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Components of Agricultural Emergency Response 15 3.5 Volunteers Volunteers may help to fill emergency response roles that cannot be filled by regular employees, and in many rural areas, emergency response is led by volunteer organizations, such as a volun- teer fire department. Protocols for how to coordinate and organize volunteer efforts are often described in emergency response plans, but in the case of a foreign animal or plant disease, spe- cial care must be taken to ensure volunteers are properly disinfected when entering or exiting their work site. This is especially true if the volunteers are at disinfection stations, or are handling livestock or agricultural equipment and vehicles. Volunteers should be trained on general biose- curity practices during the planning stage, prior to the occurrence of an incident. In addition to general biosafety training, volunteers should be briefed on incident-specific biosecurity require- ments as soon as they are called to respond to an emergency. A brief section on simple biosecurity practices is included at the end of this guide. 3.6 Standard Operating Guidelines The Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG) for law enforcement officials in a quarantine situ- ation are often unclear because many jurisdictions do not have specific guidelines on the methods officers may use to enforce a quarantine. For instance, no procedure may exist to dictate how law enforcement handles the containment of an animal or plant disease that poses no direct health threat to humans. Because quarantines and other movement restrictions are rare, precedents or written policies usually do not exist to guide the officers' actions. Between the time a disease is suspected and when it is confirmed, the situation becomes even more complicated, since no threat may even exist. It is important for local law enforcement agencies to understand the authority structure in their state for issuing quarantines and movement restrictions and to develop guidelines for appropriate rules of engagement.