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82 Safety Management Systems for Airports
Risk Assumption. accepting the likelihood or probability and the consequences associated
with a risk's occurrence. When a risk is classified under an acceptable level, you are assuming
that it is low enough that no mitigation action is required in the short term.
Risk Control. options and alternative actions that lower or eliminate the risk. Examples
include implementing additional policies or procedures, improving the airport infrastructure,
developing redundant systems and/or components, and improving training. A control is any-
thing that reduces the risk associated with a hazard. Controls can be complex or simple. It is
important that they are effective and verified before the change is approved for operation. It
is essential that each risk mitigation control is monitored for unintended consequences when
put into place.
When planning how hazards are to be controlled and risks reduced, the following hierarchy
should be considered:
· Elimination--can the hazard be eliminated completely? (e.g., removing an existing obstacle)
· Substitution--can the activity or operation be substituted for a lower risk alternative? (e.g.,
using air bridges or buses to transfer passengers, rather than have passengers walk on the
apron)
· Engineering Controls--is there a technical solution? (e.g., runway incursion prevention sys-
tem [RIPS])
· Procedural Controls--can procedures be developed? (e.g., SOPs, training, limiting exposure
to hazardous operation conditions)
Controls closer to the top of the hierarchy are preferable because they are less dependent on
human behavior. Elimination of hazards is the first choice in controlling risks, but when this is
not practical, isolation and engineering controls should be considered. Administrative controls
and PPE may provide interim solutions in a planned program to eliminate or reduce a particu-
lar risk, or they may be useful in addition to other control methods. In many circumstances, con-
trol solutions will incorporate a combination of controls.
5.7 Example of SRM
The example of SRM described in this chapter includes the analysis process for a list of five
typical airport hazards. The SRM involves five steps: describe the activity or system, identify haz-
ards, determine the risk, assess and analyze the risk, and prioritize and treat the risk.
Step 1--Describe the System or Activity
Defining and bounding the system or subsystem will help you focus on a specific activity that
will assist with having a better assessment of hazards involved with that activity. For example,
let's assume the airport will have a new aircraft operating next year. The aircraft is larger than
the ones currently operating at the airport. The activity (or system) in this case is "the operation
of a new aircraft."
In a proactive risk management setting, system (or activity) identification is performed before
the hazard identification step. However, in many cases, the identification of a hazard might take
place even before the system is identified and lead to an activity (or system) that is the source. As
an example, in a daily inspection of the airport airside, the airport on-duty operations officer
found some FOD on the runway. The existence of FOD on the runway is a hazard. The system
in this case is the whole airside, and the activity causing the hazard may be the construction work
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Safety Risk Management 83
Table 11. Hazard identification in the airport system.
How Hazard
Hazard Description
System Subsystem Activity Was
# of Hazard
Identified
1 Airside Movement Runway Runway Pilot reports
Area operations rubber build- and runway
up friction
measurements
2 Airside Construction Construction - FOD Pre-
Site drainage pipe construction
replacement conference
near runway
threshold
3 Airside Non- Ground traffic in Speeding in Increase in
Movement ramp area ramp area speeding
Area violations from
trend analysis
4 Airside Movement Topographic People Manager's
Area survey for crossing meeting
runway movement
rehabilitation areas
5 Airside Gate Areas Aircraft services People Daily
in gate areas approaching inspections at
aircraft before the ramp
anti-collision
light is turned
off
taking place in the vicinity of the runway. Table 11 contains additional examples of hazards and
their associated activities.
Step 2--Identify the Hazards for the Activity
Once the system, subsystems, or activities are defined, the hazards should be identified. Each
activity might incur one or more hazards. For the example of a new large aircraft, some brain-
storming questions leading to the identification of hazards may include
· Is the current ARFF capacity compatible with the new aircraft?
· Are current taxiway and ramp markings appropriate to the new aircraft?
· Does the pavement structure of areas used by the new aircraft have sufficient capacity to handle
the new loads?
· Are runway and taxiway width and safety areas compatible with the standards for the new
aircraft?
· Is there enough room at the ramp and gate area to accommodate the new aircraft?
· Is the AEP compatible with the operation of the new aircraft?
· Is current training for airport workers compatible with the new operation?
Answers to these questions will indicate potential hazards linked to such a change in operation.
As a general example for the SRM process, five hazards were assumed in an airside system, as
presented in Table 11. The subsystems related to each hazard are also described to facilitate the
understanding of the SRM process.
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84 Safety Management Systems for Airports
A hazard is not a danger by itself. It is always associated with certain conditions
that have the potential to result in an accident:
· A 15-knot wind can be a hazard if it is blowing across the runway; however, if
it is aligned with the runway, it can actually reduce the runway length needed
for landing
· Rubber built up on the runway is only a hazard when it reduces skid resistance
if the surface is wet
Step 3--Determine the Risk
Once you know the hazard, ask yourself what could go wrong. To determine the risk, you
should look at all the possibilities, even those that seem to have little chance of occurrence.
Table 12 presents the associated risk scenarios for the hazards identified in the previous step.
As shown, the presence of FOD may cause damage to aircraft engines if it is sucked in or may
cause damage to equipment and people if it is displaced by jet or propeller blast.
Step 4--Assess and Analyze the Risk
Risk is assessed by evaluating the likelihood (probability) of the occurrence of each risk sce-
nario and the severity of the consequences of those scenarios. For each risk scenario, there may
be several levels of consequences. If so, you should take the worst credible consequence as the
reference for your assessment.
As shown in the risk matrix in Figure 11, the likelihood varies from extremely improbable to
frequent and the severity varies from no safety effect to catastrophic. The shading of the cells in
the matrix represents the risk level (i.e., darkest shading is High Risk, medium shading is
Medium Risk, lightest shading is Low Risk).
For runway rubber build-up (hazard #1), the worst credible consequence is that the pilot may
not be able to control the aircraft during landing. The aircraft will depart the runway at high
Table 12. Risk determination for identified hazards.
Hazard
Description of Hazard Risk Scenarios
#
1 Runway rubber build-up (a) Aircraft losing directional control and/or braking
capability and departing the runway during
operation (overruns and veer-offs)
2 FOD (a) Debris being ingested by aircraft engines
(b) Jet or propeller blast displacing debris, equipment,
and people
3 Speeding in ramp area (a) Vehicles striking aircraft, other vehicles and
equipment, or people
4 People crossing movement (a) Runway incursions
areas (b) Jet or propeller blasts displacing equipment or people
5 People approaching aircraft (a) People affected by engine blast, propeller blades,
before anti-collision light is or engine suction
turned off (b) People being struck by moving aircraft
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Safety Risk Management 85
SEVERITY High Risk
RISK No Safety
Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Effect Medium Risk
MATRIX
A B C D E Low Risk
Frequent
2b
5
L
I Probable
K 4
E
L Remote
5a 3a 2a
I 3
H Extremely
O Remote 4b 5b 1a 4a
O 2
D Extremely
Improbable
1
Figure 11. Risks classification using the risk
matrix.
speed, running beyond the safety areas and eventually striking an existing structure. In this sit-
uation, there is a chance of hull loss and multiple fatalities. The severity in this case can be clas-
sified in the risk matrix as Catastrophic (E).
Then you should evaluate the likelihood. Statistics from past overrun and veer-off accidents
indicate a chance of 1 catastrophic overrun or veer-off accident in 15 million operations, given
the specific airport and hazard conditions (wet runway). Therefore you can classify this risk as
Extremely Remote (2).
This hazard, according to the risk of an aircraft departing the runway during a landing oper-
ation, is then classified as 2E, which falls in the zone of High Risk (darkest shading). This is
labeled as hazard "1a" in Figure 11. The same process can be applied to other hazards and risk
scenarios. The results are both marked on the matrix and presented in Table 13.
Table 13. Risk level classification.
Hazard Description of Likelihood Severity Risk
Risk Description
# Hazard Level Level Classification
(a) Aircraft
Runway rubber
1 departing 2 E High
build-up
runway
FOD from (a) FOD ingestion 3 E High
2
construction (b) Jet blast effects 5 C High
Speeding in (a) Accidents at the
3 3 D High
ramp area ramp
Survey workers (a) Runway
2 E High
4 crossing incursions
movement areas (b) Jet blast effects 2 C Low
People (a) Aircraft engine
3 C Medium
approaching effects
5 aircraft before
(b) Aircraft striking
anti-collision light 2 C Low
people
is turned off
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86 Safety Management Systems for Airports
Step 5--Prioritize and Treat Risk
At this point, all the risks associated with identified hazards have been assessed and classified.
The next step is to treat the risks; however, for our example, let's say the airport has limited
resources and simply cannot eliminate every existing risk. Therefore, we need to find out how to
make the best use of limited resources by prioritizing the risks. It is important to note that all
risks classified under an unacceptable level should be brought to acceptable levels using mitiga-
tion actions.
From Table 13, we identified five risk scenarios classified as High, one as Medium, and two as
Low. High-risk scenarios are treated first. But among the high-risk scenarios, which should be
addressed first?
If you compare a 3E risk with a 2E risk, you should treat 3E risk first because, with a similar
consequence, the probability is higher for 3E. When comparing 2E and 3D, the latter has a higher
probability while the former has higher consequences. In this case, they may be classified in the
same priority. Taking this approach, the risk scenarios are prioritized as shown in Table 14.
Following the prioritization, it is necessary to decide the actions to treat the risks. Table 15
provides some alternatives for the examples described.
It should be noted that some actions will mitigate more than one risk, and some actions may
mitigate the risk temporarily, as in hazard #1. Removing rubber build-up is a temporary solu-
tion because rubber will continue to build up at the runway surface and removal will be neces-
sary from time to time. It is easy to understand the need for continuous risk monitoring, even
for treated risks, to ensure their level remains acceptable.
A high risk will require immediate attention from the airport operator. Given the urgency of
a solution and the limited resources available, the associated action for a high risk may be suffi-
cient only to mitigate it to a medium level. For example, for more permanent results, it may take
months before the airport is able to develop a safety campaign with focus on vehicle speed at the
ramp. A more urgent and possible measure is to intensify enforcement of airport rules while the
campaign is being developed.
Each hazard identified should be documented and recorded in a hazard log, as described in
Table 16. The hazard log should contain a description of each hazard, its consequences, the
assessed risk in terms of likelihood and severity, and any required mitigation measures. It should
be updated as new hazards are identified and proposals for mitigation are introduced. The log
depicted in Table 16 was completed using the examples described in this section.
Table 14. Risk scenarios prioritization.
Hazard Description of Risk Description Risk Priority
# Hazard Classification
1 Runway rubber build-up (a) Aircraft departing runway 2E - High 2
2 FOD from construction (a) FOD ingestion 3E - High 1
(b) Jet blast effects 5C - High 1
3 Speeding in ramp area (a) Accidents at the ramp 3D - High 2
4 Survey workers crossing (a) Runway incursions 2E - High 3
movement areas (b) Jet blast effects 2C - Low 5
5 People approaching (a) Aircraft engine effects 3C - Medium 4
aircraft before anti- (b) Aircraft striking people
2C - Low 5
collision light is turned off
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Safety Risk Management 87
Table 15. Risk treatment actions.
Hazard Description Risk Priority Action to Further
# of Hazard Mitigate Risk Actions (when
required)
1 Runway (a) Aircraft 2 Remove rubber Repave and
rubber build- departing build-up groove
up runway
2 FOD from (a) FOD 1 Clean up and Provide training
construction ingestion define procedure on new
to eliminate procedure to
source contractor
workers
(b) Jet blast 1 Clean up and Provide training
effects define procedure on new
to eliminate procedure to
source contractor
workers
3 Speeding in (a) Accidents 2 Enforce and Monitor trends in
ramp area at the ramp implement safety number of
promotion violations and
campaign to implement
address issue system of
accumulated
points to suspend
and revoke
airport driver's
permit
4 Survey (a) Runway 3 Provide training to Monitor activities
workers incursions contractor and, if necessary,
crossing employees have an airport
movement escort with the
areas survey crew
(b) Jet blast 5 Only allow survey None
effects job on areas
closed to
operations
5 People (a) Aircraft 4 Enforce SOP for Monitor violations
approaching engine aircraft arrival and establish
aircraft effects and departure recurrent training
before anti- program for
collision light frequent violators
is turned off
(b) Aircraft 5 Enforce SOP for Monitor violations
striking aircraft arrival and establish
people and departure recurrent training
program for
frequent violators
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88 Safety Management Systems for Airports
Table 16. Example hazard log table.
Consequences
Expected Risk
Mitigate Risk
Responsible
Dept/Person
Review Date
Rating After
Risk Rating
Closed Out
Hazard No.
Mitigation
Mitigation
Action to
Potential
Location
Prior to
Hazard
Date
Date
Aircraft
Runway Rubber Dept of Jun
Jul 3 Runway excursion Apr 1
1 Build-Up (low Engineering 2E- H Remove rubber build-up M 12
2008 08/26 (overrun, 2008
surface friction) (John S.) 2008
veer-off)
Clean up and define Jun
FOD Aug 1
3E- H procedure to eliminate L 29
Intersection Dept of ingestion 2008
Jan 4 FOD from source 2008
2 of Taxiway A Engineering
2008 construction Clean up and define Jun
and C (John S.) Jet blast Aug 3
5C- H procedure to eliminate L 27
effects 2008
source 2008
Dept of Public Enforce and implement
Sep 4 Speeding in Accidents at Jul 6
3 Terminal A Safety 3D- H safety promotion campaign M
2008 ramp area the ramp 2008
(Scott L.) to address issue
Aug
Runway Provide training to contractor Jul 7
May Survey workers Dept of 2E- H M 31
incursions employees 2008
15 4 crossing Terminal C Operation 2008
2008 movement areas (John C.) Jet blast Only allow survey job on
2C- L L
effects areas closed to operations
Aircraft Enforce Standard Operating Aug
People
engine 3C- M Procedure for aircraft arrival L 11
approaching Terminal
Jun 21 effects and departure 2008
5 aircraft before Terminal A Manager
2008 Aircraft Enforce Standard Operating
anti-collision (Lynda F.)
light is turned off striking 2C- L Procedure for aircraft arrival L
people and departure
Note: H, M, and L are high, medium, and low, respectively.
The airport's hazards now have been identified and risks determined, assessed, and treated.
The SMS records have been organized, placing all information in the hazard log table. However,
remember that we need to keep monitoring those hazards and the mitigation measures to ensure
they were implemented and that they are effective to mitigate these risks over time.
