National Academy of Sciences | 150 Year Anniversary

Questions? Call 800-624-6242

| Items in cart [0]

The National Academies Press

Rights & Permissions

topleft topright

TCRP Report 130: Shared Use of Railroad Infrastructure with Noncompliant Public Transit Rail Vehicles: A Practitioner's Guide (2009)
Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP)

Citation Manager

Transportation Research Board. "1) Train Control System Functions." TCRP Report 130: Shared Use of Railroad Infrastructure with Noncompliant Public Transit Rail Vehicles: A Practitioner's Guide. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.

Please select a format:

BibTeX EndNote RefMan


Page
28
bottomleft bottomright
Page
28
Front Matter (R1-R12)
Research Objective (1-1)
Report Output (2-2)
Business Case (3-4)
Train Control Technology (5-5)
Grade Crossing Hazards (6-6)
Requirements for Concurrent Shared-Track Operations (7-7)
Practical Shortcuts (8-8)
Advancing the Shared-Track Concept (9-9)
Introduction (10-10)
Reader's Guide to the Final Report (11-11)
Scope of Work for Project A-27 (12-12)
Research Approach (13-13)
Characteristics of a Shared-Track Corridor (14-14)
Freight Operations Perspective (15-16)
Why Share Track? (17-17)
The Business Model (18-18)
Business Model Structure (19-19)
The Business Case (20-20)
Shared-Track - A Practical Business Case Structure (21-22)
Role of the Designated State Safety Organization (23-23)
Methods for Risk Analyses (24-24)
Equal Risks, Equivalent Safety (25-25)
Underpinning the Case for Shared-Track (26-26)
The Role of Command and Control Systems in Shared-Track (27-27)
1) Train Control System Functions (28-28)
2) Train Control System Design Parameters (29-29)
4) Train Control - Emerging Technology - PTC and CBTC (30-30)
System and Integration Testing - Vendor Role (31-31)
8) Issues Unique to Train Control for Shared-Track (32-32)
Auxiliary Safety Critical Systems (33-33)
9) Fail-Safe Train Separation (34-35)
2) Regulatory and Practical Requirements (36-37)
4) Functional Design of a Communications System (38-38)
2) Regulatory Mandates (39-39)
4) The Rulebook (40-40)
5) Rules and Procedures for Shared-Track (41-41)
Background (42-42)
2) Diesel Multiple Units and Electrical Multiple Units (43-43)
2) Crash Energy Management (CEM) (44-44)
3) Propulsion System (45-45)
5) Other Considerations (46-46)
Vehicles for Shared-Track Applications (47-47)
3) Standardization (48-48)
Applying Technology to Shared-Track Operations - A Brief Guide (49-50)
Shared-Track Operations - The North American Experience (51-51)
2) Former Private Freight Railroad Owner Becomes a Privileged Tenant (52-52)
4) Pressure to Commingle Is Heaviest on Lines with Higher Freight Densities* - A Review of Different Solutions (53-53)
6) Transit Operators Choosing to Avoid Commingling Sacrificed Service Quality and Efficiency (54-54)
Business Case Template (55-55)
Alternatives Analysis (56-56)
Reasons to Consider Noncompliant Equipment (57-57)
Service Characteristics to Justify the Choice of a Light Rail System (58-58)
Structures Considerations (59-59)
Cost and Ridership Analyses (60-60)
Cost Analysis for Signal System Alternatives (61-62)
System Capital Cost Assessment (63-63)
System Operating Cost Assessment (64-65)
Alternatives Evaluation (66-66)
Introduction (67-67)
Risk Analysis and Modeling Methodology (68-70)
Results and Risk Analysis Findings (71-72)
Safety Case Findings (73-73)
San Diego Trolley (74-74)
Achievable Incremental Steps (75-75)
Practical Shortcuts For Shared-Track (76-76)
Demonstration Project (77-77)
Application of Risk Analyses Methodology to the Demonstration Project (78-78)
Data Collection Plan (79-79)
San Diego Trolley, Inc. (80-80)
Barriers to Implementation (81-81)
Shared Track - The Potential Market (82-82)
Shared-Track Operation - An Evolving Concept (83-84)
Bibliography (85-86)
Appendix 1 - Abbreviations (87-87)
Appendix 2 - Glossary of Shared-Track Definitions (88-92)
Appendix 3 - TCRP A-27 Research Task Descriptions (93-97)
Appendix 4 - Relative Cost Comparison of Train Control Systems (98-99)
Appendix 5 - Sample Operating Rulebook Table of Contents (100-100)
Appendix 6 - Vehicle Cost Drivers (101-101)
Appendix 7 - Some Examples of Current Production LRV and MU Vehicle Types (102-105)
Appendix 8 - Shared-Track System Status (106-106)
Appendix 9 - Shared-Track Configuration and Operational Alternatives (107-109)
Abbreviations used without definitions in TRB publications (110-110)

Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page 28
28 Shared Use of Railroad Infrastructure with Noncompliant Public Transit Rail Vehicles: A Practitioner's Guide 1. Train control systems; 2. Communications technology; and 3. Rules and procedures. Effective integration means that Rules and Procedures are woven into the train control system, in conjunction with a communications network, to assert effective C&C over all train movements while protecting employees and the public. Together they provide redundant fail-safe features to prevent collisions and protect against technical failures or human errors. Each individual facet contributes in a complementary manner with the other two. If one com- ponent of the triangle malfunctions, the remaining two elements must compensate for the defi- ciency. During such eventualities, performance can be permitted to suffer, but safety cannot be compromised, particularly in a shared-track environment. Rules and procedures take on greater importance under such circumstances. Train Control Technology Signal and train control technologies are defined as those technologies directly involved in ensuring the safe movement of trains and preventing collisions. This segment reviews current and emerging train control technologies that can provide fail-safe backup to override inevitable human errors and therefore assist in preventing collisions between trains on the same tracks, and between trains and other encroachments into the clearance envelope of an adjacent train. The applicability and practicality of train control technologies for a shared-track setting are assessed and evaluated. Evolution of train control systems has been propelled by many factors. Accident experience and a desire to avoid financial losses, injuries or fatalities, ultimately have driven technological innovation and influences principles of design. More recently, regulations have assumed a greater role in forcing technology development and deployment. Finally, any system must be proven to serve its intended purpose and satisfy functional requirements. Practically speaking, multiple stakeholders must be satisfied with the design, manufacture, installation, and testing of a train control system. While such issues are generic to any train control systems design, their implemen- tation in a shared-track environment merits special attention. In FRA and railroad parlance, they are considered vital systems. 1) Train Control System Functions Train control systems are designed to prevent three major types of collisions: (1) head-on col- lisions between trains traveling in opposite directions on the same track; (2) flanking collisions for trains moving or standing on a siding when approaching or departing a main line track; and (3) rear-end collisions between trains following one another. However, train separation alone does not mitigate all hazards. Besides train-train collisions, a shared-track system poses some unique risks. Intrusion collisions, where freight equipment intrudes on the active passenger track due to a roll-out, derailment, or shifted-load, are not necessarily detected by the train control system. Secondary collisions between freight and pas- senger equipment (i.e., caused by an intrusion event) may not be prevented by the train con- trol system, so the best course is to prevent the primary (root cause) event. Where track is shared between compliant and light passenger rail cars, the FRA has required fail-safe train separation as a sine qua non for its approval. Figure 1 outlines technological approaches to train control that regulators would find acceptable without excessive scrutiny or burdensome strictures.