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HMCRP Report 1: Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis (2009)
Hazardous Material Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP)

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Transportation Research Board. "3.3.1 Shipper 1." HMCRP Report 1: Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.

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26
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Page
26
Front Matter (R1-R11)
Summary (1-8)
1.1 Project Purpose (9-9)
1.2.1 Literature Review (10-10)
1.2.3 Analysis of Databases (11-11)
1.3 Effective Methods to Ensure High-Quality Data (12-12)
1.4 Potential Measures to Enhance the Ability of Databases to Identify the Root Causes of Hazmat Crashes (13-13)
2.2.1 Rail Equipment - Train Accident Data (14-14)
2.2.2 Project 5 Overview - Developing Common Data on Accident Circumstances (15-15)
2.2.4 Transportation Research Circular 231: Truck Accident Data Systems: State-of-the-Art Report (16-16)
2.2.6 The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - HFACS (17-17)
2.2.9 Highway Safety: Further Opportunities Exist to Improve Data on Crashes Involving Commercial Motor Vehicles (18-18)
2.2.11 Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010: 2006 Listening Session (19-19)
2.2.16 Hazardous Materials Serious Crash Analysis: Phase 2 (20-20)
2.3 Summary of Findings and Implications (21-21)
2.3.2 Solutions Being Implemented or Under Consideration (22-22)
3.1 Introduction (23-23)
3.2 Summary of Responses from Carriers (24-24)
3.2.1 Carrier Satisfaction with HMIRS (25-25)
3.3.1 Shipper 1 (26-26)
3.3.2 Shipper 2 (27-27)
3.4.1 Interviews with Agencies Maintaining Databases (PHMSA) (28-28)
3.4.2 Interviews with Agencies Maintaining Databases (FMCSA) (29-29)
3.4.3 Interviews with Agencies Maintaining Databases (FRA) (30-30)
3.5 Summary of Findings from Interviews (31-31)
4.1.1 MCMIS Database Description (32-32)
4.1.3 Database Format (33-33)
4.1.6 Types of Fields Covered (34-34)
4.1.7 Database Purpose and Function (35-35)
4.1.10 Accuracy and Completeness of Data (36-36)
4.1.11 Identification of Hazmat Incidents in MCMIS (37-41)
4.1.12 Quality Control Process (42-42)
4.1.13 Interconnectivity with Other Databases (43-43)
4.1.14 Analyses Using Database (44-44)
4.1.15 Summary and Potential Measures for Improving Root Cause Analysis (45-45)
4.2 Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) (46-46)
4.2.1 Database Description (47-48)
4.2.3 Data Collection (49-49)
4.2.5 Accuracy and Completeness of Data (50-53)
4.2.8 Analyses Using Database (54-59)
4.2.9 Summary and Potential Measures for Improving Root Cause Analysis (60-60)
4.3 Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) (61-61)
4.3.4 Types of Hazmat Data Included (62-62)
4.3.6 Data Quality (63-63)
4.3.7 Additional Fields (64-64)
4.3.9 Compatibility with Other Databases (65-65)
4.4.4 Types of Hazmat Data Included (66-66)
4.4.5 Usefulness of the Data for Determining Root Causes (67-70)
4.4.7 Additional Fields (71-71)
4.4.10 Data Uses (72-72)
4.5.1 Database Description (73-73)
4.5.3 Data Collection (74-74)
4.5.7 Interconnectivity with Other Databases (75-75)
4.5.8 Analyses Using Database (76-77)
4.5.9 Summary and Potential Measures to Improve Root Cause Analysis (78-78)
4.6 Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System (RAIRS) (79-79)
4.6.1 Track, Roadbed, and Structures (80-80)
4.6.3 Mechanical and Electrical Failures (81-81)
4.6.5 Summary of Causes and Impact (82-83)
4.7.3 Data Collection (84-84)
4.7.5 Accuracy and Completeness (85-85)
4.8.1 Scope of Investigations (86-86)
4.8.2 Approach to Identifying Root Causes (87-87)
4.8.4 Data Quality (88-88)
4.8.5 Probable Cause Findings (89-89)
4.8.6 Summary (90-90)
4.9.1 Introduction (91-91)
4.9.4 Populating Records and Improving Data Quality (92-92)
4.9.6 Database Enhancements and Limitations (93-93)
4.9.7 Summary (94-94)
5.2 Information System Development (95-95)
5.2.1 Develop Framework for Identifying Contributing Causes and Root Causes of Hazardous Material Accidents (96-96)
5.2.3 Add or Modify Inventory Data in Databases (97-97)
5.2.5 Develop a System for Each Database That Will Target About 5% of Hazmat Crashes for More Detailed Investigation (98-98)
5.3.2 Complete Values for All Parameters (99-102)
5.4.1 Potential Measures for MCMIS (103-104)
5.4.2 Potential Measures for HMIRS (105-106)
5.4.3 Potential Measures for TIFA (107-107)
5.4.4 Potential Measures for RAIRS (108-108)
5.6 Follow-On Project (109-109)
References (110-111)
Appendices (112-112)
Abbreviations used without definitions in TRB publications (113-113)

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26 Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Data for Root Cause Analysis the database to detect contributing factors being experienced by other carriers and thereby address those factors in their own safety training programs. 3.2.2 Carrier Satisfaction with MCMIS Although most carriers do not use the MCMIS crash data, of those that had, the following sug- gestions were made: · Add specific information as to which party was responsible for a crash. Distinguish between an accident that was preventable and one that was not preventable. · Determine the specific cause, as well as contributing circumstances, as determined by inves- tigators. · Designate repeat offenders in the crash reports. 3.3 Shipper Responses Two interviews were conducted with two major shippers of chemicals in the United States. The following summarizes some of the major points and recommendations made by the officials. 3.3.1 Shipper 1 Shipper 1 is an extremely large corporation that conducts formal investigations of accidents involving its hazmat shipments. It is a standardized process that includes an auditing compo- nent. There are several triggers for conducting a formal investigation, including severity and potential consequence (e.g., how much leaked, type of hazard involved, injuries, media atten- tion, and traffic shutdown). When an incident occurs while the shipment is in the custody of a carrier, CHEMTREC is immediately notified. The distribution leader at the shipper's plant site where the shipment orig- inated creates an incident report. Based on the contents of the report, the incident is classified as one of the following: · Category A, warranting CEO attention, · Category B, investigated within 24 hours with investigation led at the vice president or direc- tor level, or · Category C, investigated within 72 hours. Also note that the size of the investigative team increases at each higher level of review. For Category A and B events, the incident investigation may include on-site data collection, but only if deemed necessary for the shipper to have confidence in knowledge of the situation. The results of an investigation are recorded in a database. Among the data elements contained in an incident record are fields for both Surface Cause (e.g., transportation accident due to human error) and Root Cause fields. The interviewee estimated that they identify the correct root cause in 70% to 80% of the cases. When problems arise, it is usually associated with the car- rier's involvement in the process. It was mentioned that bulk carriers tend to provide better reporting than less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers. The outcome of an incident investigation or an analysis performed on multiple incidents in the database is a list of recommended action items to implement in mitigating future risks. Examples of such actions include more targeted training and auditing. It also was suggested that because of recognized issues related to HMIRS data quality, a cred- ible root cause analysis should be performed by PHMSA. This could be achieved by implement-