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13 extreme conditions (wind chill, wind gusts, blowing snow performing final cleanup operations, tenants constantly call- and whiteout conditions, heavy versus light snow), night oper- ing inquiring when the surfaces will be open, aircraft running ations, pavement surface conditions (presence of ice, glycol behind schedule, and organizational pressures to serve the resulting in poor traction), and airfield congestion (vehicles customer by keeping the airfield and terminal areas open. Pres- and aircraft). The factor cited the most as increasing the sures associated with opening a runway or maintaining runway possible risk of collision during winter operations was poor operations are discussed in chapter seven. visibility. This includes fog, freezing rain, or blowing snow conditions, and reduced visibility due to snowbanks and PERSONNEL, VEHICLES, AND obscuration of markings, signs, and lights. Addressing issues EQUIPMENT RESOURCES associated with visibility restrictions and winter conditions is discussed in chapter four. The survey respondents identified not having enough vehicles, equipment, or personnel as factors. Having vehicles and equip- ment that were operational throughout the winter event also HUMAN PERFORMANCE was a concern, even though airports certificated under 14 CFR The second most cited factor affecting possible risk of collision Part 139 are required to have programs to ensure vehicle readi- during winter operations was fatigue--not just of the vehicle ness. The speed of vehicles, the heightened visibility through operators--but of ATCT controllers and others. However, lighting and marking of vehicles, and the type and placement fatigue is a symptom having many different contributing of brooms and plows were cited as potential collision risk factors. Pressure from air traffic controllers, pilots, and tenants factors. Equipment factors also refer to the airfield facilities, to open or keep open operating surfaces, complacency from such as proper signage and lighting being available and oper- working long hours, sleep deprivation, sensory overload, ational. The design of vehicles was implicated in the ques- distraction and lack of SA, too much radio chatter, operator tionnaire responses by reference to a particular design factor, inattention, repetitiveness of activity, operator attitude, phys- such as comfortable seats, lighting, control layout, heating, iological needs, vehicle ergonomics, and human error all are and wiper blade action. Vehicle design is addressed more human factors that can grouped into the human performance specifically in chapter eight. category. Chapter five of this report provides a synopsis of the effects of fatigue during winter operations, with the infor- OPERATIONAL FACTORS mation being limited to that of a primer on the contribution that fatigue can have on possible error and incursion-producing Survey respondents identified factors that, while they could effects, and not an exhaustive presentation of its effects. fall under some of the other categories, are best grouped under the heading of operational factors. This includes equip- ment not normally on runways or other operating surfaces SITUATIONAL AWARENESS during aircraft operations, non-routine vehicle and aircraft traffic patterns causing congestion, operations being con- SA has many definitions (28). Basically, it is a continuous ducted without ATCT assistance, changes in airfield config- process of attentiveness and surveillance that results in an uration due to wind changes or snow blockage of movement accurate perception of the factors and conditions affecting an areas, and the utilization of new or inexperienced employees individual and his or her environment during a defined period or contractors. of time. Essentially, SA refers to an individual's assumptions about how they feel, where they are located, the condition of Operational factors also include failure to follow standard their equipment, the abilities they have, what they thought they procedures, an oft-cited factor in the survey responses. As pre- heard or meant to say, and myriad other factors that affect the viously discussed, airports serving air carrier operations are outcome of any situation. SA was cited as a factor numerous required to have snow plans approved by the FAA as part of times in survey responses. However, it becomes more apparent the certification manual. It is a best practice for airports to when one reads accident or V/PD reports that either a loss of SA update the SICP as part of their pre- and post-winter reviews. or not having SA at all was a major factor in the event. SA is Less than adequate or failure to follow snow plans, ground discussed in more detail in chapter six. vehicle operating procedures, or vehicle operator training programs can lead to winter operation incidents. Additionally, TIME PRESSURES winter operation incidents can be created by inadequate or nonexistent procedures associated with NOTAM issuance Frequently mentioned as a collision risk factor were pres- and posting, incomplete self-inspections, lack of proper super- sures associated with maintaining operations. This includes vision, poor or slow response to conditions, vehicles not not having adequate time to complete a trip down the runway, staying together, personnel not watching for other vehicles or inadequate notice to get off a runway, length of time to gain aircraft, and inadequate information about approaching winter access to a runway for snow removal, aircraft being autho- conditions. Chapter nine delves more into how airports manage rized to taxi into position for takeoff while snow crews were these operational factors.