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Safety Risk Management 65 Human Element (e.g., Personnel involved (operations, maintenance, engineering)) Mission (functions and objective) Management Machine (e.g., SOP, (e.g., equipment, organizational hardware and structure, rules software, tool) and regulations) Media (or Environment): e.g., Airport, Airside, Terminal, Taxiway C, Garage D Figure 7. The "5M" model. 5.3 Identify Hazards FAA AC 150/5200-37 defines a hazard as "any existing or potential condition that can lead to injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to the environment. A hazard is a condition that is a prerequisite to an accident or incident."(1) Understanding the hazards and inherent risks associated with everyday activities allows the airport to minimize unsafe acts and respond proactively, by improving the processes, conditions, and other systemic issues that lead to unsafe acts. These include training, budgeting, procedures, planning, promotion, and other organizational factors that are known to play a role in many systems-based accidents. Twy D 05 Figure 8. SRM example.

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66 Safety Management Systems for Airports In this way, safety management becomes a core business function and is not just an adjunct management task. It is a vital step in the transition from a reactive safety culture--one in which the organization reacts to an event--to a proactive safety culture, in which the organization actively seeks to address systemic safety issues before they result in an active failure. Although hazards are an ever present fact of airport operations, a hazard by itself may not have the potential to cause damage under many situations. It only results in risk when specific situa- tions arise that could affect the continuity of airport operations. For example, rain is not neces- sarily a hazard; however, if the runway surface holds the water, there is potential for aquaplaning. Some airport hazards may be obvious, such as speeding at the ramp. Others may be more subtle, such as using inexperienced staff to tow aircraft. Hazard identification is the act of identifying any condition with the potential to cause injury to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of the ability to perform a prescribed function. There is a common tendency to confuse hazards with their consequences. Example: "runway incursion" is an outcome or consequence, not a hazard. In contrast, "unclear pavement markings" is a hazard that may lead to runway incursions. The initial step in SRM is to identify the hazards that the airport faces in its operational envi- ronment. A description of the system or operation must be developed as part of this step. The key and simple question to ask is what can go wrong? In an SMS, all identified hazards are documented and analyzed to determine what action is required to eliminate or reduce the safety risk associated with each specific hazard. Judgment is necessary to determine the adequate level of detail to describe the hazard. Hazard identification techniques may be reactive or proactive in nature. Reactive Proactive Trend Analysis (Accidents) Trend Analysis (Incidents) Accident Investigations Self-Inspections Occurrence Reporting Change Analysis Hazard Reporting Brainstorming Sessions Checklists Hazard Analysis Tools SMS Assessment Interviews

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Safety Risk Management 67 It is important that hazard identification be conducted at all levels throughout the organiza- tion, because there is often a relationship between the hazards and activities conducted in one department and another. While identification of every conceivable hazard would be impractical, airports are expected to exercise due diligence in identifying significant and reasonably foreseeable hazards related to their operations. Using the example illustrated in Figure 8, a couple of hazards can be identified: Hazard Category 1--Construction Affecting Operations Workers and vehicles crossing runway/taxiway Construction debris Construction equipment interference with NAVAIDS Hazard Category 2--Operations Affecting Construction Jet blast from aircraft accelerating to takeoff Aircraft excursions and undershoots Once you have completed your first hazard identification exercise (spanning the whole area under your SMS scope), the process cycle should be continuous and include mechanisms to allow for periodic and ad hoc hazard identification exercises. Hazards are continuously identi- fied and reported during daily self-inspections, observations, and hazard reports received from the available reporting system. For other situations, the airport should also define triggers to initiate the process, identify who will be involved, and the proper way to record the findings and actions taken. It should also pro- vide training to the participants. For example, a major change (see Table 17) may trigger the haz- ard identification process for that specific change. Factors for Consideration Hazard identification should consider every potential source of system failure, including equipment, the airport operating environment, and operational and maintenance procedures. Organizational and human factors to consider include the following: All persons having access to the workplace (e.g., airport workers, passengers, contractors, delivery personnel, as well as airport employees) The hazards and risks arising from their activities, the required skills and training to perform a procedure, and their varying behavior, medical conditions, and physical limitations The hazards arising from the use of equipment or services supplied to the airport and its tenants The hazards arising from operational practices and procedures The work environment (visibility, lightning, temperature and precipitation conditions, strong winds) Communications, including means, terminology, and language Regulatory factors, including the applicability and enforceability of regulations; certification of equipment, personnel, and procedures; and the adequacy of oversight Defenses, including detection and warning systems, and the extent to which the equipment is resilient against errors and failures Organizational factors, such as airport policies for recruitment, training, remuneration, and allocation of resources

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68 Safety Management Systems for Airports Evaluating hazards associated with human factors should consider latent conditions. These are usually not obvious. The process should specifically address questions such as: How might staff misinterpret this procedure? How might a person misuse this function/system (intentionally or unintentionally)? Hazard Identification Techniques There are several means that the airport can use to identify hazards. In general, airside haz- ards are identified by the airport operations staff, in many cases, as part of Part 139 regulatory requirements for self-inspection. With SMS, the airport can use additional means. The most common ones used by airports are the following: Hazard reporting--this is an effective multiplier of the "eyes" of the airport to identify hazards because it is accessible to any person working (or not) at the airport Visual inspection--on the airside it is mostly performed under Part 139 self-inspections by airport staff; on the landside and terminal areas, maintenance and public safety staff can be trained to identify hazards Checklists (group review)--review of experience and available data from accidents, incidents, or similar systems to draw up hazard checklists that can be used to identify potentially haz- ardous areas that require further detailed evaluation Checklists can be used as a reminder of what types of potential hazards to consider and to record the initial hazard identification; however, care should be taken to avoid over reliance on the use of checklists. Checklists should be specific to the work area, process, or equipment being evaluated. Brainstorming may be unstructured thinking (e.g., when major changes occur) or may be based on a review of an existing checklist. The group should consist of people with a wide vari- ety of backgrounds with relevant experience and competence Review of accident investigation reports from your own airport or from other airports. Example: it would be difficult to identify all hazards leading to aircraft overruns if accidents from only one airport were evaluated Change analysis (construction, new equipment or facility, organizational changes, new reg- ulation, etc.) Information from industry associations and advisory bodies SMS publications and websites Professional advice Consultation and interviews with employees/stakeholders SMS and internal safety assessments Statistical analysis of records and performance indicators (trend analysis) Hazard identification tools: (see Annex E) -- Functional hazard analysis -- Change analysis -- Job hazard analysis Information from other management systems (Air Traffic Control (ATC)(27), airlines(28), envi- ronmental, wildlife, risk management, etc.) Safety surveys When an unexplained increase in safety-related events or infractions is identified