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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
×
Page 10
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2008. Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14199.
×
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3Winter operations pose a unique hazard or risk for airports because snow removal vehicles and equipment are authorized to conduct operations on the movement areas of an airport, including active runways. Often, limited visibility caused by blowing or piled snow hampers the ability of vehicle operators to see and avoid aircraft or other vehicles. Reduced visibility also decreases the advantage of having an air traffic control tower (ATCT), since tower personnel cannot see exactly where vehicles or aircraft are positioned, unless the ATCT has new technology to assist the controller. Otherwise, com- munication protocols and recognized standard operating pro- cedures (SOPs) must be practiced. In either case, technology and SOPs can be negated if a vehicle operator is fatigued, experiences a loss of situational awareness (SA), or otherwise makes an error in operation. This study sought qualitative information on factors affect- ing safe winter operations by airport snow removal and equip- ment operators. The information contained in this synthesis can be of value to airport operators in their efforts to provide a safer operating environment when engaged in snow and ice removal operations during conditions of normal and low visibility. An emphasis of the study is on preventing or miti- gating the factors that lead to runway incursions and aircraft and/or vehicle conflicts on the airport. OBJECTIVE OF SYNTHESIS The objective of this synthesis is to provide a compendium of existing practices, procedures, training, and systems that air- port operators use to reduce the risk of vehicle–aircraft inci- dents and incursions during winter operations and periods of low visibility. A low visibility operation is defined in Advisory Circular 120-57A, Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems, as the movement of aircraft or vehicles on the air- port’s paved surfaces when visibility is reported to be less than 1,200 feet runway visual range (RVR) (1). The synthesis considered commercial service and general aviation airports that have either a full-time, part-time, or no operating ATCT. Specific areas researched or reviewed under the synthesis study were: • Communication protocols and systems currently in use between winter operation vehicles, aircraft, and air traffic control facilities (both the ATCT and approach control), and between winter operation vehicles and aircraft at airports without an operating ATCT. • Winter operational protocols at airports, such as closing of runways, avoiding encroachment of auxiliary runways or taxiways, conducting winter operations between air- craft operations, and assuring that all winter operation vehicles are clear of a runway or a particular area. • Human performance factors that affect the SA of person- nel while conducting winter operations, such as fatigue, sense of urgency in operations, distractions in the cabin area, and vehicle design features. • Equipment and vehicle design factors that affect the SA of employees during winter operations and low visibility conditions. • The training or training systems provided to airfield vehi- cle operators for winter and low visibility operations. • The availability of technology and displays or warning systems that are used, or are being evaluated for use, to prevent vehicle–aircraft incidents. A concern associated with airport operations that has received increased research and scrutiny over the years has been runway incursions. The FAA has established dedicated programs and organizational offices comprised of teams, com- mittees, and individuals to address the safety issue. Although runway incursion efforts have been focused on preventing vehicles from entering or encroaching on an active runway or operational area, snow removal equipment must operate on those same active areas. The problem then becomes how to ensure that such vehicles are off of the movement or opera- tional area when an aircraft operation is being conducted. Such assurance is especially true when low visibility hampers the ability of air traffic control personnel or vehicle operators from seeing aircraft operating on the pavement surfaces where snow removal operations are in progress. DEFINITION OF INCURSION A basic understanding of runway incursions and surface inci- dents will help to explain why winter operations are a major safety concern of airports. Runway incursions or surface incidents are a major concern affecting safe operations of the Nation’s airports because they present a collision hazard. The NTSB has identified the pre- vention of runway incursions as one of the “Most Wanted” CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

safety issues to be addressed in aviation (2). Both the FAA and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have implemented measures to combat and reduce runway incursions and/or surface incidents. Prior to October 2, 2007, a runway incursion was defined by the FAA as Any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land (3, p. A-9). On October 2, 2007, the FAA announced a change to the definition of an incursion (4). In standardizing this definition worldwide, the FAA adopted the definition used by the ICAO. Thus, a runway incursion is now defined as Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect pres- ence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft (5, p. L-1). The adoption of the ICAO definition will require the FAA to reclassify certain events that previously have been 4 defined as a “surface incident.” The FAA definition of a surface incident is Any event where unauthorized or unapproved movement occurs in the movement area that affects or could affect safety of flight (3, p. A-10). The primary difference between the older FAA definition of runway incursion and the newer ICAO definition is that ICAO defines an incursion to include any unauthorized intru- sion onto a runway, regardless of whether a potential conflict with an aircraft exists or not. For the FAA, an incident not involving a potential conflict with an aircraft—such as an unauthorized vehicle crossing a runway while no aircraft are in the vicinity—was previously defined as a “surface inci- dent” and not a runway incursion. A comparison of the two categories is identified in Figure 1. Class A or B incursions are considered serious enough to have posed a significant risk of collision, while class C or D incursions are classified as not having posed an immediate major threat. Class E is not used in the United States as of yet. For additional assessment purposes, the FAA groups incursion or incidents events into one of three categories: (1) operational FIGURE 1 Comparison of the old FAA and the new ICAO incursion classifications. (Source: FAA.)

5error, (2) pilot deviation (PD), or vehicle/pedestrian devia- tion (V/PD). An operational error is a human error involving an ATCT controller, of which there are more than 8,000 in the United States. A PD is a human error involving a licensed pilot, of which there are more than 675,000 in the United States. A V/PD is a human error involving a vehicle operator or pedestrian that results in an entry onto the movement area that has not been authorized by an ATCT controller. The change in definition will have implications on how vehicle incidents are recorded and on the number of inci- dents recorded. The number is expected to increase because previously identified surface incidents will now be recorded as incursions. The new method of recording data reflects how any incident is a potential hazard that could manifest itself later as an incursion or an accident if the timing is different. BACKGROUND ON INCURSIONS Much emphasis has been placed on runway incursions over the past decade, in part because of the significant possibility for loss of life and property. The most recent U.S. statistics covering the FAA fiscal year ending September 30, 2007, show there were 24 serious runway incursions (using the old FAA definition) (6). The incursion data reported by the FAA represent those tracked at airports having staffed ATCT (7). The 24 reported incursions occurred in relation to approxi- mately 61 million operations. Even though 24 incursions can be considered a small number, just one incursion can have catastrophic results. A drawback to identifying the true number of incursions or incidents is that they are normally only recorded at airports that have operating control towers, of which there are 397 overseeing more than 61 million aircraft operations. Not recorded are the number of incursions or incidents that may have occurred at airports without an ATCT operating or dur- ing periods the ATCT was closed, of which there are a total of 3,364 public use airports in the National Plan of Integrated Airports System and an additional 1,906 public use airports that are not included in that National Plan (8). The reported incursions and incidents may not be a true representation of the severity of the problem. Information on runway incursions is important from an air- port safety management standpoint. Airport operators need to know the potential risks associated with an activity so that they can determine the proper measures to manage the risk. During winter snow removal operations, the risk of incursions can increase significantly. Risk is assessed by identifying: (1) the probability that an event could occur, (2) the severity of its potential outcome, and (3) its exposure level, which is the number of opportunities for the event to occur (9). Risk increases during winter operations because snow removal equipment is authorized to be on the airfield in larger numbers than other equipment during normal operations; more individuals who are not normally accustomed to regularly operating on the airport are at the controls of the equipment; and low visibility or obstructed conditions make it difficult for controllers, pilots, and vehicle operators to see each other. The FAA has established a voluntary program called the Runway Incursion Information Evaluation Program (RIIEP). The program seeks to gather more in-depth runway safety data on runway surface incidents and runway incursions and seeks to understand the specific pilot or mechanic activities or operating conditions that resulted in them (10). The primary means of gathering the data is through in-depth interviews of pilots and maintenance technicians involved in these incidents. Analysis of the data is used to implement risk-reduction pro- grams, produce guidance, and augment technologies. To date, this program has not been extended to incidents other than those involving pilots and mechanics. The FAA has also established Runway Safety Action Teams as part of a national program, These teams are composed of individuals who have a vested interest in safe operations at a particular airport, such as airport management, air traffic control management, airline management, pilot groups, tenant groups, and others. REGULATIONS Under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 139, airports desiring to be served by air carrier operations must acquire an airport operating certificate from the FAA (11). The certifi- cate is issued only after the airport sponsor has developed an airport certification manual (ACM) that describes how the organization will comply with the federal safety regulations. Four sections of the regulations are pertinent to this synthe- sis study: (1) Section 139.303 Personnel, (2) Section 139.313 Snow and Ice Control, (3) Section 139.329 Pedestrians and Ground Vehicles, and (4) Section 139.339 Airport Condition Reporting. Under Section 139.303 Personnel, airport management has the responsibility to provide sufficient and qualified person- nel to comply with the requirements of its ACM and Part 139; equip personnel with sufficient resources; and train all person- nel who have access to the movement areas and safety areas. In particular, training is to address airport familiarization; procedures for access to, and operation in, movement areas and safety areas; airport radio communications; and other duties required under the ACM. Section 139.313 Snow and Ice Control requires airport man- agement, located at airports where snow and icing conditions normally occur, to prepare, maintain, and carry out a snow

and ice control plan (SICP). The SICP contains instructions and procedures for the prompt removal or control of snow and ice, the positioning of snow off the movement area surfaces, the selection and application of authorized materials for snow and ice control, the timely commencement of snow and ice control operations, and the prompt notification to all air carriers and users of the airport whenever less than satisfac- tory conditions exist for safe operation by their aircraft. Section 139.329 Pedestrians and Ground Vehicles requires an airport operator to limit access to movement areas and safety areas to only those pedestrians and ground vehicles necessary for airport operations; establish and implement pro- cedures for the safe and orderly access to, and operation in, movement areas and safety areas by pedestrians and ground vehicles; ensure that those having access are under positive control of ATCT if in operation, or provide adequate proce- dures to control pedestrians and ground vehicles when ATCT services are not available; and maintain records of personnel training and accidents or incidents at the airport. Section 139.339 Airport Condition Reporting requires an airport operator to collect and disseminate airport condition information to air carriers using the notice to airmen (NOTAM) system and other systems and procedures, as authorized by the FAA. It further requires the airport operator to prepare and keep a record of the dissemination of each airport condi- tion report to air carrier operators. In support of an airport operator’s obligations to comply with the regulations, guidance material is provided through FAA Advisory Circulars (AC). Advisory circulars contain methods and procedures for compliance that are acceptable to the Administrator of the FAA. Three primary ACs that support the regulations and provide guidance to the airport operator are: (1) AC 150/5200-30, Airport Winter Safety and Operations (12), (2) AC 150/5210-20 Ground Vehicle Oper- ations on Airports (3); and (3) AC 150/5200-28 Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) for Airport Operators (13). Although airports serving scheduled air carrier operations are required to have an SICP as part of their ACM, there are more than 4,500 other commercial service, cargo, or general aviation airports that are not required to have such a plan. The authority of the FAA to regulate airports is predicated on the airport being served by an air carrier operator. The remaining airports fall under the purview of their respective state or local governments, which may or may not require snow plans. VEHICLE/PEDESTRIAN DEVIATIONS It is not clear that there is a higher risk of vehicle and/or air- craft incidents at airports without an operating control tower, because no reliable or mandatory reporting and tracking system exists to date. Winter operations at airports present an increased risk and opportunity for an incident or accident to 6 occur for the simple reason that a greater number of vehicles than normal are on the movement areas of the airport. Any time a vehicle operator drives onto an airport movement area, the exposure of that vehicle to potential aircraft is present. A winter season with numerous snow events will increase the number of vehicles being exposed to aircraft, thus the risk of an incident or accident can increase unless additional preven- tive measures are taken. For example, for the period of October 2006 to February 2007, the FAA Great Lakes Region recorded 20 vehicle devi- ations on airports. Nine of the deviations involved snow removal equipment, with six of the nine categorized as run- way incursions (14). Although any surface incident could result in an accident, runway incursions cause the greatest risk of a collision having a catastrophic outcome. The increased risk caused by the additional snow removal vehicles and the length of operational exposure time is further compounded by the nature of airport operations and the limitations of humans conducting those operations. Snow removal and low visibility conditions present hazards not nor- mally experienced in daily airport operations. Winter weather conditions create cold, blustery environmental conditions that can be difficult to manage or withstand over long periods. Because snow events can last from one hour to several days, the impact they can have on humans can result in fatigue, ver- tigo, disorientation, confusion, and other serious ramifications. Low visibility conditions can result from winds, drifting and blowing snow, or from fog. All these conditions can result in operators not being able to determine hold line locations when working on taxiway intersections that lead to the runway, or recognizing their exact location. As a result, snow removal operators may easily cross over a hold short line or not follow air traffic instructions resulting in a runway incursion. To emphasize the nature of the problem nationally, a list of V/PDs involving snow removal equipment for the period of October 2006 to April 2007 is provided here (B. Castellano, FAA Division of Airport Safety, Washington, D.C., personal communication, Sep. 2007). The summary reports of V/PDs are presented as entered into the FAA database [note: reports listed under Section 2 as surface incidents may well be iden- tified as incursions under the new incursion definition]. Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations Classified as Runway Incursions A. 12/6/06 V/PD Non-Hub Airport. Airport vehicle, Truck 39, had previously been authorized to make one turn around on Runway 31 at Taxiway Charlie. Local/ Ground Control observed this operation to be com- plete and Truck 39 was clear of the safety area on Taxi- way C. A Cessna C172, cleared to land on Runway 31 was crossing the approach end when Local Control observed Truck 39 crossing Taxiway C hold lines and instructed the vehicle driver to stop. Truck 39 stopped

7prior to runway edge. The C172 landed and reached taxi speed 800 ft from Taxiway C. B. 1/13/07 V/PD Medium-Hub Airport. Sander 62 was instructed and read back instructions to hold short of Run- way 5 at Taxiway D. Subsequently, Sander 62 crossed Runway 5 at D as a Continental Express EMBRAER E145 was on landing roll Runway 5. The E145 was abeam Taxiway M as the vehicle cleared the runway. Closest proximity reported was 2,000 ft horizontal. C. 1/18/07 V/PD Small-Hub Airport. Maintenance M17, an airport snow plow, was instructed by Ground Control to hold short of Runway 18 on Runway 9. Driver of M17 read back “hold short Runway 18 on Runway 27.” An Atlantic Southeast CRJ2 was cleared for takeoff on Runway 18 and was turning the corner at approach end when Maintenance M17 crossed Run- way 18 at Charlie eastbound. Local Control immediately canceled the CFJ2’s takeoff clearance. The pilot of ASA had observed the vehicle and did not roll. Closest proximity reported was 600 ft horizontal. D. 2/1/07 V/PD General Aviation Airport. Plow 4, a snow removal vehicle, entered the departure end of Run- way 6 as a Piper PA31 was on departure roll Runway 6. Due to the Piper’s takeoff speed, pilot was advised of the vehicle. Ground Control instructed Plow 4 to imme- diately clear the runway. Plow 4 cleared the runway into the grass area at departure end as the PA31 lifted off approximately 1,500 ft away. E. 2/2/07 V/PD Large-Hub Airport. A snow plow entered Runway 26 between Taxiway R4 and R6 on the Air- craft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) access road. It proceeded northbound and conflicted with a United B733 which was landing. The B733 was approxi- mately 1,283 ft from the snowplow at the time and at an estimated speed of 94 knots. The snowplow exited on the north side of the runway with the B733 approx- imately 700 ft away at an estimated 56 knots. F. 2/6/07 V/PD Small-Hub Airport. PLOW 36 and 3 brooms, conducting snow removal on Runway 9R/27L, had exited the runway and were told to hold short of Runway 27L. PLOW 36 operator read back the hold short instruction. Local Control (LC) then issued takeoff clearance on Runway 9R to a Learjet LR35. PLOW 36 reentered Runway 9R at Taxiway B-4 (midfield) head- ing northbound then made a 180 and exited the run- way. The brooms remained holding short. The Lear overflew PLOW 36 by 50 ft. G. 2/13/07 V/PD Medium-Hub Airport. CITY 81 and company, plowing on Runway 19R, were instructed to hold short of Runway 7R. CITY 81 read back hold short instructions. A snowplow then crossed Runway 7R and was in the intersection of 7R/19R when a Conti- nental Express EMBRAER E145, was rolling out on Runway 7R. The E145 exited at Taxiway R, a normal exit point, as the snowplow cleared 7R/19R intersection. Closest proximity reported was 2,000 ft horizontal, the distance from taxiway R to the 7R/19R intersection. H. 2/14/07 V/PD General Aviation Airport. SNOW 6, an airport snowplow, was working on the edges of Run- way 5 and then exited the runway at the departure end onto Taxiway Alpha. SNOW 6 proceeded to remove snow on the taxiway then reentered Runway 5 without authorization. A Gulfstream GLF4 performing a Run- way 5 full-length departure was just rotating near mid- field when SNOW 6 entered the departure end of the runway. Closest horizontal distance at that point was 3,000 ft and the GLF4 passed overhead of the departure end above 300 ft vertical in a climb. I. 3/17/07 V/PD Small-Hub Airport. Plow 74, an airport vehicle, crossed Runway 29 hold short line at taxi- way C without authorization and conflicted with a Jet Blue EMBRAER E190 that was cleared for takeoff on Runway 29 full length. Plow 74 stopped prior to the edge of the runway and did not enter. The E190 had not yet rolled when takeoff clearance was immediately canceled. Closest proximity reported was 2,000 ft horizontal. Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations Classified as Surface Incidents A. 12/3/06 V/PD Small-Hub Airport. Snow removal was in progress with two airport units authorized on the runway. A third unit, Unit 24 snow broom, entered the approach end of Runway 8 without clearance. No con- flicts reported. Unit 24 then called ATCT for approval and was instructed to continue clearing the runway. B. 1/18/07 V/PD General Aviation Airport. Airport 10, a snow removal vehicle, entered Runways 3 and 1 without authorization. No conflicts reported. C. 1/24/07 V/PD Non-Hub Airport. Broom 1, an airport utility vehicle, was instructed to exit Runway 35 and remain clear. Broom 1 acknowledges then reports clear and holding short of Runway 35. Local Control clears an AMR American Eagle EMBRAER E145, on a visual approach, to land on Runway 35. Local Control then observes Broom 1 on Runway 35 near the inter- section of Runway 35 and Taxiway C. Local Control instructs Broom 1 to exit the runway. Broom 1 com- plies and exits 35 at the Runway 23 intersection. The E145 is approximately 4 to 5 mi final when vehicle clears and the E145 is continued inbound for landing. D. 1/26/07 V/PD Medium-Hub Airport. Local Control cleared Sand 2 (airport vehicle) to cross Runway 7R and to hold short of 7L. Sand 2 acknowledged and Local Control requested driver to read back hold short instruc- tions. Sand 2 read back hold short instructions then continued across Runway 7L at Taxiway G. No con- flicts reported. E. 1/31/07 V/PD Medium-Hub Airport. Loader 77, an airport vehicle, called Ground Control from the east side requesting to clear snow on the access road up to Runway 31. Due to this access road intersecting Runway 31 inside the runway safety area (RSA) for

Runway 25L, Ground Control instructed Loader 77 to hold short of Runway 25L at all times and to advise if they needed to get into the clear zone for 25L. Loader 77 acknowledged this and read back the hold short instructions for 25L. Subsequently, Ground Control observed Loader 77 turning around on the very end of Runway 31, which is inside the RSA. Ground Control instructed Loader 77 to exit the RSA due to traffic on final for 25L. Loader 77 exited the RSA when arrival reached 2 mile final. No loss of separation reported. F. 2/12/07 V/PD Large-Hub Airport. A snow plow vehicle was sanding a perimeter road west of Runway 22L. When making a 180-degree turnaround, the vehicle proceeded to cross the hold short line for Runway 22L. Local Control observed the snow plow and issued a go around to a Northwest Airlink CRJ2 that was on 1-mi final for Runway 22L. No loss of separation reported. G. 2/17/07 V/PD Small-Hub Airport. Snow removal in progress for Runway 8 with 3 vehicles authorized to operate on the runway. Local Control then observed a fourth vehicle, Unit 26, on the runway at the west end without clearance. H. 2/17/07 V/PD Non-Hub Airport. Snow removal was in progress for Runway 10. Airport 12 was instructed to exit Runway 10 and report off. Approximately 2 min later Airport 12 reported all vehicles clear of Runway 10. One vehicle at C2 intersection for Runway 10 moved onto the runway without authorization. A Continental Express E145 at outer marker and beyond 1 mi for Run- way 10 was issued missed approach instructions to avoid loss of separation. Airport 12 was notified and had the vehicle clear the runway. I. 4/5/07 V/PD Small-Hub Airport. Sweeper 11, an air- port vehicle, requested to proceed onto Taxiway A between the hold line for Runway 03 and the runway. Ground Control instructed Sweeper 11 to cross hold line for Runway 03 but hold short of the runway. Sweeper 11 read back the instructions then proceeded to cross Runway 03. No conflicts reported. J. 4/17/07 V/PD Small-Hub Airport. A vehicle (basket lift) entered Runway 36R at Taxiway E2 without autho- rization. No conflicts reported. The driver stated he was taking a shortcut and did not see the runway signs. Attempting to quantify the root causes of the above inci- dents is difficult. The descriptions do not provide the level of detail that allow for in-depth analysis. There are multiple fac- tors involved and they occur at different categories of air- ports and by different vehicles. This report seeks to better identify some of the factors involved. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY A qualitative approach was used in the accumulation of information for this report. The data were gathered by means of a questionnaire, telephone interviews (where necessary), 8 e-mail correspondence, and a review of published studies and general literature. The first step in the development of this report was to con- duct a literature review. The following sources of information were investigated: • Transportation Research Information Services (TRIS) database, • AAAE and affiliated chapters, • FAA national and regional offices, • Personnel from several airports in the United States, • Internet searches using various search engines, and • Snow equipment organizations. Additional material suggested by TRB project committee also was reviewed. The bibliographies from the researched literature were reviewed for any further sources that could be included in the analysis. Also considered during the review were more than 50 snow removal plans submitted to the FAA by various airports. The second step in the development of this synthesis study was to conduct a survey of airports to seek qualitative infor- mation about their operations and experiences. The nature of the investigation into practices and procedures precluded the use of a closed-end questionnaire. The information being sought required a description of the activities being conducted at an airport. For this reason, an open-ended questionnaire was deemed more appropriate for collecting data on how the airports conduct their snow removal operations. The questionnaire used for the survey (Appendix A) was pre-tested at a training workshop at the 41st International Aviation Snow Symposium, held annually by the Northeast Chapter of the AAAE (NEC/AAAE). Attendees of the work- shop were primarily individuals involved in snow removal operations from across the country. As a result of the pre-test and suggestions from panel com- mittee members, the questionnaire was refined and dissemi- nated to airports both electronically and by mail. Targeted specifically was a cross section of airports that fell into the following categories: large-hub, medium-hub, small-hub, non- hub, and general aviation. Thirty-six responses to the ques- tionnaire were received. The categories into which the airports fell were: large-hub (6), medium-hub (4), small-hub (8), non- hub and commercial service (10), and general aviation (8). Several of the airports had cargo and/or military operations conducted on their airport. Further categorizing the responses, 20 were from airports with full-time ATCTs, 12 from part- time ATCTs, and 4 from airports without ATCTs. A list of air- ports from which responses were collected is provided in Appendix B. Further targeted for the survey were airports that had received the Balchen/Post award from previous NEC/AAAE

9Snow Symposium meetings. The Balchen/Post award is deter- mined by a committee made up of industrywide aviation professionals who seek to acknowledge those airports that demonstrate responsive winter operations. Additional ques- tionnaires were sent out electronically to representatives of the following AAAE committees: Small Commercial Service Airports; General Aviation; Operations, Safety, and Planning; and the Technical Services. Data were collected and synthe- sized over the period from April to October 2007. Upon receipt of the completed questionnaires, the data were grouped by questions and topic area. Clarification of responses was sought as needed through direct communica- tion with the responder. As part of the questionnaire, airports were asked to submit examples of their snow removal plans, separate winter operations procedure or policy manuals, and letters of agreement (LOAs) that existed with air traffic con- trol towers. These documents were reviewed for information related to the synthesis study. The third step in the development of this report was to research the technology associated with winter operations, runway incursions, snow equipment, and driver training. This entailed contacting companies engaged in runway incursion prevention, snow equipment manufacturing, and driver train- ing simulators. CONCLUSIONS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW The literature on runway incursions is fairly extensive, having received emphasis from the NTSB and the FAA. FAA and other aviation stakeholders have taken steps to address run- way and ramp safety, but the lack of coordination and lead- ership, technology challenges, the lack of data, and human factors-related issues have impeded progress (10). The lack of data and human factors issues is pertinent to this report. The review of literature found that previously published infor- mation on the topic of preventing incursions of snow removal vehicles was minimal, receiving only cursory mention in arti- cles that focused more on snow removal equipment or on snow removal plans. Published research or articles on roadway snow removal operations were much more extensive and refined. Research from the highway sector was reviewed and included in this report where it was assessed that the results and information could have application to airports. Areas such as accident prevention, vehicle design and lighting, and human factors are such areas. Research on highway human factors has been well studied, and several studies are cited for inclusion in this report. In particular, a search on the effects of fatigue in snow removal operations resulted in numerous articles that were trans- portation-related but not specific to snow removal operations at airports. Because of the human factors implication of fatigue, the search results covered topics such as technologies for monitoring and preventing driver fatigue (15, 16); health and wellness factors (17); physiological, personality, and behavior aspects (15, 18); sleep loss factors (19); vigilance monitoring (20); duty time (21); ergonomics and other design considerations (22, 23); and management practices (24). All these factors were identified by the airport survey respondents as affecting their operations. For extensive information on fatigue and fatigue manage- ment, both NASA (http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/zteam) and the Australian National Transport Commission (http:// www.ntc.gov.au) have conducted significant research into fatigue in the transportation and aviation industry, as has the FAA (http://www.faa.gov) and the FMCSA (http://www. fmcsa.dot.gov). The results of the literature search in these areas are provided in subsequent chapters of this report, in particular chapter five. Although many areas of aviation and flight operations have been studied and researched (e.g., extensive human factor research has focused on pilots and mechanics; aircraft design human factor research has focused on aircraft cabin layout; research into cognitive learning has resulted in more effective training regimens; and weather research has resulted in new systems for detection of significant events), little research has been conducted into the area of airport operations, and in particular, those associated with winter operations. Yet winter operations and low visibility conditions represent an increased risk component for airport operations and further result in the escalation of risk elsewhere in the aviation system. As previously mentioned, the issue of runway incursion has received focused attention from the FAA and other government regulators internationally. The FAA has established an Office of Runway Safety (http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety/) for that purpose. Various reports from the website were reviewed for information related to winter operations. Preventing incur- sions takes a coordinated effort of pilots, air traffic con- trollers, and airport operators to resolve. Many of the actions taken for preventing incursions also apply to snow removal operations. Results from the FAA studies indicate the major- ity of incursions are the result of pilot error, with controller error being second, and vehicle/pedestrian error being third. Snow removal equipment operator error is grouped into the last category. In addressing the issue of runway incursion and how to reduce the number of deviations, the FAA has devel- oped guidance through various brochures, procedures, and manuals (Figure 2). Chapter ten provides a synopsis of technology that has been considered in the past, is currently in use, or is being consid- ered for use at airports to prevent incursions. The technology and systems identified represent a broad range of advanced technology and cost that is intended to address runway incur- sions in general. The systems include facility-based controller notification through the use of surface-movement obstacle detection equipment; ground-based flight crew notification

technology through ground tracking of aircraft and vehicles; and in-cabin aircraft and vehicle positioning equipment that provides pilots and vehicle operators with real-time position information on the airfield. The primary drawback to the implementation of advanced technology in the prevention of incursions is related to cost. A review was conducted of approximately 95 airport snow plans submitted by Part 139 airports as part of their ACM. Although an airport’s ground vehicle operating procedures (required under Part 139) may address winter operating con- ditions, the snow plans reviewed were not detailed enough to provide actual guidance for many of the decisions that must be made during a snow event; nor did they detail the method for vehicle operation. In essence, the plans only address the standards expected to be obtained and not the “how to.” The lack of standardization or procedures in this area of the ACM is an area for further evaluation. One non-hub airport with a part-time ATCT identified the following in its approved snow plan: A. During non-tower operations, runways will be closed during snow removal activities. Operations personnel will advise the air carriers of such closures and issue the appropriate NOTAMs. B. During tower operations, it may be necessary to close the main air carrier runway depending upon precipitation type, depth, weather conditions, and other factors. In such situations: i. Airport management will determine the length of time required for runway closure: ii. Other runways/taxiways may be closed for reasons of accumulated snow depth, excessive windrow height, snow removal operations, etc. The example is typical of the SICPs submitted and reviewed for this report. Lacking is additional guidance or procedures for personnel responsible for implementing the plan. State- ment A (non-tower operations) is straightforward in closing the runway. Statement B (tower in operation) provides flexi- bility. However, neither gives guidance about how to assess the 10 conditions, in what manner the conditions should be addressed, when the activity is to occur, or how decisions will be made. Some airports have bridged this gap by generating separate written snow policies, methods, or procedures outside of the regulatory framework of Part 139. This is accomplished due to liability concerns for a violation of the regulation under the ACM if a particular procedure is not followed. Of the SICPs examined, fewer than 10 were determined to have separate procedures established. Most airports relied on and utilized the experience and knowledge of existing personnel for bridging the gap. None of the SICPs reviewed for this report discussed run- way incursion prevention issues associated with driver fatigue and distraction. Fatigue was mentioned in an ancillary policy and procedure manual developed by one airport. Some of the questionnaire responses provide insight into competing goals as a possible root cause of winter incursions and unsafe situations during winter operations. For instance, air traffic system performance is measured, in part, by the availability of the air transportation system to accept the aviation demand, which includes the availability of a runway to accept an aircraft operation. An example of the pressures to keep the runway open is contained in one non-hub airport’s approved snow plan: It is the intent of this program that airport personnel shall work closely with the ATCT when performing snow removal activi- ties to keep runway closings to a minimum. Closing a runway for snow removal, which advances the goals of airport operational safety, competes with the goal of availability. Competing goals create pressures on airport snow removal crews. A more in-depth analysis of competing goals and the pressures that snow removal operators experience is presented in chapter seven. The literature search determined that much research about snow and ice removal has been accomplished on the road and highway systems, but not on the airport system. Much of the research points toward design and human factors issues as primary factors affecting driver operation. This is echoed in the survey responses. Even though highway operations and airport operations differ, this study sought to identify equip- ment, practices, and techniques that produce benefits to the airport system. An investigation into technology that addresses the runway incursion issue seeks to create a defense barrier against potential error. However, the cost of implementation and because new technology can create new error possibilities has made airport operations more complicated. One source of unique information on winter operational experiences was found in the ACI–NA’s annual survey on airport winter operations and services across North American airports (25). For 2006, it included a wide range of airfield operational issues including operational experiences, runway incursion prevention plans to eliminate perceived hazards, FIGURE 2 Various FAA sources of safety material. (Source: FAA.)

11 and experience in implementing and auditing ICAO Annex 14-recommended safety management systems (SMS). SUMMARY Chapter one introduces how winter operations pose a unique hazard or risk for airports because snow removal vehicles and equipment are authorized to conduct operations on the move- ment areas of an airport, including active runways. It outlines the purpose of the study and the research methodology that was used, including a literature search, questionnaire distri- bution, and a review of airport snow plans. The objective of the synthesis is to provide a compendium of existing practices, procedures, training, and systems that airport operators use to reduce the risk of vehicle–aircraft incidents and incursions during winter operations and periods of low visibility. Within this chapter, background information is provided on runway incursions and the risks associated with such events. It further explains current regulations in place under 14 CFR Part 139 to address the issue. Provided are specific examples of runway incursion reports that occurred over one winter season. The reports highlight the varied nature of the incur- sion problem and introduce some of the factors causing them. The next chapter provides a brief synopsis of the factors affecting collision risks that was culled from the literature search and the responses to the questionnaire.

Next: Chapter Two - Factors Affecting Collision Risks »
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TRB’s Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) Synthesis 12: Preventing Vehicle–Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility examines factors affecting safe winter operations and the prevention of runway incursions by airport snow removal equipment operators.

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