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CHAPTER 1 Introduction In recent years, new concerns have arisen about the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to the delib- erate introduction of foreign animal and plant diseases, referred to as agroterrorism. Several of the national planning scenarios outlined in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, National Preparedness (1), call on transportation agencies to prepare for their roles in the National Incident Management System (NIMS), (2) which provides "a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, tribal, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity." Responding to agroterrorism or other natural or accidental biological outbreaks of foreign animal or plant diseases, collectively referred to as "agricultural emergencies" for the purpose of this guide, could require immediate isolation and/or quarantine of potentially infected areas. Research indicates that the economic impact of the outbreak is a function of the time it takes to enforce quarantine and eradicate or control the infection. Therefore, it is essential that local responders have the tools and resources needed to implement a response within the first few hours of notification. In the event of an animal disease outbreak, a quarantine boundary may enclose an area with a 3- to 6-mi (5- to 10-km) radius that could cross more than 30 roads and could be enforced for several months. While federal support for longer-term assistance may arrive in a few days, containment of the disease agent requires an effective, complete, and locally implemented response within hours. The purpose of quarantines is to isolate a disease and to stop the spread of the organisms that cause the disease. Citizens of rural counties are accustomed to free movement, full access, and unrestricted freight movement; however, in a foreign animal or plant disease emergency, biose- curity must take precedence over normal rural transportation needs. The area to be quarantined will be determined based on the disease, the local environment, and the location of other sus- ceptible plants or animals. Other conditions such as weather, wind direction, and the methods that are available to combat the disease's spread will be considered as well. Rural law enforcement agencies are unlikely to have the ability to control vehicle movement at all of the entrances and exits around a quarantine boundary at one time, and rural public works departments or local DOT offices will most likely only have enough signs and barricades on-hand to detour one or two roads in a county. Thus, more innovative methods are needed that can be implemented in partnership with law enforcement, military (Active, Reserve, and Guard), the private sector, transportation agencies, and other organizations at the local and state levels. 1.1 History of Agroterrorism in the United States While the United States has experienced intentional attacks on its food supply, such as the intentional placement of salmonella in salad bars in Oregon in 1984, all of the incidents 1