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22 If the visibility gets too poor, several airports stated their An SMS is a formal, top-down, business-like approach to policy is to stop snow removal operations until conditions managing safety risk. It includes systematic procedures, prac- improve. "Pull the operators off in low visibility--manage the tices, and policies for the management of safety (including risk," was the lament of one operator. When encountering a safety risk management, safety policy, safety assurance, and whiteout condition, one airport's practice is to stop and stay in safety promotion) (36). position until it has passed. This requires good communica- tion with other vehicles and with the ATCT, if in operation. In SUMMARY this case, the vehicle operators would all call in their positions to the designated supervisor or to the ATCT for runway evac- Chapter four discusses the effect of winter environmental con- uation instructions. If occurring at an uncontrolled airport, the ditions on collision risk factors such as driver visibility and risks must be evaluated beforehand as to what actions will be the absence of visual cues for snow removal efforts. The speed taken. For example, the point at which one airport ceased of vehicles was deemed to be a collision risk factor because snow operations was the visibility reaching a trigger point of higher speeds decrease driver reaction time and increase 300 ft RVR; for another, operations stopped when visibility braking distances. Suggestions are made for the use of snow was one-eighth of a mile (approximately 600 ft RVR). sticks and reflective tape to assist in recognizing positional placement. Consensus did not exist on whether runway lights The nature of wintry conditions makes it difficult for oper- should be on bright, low, or off when conducting winter oper- ators to see where they are located on a surface. It also makes ations. There were various comments received supporting it difficult to judge their distance from other vehicles or even each arrangement. Nor was there agreement on what to do the presence of other vehicles. Determining the best methods during poor visibility conditions; that is, whether to stop in or procedures for working in these conditions is difficult position on the runway or to pull all the vehicles off the oper- because of the various operating capabilities and characteris- ation until conditions improved. Because of the variability of tics of the airport and its employees. The operational variabil- operations at airports, it is suggested that each airport imple- ity means that each airport needs to evaluate in more depth its ment an SMS to evaluate their procedures in more depth. An exposure to risk. The implementation of an SMS can help SMS is one avenue for accomplishing proper evaluation, as in this evaluation and provide guidance for each operator. is pre- and post-season review of the SICP.