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Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis (2009)

Chapter: Chapter 2 - Literature Review

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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 2 - Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2009. Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14336.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

2.1 Introduction Concern for transportation accident data collection and the performance of effective root cause analysis is not new. Over the last several decades, policy analysts and researchers have attempted to use crash data to understand what causes accidents and how best to prevent future occurrences. As a result, a body of literature exists with the potential to provide beneficial information to this hazmat root cause analysis study. The study team conducted extensive online searches for relevant literature, focusing on studies of transportation accidents and, more particularly, on the quality of information utilized and the types of analyses that have been performed. As a result, a variety of sources were identified and subsequently reviewed. The remainder of this chapter describes the results of that process. 2.2 Synopses of Relevant Studies The discussion below contains synopses of relevant literature that was obtained and reviewed. In each case, background is provided on the study objectives, followed by a description of find- ings, conclusions, and recommendations. The synopses appear in no particular order. Section 2.3 contains a summary discussion of key lessons learned from the literature review and how this information relates to the objectives of the hazmat root cause analysis study. 2.2.1 Rail Equipment—Train Accident Data Rail Equipment—Train Accident Data (Bureau of Transportation Statistics) is a document that describes reporting requirements for rail equipment, train accidents, and issues associated with data collection. Railroads are required by regulation (49 CFR 225) to report monthly to FRA all such accidents that meet a certain dollar threshold. This damage amount does not include loss of lading, cleanup costs, societal costs, loss of main line, personal injury, or death. Data must be updated when the costs associated with the accident are 10% higher than initially reported. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) acknowledges that non-sampling errors exist in this reporting system due to 1. Non-entry error, 2. Duplicate entry error (when more than one railroad is involved), 3. Missing data error, 4. Response/measurement error (e.g., accuracy of repair records), 5. Coding/recording error, and 6. Non-coverage error (railroad systems that are excluded from reporting requirements). 14 C H A P T E R 2 Literature Review

It is further noted that such errors are less likely to be associated with the more severe accidents since they receive greater investigative scrutiny. The following recommendations are made for conducting verification and validation at various levels of the reporting process: 1. Improvements in the railroad’s internal control plan to ensure that missing and corrected data are provided to the railroad safety officer, 2. Review of reports by railroad safety officer prior to submission to FRA, 3. Use of edit checks within FRA’s data entry system, and 4. Performance of cross-field and cross-record checks. The information is posted on the FRA Internet site, providing others with an opportunity to review entries and comment on their authenticity. 2.2.2 Project 5 Overview—Developing Common Data on Accident Circumstances Project 5 Overview—Developing Common Data on Accident Circumstances (Bureau of Transportation Statistics) describes a project undertaken to evaluate data currently available from which to identify the factors and circumstances that are present in transportation crashes and incidents. A comparison also is made to what is needed by investigators and researchers to improve analysis effectiveness, leading to recommendations that are made for how to enhance data quality. The overall objective of the activity was to identify those data elements needed for adopting a common framework of factors across a wide variety of events and modes. Included within the scope of the study were crashes or mishaps meeting all of the following conditions: 1. Involving the movement or operation of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, pipeline, or other con- veyance in the course of moving people or goods, 2. Occurring within a U.S. jurisdiction or involving a U.S. commercial carrier, 3. Being either intentional or unintentional in nature, and 4. Resulting in substantial property damage or injury, or the death of a passenger, crewmember, pedestrian, other worker, or bystander within 30 days of the event. Data reviewed as part of the project included reports filed with U.S.DOT agencies, other fed- eral agencies, and some non-federal agencies (e.g., state medical examiner offices). The basis for performing an evaluation of these data was the Haddon Matrix, a conceptual framework used to analyze risk factors or prevention measures for mishaps and injuries. The Haddon Matrix divides an event into three chronological phases (1) pre-event (contributing to event likelihood), (2) event (influencing likelihood and severity of an injury), and (3) post-event (affecting likeli- hood of survival/recovery). Each of these phases is further divided into four groups of risk fac- tors (1) operator, (2) vehicle, (3) physical environment, and (4) social/cultural/organizational circumstances. Among the data gaps and limitations discovered from applying this methodology were the following: • Some important data elements are rarely collected, such as data on the injury mechanism, operator fatigue, distractions, and alcohol use; • Lack of information on injury type and severity; • Lack of a narrative description in reports, or information contained in narratives is not used; • Lack of detail on human factors; Literature Review 15

• Absence of guidelines for law enforcement officers and others who are expected to file incident/ accident reports; and • A linkage between a crash investigation report and death certificates and autopsy data is typically missing. Among the recommendations for addressing these inadequacies are • Make greater use of sampling to obtain more detailed information on events of interest, including performing supplemental studies in conjunction with sampling. • Perform special studies using other databases (e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission’s National Electronic Injury Surveillance System) to address transportation-related injuries for which data are not routinely collected by DOT agencies. • Improve data collection/reporting details about crash severity and mechanisms of injury. • Add photographic evidence to crash files. • Make greater use of geographic information systems (GIS) to identify more precisely where the event occurred and to relate the location to surrounding features. • Incorporate data from non-DOT sources (e.g., information on a death certificate) into DOT data records. Other recommendations were associated with how to make greater use of technology to improve data collection and included • Provide crash investigators with handheld devices containing drop-down menus for on-scene data entry. • Incorporate the use of event data recorders into the police accident reporting process. • Encourage the installation of automatic crash notification in road vehicles and have this data included in the investigation. 2.2.3 “National Crash Data Bases Underestimate Underride Statistics” “National Crash Data Bases Underestimate Underride Statistics” (Road Management & Engineer- ing Journal 1999), summarizes the results of a study that selected 275 fatal truck-car crashes reported in both the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and National Accident Sampling System— Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/CDS) for the purpose of evaluating the frequency of crashes that are characterized as underrides. Data from NASS/CDS showed that the percentage of fatal underrides of large trucks by passenger vehicles was much higher in NASS/CDS (27%) than in FARS (7%). The NASS/CDS statistics were considered to be more reliable because a larger amount of resources and personnel are devoted to investigating a crash in NASS/CDS than in FARS. This discrepancy in underrides as a crash characteristic was attributed in part to a lack of avail- able information in the FARS police reports to determine whether the crash involved an under- ride. To help alleviate this problem, it was suggested that the interview skills of FARS analysts be enhanced to help guide them in identifying and coding underrides. 2.2.4 Transportation Research Circular 231: Truck Accident Data Systems: State-of-the-Art Report Transportation Research Circular 231 (TRB 1981) summarizes the proceedings of a workshop that addressed 1. Issues that should guide the collection of truck safety data, 2. Data available to address these issues, 3. Quality and completeness of available data, and 4. Potential sources of additional data. 16 Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis

It was concluded that meaningful data to support heavy truck accident causation studies existed in a variety of sources. However, being able to locate, verify, and collate such data was considered challenging. Two important areas of data deficiency were noted as (1) the role of economic factors in truck operations and driving practices and (2) coarse categorization of truck accident data. 2.2.5 Accident Models for Two-Lane Rural Roads: Segments and Intersections Accident Models for Two-Lane Rural Roads: Segments and Intersections (Vogt and Bared 1998) describes the collection, analysis, and modeling of accident and roadway data pertaining to seg- ments and intersections on rural roads in the states of Minnesota and Washington. A compre- hensive review of data quality was performed as part of this effort. This included comparisons of values of multiple variables for consistency and flagging unusually large values of variables. Of particular interest were findings that there are inconsistencies in how attributes are defined in different accident databases as well as variations in reporting thresholds, making it difficult to conduct direct comparisons. The authors also note that the reliability of reported accident char- acteristics depends on the acumen of the report officer/official and witnesses. 2.2.6 The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System—HFACS With human error cited as the cause of the vast majority of civil and military aviation accidents, an argument is made that a more comprehensive accident analysis and classification framework for collecting data investigating human error is needed. HFACS was developed with this objective in mind. HFACS describes the following four levels of human failure: 1. Unsafe acts, 2. Preconditions for unsafe acts, 3. Unsafe supervision, and 4. Organizational influences. Unsafe acts are comprised of errors (mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve their intended outcome) and violations (willful disregard for the rules and regulations that govern safe operations). Errors are further subdivided into those that are skill based, decision oriented, and perceptual, while violations are segmented into routine and exceptional. Preconditions for unsafe acts are based on the premise that unsafe acts are often symptoms of a deeper problem. Preconditions are divided into substandard conditions of operators and the prac- tices they commit, respectively. Substandard conditions of operators are subdivided into adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, and physical/mental limitations. Substandard practices of operators are categorized as crew resource management and personal readiness. Unsafe supervision traces causation of events back to the supervisory chain of command. Four subcategories of unsafe supervision are defined as 1. Inadequate supervision, 2. Planned inappropriate operations, 3. Failure to correct a known problem, and 4. Supervisory violation. The final category, organizational influences, addresses the institutional culture and how the organization is structured to perform. Organizational influences are subdivided into the following three groups: 1. Resource/acquisition management, 2. Organizational climate, and 3. Organizational process. Literature Review 17

It is argued that accident databases can be reliably analyzed using HFACS and, in doing so, objec- tive, data-driven intervention strategies can be identified. The authors (Shappell and Wiegmann 2000) state that application of HFACS has been proven effective and the approach is now being utilized by multiple military and civilian organizations. 2.2.7 “Human Factors Root Cause Analysis of Accidents/Incidents Involving Remote Control Locomotive Operations” “Human Factors Root Cause Analysis of Accidents/Incidents Involving Remote Control Loco- motive Operations” (FRA 2005) documents a human factors root cause analysis (RCA) of six train accidents/incidents involving remote-control locomotive (RCL) operations in U.S. railroad switch- ing yards that occurred in 2004. RCA used a modified version of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), in which operator impacts, preconditions for operator acts, super- visory factors, organizational factors, and outside factors were defined as concentric category influ- ences. Data collection and analysis tools included information gathered from participating railroads, interviews and surveys, travel to the accident/incident site, and the development of decision trees designed around the HFACS taxonomy. A total of 36 probable contributing factors were identified among the 6 case studies, from which several key safety issues emerged. 2.2.8 Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) Analysis Series: Using LTCCS Data for Statistical Analyses of Crash Risk The Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) was undertaken jointly by FMCSA and NHTSA, utilizing a representative sample of nearly 1,000 injury and fatal crashes involving large trucks that occurred between April 2001 and December 2003. This report (Hedlund and Blower 2006) focuses on how statistical analyses of the LTCCS database can be used to investigate crash causes and contributing factors. Within this context, data limitations are discussed. These include issues involving data accu- racy and completeness. The authors conclude that variables that are directly observable by inves- tigators are likely to be more accurate and complete, such as most vehicle and non-transitory environmental data. By contrast, variables that depend on interviews are more suspect in terms of accuracy and completeness (even if investigators have checked other sources to confirm the inter- view reports). An example of this latter consideration is whether the truck driver was in violation of the federal hours-of-service rules at the time of the crash. 2.2.9 Highway Safety: Further Opportunities Exist to Improve Data on Crashes Involving Commercial Motor Vehicles The process for collecting, entering, and processing commercial motor vehicle crash data to meet federal reporting requirements involves several steps. Crash data initially are collected by local law enforcement then sent to the state for processing before being uploaded by the state into FMCSA’s data system. The objective of this study (GAO 2005) was two-fold: to examine what is known about the quality of commercial motor vehicle crash data and what states are doing to improve it, and to evaluate the results of FMCSA’s efforts to facilitate the improvement of the quality of commercial motor vehicle crash data submitted to the agency. Sources of information utilized in the study included data reported by FMCSA; previous studies on the quality of commercial motor vehicle crash data; interviews with FMCSA officials, developers of FMCSA crash data tools, commercial vehicle industry researchers, and public interest organizations; grant documentation for 34 states that participated in FMCSA’s safety data improvement program in fiscal year 2004; case studies of six states that participated in that program; and interviews with states that had not participated or were no longer participating in the safety data improvement program. 18 Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis

Overall, GAO concluded that commercial motor vehicle crash data do not yet meet general data quality standards of completeness, timeliness, accuracy, and consistency. More specifically, for fis- cal year 2004, nearly one-third of commercial motor vehicle crashes that states are required to report to FMCSA were not reported and, of those that were reported, there were problems with accuracy, timeliness, and consistency (e.g., 15% of crash records reported to FMCSA could not be matched to the carrier’s DOT number). Data quality problems most often stemmed from errors or omissions either by law enforcement officers at the scene of a crash or in the processing of crash reports to a state-level database. Among the specific problems cited were the following: 1. Infrequent opportunities for officers to receive training on filling out crash reports, 2. Unfamiliarity with what and how to report that result from infrequent occurrences of com- mercial motor vehicle crashes in an officer’s jurisdiction, 3. Competing priorities at the officer level (where safety is a higher priority than data collection at the crash scene), 4. Use of manual crash reporting forms (compounded when the commercial vehicle crash report is a supplemental form), 5. Complex processes some states use to transform a report into the FMCSA format, and 6. An overall lack of quality control during data entry. To combat this problem, individual states are engaged in the following activities, utilizing federal funds allocated by FMCSA to support state efforts to collect and report commercial motor vehicle crash data: • Analyzing existing data to identify problems and develop plans for addressing them, • Reducing report backlogs that have not been entered into state-level databases, • Developing and implementing electronic data systems for collecting and processing crash information (e.g., on-scene reporting using handheld computers), and • Providing training on the definitions and criteria for commercial motor vehicle crashes and emphasizing the importance of data quality. To date, improvements in both the timeliness and number of reportable crashes have been observed, as measured by FMCSA’s data quality rating system. However, GAO found that this sys- tem contains some flaws that can mask the true effectiveness of crash reporting and made specific recommendations for how to address these shortcomings. 2.2.10 In-Depth Accident Causation Data Study Methodology Development Report (SafetyNet) This report (Paulsson 2005) was prepared for the European Commission in order to develop a system for taking an independent, in-depth accident causation database and creating an investiga- tion process that identifies the main risk factors leading to a crash. The main difference between the proposed and existing systems is that this system would be constructed from the ground up with the sole purpose of determining the causes of accidents, unlike the multitude of existing databases that have to be cross-referenced, when even possible, to accomplish this objective. One major concern that this report recognizes is the need for accurate and consistent data. To address this concern, the report recommends conducting interviews and issuing questionnaires to confirm all aspects of an incident as well as implementing systems to review the procedures that data collectors are using at crashes. 2.2.11 Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010: 2006 Listening Session This listening session (Coray Gurnitz Consulting and Abacus Technology 2007) enabled partic- ipants to supply ideas on how FMCSA could improve its commercial motor vehicle safety compli- ance and enforcement programs. Among the suggestions made were the need for higher quality Literature Review 19

data (including crash causation determination and type of accident), consistent data submission and enforcement across states, and making the data visible immediately after it is submitted. 2.2.12 Safety Report: Transportation Safety Databases This report (NTSB 2002) evaluated the data quality issues of the many external databases used to perform accident investigations, safety studies, and special investigations. The main purpose of this report was to identify information gaps and establish data quality standards to ensure compatibility between databases and increase the usability of these databases. Aside from developing a new database that would contain all of the necessary information for the various analyses, NTSB felt that it was most important to modify existing databases to be more compatible with each other (namely the NASS, FARS, and state databases), and improve the accuracy or completeness of submitted information (many databases have fields for infor- mation that are not recorded by the data collector). 2.2.13 Illinois Department of Transportation Crash Data Process Audit This report (Scopatz 2006) was compiled after a study team collected information about the processes the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) uses to collect motor vehicle crash data. It was concluded that the current accident reporting system was not working well. This audit was not conducted because of incorrect or incomplete information, but rather due to untimely information. Because of inefficient recording processes, IDOT was experiencing a backlog of nearly six months for reporting crashes to the necessary databases (FARS and MCMIS). Recommendations included reducing the number of unnecessary reports that are filed (for crashes that do not meet the FARS or MCMIS reporting requirements) and implementing electronic file transfer instead of printing out reports and hand keying them into the necessary database. 2.2.14 User’s Guide to Federal Accidental Release Databases This report (EPA 1995) focuses on the incompatibilities of the various federal hazmat databases hosted by agencies such as NRC, EPA, and DOT. It was concluded that it is difficult to evaluate the overall effect of an accident without gathering information from more than one database, which can be time consuming. It was recommended that, in the future, the databases be linked by key identifiers to give users access to all of the available information for a given accident. 2.2.15 Comparative Risks of Hazardous Materials and Non-Hazardous Materials Truck Shipment Accidents/Incidents Although this report (Battelle 2001) is a risk assessment for hazmat and non-hazmat accidents, it includes discussion of the federal databases being used in hazmat root cause analysis. From reviewing these databases, the following recommendations were made: • Standardize the definitions of what constitutes an accident, what accidents must be reported, and what information must be reported. • Include common fields in various databases so that pertinent information can be shared and not duplicated. • Implement electronic filing for the major databases to reduce any backlog time. 2.2.16 Hazardous Materials Serious Crash Analysis: Phase 2 This report (Battelle 2005) details the process that the study team implemented in order to develop a hazmat accident database by combining data from MCMIS, HMIRS, state police accident reports (PARs), and interviews of carriers involved in the accidents. By joining these data, a higher 20 Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis

level of understanding about the details and possible cause of the crash were obtained. This would not have been possible by using only the MCMIS or HMIRS database because of often-missing or inaccurate data. For instance, the MCMIS database classified 569 crashes as accidents involving hazmat Class 3 cargo. Once this was combined with the other sources, only 465 of these actually contained hazmat Class 3 cargo, and 69 of the 569 crashes did not even represent hazmat shipments. 2.2.17 Unified Reporting of Commercial and Non-Commercial Traffic Accidents The objectives of this study (Shupe Consulting 2001) were to document the current business processes, forms, and data used for accident reporting in South Dakota and on national data- bases, and to develop a design specification for implementing a single system that could record, manage, and track accident information. It was concluded that the existing system was not well integrated with national databases (conflicts with state and FARS reporting), needed greater analysis capabilities, was time consuming to support (too much dependence on manual entry), contained inaccurate data, and lacked user accessibility. In proposing an improved system based on electronic data entry, it was recognized that challenges remain with redesigning crash report forms, establishing uniform reporting policies and procedures across the state, and providing adequate accident data collection training for law enforcement officers. 2.2.18 “Crashes Involving Long Combination Vehicles: Data Quality Problems and Recommendations for Improvement” The author (Scopatz 2001) performed a study for the AAA Safety Foundation to identify bar- riers to analysis of longer combination vehicles (LCVs)—doubles and triples operating on our nation’s highways. The states of Florida, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah participated in a review and evaluation of their data collection and analysis practices. Oregon and Utah also par- ticipated in an audit of completed crash reports for crashes involving LCVs. It was concluded that none of the five states had a crash reporting system that adequately supports an analysis of LCV safety. Of particular note was a lack of reliable data on the specific configuration of vehicles involved in crashes. The report also contains recommendations for improving the quality of data for crashes involving large trucks and a state’s ability to analyze LCV crashes. 2.2.19 “Use of Emerging Technologies for Marine Accident Data Analysis Visualization and Quality Control” This paper (Dobbins and Abkowitz 2009) focused on performing analyses of allisions, collisions, and groundings on the inland waterway system. (Note: a vessel collides with another moving vessel but allides with a fixed object such as a bridge.) The source of accident information was U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty data from 1980 through mid-2007. During that time, the Coast Guard transitioned between three major system designs. The authors found significant quality issues with the U.S. Coast Guard accident data, specifically reporting inconsistencies among regions, missing data elements, and inaccurately reported information (including geographic location). Visualization using satellite imagery (in programs such as Google Earth) proved valuable in vali- dating accident locations and understanding how the characteristics of each location may have con- tributed to accident causation and consequence. Recommendations are made as to how emerging technologies can be meaningfully applied to marine casualty data validation and analysis. 2.3 Summary of Findings and Implications A review of relevant transportation accident data collection and analysis literature over the past three decades reveals some important findings and implications regarding the current state of the art of root cause analysis. These can be conveniently separated into recognition of problems Literature Review 21

and proposed solutions. These considerations are addressed, in turn, in the following discus- sion. It should be noted that a disproportionate number of prior studies has focused on the truck mode. However, where other modes have been considered, the findings and implications are remarkably consistent. 2.3.1 Data and Analysis Problems As early as 1981, there was acknowledgement that analyzing transportation safety using empir- ical accident data was problematic. Beginning then, and continuing to the present time, numerous studies have cited the following five basic problems: 1. Inconsistent reporting practices within and across regions, 2. Non-reporting of reportable accidents, 3. Missing information in accident report records, 4. Inaccurate information included in accident report records, and 5. Data elements needed for root cause analysis not appearing on the report form. A variety of reasons have been provided for why these problems exist, most notably • Low law enforcement priority of data collection at the accident scene when compared with protecting public safety; • Lack of understanding of how to complete an accident report involving vehicles hauling hazardous materials due to the low frequency of filling out these reports for police and many carriers; • Reliance on manual data entry; • Different reporting forms used by entities to serve different interests; and • Disagreement or misunderstandings regarding the definition of terms. Whatever the case, until these problems are adequately resolved, the ability to perform highly effective root cause accident analysis will be compromised. 2.3.2 Solutions Being Implemented or Under Consideration Fortunately, the literature also contains suggestions and indications that some progress is being made in addressing data quality problems. Among the strategies being implemented or under consideration are the following: • Posting available accident data on the Internet for review and feedback regarding its authenticity; • Designing standardized accident reports toward a goal of more uniform data collection; • Making extensive use of electronic data entry; • Using visualization technologies to more precisely locate where an event occurred; • Having data collection requirements influenced by available root cause analysis methodologies (e.g., HFACS, Haddon Matrix); • Using sampling techniques to target certain types of accidents; • Including common identifiers in complementary accident databases so as to integrate key causal information while avoiding duplication of effort; and • Providing better training for law enforcement officials and other data entry personnel to enable them to collect and process information in a consistent, complete, accurate, and more timely manner. Many of these strategies offer considerable potential, and are among those that were given careful consideration in the hazmat root cause analysis study. 22 Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis

Next: Chapter 3 - Summary of Interviews with Carriers, Shippers, and Database Managers »
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TRB’s Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) Report 1: Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis examines potential technical improvements to hazardous materials accident databases that are collected and managed by various agencies. The report explores gaps and redundancies in reporting requirements and attempts to estimate the extent of the under-reporting of serious incidents.

Appendixes A through E to HMCRP 1 are available online.

Appendix A: Questionnaires

Appendix B: Questionnaire Results for Carriers and Database Administrators

Appendix C: Brief Summary of the 2005 MCMIS Crash Records

Appendix D: The Percent of Missing Data for Variables from TIFA/FARS, 1999–2004

Appendix E: Selected Analyses Performed with the Hazmat Accident Database

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