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47 4.4 Type III Guidelines over time. Therefore, the Type I and II guidelines presented should be reviewed for applicability to Type III institutional Type III guidelines build on the Types I and II guidelines arrangements. Type III guidelines focus on consensus build- and specifically address the needs of Type III institutional ing, organizational structure, leadership, risk reduction, cost arrangements. Type III arrangements are organizations that and schedule control, and ongoing mitigation of challenges implement freight-related projects. These differ from Type II or obstacles. Table 4-4 summarizes the Type III guidelines. in that they typically represent a formalized organization The examples presented in Table 4-4 are described in detail designed to address one particular need or program, rather in Examples 4.4-1 through 4.4-3; full detailed case studies are than competing projects or programs. These organizations given in Appendix C. are responsible for need identification, project definition, and project implementation. Project implementation en- tails environmental approvals, design, right-of-way acquisi- Guideline 23. Build consensus on specific tion, utility relocation, construction, mitigation of project project parameters. impacts, and financing. In addition, some arrangements transition into operating authorities following completion Consensus on the scope of the project is essential. If there of construction activities. Construction activities can range is uncertainty about the scale or location of the project, de- from physical capacity improvement projects to new uses of lays will occur and costs will rise. Key considerations include technologies to streamlined operations. Type I through III project design, development of the preferred alternative, and guidelines represent a progressive process that grows more identification of specific costs and benefits. Having a clear un- specific and detailed as the mission of an institutional arrange- derstanding of the distribution of benefits is necessary for ment becomes more focused and specialized. Most, if not productive negotiations on project design, location, and all, Type III institutional arrangements should follow all the funding responsibility (including funding responsibility for defined guidelines as they work through their development. mitigation measures). Unfortunately, many projects never In fact, many begin as a Type I and progress to a Type III get beyond this stage. Table 4-4. Summary of Type III guidelines. CREATE CVISN ACTA Guideline 23 Build consensus on specific project parameters 24 Seek out champions and develop a diverse coalition of interest groups 25 Provide a neutral forum 26 Secure private-sector involvement/commitment 27 Develop mitigation strategy for project impacts 28 Establish clear decision-making authority 29 Remain focused on defined mission 30 Adopt a product orientation 31 Identify, monitor, and address obstacles 32 Develop partnership agreements 33 Negotiate third-party agreements early 34 Allocate risk between owner and contractor 35 Establish funding firewalls and sunset clauses 36 Consider Design-Build procurement 37 Understand how bond rating agencies make decisions 38 Establish cost-sharing structure 39 Maintain adequate contingency and reserves 40 Maximize use of available funding cycles
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48 Guideline 24. Seek out "champions" and be developed. This strategy should detail all the activities that develop a diverse coalition of interest will be required to conform to the requirements. A team of groups to support the project. experts should be developed to lead the implementation of this strategy. Having a visible strategy will also communicate Champions are people in positions of authority (e.g., to key stakeholders that mitigation activities are being given elected officials, major industry owners, and agency Board the necessary focus. presidents) who can advocate the merits of the project. Such champions are often helped in their lobbying efforts when they are supported by a broad coalition of interest groups Guideline 28. Establish clear decision- (e.g., chambers of commerce, individual companies, major making authority. shippers, carriers, and environmental groups). Supporters In the public works arena, it is critical to know who has of a project can write letters to key decisionmakers to pro- authority to make what decisions so that the project is not mote the project. Although the need for a champion was in- delayed while waiting for decisions to be made. Within each troduced in the Type I guidelines, it is re-emphasized in organization it is important to clearly identify at what level Type III to address the complexities of project development in the organization decisions can be made. and construction. Breaking ground on a project often de- pends on the consistent efforts and commitment of one or more champions. Guideline 29. Remain focused on the defined mission. Guideline 25. Provide a neutral forum. Over the course of project design and construction, there often is pressure from stakeholders to broaden the scope of a Major new projects affect a vast array of stakeholders in- project in order to spread the benefits. This can lead to an in- cluding system users, local communities, and funding and op- creased scope, resulting in cost increases and schedule lapses. erating entities. By providing a neutral forum, a level of con- Although not analyzed in this study, the "Big Dig" project in fidence can be built among the stakeholders that will minimize Boston is often cited as a project that allowed many additional conflicts and help ensure that the final outcome will provide scope changes in response to constituents' demands, leading the most equitable situation for all affected. The neutral forum to cost overruns and schedule delays. provides a venue to ensure that all stakeholders have an equal opportunity to provide input regarding development of acceptable solutions. Guideline 30. Adopt a product orientation. Many arrangements are process driven, designed to bring Guideline 26. Secure private-sector stakeholders together for a common purpose. However, for involvement and commitment. Type III arrangements, the focus must be on the defined Specific projects and/or new organizations and authori- product. Agencies that are more interested in achieving ex- ties must provide new or improved conditions for the af- plicit goals and producing well-defined products are often fected stakeholders. For example, a new tolled truck-only more successful in controlling costs and keeping on sched- corridor will be used by industry only if the benefits out- ule than agencies that are primarily process oriented. Fol- weigh the additional user costs. As projects are designed and lowing bureaucratic procedures is important, but when pro- constructed, these stakeholders must be involved to ensure cedures hinder producing the project on time or on budget, the outcome adds value. A commitment by these stakehold- adjustments to the processes should be considered. Being ers to use the new capacity or program requires outreach focused on specific goals will foster concurrent, rather than throughout the process. sequential, processing of key activities. Guideline 27. Develop a mitigation Guideline 31. Identify, monitor, and strategy for project impacts. address obstacles. One of the key challenges of a major infrastructure project It is important to continually monitor potential obstacles is the required mitigation activities. Mitigation often refers to and develop action plans to resolve them in a timely manner. environmental impacts, but can also include quality-of-life There often is a tendency to put off defining and implement- and community impacts as well as traffic impacts. For a project ing solutions. Such delay wastes money and can result in the to address these requirements successfully, a strategy should termination of the project.
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49 Guideline 32. Develop partnership stated purpose and that after the project is completed, the agreements. fees will go away. Stakeholders responsible for paying these user fees must understand how the funds will be used and Partnering agreements among the owner, designer, and how long the fees will be charged. This helps build accept- contractor can minimize disputes and shorten the time to ance for the cost. Building support for these fees is critical. resolve differences that may arise. These agreements estab- If the project does not provide significant benefits, the costs lish responsibilities and ensure each partner is vested in the will not be accepted and facility users will find alternate project. These agreements are similar to MOUs; however, routes. they go a step further by putting key stakeholders on an equal platform, with defined responsibilities for ensuring Guideline 36. Consider Design-Build project success. procurement, particularly for revenue- driven projects. Guideline 33. Negotiate third-party agreements early. With Design-Build procurement, design activities can over- lap construction to some degree, thus saving valuable time. In Agreements with utilities for relocation or protection of fa- addition to saving time, Design-Build procurements can allow cilities affected by the project can be time-consuming and for contractor innovation. costly. Typically, these discussions focus on who has prior rights and thus who is responsible for paying for the reloca- tion or protection. Another time-consuming task is negotiat- Guideline 37. Understand how bond rating ing with municipalities for city permits for work involving agencies make decisions. city-owned facilities (e.g., sewers, water lines, traffic signals, Many agencies need to borrow funds in order to fund a curbs and gutters, and striping of streets). Cities often use major project fully. When asked to assess credit risk, the bond these negotiations to request extra mitigations such as urban rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's, and Standard & Poor's) re- design improvements, aesthetic treatments, landscaping, and view all potential risks to a project. Project management skills other enhancements. All of this takes time, so project owners and ability to control costs and keep on schedule are just a few do well to address these issues early. Without agreements in of the items reviewed by rating agencies. It is prudent to un- place early in the program, the risks to the project can be much derstand what these agencies look for and to plan accord- greater. These agreements can take the form of MOUs, which ingly. This management advice is useful for any project, even specify the responsibilities of the various parties as construc- if revenue bonds are not involved. tion proceeds. Guideline 34. Allocate risk between owner Guideline 38. Establish a cost-sharing and contractor. structure. Before signing a construction contract, it is important to de- The construction of a major project probably will rely on cide how risks will be shared between the contractor and owner a mix of funding sources. It may include issuance of private for unexpected cost increases due to constructability issues, or municipal bonds, local or state transportation funding, unknown conditions, hazardous materials encountered, miti- private-sector funding, or user fees. The success of the project gation requirements, and so forth. For example, depending on will depend on the ability to provide funding on an as-needed the scale of the project, it might be appropriate to agree that the basis throughout construction. Delays can hinder the schedule, first $X million cost of addressing an unknown condition support for, and overall outcome of the project. A plan should would be the contractor's responsibility, the next $X million be in place to effectively manage the available funds, including the owner's responsibility, and anything beyond that a 50-50 match requirements, contracting requirements, and flexibility responsibility between owner and contractor. to address issues that arise during the project. Guideline 35. Establish funding firewalls Guideline 39. Maintain an adequate and sunset clauses. contingency and reserves. For projects that involve user fees or tolls, it is critical to The success of many large infrastructure projects depends provide safeguards to reduce investor risk. No one likes to on adequate funding. In many instances, initial resources fall pay fees, but the risk to the private sector can be reduced if short of total costs because of unforeseen circumstances (e.g., there are assurances that the funds will only be used for their complications with environmental mitigation requirements
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50 or changes in design). To keep a project on schedule, it is nec- slip away. Sometimes agencies believe that they are "not essary to have access to contingency funding. ready" to apply or think that the competition is too great. As a result they often miss out on funding opportunities. It is im- portant to get the project in queue, get the project known, in- Guideline 40. Maximize the use of crease the project's visibility, and tout the merits of the proj- available funding cycles. ect at every opportunity. Requests for project information Project sponsors should seize on all potential opportuni- from key decisionmakers should be met. Each opportunity ties for funding and not let deadlines for applying for grants provides a new opportunity for success. Example 4.4-1. Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority The Alameda Corridor in Southern California is one of the nation's largest and most successful public works projects. Combining capacity improvements and environmental enhancements, the project dra- matically improved railroad access to the largest port complex in the United States. The purpose of the project was to consolidate harbor-related railroad traffic onto a single 20-mile corridor between the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles and the railroad mainlines near downtown Los Angeles. The project was designed to build consensus on the following project parameters: impacts of trains on grade crossing delays (e.g., vehicular delay, emergency vehicles), noise impacts in residential areas, air quality concerns, efficiency of train operations, potential challenges to future port growth proposals, and facilitation of international trade. To get the process started, the Southern California Association of Gov- ernments (SCAG) created a Ports Advisory Committee (PAC). This committee brought together a diverse coalition of interest groups to begin the communications and consensus-building process. PAC members included local elected officials, as well as representatives of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, affected railroads, the trucking industry, and the Los Ange- les County Transportation Commission (LACTC). During this phase, the effort could have been described as a Type I institutional arrangement, dedicated to consensus building, information sharing, identifying obstacles, and building trust. As the concept for the Alameda Corridor progressed, the arrangement transitioned to Type III--one focused on implementing a specific project. SCAG created the Alameda Cor- ridor Task Force (ACTF), with a membership similar to the PAC but including the California Public Utili- ties Commission and each of the cities along the corridor. The ACTF created the Consolidated Transporta- tion Corridor Joint Powers Authority in August of 1989. The agency changed its name to the Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (ACTA) in November 1990. In 1995 ACTA hired a program management entity called the Alameda Corridor Engineering Team (ACET), which is a joint venture of four major engineering firms. This joint venture and its subcontractors were responsible for preliminary design, environmental reviews, engineering and construction oversight, and other key aspects of the project. Staffing for ACET has varied over the life of the project in response to the need for engineering and construction services. This project management team established decision- making authority and made it clear at what level in the organization a decision could be made. ACTA's primary mission was to design and construct the Alameda Corridor Project. There was a strong mandate to complete the project on time and on budget. The dedicated focus on the primary mission of the project helped keep it from costly overruns and schedule delays. The commitment to the product, as opposed to just the process, also helped ACTA accomplish its mission in April 2002 when the project opened for service. ACTA had a reputation for focusing on the principal objective of completing the proj- ect on time and on budget. ACTA awarded consulting contracts through a qualifications-based selection process. Traditionally, con- struction projects are awarded through the Design-Bid-Build process; however, ACTA's largest contract for the mid-corridor trench was awarded on a Design-Build basis. In 1997, ACTA evaluated the pros and cons of the Design-Build approach for the Mid-Corridor contract. It was estimated that with the traditional
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51 Example 4.4-1. (Continued) Design-Bid-Build approach the project could not be completed until 2003. ACTA concluded that, in order to make the project financially feasible, an earlier delivery date was required. Considering Design-Build procurement allowed ACTA to (1) reduce the overall completion time by approximately 18 months by enabling the design and construction phases to overlap; (2) facilitate a bond sale through earlier identi- fication of total project cost and shift much of the project risk to the contractor; and (3) encourage con- tractor innovation through early participation in the development of the project. ACTA paid special attention to the risk allocated between the owner and the contractor. They devel- oped a risk-allocation matrix as a framework for negotiation of design-build construction contracts. It was especially important to decide ahead of time how risks would be shared between the contractor and owner for unexpected cost increases due to constructability issues, unknown conditions, hazardous mate- rials encountered, and other issues that might arise. ACTA negotiated several complex agreements with corridor cities, utilities, railroads, and other stakehold- ers. For example, when SCAG adopted the plan for the consolidated railroad corridor in 1984, the railroads were generally opposed because they had their privately owned tracks and they thought the government should not attempt to force them to share a common right-of-way. Improving the efficiency of the rail line and facilitating the movement of international cargo were important objectives, along with the goals of reducing vehicular delays at grade crossings, improving emergency vehicle access, reducing noise in res- idential neighborhoods, and reducing air pollution. Negotiating agreements with the railroads took sev- eral years. A major issue was the competitive nature of the private railroads. The ports and railroads also negotiated construction and maintenance agreements and use and operating agreements. Without these third-party agreements in place early in the program, the risks to the project would have been much greater. In addition, it was important to have the right assurances in all agreements such as establishing funding firewalls and sunset clauses. ACTA built these guarantees into its agreements with the railroads. Although there was no public opposition to the project, during the environmental review process, there were local disagreements over project design. The corridor cities preferred a lowered railway--i.e., a trench--but the ports preferred an at-grade railway with standard grade separations. During this debate over project definition, ACTA faced significant funding shortages. ACTA used the EIR and EIS processes to compare and contrast alternative project designs and to identify mitigations for environmental impacts. Several variations of the at-grade and the depressed railway options were analyzed. In the end, the final configuration included standard grade separations at the north and south ends and a lowered railroad in the mid-corridor. Other important compromises were negotiated on alignment and design, including aesthetic treatments along the entire 20-mile corridor. These agreements could not have been reached without extensive technical studies, including preliminary engineering and the EIR/EIS, and painstaking negotiations with project stakeholders. ACTA faced several critical challenges and issues during the course of this project, including project defini- tion, governance structure, relations with corridor cities, railroad cooperation and participation, funding, construction and project delivery, environmental compliance, disadvantaged business enterprise participa- tion, job training, and local participation. ACTA continually identified and monitored all potential obsta- cles and then addressed them early to determine resolutions as soon as possible. In addition, with a com- plex project like the Alameda Corridor, ACTA deemed it prudent to maintain an adequate contingency. It had a $200 million contingency fund to start, which provided a mechanism to pay for unforeseen obstacles. One of ACTA's biggest challenges was to raise additional funds beyond the initial seed money provided by the ports. ACTA acted on any opportunity to maximize the availability of a funding cycle in order to raise all the funds necessary for the Alameda Corridor Project. For example, in the early 1990s, the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) was responsible for programming state and Federal funds in (continued)
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52 Example 4.4-1. (Continued) Los Angeles County. Initially, ACTA was frozen out of the competition for these funds because there was no category in which to compete. The Alameda Corridor was not a freeway project, a light rail project, or any of the other categories established by the LACTC. For 2 years ACTA lobbied for a new category on the basis that goods movement projects such as the Alameda Corridor are essential for reducing congestion and air pollution and for maintaining a healthy economy. Ultimately, the LACTC and its successor agency, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), provided a major financial contribution to the project. For projects funded with revenue bonds, it is necessary to understand how bond rating agen- cies make decisions. Many aspects of a project are reviewed by these organizations and can make a differ- ence in what type of and how much credit might be available and at what interest rate. The Alameda Corridor cost $2.43 billion. Much effort was given to secure this large sum of money. In addition to never missing an opportunity to apply for a funding cycle, a cost-sharing structure was estab- lished to secure necessary funding from various sources. The largest component of ACTA's funding came from a $1.1 billion revenue bond sale in January and February of 1999: $520 million in tax-exempt bonds and $643 million in taxable bonds were sold. Funding also included a $400 million Federal loan. This loan later became the inspiration for the Federal credit program for transportation projects of national or regional significance authorized by the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 (TIFIA). In 2004, ACTA pre-paid and replaced the Federal loan by issuing $475 million in tax-exempt bonds and $211 million in taxable bonds. The ports contributed $394 million for the purchase of needed railroad right-of-way. The MTA provided $347 million in Federal, state, and local grants. Of that amount, the Federal government provided only $80 million of grant funds (3% of the total project costs). Another $130 million came from miscellaneous sources, including income from investing bond and loan proceeds. Example 4.4-2. Chicago Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency Program The Chicago Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency Program (CREATE), a public-private partnership created in 2003, includes the state and city transportation departments, the passenger rail services Metra and Amtrak, and six of the largest North American freight railroads (i.e., BNSF, CN, CP, CSX, NS, and UP1). The CREATE Program consists of approximately 78 projects of national and regional significance aimed at addressing existing and future congestion issues on the rail system, which, if not addressed, are expected to adversely affect the national economy and the transportation system. The CREATE Program is an excellent example of engaging private industry in capital investments that will intrinsically benefit them as well as the public sector. CREATE represents the first time the public sector (state and local government) has partnered with the railroad industry to solve the urban rail congestion problem in Chicago on such a large scale. It is an example of successful consensus building, because it is the first project where private railroads overcame competitive issues and reached agreement on a list of improvement projects to increase the efficiency of an urban rail network. These are primarily functions of a Type I institutional arrangement; hence Type I guidelines would have been helpful to the effort at this point in its evolution. Six of the seven Class I railroads operating in North America pass through Chicago and all six are partners in the CREATE Program. All have pledged to contribute funds to com- plete the necessary improvements that will benefit all six railroads as well as the commuter rail (Metra), the intercity rail service (Amtrak), and the highway network--all public benefits. The CREATE Program has also set new parameters on private-sector commitment for public-private partnerships. The freight railroads are committed to providing $212 million, based on an estimate of the economic benefits that the private sector will gain with the implementation of the program, as determined through analysis con- ducted by the railroads.
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53 Example 4.4-2. (Continued) In addition to the commitment by private railroads and the strong political support from all of its stake- holders, CREATE is recognized as a project of regional and national significance. Since its genesis, a strong leadership presence from political leaders has helped bring private industry into the project design process. Support from communities and freight organizations was also achieved thanks to the political leaders at the Chicago Department of Transportation (CDOT) and at the Illinois Department of Trans- portation (IDOT) who have actively promoted the benefits of the CREATE Program to gain public sup- port for the projects. Over 15 businesses have produced letters of support stating how the CREATE Program improvements will benefit their businesses. To add significant local resident appeal for neigh- borhoods bisected by freight lines and obtain their support, several key grade separation improvements were also included in the overall list of projects. In the end, the political support of a diverse coalition of interest groups like political leaders, private and public partners, businesses, and local communities pro- moting not only the local and regional benefits but also the national benefits made the case for the sig- nificance of investing in CREATE projects and positioning it to better compete for the Projects of National and Regional Significance (PNRS) Program money. As a result, CREATE received funding, although not the amount requested, from the PNRS Program and is recognized nationally as a single project that will produce great benefit to the movement of goods and passengers. Having a common goal and clear benefits has made it easier for CREATE partners to work together and cooperate with each other in order to see the CREATE Program completely implemented. The CREATE Program has successfully remained focused on its mission which is to proactively address and invest in the numerous railroad bottlenecks in the Chicago region to streamline operations and allow rail cars (freight and passenger trains) to move more efficiently through the regional network. All CREATE part- ners are working toward the same goal, even competing private railroad and public-sector partners. CRE- ATE's focus on implementing a consensus set of projects typifies a Type III arrangement. The CREATE Pro- gram has effectively articulated how the main stakeholders (i.e., freight shippers, railroads, passenger rail services, and highway users) will benefit. It has also identified the significant local, regional, and national benefits CREATE will produce. In the end, all will benefit from an improved Chicago railroad network that will generate national and regional economic benefits, reduce congestion, improve trans- portation safety, enhance the national transportation system, and help protect the environment. To ensure the program's implementation, a partnership agreement or "Joint Statement of Understanding" (JSOU) that identified the roles and responsibilities of the partners, created a governance structure, and defined the private funding contribution levels was signed in June 2003 by the program partners. The CREATE Program's 78 projects were divided into three categories, which also defined partner responsibilities: (1) railroad improvements, excluding rail-rail separation (Railroad Components); (2) rail-rail separation (Metra Components); and (3) public improvements, including separation of at-grade highway-rail crossings, viaduct improvements, and grade crossing safety enhancements (Public Component--IDOT and CDOT). A multi- institutional committee structure, including a series of groups with specific roles, was created to imple- ment and manage all CREATE improvement projects. All together, these committees and groups make sure CREATE projects are completed on time and on budget, partners continue to advocate for additional funding at all levels (i.e., Federal, state, local, and private), and communities are informed of the progress of each project. Given its complex multi-institutional committee structure, the decision-making authority falls to several committees that manage the program, resulting in a somewhat cumbersome and slow process. The Stake- holder Committee sets policy for the CREATE Program and approves any changes in scope or budget. This committee provides final resolution on all stakeholder issues and makes decisions by unanimous agreement. The Management Committee reviews and approves project designs, project cost estimates, and construc- tion assumptions and makes decisions regarding scope, schedule, and budget based on recommendations (continued)
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54 Example 4.4-2. (Continued) from the Implementation Team. The Implementation Team tracks budget and construction progress and recommends project changes. The Finance and Budget Committee identifies sources of public funds, mon- itors project cost estimates versus actual expenditures, and assists project managers with financial manage- ment issues. The Advocacy Committee is responsible for all CREATE communications, addressing commu- nity concerns, and advocating for CREATE. Each project in the CREATE Program was delegated to one or more partners, who become the Project Managers. The Component Project Managers are responsible for all phases of development through implementation, including design and construction, and are responsi- ble for tracking project status and potential scope and cost changes. The Project Office is responsible for tracking all projects, approving final designs and cost estimates, assisting with grant applications, and act- ing as a liaison between the Component Project Managers and other groups. The Project Office identifies, monitors, and addresses potential obstacles; initiates requests related to changes in project scope and/or costs; and advises the Management Committee of proposed actions. Some have suggested that the CREATE Program would benefit from a separate institutional structure (i.e., Joint Powers Authority) to build the CREATE Program rather than this complex multi-institutional committee structure. The total cost of all CREATE projects was estimated at $1.5 billion in 2003. In December 2008, the CREATE partnership updated the program cost and the new, total unfunded CREATE Program cost is estimated at $2.6 billion. The CREATE Program did not receive the $900 million in Federal funding anticipated from SAFETEA-LU in 2005. Instead, it received $100 million with the remaining funding coming from a mix of funding sources (private-sector contributions and state and local funding). As a result, the project list was prioritized and will need to be implemented in phases, which has slowed the program and significantly delayed its benefits. Phase I includes only 32 projects that are programmed to be in design or construction by 2009. Funding for Phase I comes from the following sources: SAFETEA-LU Programs of National and Regional Significance--$100 million; State of Illinois--$100 million (unsecured to date); Freight Railroads-- $100 million; and City of Chicago--$30 million. These amounts will be insufficient to complete all 78 CREATE projects. Federal funding is necessary to complete all projects. Otherwise, all other partners will have to increase their contributions or projects will be delayed until funding becomes available. Continued delays will result in higher project costs due to inflation, especially the increased costs of construction materials. CREATE stakeholders continue to move Phase I projects into construction. At the same time they have begun obtaining consensus and drafting the next phase (Phase II) of projects. CREATE partners will con- tinue to participate actively in the national debate on freight policy and maximize the opportunity of the next available funding cycle at the Federal level. CREATE will seek additional funding in the next Fed- eral transportation authorization. The partnership will engage the shipper, business, and passenger com- munities in order to generate more advocates supportive of CREATE goals. CREATE will continue to work to complete all the critically needed rail improvements included in the program in order to make the Chicago freight hub the country's model for safe, productive, and efficient railroad operations. 1 Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), Canadian National (CN), Canadian Pacific (CP), CSX, Norfolk Southern (NS), and Union Pacific (UP). Example 4.4-3. Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks The Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) Program consists of a framework for organizing, deploying, and funding the implementation of technology to automate various motor carrier regulatory and safety enforcement functions with the ultimate goal of improving commercial motor vehicle safety. The mission is to support the U.S. DOT and FMCSA's performance goals in high- way vehicle safety, hazardous materials safety, homeland and national security, transportation relia-
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55 Example 4.4-3. (Continued) bility and productivity, and organization excellence. The core CVISN Program capabilities focus on three program areas: Safety Information Exchange (automated roadside vehicle and driver inspections), Electronic Screening (transponder-based systems), and Electronic Credentials Administration (automatic application, processing, and issuance of credentials and permits). The program is managed by FMCSA; however, deployment, planning, and implementation of the program require the full participation of FMCSA, state agencies with motor carrier safety or regulatory responsibilities, and private industry. Effective planning and deployment of CVISN projects in all three program areas has required effective part- nership agreements at all levels, including Federal-state partnerships, regional partnerships, inter-agency partnerships within states, and public-private partnerships. On the Federal and state level, FMCSA cannot achieve its mission of reducing crashes involving trucks and buses without the support of states responsible for administering and enforcing commercial vehicle regulations. States, on the other hand, typically cannot fully finance the technology infrastructure required for CVISN, nor are individual states well suited to coor- dinate activities across states for purposes of promoting uniformity and standards. States wishing to receive Federal CVISN funds must enter into formal partnership agreements with FMCSA. These agreements spec- ify what is required of states in order to qualify for and receive CVISN grant money and outline what they can expect from FMCSA. As the champion, FMCSA's primary responsibility is managing and overseeing the CVISN Program at the national level. States are responsible for planning, deploying, operating, and maintaining their CVISN architecture and services. Multi-state coalitions, like the I-95 Corridor Coalition, have supported the CVISN program on a number of fronts, including providing funding to support (1) CVISN training and program planning activities and (2) design and implementation of specific projects of regional signifi- cance. State agencies with commercial vehicle operations (CVO) responsibilities like the Departments of Transportation, Revenue, Public Safety and/or State Police often are engaged in CVISN planning and deployment activities. Given the distributed nature of CVO regulatory and enforcement functions, most states participating in CVISN have executed formal memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to identify cost-sharing agreements, designate the lead agency, and clarify the responsibilities of all partners to the agreement. The funding contributions of the MOU participants vary depending on the functional- ity that a state is electing to deploy. For example, systems such as the Commercial Vehicle Information Exchange Window (CVIEW) provide functionality that is beneficial to all agencies in a state. As such, the agencies may agree to share in the costs to deploy a CVIEW equally. Certainly MOUs between or among multiple state agencies have helped to solidify working relationships and memorialize commitments that have been made, even when administrations change. Public-private partnerships and private-sector involvement have played a significant role in advancing the CVISN Program and have taken on many different forms. For example, motor carriers have been asked to participate in discussions about the design of software that will allow them to apply for and receive certain credentials electronically. As the systems are built or customized, carriers also have been asked to review or participate in pilot testing of the systems to confirm that they have been built around the needs of industry and are operating as intended. These informal partnerships between states and industry whereby motor carriers and motor coach operators are engaged in the planning and design of CVISN systems to ensure that the systems are built in a manner consistent with the needs of industry exemplify how CVISN has reached out to the private sector to build consensus on specific project parameters. Formal partnerships include cost-sharing agreements among carriers, vendors, state agen- cies, and other third-parties that are memorialized in writing. Some of these contracts have resulted in cost sharing between the parties whereby vendors will provide in-kind services at a reduced fee or will implement their systems at no cost to the state in exchange for the opportunity to deploy their systems and collect future revenue based on user fees. (continued)
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56 Example 4.4-3. (Continued) All 50 states have begun to deploy some of the core CVISN capabilities. As of August 2008, 20 states are Core CVISN Compliant or have deployed all of the core CVISN capabilities. These states have shown a more pro- nounced CVISN deployment progress because of their strong partnership with the Federal government, across state agencies, and with private industry. FMCSA and its state and industry partners have been critical to the overall success of the program and continue to support the development of the program. They have identified a series of expanded CVISN functionalities that are being integrated into the CVISN program while remaining focused on its mission to support FMCSA's ultimate goal of improving commercial motor vehicle safety.