below-grade stations are critical, as they are not easily replaced from a financial or engineering perspective. Ferries. Ferries operated by a state agency are not commonplace. They provide substantial contribution in Alaska, Washington, and selected communities, but do not form the back- bone of service in a majority of states. The choice of a ferry vessel varies widely, dependent on use, cost, and choice of the responsible agency. The wide variety eliminates any reasonable and consistent common cost elements. High-Consequence (Critical) Assets CAPTool requires the user to input assets and asset classes to be considered for analysis. The data needed for CAPTool should be readily obtainable from agency records. Data typi- cally includes annual average daily traffic, length, travel lanes, construction type, occupancy of rail cars, and ferries. The data for each asset must be entered to allow CAPTool to process the asset. CAPTool performs calculations matching user-designated thresholds with asset characteris- tics to assemble a list of high-consequence (critical) assets. These assets are sensitive to the user inputs and will be considered in CAPTA for further evaluation by a tactical guide. The assets drawn into the list of high consequence will ultimately be treated with countermeasures to gauge an understanding of resources required to decrease the risk of that asset exceeding the threshold for adverse consequences. The list of high-consequence assets can be redrawn by the user by returning to the threshold choice portion of CAPTool and altering the levels. The flexibility of CAPTool allows the user to evaluate different levels of threshold for asset classes. This ability to assess different levels of con- sequence can be repeated as often as the user chooses. Countermeasures When utilizing these recommendations, one must recognize that most mitigation counter- measures span between two extremes. One extreme is to prevent all damage at enormous cost, and the other extreme is to spend nothing and risk enormous damage. Transportation owners, operators, and engineers must make balanced decisions in selecting countermeasures for their facilities--preferably to risk an acceptable level of damage at a reasonable cost. However, finding this balance becomes more complicated when considering possible loss of human life, for which it is extremely difficult if not impossible to assign a value.

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CAPTA Components 31 CAPTA allows the user to organize a vast assembly of assets to discern those more deserving of mitigation measures. CAPTA separates assets and asset classes based upon their degree of consequence. This organized list can then be treated with any of a selection of measures that span a wide spectrum of cost, applicability, and potential effectiveness. The CAPTool does not prescribe any definitive costbenefit analysis to any countermeasure. The CAPTA model will allow the user to select measures and evaluate their cost and applicability. The model also allows the user to consider various combinations of countermeasures that could be deployed within given budget constraints. While preparing budgets for design engineering countermeasures, one must be careful to include the costs associated with local labor, materials, and professional services. The cost of a design change is very specific to individual assets, and there is no attempt in CAPTA to provide more than a general estimate. The relative effectiveness and order of magnitude cost ratings in the countermeasures diction- ary are based on engineering judgment and past project experience. They make use of a number of parameters, including the assets characteristics, construction type, construction materials, and impact to the operation of the asset. The relative effectiveness and cost estimates provided in CAPTA can be used for general guidance. Examination of specific measures for an asset should be undertaken locally, by staff with institutional, engineering, and tactical expertise. Local staff may avail themselves of the many NCHRP/TCRP guidance documents. Countermeasures are assembled in the countermeasures dictionary. This dictionary is built into the CAPTA electronic model. The dictionary is assembled with categories along the left col- umn and individual measures assembled along the horizontal axis. The concepts upon which the countermeasures are arrayed include prediction, deterrence deflection, detection, interdiction, response preparedness, and design engineering. Prediction This countermeasure concept revolves upon possessing prior knowledge that a threat or hazard may be introduced to your assets or infrastructure. In the matter of natural events, sophisticated systems exist to analyze and interpret the physical world. Great amounts of historical data are also available to assist in determining the likelihood of a natural calamity. To attempt to predict a threat requires an intelligence-gathering infrastructure, or access to intelligence agencies that may possess information relevant to transportation assets. Unintentional hazards generally are not predictable, but rather are spontaneous and random. Deterrence Deflection This category is based upon a sure strategic objective: making an asset so difficult to disrupt, or making the effort so costly to the intentional attacker, that any disruption is not attempted. This may also include the owner/operators' ability to present their asset as impervious to intentional harm such that the attacker is diverted to explore another target. The concept of deterrence is not usable against natural hazards. Extreme weather, earthquakes, floods, and other acts of nature cannot be deterred. Detection This concept centers on the ability of the owner/operator to recognize that a hazard or threat to the asset exists and be able to communicate that actual or perceived hazard or threat to responders. This category is based upon those measures implemented to learn of a disruptive event. The

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32 CAPTA Final Report methods, techniques, technology, and personnel deployed to learn of a pending or actual inci- dent may vary based upon local conditions. The means of detection may range from the physi- cal, using sensors and implanted devices, to the operational, including analysis of intelligence gleaned from various sources. The act of detection extends to natural disasters and other unintentional events as clearly as to those of nefarious origin. Use of technology to pinpoint an unusual weather event or a faulty pump that may flood a roadway is as applicable to detecting a hazard as the police officer on fixed post at the portal inspecting cargo and discovering an explosive. Interdiction This category is based upon the asset owner/operator's ability to meet a hazard after it has begun the delivery process. The asset owner/operator should have pre-established personnel and material resources that may immediately be deployed upon learning of the hazard, which may be approaching, at the target, or in the process of being delivered. Interdiction most normally applies to intentional acts of disruption, such as an attacker or saboteur entering the asset. Inter- diction is a less applicable strategy in dealing with natural weather events or spontaneous hazards such as equipment fires. Response Preparedness This category identifies measures designed to lessen the impact or disruption of any success- fully delivered hazard or the concept of lessening the consequence of a successfully delivered haz- ard or threat. The wide-ranging measures that fall into this category include both strategic efforts requiring forethought and planning and tactical efforts conducted by on-scene responders. Longer range strategic efforts to mitigate the disruption to an asset involve elements such as plan- ning, emergency preparedness, pre-staged equipment, training, improving response capabilities, and establishing communication channels. All require effort and resources well in advance of a potential or actual hazard. The planning and preparation components are key tools of successful mitigation measures. The owner/operator's ability to predict a range of possible disruptions, prepare the necessary drawings and specifications, and coordinate a set of responses can mitigate a series of adverse consequences. Planning and preparation generally include Institutional arrangements and plans, including memoranda of understanding; Communications/public outreach plan; Interdiction plans for intentional acts; Security plans; Continuity of operations plan; Emergency response and recovery plan; Agency preparedness plan; Agency mobilization plan; A drill and exercise guide; and Personal preparedness plans (for responding employees). The sum of these components is to allow the transportation operating agency to prepare and respond to any disruption as one unified body, well-versed enough in the plans that they have practiced to facilitate last-minute, on-the-spot alterations. Strategic mitigation may also be accomplished by the implementation of measures impervious to the impact of the hazard or threat deployed. The ability to withstand a hazard or threat is achieved through physical improvements to an asset.