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Introduction 67 Assumptions The consequence-based CAPTA methodology makes several assumptions about asset classes, hazards and threats, and countermeasures. The default values and assumptions embedded in the methodology are transparent to users and, in most cases, users have the opportunity to modify them to reflect local values. Transportation owners and operators face a range of routine hazards or threats to transporta- tion infrastructure and assets, such as equipment breakdowns, derailments, utility disruptions, criminal acts, and medical emergencies. Guidance for handling these routine, often-encountered events and conditions and for asset-specific risk assessment is already addressed in handbooks, manuals, and industry standards that are readily available. Many are located at securitypubs/. The following list contains individual examples of such materials: TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525, Volume 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure (Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc., Science Applications International Corpora- tion, and Interactive Elements Incorporated; Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, DC, 2006). This guide focuses solely on tunnel assets. "A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protec- tion" (Science Applications International Corporation; AASHTO, Washington, DC, 2002). This document develops guidelines for assessing and mitigating vulnerabilities among high- way assets. "Risk Based Prioritization of Terrorist Threat Mitigation Measures on Bridges" (J. C. Ray, Journal of Bridge Engineering, Vol. 12, No. 2, March/April 2007, pp. 140146). This guide, developed by FHWA, provides a standardized, detailed method to assess the vulnerabilities of specific bridge components. NCHRP Report 526: Snow and Ice Control: Guidelines for Materials and Methods (R. R. Blackburn, K. M. Bauer, D. E. Amsler, Sr., S. E. Boselly, and A. D. McElroy; Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, DC, 2004). NCHRP Report 525, Volume 6: Guide for Emergency Transportation Operations (S. Lockwood, J. O'Laughlin, D. Keever, and K. Weiss; Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, DC, 2005). The CAPTA methodology makes the following additional assumptions: The user takes the information provided by CAPTA as a capital budgeting prioritization tool, not as an asset-specific assessment tool. The CAPTA process delineates assets or asset classes that are of high consequence to the user. This high-level delineation will allow the user to set aside budgetary resources on a rough order of magnitude. The user will then need to apply an asset-specific tool to discern how to use any resources provided to the high-consequence assets. The user follows analysis using CAPTA with an asset-specific assessment tool, which may include conducting a full engineering assessment that takes into account facility-specific conditions. Nuclear hazards or threats are not addressed. These catastrophic threats require mitigation and response measures that are beyond the capacity of a transportation agency. Cyber threats are not addressed. The evolving nature of cyber threats to the operating and con- trol systems of a transportation agency are best addressed by commercial vendors. Standard practice for any agency is to have a robust, up-to-date cyber security plan. Routine inspection and maintenance issues are not addressed. These operational measures typically do not require high-level strategic capital allocation measures. The user has available basic data about the assets to be considered under CAPTA, including physical features, cost, and typical usage of an asset. The information requested in the CAPTool was specifically designed to incorporate data typically available to transportation agencies.