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60 APPENDIX C Reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Full-time ATCT. Large-hub. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR TKOF AT RWY 4, STARTED NORMAL TKOF WITH CONFIGN OF FLAPS 3 DEGS FOR CONTAMINATED RWY. JUST AFTER V1 AND VR STARTED NORMAL ROTATION AND NOTICED FLASHING YELLOW LIGHTS OUT OF FRONT WINDSCREEN RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME. ABOUT TIME MAIN GEAR WAS OFF COULD SEE THAT IT WAS A SNOW PLOW. THEN I NOTICED 2 OTHER VEHICLES ON THE NEW RWY. WHEN THE NOSE OF ACFT WAS TOO HIGH TO SEE FIRST VEHICLE, AND WE WERE ABOUT TO OVERFLY, I COULD SEE 1 VEHICLE THAT APPEARED TO BE ON RWY ALSO AND THE THIRD VEHICLE APPEARED TO BE JUST CLR OF RWY. XING HT WAS APPROX 50-75 FT. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Small-hub. MD80. SNOW PLOW ALMOST ENTERED RWY AS THE CREW ACCELERATED PAST V1. SAFETY OF FLT--DANGEROUS OP OF SNOW REMOVAL TRUCK. SAFETY OF FLT. DANGEROUS OP OF SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLE. TWR CLRED US `POS AND HOLD' ON RWY 10 TO WAIT FOR SNOW REMOVAL VEHI- CLES TO FINISH A RUN OF REMOVING SNOW FROM THE RWY. THE 3 SNOW PLOWS WERE PROCEEDING TOWARDS THE DEP END OF RWY 10 (TOWARDS THE E). WHEN THEY HAD COMPLETED THEIR WORK, ALL 3 VEHICLES EXITED THE RWY AT THE END. AFTER CONFIRMING WITH THE VEHICLE DRIVERS ON THE TWR RADIO FREQ THAT THEY WERE ALL CLR OF RWY 10, TWR THEN CLRED US FOR TKOF ON RWY 10. DURING THE FIRST PART OF OUR TKOF ROLL, ONE OF THE SNOW PLOW TRUCKS HAD PROCEEDED W ON TXWY A AND THEN MADE A TURN TOWARDS RWY 10 ONTO TXWY M (PRESSUMABLY TO PROCEED TO THE APCH END OF RWY 33 VIA TXWY M IN ORDER TO MEET ONE OF THE OTHER SNOW PLOWS TO PLOW SNOW FROM RWY 33). AS OUR AIRPLANE ACCELERATED TOWARDS V1 SPD, BOTH COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS NOTICED THE SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLE ON WHAT APPEARED TO BE A COLLISION COURSE WITH OUR ACFT AND CONTINUING TOWARDS THE RWY AT A RAPID PACE WITH NO OBVIOUS SIGNS OF STOPPING BEFORE ENTERING THE RWY. AT SOME POINT VERY CLOSE TO OUR V1 SPD, THE DRIVER OF THE SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLE APPEARED TO VERY ABRUPTLY STOP AT A VERY CLOSE DISTANCE FROM THE EDGE OF THE RWY JUST AS WE PASSED BY HIM. WE WERE ABLE TO CONTINUE OUR TKOF PAST HIM UNEVENT- FULLY. THE SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLE DRIVER WAS NOT EXERCISING DUE CAUTION AND SAFELY OPER- ATING HIS VEHICLE GIVEN THE SLIPPERY TXWY CONDITIONS. HIS VEHICLE COULD VERY EASILY HAVE SKIDDED AS HE TRIED TO STOP AND COULD HAVE ENTERED THE RWY JUST IN FRONT OF OUR ACFT JUST AS WE WERE ACCELERATING TO ROTATION SPD. HIS ACTIONS CAUSED BOTH PLTS IN OUR CREW TO FOCUS ON HIM AND THE POTENTIAL FOR COLLISION, AND GREATLY DISTR US FROM OUR PRIMARY DUTIES OF MONITORING OUR ACFT DURING THE MOST CRITICAL MOMENTS OF OUR TKOF. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Non-towered. Non-hub. SNOW PLOW ON SIDE OF RWY END DURING DO-328 LNDG ROLLOUT. NO CONFLICT. HOWEVER, VEHICLE PRESENCE NOT DISSEMINATED VIA ARTCC CTLR, OR ACKNOWLEDGED BY ARPT CTAF ADVISORY FREQ WHEN FLC BROADCAST THEIR LOCATION AND INTENTIONS PRIOR TO LNDG. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Part-time ATCT. Non-hub. ON FEB/XA/01, CAPT AND I WERE FLYING FLT A LITTLE AFTER XA00. I WAS THE PF UNTIL THE LNDG PHASE. OUTSIDE THE IAF, RECEIVED THE ATIS AND DID NOT STATE ANYTHING ABOUT

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61 PLOWING IN EFFECT, WHEN HE READ ME THE ATIS. VISIBILITY WAS ABOUT 2 MI WITH LIGHT SNOW. WE SET UP FOR THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 17. AT THE FAF, CAPT MADE THE TFC RPT ON CTAF, THAT WE WERE INTXN INBOUND, ANYONE PLEASE ADVISE, AND NO ONE RESPONDED. I FLEW THE APCH DOWN TO THE MDA, THEN CAPT TOOK THE PLANE OVER FOR THE LNDG BECAUSE THE BRAKING ACTION WAS RPTED AS POOR. WHILE LNDG AND IN THE ROLLOUT PHASE, THE CAPT AND I NOTICED SOME DIM FLASHING LIGHTS WAY DOWN AT THE FAR END OF THE RWY AND OFF TO THE L-HAND SIDE. WE BOTH THOUGHT THAT MAYBE IT WAS JUST SOME CONSTRUCTION SIGNS OFF TO THE SIDE OF THE RWY AT THE FAR END. WE BOTH DID NOT FEEL THREATENED OR IN ANY DANGER AT ANY TIME, SO WE CONTINUED THE ROLLOUT. UPON ROLLOUT WHILE APCHING OUR TURNOFF, WE BOTH REALIZED THAT IT WAS A PLOW THAT WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE RWY AT THE FAR END. THERE WAS NOTHING ON THE ATIS OF PLOWING AND ZAU WAS NOT INFORMED OF SNOW PLOWING IN EFFECT. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Large-hub. JUST AIRBORNE FROM RWY 4, ACR RPTS TO TWR EQUIP ON RWY DEP END. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR TKOF AT RWY 4, STARTED NORMAL TKOF WITH CONFIGN OF FLAPS 3 DEGS FOR CONTAMINATED RWY. JUST AFTER V1 AND VR STARTED NORMAL ROTATION AND NOTICED FLASHING YELLOW LIGHTS OUT OF FRONT WINDSCREEN RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME. ABOUT TIME MAIN GEAR WAS OFF COULD SEE THAT IT WAS A SNOW PLOW. THEN I NOTICED 2 OTHER VEHICLES ON THE NEW RWY. WHEN THE NOSE OF ACFT WAS TOO HIGH TO SEE FIRST VEHICLE, AND WE WERE ABOUT TO OVERFLY, I COULD SEE 1 VEHICLE THAT APPEARED TO BE ON RWY ALSO AND THE THIRD VEHICLE APPEARED TO BE JUST CLR OF RWY. XING HT WAS APPROX 50-75 FT. RPTED TO TWR THAT VEHICLES WERE OVERFLOWN ON RWY. TWR THEN STATED OVER RADIO, `WHO ARE THE VEHICLES ON MY RWY?' WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF TO DEP CTL. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Non-towered. General aviation. ACFT X TAKES EVASIVE ACTION AND EXECUTED A GAR TO AVOID A SNOW PLOW THAT BLUNDERS ON THE ACTIVE RWY. THE ARPT USES A CITY AND UNICOM RADIO WHEN SNOW PLOWS ARE ON THE ARPT GROUNDS. ACFT RADIO AND PERSONNEL CALL THE CITY AND ADVISED THEM OF THE INBOUND ACFT. I AM THE RAMP SUPERVISOR THERE AND WAS NEEDED AT THE HANGER TO PULL AN ACFT OUT. WHEN I WAS DONE WITH THE JOB THE DRIVER OF THE SNOWPLOW CAME OVER AND INFORMED ME OF A NEAR MISS WITH AN ACFT. I WENT IN THE FBO, WHERE MY BOSS WAS SUPPOSED TO BE MONITORING THE RADIO IN MY ABSENCE, AND SHE WAS ON THE PHONE OBLIVIOUS TO THE SIT. I WENT AND TALKED TO THE PLTS OF THE EMB-120 AND THEY INFORMED ME THAT THE SNOWPLOW EXITED THE RWY AND THEN BACKED UP ONTO THE ACTIVE WHILE THEY WERE LNDG. THE PLT INITIATED A GAR AND MISSED THE PLOW BY AN ESTIMATED 5 FT. WHEN I WENT BACK IN THE OFFICE AND TALKED TO MY BOSS SHE WAS AWARE OF THE PROB AND TRIED TO TRANSFER BLAME TO ME SAYING THAT THE RADIO WAS TURNED DOWN (IT WAS STILL TURNED `WAY UP' I COULD HEAR IT 20 FT AWAY THROUGH A DOOR). THE RADIO FOR THE CITY WAS ALSO TURNED UP AND PRIOR TO GOING OUT I BLATANTLY TOLD MY BOSS TO MONITOR THE RADIO, AS IS COMMON PRACTICE. NO ONE WAS INJURED HOWEVER THE EMB120 TOOK EVASIVE ACTION AND INITIATED A GAR TO MISS THE VEHICLE. CITY PLOWS ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH AN AVIATION RADIO AND WHEN MY BOSS WAS ASKED ABOUT THIS SHE SAID `IT DOESN'T DO ANY GOOD BECAUSE THEY DON'T UNDERSTAND AVIATION JARGON.' THIS ISN'T THE FIRST TIME THIS HAS HAPPENED HOWEVER THIS IS THE CLOSEST WE HAVE COME TO AN ACCIDENT AND IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE CURRENT STANDARDS OF ADVISING ACFT AND SNOW PLOWS DOES NOT WORK. THIS IS DEFERRED BY MY BOSS BY HER STATING THAT IF WE WOULD MONITOR THE RADIO CLOSER IT WOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE. AS THIS SHOWS, EVEN WHEN THE RADIO IS `MONITORED' THERE IS STILL A PROBLEM. NO NOTAM WAS FILED ABOUT PLOWS AND EQUIP ON THE RWYS. CALLBACK

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62 CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR HAD NOTHING NEW TO ADD TO HIS ORIGINAL RPT. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Non-hub. A DH8 CREW MADE A GAR WHEN A VEHICLE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE RWY. UPON CONTACT WITH THE TWR CTLR, WHILE FLYING THE ILS RWY 28, WE WERE INFORMED THAT THERE WERE MEN AND EQUIP ON THE RWY (RWY 28) AND A LNDG CLRNC WAS NOT GIVEN. A FEW MINS LATER, LNDG CLRNC WAS GIVEN. APPROX 500 FT AGL, WE BECAME VISUAL AS WE DEPARTED THE PASSING SNOW SHOWER. WE WERE ABLE TO VISUALLY CONFIRM THAT THE RWY OF LNDG WAS CLR OF SNOW REMOVAL EQUIP. WE ALSO NOTICED EQUIP REMOVING SNOW ON THE XING RWY 15/33. I MENTIONED TO THE CAPT THAT A SNOW PLOW WAS MOVING RAPIDLY ON RWY 33, FROM OUR L TOWARD OUR LNDG RWY (RWY 28). AS WE DSNDED, WE REPLIED THAT IF WE HAD TO GO AROUND WHAT THE PROC WOULD BE. WITH OUR PLAN IN PLACE, AS WE REACHED 200 FT AGL, THE PLOW PROCEEDED TO CROSS ONTO OUR RWY. UPON ENTERING OUR RWY, HE MADE A TURN THAT LOOKED AS IF HE REALIZED HIS MISTAKE, BUT TURNED OUT TO BE HIM SETTING UP FOR HIS U-TURN TO GO BACK ONTO RWY 33. AS WE REACHED 100 FT AGL, THE CAPT LEVELED OFF AND STARTED ADDING PWR AS WE WATCHED TO SEE WHAT THE PLOW WOULD DO. AFTER HIS INITIAL TURN TO THE L, HE TURNED BACK R, PROCEEDING ACROSS OUR RWY CTR- LINE IN HIS U-TURN. AT THIS POINT WE WERE ADDING PWR AND PERFORMING THE GAR. WE RPTED TO TWR `GOING AROUND, SNOW PLOW ON RWY.' WE MADE A VISUAL PATTERN BACK AROUND AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. TWR ASKED EQUIP PEOPLE IF THEY HAD BEEN ON THE RWY. WE DID NOT HEAR THE REPLY. IT PAYS TO KEEP YOUR EYES OPEN, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS UP, AND BE READY WITH A PLAN IF THINGS GO AWRY! +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Med-hub. A320 CREW SHORTLY AFTER ROTATION, IN A LOW VISIBILITY CONDITION, SAW VEHICLES ON THE RWY. TAXI FOR TKOF IN RESTR VISIBILITY FOR DEP ON RWY 4. GND CTL AND TWR WERE COMBINED ON 1 FREQ. AN ACR X ACFT WAS WAITING FOR TKOF. JUST AFTER BEGINNING OUR TAXI FROM GATE, WE HEARD WHAT SOUNDED LIKE A SNOW PLOW ASK IF HE COULD HAVE THE RWY BACK AFTER ACR X DEPARTED. TWR SAID YES. WE CALLED THE TWR TO REMIND THEM THAT WE WERE TAXIING OUT SO THEY WOULD KEEP THE RWY OPEN LONG ENOUGH FOR US TO DEPART. THE FO THEN CONTACTED DISPATCH TO UPDATE THEM ON FIELD CONDITIONS. I HEARD A VEHICLE REQUEST CLRNC TO CROSS THE RWY, WHICH WAS GRANTED. TWR TOLD US TO CALL WHEN #1 FOR TKOF. WE DID--ABOUT 3-5 MINS AFTER I HEARD THE VEHICLE ASK FOR XING CLRNC. WE THEN GOT CLRNC TO TAXI INTO POS AND TOLD TO CALL WHEN READY. WE CALLED READY AND WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. JUST AFTER ROTATION WE SAW VEHICLES XING OUR RWY AT ABOUT TXWY P OR TXWY G. WE FLEW OVER THEM AT 50-75 FT (CEILING 100 FT). I RPTED THIS TO TWR. THE CTLR ASKED THE VEHICLES WHAT THEY WERE DOING ON HIS RWY. I THINK EITHER THE CTLR ASSUMED THEY HAD ALREADY CROSSED (THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLR SEVERAL MINS EARLIER) AND I ALSO THINK THE SNOW PLOWS THOUGHT ACR X WAS THE ONLY DEP AND THEY COULD HAVE THE RWY BACK. APPARENTLY, ONLY 1 CAR HAD AN ATC RADIO AND THE OTHER PLOWS AND VEHICLE FOLLOWED HIM, OR THEY JUST CROSSED WITHOUT CLRNC. THEY SHOULD HAVE HEARD OUR TKOF CLRNC. THEY KNEW WE WERE TAXIING BECAUSE THEY HAD TO GIVE WAY TO US AT TXWY E. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Non-towered. Non-hub. AN SF340 FLC LANDS THEIR ACFT ON A SNOW AND ICE COVERED RWY WHILE IT IS OCCUPIED BY A SNOW PLOW. I WAS ON THE 3RD DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP. I HAD TO RPT THAT DAY AT AB00. I WAS ON THE 4TH AND LAST LEG OF THE TRIP, IN IMC WITH CLR ICE BUILDING UP ON MY AIRPLANE WITH THE AUTOPLT INOP. THE CTR CTLR TURNED US IN HIGH AND TIGHT FOR THE APCH AND THE RWY WAS SNOW AND ICE COVERED WITH

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63 WHITEOUT CONDITIONS. ZBW ON 124.75 CLRED FLT FOR THE ILS RWY 1 APCH. WE WERE AT 3200 FT MSL AT 1-2 MI FROM THE FAF. WE WERE VECTORED HIGH ON THE GS SO WE INCREASED OUR RATE OF DSCNT TO INTERCEPT THE GS. THE AUTOPLT WAS MEL'ED INOP, SO I HAD TO HAND FLY THE APCH USING ONLY THE FLT DIRECTOR. AT 3200 FT TO 1000 FT WE WERE ENCOUNTERING FREEZING RAIN AND PICKING UP CLR ICE ON THE ACFT. AFTER THE APCH CTLR (ZBW) CLRED US FOR THE APCH, HE NEVER SWITCHED US TO CTAF ON 122.8. WE, THE CREW, ALSO FORGOT TO GO TO THE CTAF. AFTER LNDG ON RWY 1, THE FO AND I SAW A PLOW TRUCK APPROX 3/4 MI DOWN THE RWY ON THE L-HAND SIDE PLOWING SNOW DRIV- ING AWAY FROM US. I MANAGED TO STOP THE ACFT APPROX 1500 FT BEHIND THE PLOW TRUCK AND EXITED THE RWY AT TXWY C AND PULLED UP THE CTAF AND ANNOUNCED ON THE RADIO THAT FLT WAS CLRING RWY 1. BY THE TIME WE SAW THE TRUCK WE HAD ALREADY LANDED ON THE RWY AND FELT THAT DOING A GAR ON A SNOW AND ICE COVERED RWY AND GOING BACK UP INTO FREEZING RAIN WOULD BE A LOT MORE DANGEROUS THAN JUST STOPPING BEHIND THE PLOW TRUCK WHICH WAS DRIV- ING AWAY FROM US ANYWAY. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Part-time ATCT. Non-hub. THE FLC OF A TWIN JET CPR ACFT LANDED ON A RWY THAT WAS OCCUPIED BY A SNOW PLOW. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AFTER EXECUTING A LOC BACK COURSE TO RWY 21. OUR LNDG CLRNC WAS ISSUED 5 MI FROM THE THRESHOLD OF THE RWY. WHILE ON THE LNDG ROLLOUT WITH BRAKES APPLIED, BOTH CREW MEMBERS NOTICED A SNOW PLOW TRUCK AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS FACING OUR OPPOSITE DIRECTION ON THE ACTIVE RWY APPROX 3000 FT FROM OUR ACFT. THE SNOW PLOW IMMEDIATELY EXITED THE RWY TO THE R IN ORDER TO AVOID OUR ROLLOUT. WE CONTINUED OUR BRAKING AND STOPPED APPROX 1000 FT PRIOR TO THE PLOW'S LOCATION. A DETERMINATION WAS MADE DURING A MEETING BTWN CREW AND ARPT MGMNT, THAT TWR PERSON ON DUTY CLRED THE PLOW ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY 21. HOWEVER, THEN CLRED US TO LAND AND NEVER NOTIFIED THE PLOW DRIVER TO EXIT THE RWY. SINCE OUR LNDG CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO US 5 MI OUT, THERE WAS MORE THAN A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF TIME TO CLR THE PLOW OFF THE RWY. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS OCCURRENCE WAS THE TWR CTLR'S LACK OF COM TO GND EQUIP PERSONNEL. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Part-time ATCT. Non-hub. P180 LNDG OBSERVED SNOW PLOWS ON RWY DURING LNDG ROLL, NO INFO FROM ATC. I WAS THE PF ON THE TRIP. WE DEPARTED XXXX AT XA32. WE WERE IN VMC. WHEN ATC GAVE US VEC- TORS FOR THE APCH, WE ENTERED IMC AT THAT TIME AND REMAINED IMC FOR THE REST OF THE APCH. THE CAPT ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AND ATC CLRED US THEN TO THE VOR AND FROM THERE FOR THE ILS APCH. THE CAPT CONTACTED THE TWR AND WAS TOLD TO CALL A CERTAIN FIX INBOUND. I WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE INSTS AND FLYING THE AIRPLANE WHILE THE CAPT WAS CALLING OUT ALTS ABOVE DECISION HT. I WAS MENTALLY GOING OVER THE MISSED APCH PROC AND PREPARING MYSELF FOR THE APCH LNDG TRANSITION WHEN THE CAPT ACQUIRED VISUAL REF WITH THE RWY AT ABOUT 250 FT ABOVE DECISION HT AND ABOUT 1 1/4 MI FORWARD VISIBILITY. I LOOKED OUTSIDE AND ALSO SAW THE RWY. I THEN DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND LANDED. ONCE WE TOUCHED DOWN, I SAW 2 OBJECTS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE RWY AT A DISTANCE IN FRONT OF US. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO KEEP THE AIRPLANE STRAIGHT ON THE CTRLINE AND TO SLOWDOWN USING PROP REVERSE. WHEN WE PASSED THE OBJECTS, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE SNOW PLOWS, THE ACFT HAD SLOWED DOWN CONSIDERABLY. IN MY OPINION, THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE BY THE CAPT/PNF TO RPT THE FIX INBOUND. IT WAS THE FIRST TRIP THE CREW MEM- BERS FLEW TOGETHER. UP TO THE FAF, I CAN RECALL THE RADIO XMISSIONS QUITE CLRLY. THERE- AFTER, I TUNED OUT THE RADIO SOMEWHAT AND ASSUMED THE CAPT/PNF RPTED THE FIX AND OBTAINED LNDG CLRNC. I WAS CONCENTRATING, DURING THE LAST SEGMENT OF THE APCH, PRI- MARILY ON THE INSTS AND APCH PROGRESSION. THE CAPT MONITORED MY FLYING THE APCH CLOSELY SINCE IT WAS MY FIRST TIME AS PF WITH HIM, TAKING SOME ATTN AWAY FROM HIS DUTIES AS PNF. I ALSO THINK THERE WAS A LACK OF AWARENESS BY THE CTL TWR. WHY DIDN'T THE TWR INVESTIGATE/CALL US AFTER FAILING TO HEAR FROM US? THE TWR KNEW WE WERE ON THE APCH

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64 INBOUND FOR LNDG. WHY WAS THE SNOW PLOW EQUIP ON THE RWY WHILE INST APCHS WERE IN PROGRESS? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT THEY DID IN FACT LWOC. THE SNOW PLOWS, AT THE TIME THEY PASSED THEM, WERE OPERAT- ING ON THE SIDE OF THE RWY AND NOT ON THE RWY SURFACE. WHEN THEY PARKED THE ACFT, THEY WERE MET BY A SHERIFF'S DEPUTY WHO STATED THEY HAD LWOC AND THAT HE WAS THERE BOTH TO GATHER INFO REGARDING A POTENTIAL VIOLATION AS WELL AS TO `PROTECT THEM FROM THE SNOW PLOW OPERATORS--WHO ARE KIND OF HOT HEADS AND WERE UPSET WITH THE CREW.' THE DEPUTY REVIEWED THEIR FLT BAGS, CHARTS AND PLATES, AND TOOK DOWN PERSONAL INFO. THE CAPT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED A `LETTER OF INVESTIGATION' FROM THE FAA. RPTR EMPHASIZED HE FELT THE ATCT LCL CTLR WAS LAX IN NOT MONITORING THEIR ARR MORE CLOSELY AND FOR NEVER ADVISING THEM REGARDING THE PLOWING IN PROGRESS. HE FURTHER SPECULATES THAT THE OP OF SNOW PLOWS ON OR IN THE VICINITY OF THE ILS ANTENNAS MIGHT WELL DISRUPT SIGNAL PROPAGATION AND IS LIKELY NOT AN AUTH ACTIVITY. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Part-time ATCT. Non-hub. FLT CREW OF PIAGGIO P180 ON ILS APCH FORGETS TO RPT AT FIX INBND, AND LWOC IN IMC AND SNOW WITH SNOW PLOWS STILL ON RWY. I HAD NEVER BEEN TO AIRPORT BEFORE. AS WE WERE APCHING, CTR ASKED US TO SLOW DOWN, THERE WAS A CHEROKEE ON THE APCH. WE COMPLIED. THE CHEROKEE GOT VERY DISORIENTED. THEY TOOK HIM BACK AROUND ON VECTORS TO RETRY THE ILS. I OFFERED TO DO SEVERAL 360 DEG TURNS TO GIVE HIM MORE SPACING. WE WERE STILL VMC AND I WOULD HAVE RATHER STAYED VMC THAN GO TO THE VOR AND HOLD IMC WITH RPTED ICING. APCH SAID OK. THE CHEROKEE GOT IN, AND WE WERE CLRED TO A FIX. I ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION, APCH CLRED US TO THE VOR AND CLRED US FOR THE APCH. (THERE WAS NO PT REQUIRED FROM THE VOR.) WE GOT ESTABLISHED, APCH HANDED US OFF TO TWR. I PICKED UP NEW ATIS WITH MUU RPTS (BRAKING ACTION). TWR SAID HE WOULD GET US A NEW MUU RPT, THEN ASKED US IF WE HAD THE RPT. I ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, WE HAD THE NEW BRAKING ACTION RPT. I WAS MONITORING FO. MY EXPERIENCE SHOWS NEW PLTS IN THE PIAGGIO TEND TO GET SLOW. VERY DANGEROUS IN THE P180. APCH SPD IS 140 KTS, TOUCHDOWN IS 120 KTS. I WAS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE, WATCHING FOR RWY AND MONITORING FO. WE GOT GND CONTACT ABOUT 500-600 FT AGL, BUT FORWARD VISIBILITY WAS 1 MI OR LESS THAN 1 MI. FINALLY SAW RWY/LIGHTS. WE TOUCHED DOWN AND I SAW OBJECTS ON BOTH SIDES OF RWY APPROX 1/2 WAY DOWN. I WAS NOT EXPECTING ANYTHING TO BE ON THE RWY. WE WERE NEVER TOLD SNOW REMOVAL EQUIP ON RWY. I MADE A JUDGEMENT CALL. I COULD SEE THERE WAS ROOM BTWN THE SNOW PLOWS FOR US WITH PLENTY OF ROOM ON EITHER SIDE. WE WERE SLOWED DOWN TO WHERE THE IAS WASN'T EVEN READ- ING WHEN WE PASSED THE TRUCKS. I DIDN'T WANT TO TRY A TOUCH-AND-GO, AIRPORT IS APPROX 6600 FT MSL. WE PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AIRBORNE BY THE TIME WE WERE BY THE PLOWS. OUR COURSE OF ACTION WAS THE SAFEST POSSIBLE IN THAT SIT. TWR TOLD US TO CONTACT HIM VIA PHONE. TWR PERSON AND I TALKED SEVERAL TIMES. HE TOLD ME HE HAD ONLY BEEN THERE 1 MONTH. HE TOLD US HE WAS THE ONLY ONE IN THE TWR. WHY WAS THERE NO SUPVR IN THE TWR? WHY DID- N'T HE TELL US THERE WAS EQUIP ON THE RWY? WHY AM I CLRED FOR AN APCH WHEN THERE IS EQUIP THAT CAN MAKE MY LOC READ ERRONEOUS IN IMC? DID HIS ATIS SAY SNOW REMOVAL WAS IN EFFECT? +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Non-towered. Non-hub. C208 PLT IS SURPRISED TO FIND 2 SNOW BLOWERS ON THE RWY FOLLOWING AN ILS APCH. ON GAR DIS- COVERS HE HAD SELECTED THE WRONG CTAF FREQ. VEHICLES CLRED THE RWY TO ALLOW A SUCCESS- FUL LNDG. AT APPROX 35 MI FROM LNDG, I WAS ABLE TO PICK UP THE ASOS AND NOTIFIED ZDV THAT I WOULD BE REQUESTING THE ILS RWY 10 APCH TO THE AIRPORT. I BEGAN AT THIS TIME TO SET RADIOS FOR THE ILS AND REQUESTED VECTORS TO THE LOC FROM ATC. AT ABOUT 13 MI FROM AIRPORT, I WAS CLRED FROM CTR FREQ TO ADVISORY FREQ. AT THIS TIME I SELECTED THE FREQ I HAD PREVIOUSLY STORED WHEN

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65 SETTING THE RADIOS FOR THE APCH. I MADE A POS CALL ON ADVISORY FREQ AND RECEIVED NO REPLY FROM UNICOM WHICH IS NOT TOO UNUSUAL. AT 7 MI, MADE ANOTHER POS RPT AND KEYED PLT CTL LIGHTING TO `HIGH.' AT ABOUT 2 MI, BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST AND MADE A `SHORT FINAL' POS RPT. IT WAS AFTER THIS I NOTICED A ROTARY SNOW BLOWER ON THE TXWY APCHING THE RWY AND IT APPEARED HE WAS GOING TO CONTINUE ONTO THE RWY OVERRUN AREA. I STOPPED MY DSCNT AND LOST SIGHT OF THE PLOW UNDER THE NOSE OF THE ACFT. AT THIS POINT, I NOTICED ANOTHER PLOW ON THE RWY ITSELF AND MADE THE DECISION THAT I WOULD BEGIN THE MISSED APCH. I BEGAN A CLB BUT DID NOT IMMEDIATELY BEGIN THE TURN TO THE VOR, SO I COULD EXAMINE THE RWY TO SEE IF THERE WAS SOME UNDISCLOSED HAZARD OR SITUATION TO BE AWARE OF DURING MY FOLLOWING APCH. NOT SEEING ANYTHING, I BEGAN MY TURN ON THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH AND WENT TO SELECT THE CTR FREQ TO NOTIFY THEM OF THE MISSED APCH WHEN I NOTICED THAT I HAD SELECTED THE WRONG FREQ FOR CTAF 122.8 INSTEAD OF 123.0. I SET THE CORRECT FREQ AND CALLED AIPORT UNICOM TO ADVISE THEM OF THE SITUATION. THEY SAID THEY HAD `HEARD ME ON STEAMBOAT'S FREQ' AND WERE CLRING THE RWY. WHEN THEY MADE THE CALL THAT ALL THE EQUIP WAS CLR, I WAS ON DOWNWIND AND HAD GOOD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE RWY AND ELECTED TO LAND FROM THAT POINT. THE PRIMARY FAC- TOR IN THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WAS THE PLT'S SELECTION OF THE WRONG CTAF. BETTER AWARE- NESS OF THIS IS THE RESOLUTION. ADDITIONALLY ISSUANCE OF NOTAMS MAY HAVE REINFORCED THE NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH UNICOM INSTEAD OF JUST MAKE STANDARD POS RPTS. ALSO A MEANS OF MONITORING ARTCC MIGHT GIVE ADDITIONAL ALERT OF INBOUND ACFT HELPING TO REDUCE THE CHANCE OF SIMILAR CONFLICT IN A FUTURE OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Large-Hub. CTLR EXPERIENCES AMASS ALERT WITH NO VISUAL CONFLICTING TFC. ACFT X ILS RWY 9L APCH TO VISUAL CONDITIONS. DEICER TEAM (DEICER 3) TO CROSS RWY 4 AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9L WITH ACKNOWLEDGMENT. THERE WAS AN AMASS ALERT THAT THE RWY WAS OCCUPIED. I SCANNED THE RWY, AND THE DEICING TEAM HAD STOPPED SHORT OF THE RWY. I THEN SCANNED THE REST OF THE RWY FOR OTHER VEHICLES AND ACFT, AND THE RWY WAS CLR. I THEN DECIDED TO ALLOW THE ACFT TO LAND. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Large-Hub. A CL65 FO RPTED BEING DISTR DURING TAXI AND ALLOWING HIS CAPT TO DEPART THE TXWY AND JOIN A ROADWAY. WE WERE TALKING TO THE RAMP CTLR. HE CLRED US TO TAXI W ON TXWY A, WITH OUR DISCRETION, TO CUT OVER TO TXWY B ON TXWY A4 OR TXWY A3 BECAUSE OF SNOW AND SLUSH ON TXWYS. I WAS BUSY WITH CHKLISTS AND WAS HEADS DOWN. I LOOKED UP AND SAID `WE'RE COMING UP ON TXWY A4.' THE CAPT SAID, `IT LOOKS GOOD. LET'S TAKE IT,' AND HE TURNED US ONTO IT. WE TAXIED ABOUT 20 FT WHEN THE RAMP CTLR ADVISED US TO STOP, THAT WE WERE ON A VEHICLE ROAD. AT THE TIME OF THE TURN, THERE WAS NO TFC ON THE ROAD. WHEN WE REALIZED WHERE WE WERE, A BIG BUS STARTED TOWARDS US, THEN STOPPED. THE CTLR HAD THE BUS BACK UP AND HE CLRED US OVER TO TXWY B AND WE WERE ON OUR WAY. I APOLOGIZED AND HE SAID `NO PROB.' THE VEHICLE ROAD WAS IN BETTER SHAPE THAN THE TXWYS. WE MISTOOK IT FOR A CLRED TXWY BECAUSE WE WANTED TO AVOID SNOW/SLUSH. WE JUST FLAT OUT SCREWED UP. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATC. Medium-hub. A B737-200 IS ALMOST HIT BY A BOX PLOW DURING ITS TXWY INCURSION WHILE REMOVING SNOW AT A HIGH SPD FROM THE RAMP AREA. WX AT TIME OF INCIDENT: WIND 210 DEGS AT 10 KTS, GUSTING TO 25 KTS. VISIBILITY VARIABLE 1/2 3/4 MI, BLOWING SNOW AND MIST. AFTER PUSHBACK AND AFTER DEICING THE ACFT, WE RECEIVED

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66 A TAXI CLRNC TO TAXI THE ACFT TO RWY 24L VIA TXWY K, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24R AT TXWY C. WE ENTERED TXWY K DIRECTLY ABEAM GATE X AND WHILE TAXIING E ON THE TXWY, BOTH THE FO AND I OBSERVED A BOX PLOW THAT HAD STARTED ITS RUN FROM THE XA GATE AREA, MOVING S TOWARD TXWY K AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD. NEITHER I NOR THE FO WERE SURE OF THE PLOW OPERA- TOR'S INTENTIONS, SO I BEGAN TO SLOW THE ACFT SO AS TO AVOID A POTENTIAL PROB. HOWEVER, WITHIN JUST A FEW SECONDS, WE BOTH REALIZED THE PLOW OPERATOR DID NOT SEE US AND WAS CONTINUING ITS APCH TO TXWY K, STILL PROCEEDING AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD AS THOUGH THE INTENTION WAS TO GO THROUGH THE TXWY AND PUSH THE SNOW TO THE S SIDE OF THE TXWY AREA. AT THAT POINT, I APPLIED MAX BRAKING AND TURNED THE ACFT APPROX 25 DEGS TO THE R TO AVOID A COLLISION AND SLID TO A STOP WITHIN JUST A FEW FT OF THE S EDGE OF THE TXWY. OPERATOR ALSO APPLIED MAX BRAKING AND SLID TO A STOP APPROX 15 FT FROM THE L SIDE OF THE FORWARD ACFT FUSELAGE, ABEAM THE L-1 DOOR AND JUST OUTBOARD OF THE #1 ENG INLET. ONCE WE REALIZED THAT BOTH THE ACFT AND THE PLOW HAD STOPPED AND NO COLLISION HAD TAKEN PLACE, WE CONTACTED GND CTL AND INFORMED THEM OF THE NEAR COLLISION. AFTER CLRING THE AREA AND MAKING SURE WE HAD ENOUGH ROOM TO TURN THE ACFT TO THE L AND BACK TOWARD THE CTR OF TXWY K, WE ASKED FOR CLRNC TO CONTINUE OUR TAXI UP TO THE HOLDING POINT SHORT OF RWY 24R. THE PLOW OPERATOR BACKED THE PLOW UP AND RETURNED TO THE GATE AREA. AFTER OUR RETURN TO THE AIRPORT, LATER IN THE DAY, I CONTACTED THE PLOW OPERA- TOR'S SUPVR MR X AND DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE EVENTS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE EARLIER THAT MORNING. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS PLOW OPERATOR IS NOT ONE OF HIS REGULAR, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES, BUT IS RATHER A PART-TIME WORKER WHO IS PERIODICALLY CALLED IN DURING PEAK WORKLOAD TIMES. IN ADDITION TO THE EVENTS JUST DESCRIBED AND WHILE TAXIING OUT FOR DEP AS FLT ABCD, WE WERE PROCEEDING N ON TXWY R FOR A DEP OFF RWY 14 WHEN ANOTHER INCIDENT OCCURRED. JUST NO F TXWY M, 2 ROAD GRADERS WERE ON THE TXWY AND BEGAN TURNING SBOUND TO GET BACK TO A ROAD THAT TRAVELS IN A SOUTHEASTERLY DIRECTION FROM THE TXWY. THOUGH THEY WERE STILL APPROX 150-200 YARDS AHEAD OF US, GND CTL HAD NOT NOTI- FIED US THAT THE GRADERS WERE CLRED TO BE ON THE TXWY, AND I'M NOT AT ALL SURE THEY DID HAVE A CLRNC TO PROCEED ONTO THE TXWY. WE DID HAVE TO SLOW THE ACFT SOMEWHAT IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM TIME TO CLR. I WOULD NOT CATEGORIZE THIS AS A `NEAR MISS,' BUT THE FACT REMAINS, THEY WERE SOMEWHERE THEY PROBABLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN. I ONCE AGAIN CONTACTED GND CTL AND INFORMED THEM THAT THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME TODAY THAT WE HAD AN UNCOMFORTABLE EXPERIENCE WITH SNOW REMOVAL EQUIP. THEIR REPLY (ONCE AGAIN) WAS THAT THEY WOULD CONTACT THE AIRPORT OPERATOR AND INFORM THEM OF THE PROB. SNOW REMOVAL AT A MAJOR ARPT IS A VERY DIFFICULT JOB AND REQUIRES A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF COORD BTWN THE WORKERS AND GND AND/OR TWR CTL, BUT IT SEEMS THAT IN THIS CASE THOSE COMS HAD BROKEN DOWN. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Part-time ATCT. Non-hub. ARPT OPS SUPVR ALLEGES KC135 GAR CAUSED BECAUSE OF NON XFER OF CTL TWR WITH MEN AND EQUIP ON RWY PROVIDING SNOW REMOVAL. DURING SNOW OPS AT APPROX XA45, A KC-135, BASED AT THIS ARPT ALMOST LANDED ON A SNOW REMOVAL CREW ON RWY 5R WITHOUT HAVING THE PROPER ATC CLRNC TO LAND. THE PLT WAS TALK- ING TO A DIFFERENT AIRPORT ATC CTL. THE OTHER AIRPORT SWITCHED THE ACFT OVER TO OUR TWR, BUT THE PLT DID NOT CONTACT AIPORT TWR UNTIL HE SAW THE EQUIP ON THE RWY. AT THAT TIME HE SAID `GOING AROUND,' THEN PULLED UP AND CIRCLED AROUND FOR ANOTHER APCH. IT WAS SNOWING AND THE VISIBILITY WAS APPROX 1 MI., THE ACFT WAS APPROX 300 FT OVER THE THRESHOLD BAR OF THE RWY. THE CTLR STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE ACFT WAS ON FINAL APCH BECAUSE THE ACFT DID NOT HAVE A T-TAG (ON THE RADAR SCOPE) AND NEVER CONTACTED HIS TWR FREQ. THE CTLR FOUND OUT THAT THE ACFT WAS ON FINAL APCH WHEN VEHICLES ON THE RWY INQUIRED ABOUT IT ON GND FREQ, AND BY THAT TIME THE ACFT HAD ALREADY BEGUN THE GAR. THERE WERE 2 PLOWS, 2 BROOMS AND 2 PICKUP TRUCKS ON THE RWY. THE LCL FSDO OFFICE WAS NOTIFIED AND A RPT WAS MADE WITH THE FAA. ALSO, WE HAVE HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH AIRPORTS' TWR CHIEFS. MY CONCERN IS

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67 THAT THIS IS THE SECOND TIME IN 2 YRS THAT WE HAVE HAD THIS HAPPEN AND THIS MAY BE A SYS PROB AS WELL AS HUMAN ERROR. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Large hub. B12 HELI PLT AND ATCT LCL CTLR DIFFERED ON WHERE THE LNDG WAS TO TAKE PLACE. DURING APCH TO LNDG ON TXWY, TWR CTLR ADVISED SNOW REMOVAL ON TXWY F (SAME TXWY I WAS LNDG ON) AND MEN AND EQUIP WORKING ON THE BARRIERS ON RWY 31. I THOUGHT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO AVOID MEN AND EQUIP ON THE RWY AND TXWY. I CROSSED THE RWY AT 90 DEG ANGLE WELL CLR OF THE MEN AND EQUIP AND 300-400 FT AGL. LANDED ON TXWY F 1000-3000 FT FROM NEAREST VEHICLE. TWR OPERATOR WAS SURPRISED. HE THOUGHT HE HAD RESTR ME FROM ANY FLT OVER THE RWY (14,500 FT LONG). +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ B737-300 WAS ALMOST HIT BY AN ARPT GND EQUIP SNOW REMOVAL TRUCK. Full-time ATCT. Large hub. AFTER LNDG ON RWY 21L, WE WERE TOLD TO FOLLOW THE ACR ON TXWY T AND TXWY K AND HOLD SHORT OF CLOSED RWY 9L. THIS IS A VERY LONG RTE AROUND THE NEW TERMINAL CONSTRUCTION. APCHING TXWY K, WE OBSERVED SEVERAL LARGE SNOW SCRAPER/BLOWERS WORKING NEAR THE AREA OF CLOSED RWY 21R AND TXWY Y. THEY WERE MOVING RAPIDLY AND IN A VERY IRREGULAR PATTERN, HITTING THE AREAS OF SNOW ON THE TXWYS. OUR TXWYS WERE CLR ON THE CTRLINE WITH A BAND OF SNOW ON THE R EDGE. NO SNOW WAS FALLING AND THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD. WE WERE 1/4 MI BEHIND THE ACR AND 1/4 MI IN FRONT OF A COMPANY FLT THAT WITNESSED THE EVENT. AS WE APCHED TXWY K4, A SMALLER SNOW BLOWER WHO WAS WORKING ON TXWY Y MADE A TURN ONTO TXWY K4 AND WITHOUT STOPPING OR SLOWING DOWN CAME DIRECTLY AT US AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD AND OBLIVIOUS TO OUR MOVEMENT ON THE ACTIVE TXWY. MY FO YELLED `I DON'T THINK HE IS GOING TO STOP'--AND HE DID NOT. I TOOK EVASIVE ACTION TO THE R AND SLAMMED ON THE BRAKES. WE DID NOT DEPART THE TXWY, BUT GOT NEAR THE EDGE INTO THE SNOW. LUCKILY, THE VEHICLE WAS SMALL ENOUGH TO GO UNDER THE WINGTIP WITHOUT COLLIDING WITH US. WITHOUT OUR ACTION, WE BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE IMPACTED US BTWN THE NOSE GEAR AND #1 ENG. AT THE GATE, I CALLED THE ARPT MGR WHO STARTED AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENT. LOOKING BACK, I DO REMEMBER SEEING AN SUV TYPE TRUCK WITH THE SNOW PLOWS, BUT HE WAS DEFINITELY NOT IN CTL OF HIS EQUIP. THIS ARPT IS BY FAR THE MOST DANGEROUS ARPT FOR TAXI AND COMPLICATED INSTRUCTIONS IN OUR SYS. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Part-time ATCT. Non-hub. RWY AT ARPT WAS OCCUPIED BY A SNOW SWEEPER WHEN A REGIONAL JET CHKED IN ON A 1 MI FINAL. I WAS WORKING THE LCL CTL POS ON JAN/XA/01. VISIBILITY WAS RESTR DUE TO SNOW SHOWERS AND LOW CEILINGS. A VEHICLE WAS ON THE MAIN RWY (RWY 5/23) TRAVELING SWBOUND SWEEPING SNOW. THE VEHICLE WAS APPROX 1500 FT FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 23 WHEN ACR X, A REGIONAL JET, FIRST CHKED IN. I GLANCED UP AT THE BRITE RADAR DISPLAY IN THE TWR AND WAS SHOCKED TO SEE THE ACFT ON A 1 MI FINAL TO RWY 23 AT 500 FT AGL. I LOOKED DOWN AT THE VEHICLE AND HE WAS 1000 FT FROM THE CLOSEST TURNOFF AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO CLR THE RWY IN TIME FOR ACR X TO LAND. ACR X WAS SENT AROUND, BUT THE ACFT'S MOMENTUM ALLOWED THE ACFT TO DSND DOWN TO 200-300 FT AGL. ACR X OVER FLEW THE VEHICLE AT A LOW ALT. A REVIEW OF THE VOICE TAPES INDICATED THAT ACR X WAS NEVER ADVISED TO CONTACT THE TWR BY APCH CTL. WHEN QUIZZED BY THE RADAR CTLR AFTER THE GAR THE PLT STATED HE SWITCHED OVER ON HIS OWN BECAUSE HE WAS `COMING UP ON SHORT FINAL.' THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN TRAGIC IF ACR X HAD NOT SWITCHED FREQS ON HIS OWN. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, PLTS LAND WITHOUT A LNDG CLRNC WHEN THEY ARE NOT SWITCHED TO THE TWR OR THEY FORGET TO CHANGE

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68 FREQ. THE POS AND DIRECTION OF THE VEHICLE, ALONG WITH THE LOW VISIBILITY, WOULD HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SPOT DURING LNDG. WE WERE WORKING WITH THE `NEW' STAFFING LEVELS TODAY WHEN ACR X CAME WITHIN FT OF HITTING A VEHICLE. THE 4 CTLRS WERE WORKING THE 4 REQUIRED POS (2 IN THE TWR AND 2 IN THE RADAR ROOM) AND THE SUPVR WAS AWAY FROM THE OP DOING PAPERWORK. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Non-hub. DAY CTLR CONCERNED WITH DAY ARPT SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLE RESTRS. I WAS WORKING THE GND AND LCL CTL POS IN THE ATC TWR. SNOW REMOVAL OPS WERE ONGOING WITH SNOW AND FREEZING RAIN. RWY 6L WAS THE ACTIVE RWY AND THE ILS RWY 6L THE ONLY APCH AVAILABLE. BRAKING ACTION ON THE TXWYS WAS NIL. BRAKING ACTION ON THE RWY WAS POOR, DETERIORATING RAPIDLY TO NIL. WHEN SNOW REMOVAL IS IN PROGRESS, THE CITY DOES NOT CLOSE THE RWY. WE (ATC) WORK THE EQUIP ON AND OFF THE RWY BTWN ARRS AND DEPS. AT ONE POINT, I HAD 5 DIFFERENT GROUPS OF VEHICLES ON THE RWY. EACH GROUP WITH A DIFFERENT CALL SIGN. I HAD TO MAKE 5 DIFFERENT CALLS TO CLR THE VEHICLES OFF THE RWY AND 5 CALLS TO VERIFY CLR OF THE RWY. THIS IS A DANGEROUS AND UNSAFE CONDITION. THE RWY BRAKING ACTION IS DETERIO- RATING AS SNOW REMOVAL CANNOT TAKE PLACE WITH ACFT OPERATING ON THE RWY. I HAVE TO REMEMBER WHERE ALL THE TRUCKS ARE WHILE CONTINUING AIR OPS. THE ANSWER SEEMS SIMPLE. CLOSE THE RWY (MAYBE 20-30 MINS). CLR THE SNOW AND ICE, THEN REOPEN FOR OPS. IN MY 15 YRS EXPERIENCE AT DAYTON, THIS IS HOW IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN. I'M TIRED AND FRUSTRATED TO BE PLACED IN THIS SIT. WE ARE SACRIFICING THE SAFETY OF THE FLYING PUBLIC, PLTS, AND SNOW REMOVAL EQUIP OPERATORS. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Large hub. ACR B727 STRIKES GND VEHICLE DURING WINTER CONDITIONS ON RAMP. DURING A LIGHT/MODERATE SNOWSTORM, OUR B727 WAS TAXIING TO OUR GATE. THE RAMP WASCOV- ERED WITH APPROX 2 INCHES OF SNOW. BRAKING AND MANEUVERABILITY WERE FAIR TO GOOD. WHILE ACFT WAS ON PARKING CTRLINE, THE L WINGTIP STRUCK A DEICING TRUCK PARKED NEARBY. MAR- SHALLERS AND WING WALKERS WERE PRESENT, BUT NOT ABLE TO TELL IF A CONFLICT WAS PRESENT UNTIL TOO LATE. THE SNOW COVERED THE SAFETY LINES SO NO ONE COULD TELL IF THE TRUCKS WERE IN THEIR PROPER POS. DAMAGE TO THE ACFT WAS SMALL, TRUCK WAS UNDAMAGED. I BELIEVE THAT THE INCLEMENT WX MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE GND PERSONNEL'S PERFORMANCE. I'M SURE THEY WANTED TO GET OUT OF THE COLD AND SNOW ASAP. IN ADDITION, THE MARSHALLER DIDN'T KEEP AN EYE ON THE WING WALKERS SHE WAS WATCHING THE ACFT ALIGNMENT WITH THE TAXI CTRLINE. SUP- PLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 461253: SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE MARSHALLER SIGNALED THE CAPT TO STOP, BUT THE MARSHALLER DID NOT GIVE THE STOP SIGNAL. IT APPEARED THAT THE SAFETY CONES WERE IMPROPERLY PLACED AND THE MARSHALLER SIMPLY WASN'T PAYING ATTN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 461669: THE MARSHALLER, WHEN ASKED WHY THEY DID NOT SEE THE WING WALKER'S STOP SIGN, SAID THEY WERE NOT WATCHING THE WING WALKERS. BETTER TRAINING MAY PREVENT THIS, PLUS KEEPING SAFETY LINES CLR OF SNOW WOULD HELP. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Full-time ATCT. Small hub. FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE TO THE R ENG OF A B737 WHEN IT ENCOUNTERED A 3 FT PILE OF SNOW WHILE MANEUVERING TO AVOID SNOW REMOVAL EQUIP. FOLLOWING A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG TO RWY 4, ACFT WAS TAXIED CLR OF THE END OF RWY TO THE GATE. SEVERAL GND/SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLES WERE OPERATING TO L OF ACFT SO WE MOVED TO THE R SIDE OF RAMP. BLUE TAXI EDGE LIGHTS WERE CLRLY VISIBLE TO THE R. ACFT TAXIED INTO APPROX

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69 3 FT HIGH SNOW PILE AND BECAME STUCK. R ENG INGESTED SNOW, RESULTING IN FOD. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE LOW VISIBILITY AND NO NOTICE OF PILED SNOW ON AN ACTIVE TXWY. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Part-time ATCT. Non-hub. A SAAB 340 PLT LNDG AT CTAF RPTS OVERFLYING AND LNDG BEYOND AN ARPT MAINT VEHICLE THAT DID NOT EXIT THE RWY FOLLOWING SEVERAL CALLS. THE LACK OF ATTN OF THE GND VEHICLE DRIVER TO HIS POS ON THE RWY (HOW FAR HE HAD TO GO TO BE CLR) AND TO HOW FAR OUT THE ACFT WAS ON APCH. LNDG AT AIRPORT, WE WERE TALKING ON CTAF GIVING POS RPTS AS NEEDED. GIVING A BASE LEG RPT, THE DOT SWEEPER DRIVER RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD BE CLR OF THE RWY. ARPT `MOBILE ONE' ALSO STATED `LIGHTS ARE ON, DECK IS CLR.' VISIBIL- ITY THEN DROPPED DUE TO A SNOW SQUALL. UPON TURNING FINAL I NOTICED A VEHICLE ON THE RWY. 2 COMPANY ACFT WERE WAITING TO CROSS THE RWY. THEY HEARD OUR POS CALLOUTS AND HELD ON THE N SIDE OF THE RWY WAITING FOR US TO LAND. 1 ACFT SEEING US ON FINAL AND THE VEHICLE ON THE RWY CAUTIONED ME AND STARTED YELLING AT THE DRIVER. A GAR WAS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO THE VERY LOW VISIBILITY OFF THE DEP END OF THE RWY. I DECIDED THE SAFEST THING TO DO WAS TO LAND BEYOND THE VEHICLE. I SIDE-STEPPED SLIGHTLY TO THE R AND OVERFLEW THE VEHICLE AND SAFELY LANDED. PLT WITNESSES RPTED THAT WHEN I TOUCHED DOWN THAT THE VEHICLE WAS CLR. IT IS NOT EVERY DAY THAT I OVERFLY A VEHICLE ON THE GND WHEN LNDG. IN FACT IT IS THE FIRST TIME. HAVE THE DOT DRIVERS BETTER UNDERSTAND WHERE THEY AND ACFT ARE IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER. THE CREW SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE CLR. IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE VISIBILITY WENT DOWN I OPTED TO LAND AS THE SAFEST MEASURE. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++