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24 distances, or the installation of an EMAS. From an operations AC 150/5200-37 presents guidance on safety manage- standpoint, any arrestor developed must accomplish the goal ment systems (SMS) and includes relevant risk assessment specified by the EMAS advisory circular: to arrest aircraft with approaches (25). It has become apparent through the literature an exit speed of 70 knots, thereby providing protection that review that the reliability and risk for passive arrestors is less is equivalent to a standard RSA (1). understood than for military-type systems. The military sys- The current status of the Part 139 airports is summarized tems have been well characterized and are required to pass a in an FAA database (22), which was consulted for determining 97.5% reliability criterion; no parallel currently exists for civil the survey participant pool. systems. The SMS guidance presents a paradigm to be adopted with civil arresting systems. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) incident 2.6. Accidents and Incidents reports for several overruns were reviewed, including some Two major studies have documented historical overrun involving arrestor beds (2628). These documents provide accidents and incidents. In 1990, David (23) conducted an some information in terms of exit speed and distance travelled extensive review of overruns and summarized historical event through the arrestor beds. However, detailed information data, including the distance travelled and the final location regarding the loading and deceleration effected by the arrestors of the aircraft with respect to the runway end and center- is not provided. line. DOT/FAA/CT 93-80 (5, p. 1) gives a histogram sum- marizing the exit speed distribution. This plot produced 2.7. Financial the historical basis for associating an exit speed of 70 knots or less with capturing roughly 90% of overruns. The arrestors FAA Order 5200.9 provided guidelines for estimating the have historically used 70 knots as a design objective for costs to establish an EMAS at an airport (29). It provided a this reason. process for estimating the life-cycle costs of a system and estab- In 2007, Hall et al. (24) revisited the topic with a study for lished guidelines for comparing that cost to maximum feasible TRB/ACRP. This research involved newer data compiled from thresholds. The data contained therein served as a baseline for several database sources pertaining to landing overruns, landing comparison with the airport operator survey (Chapter 3). undershoots, and takeoff overruns. The database compiled in that study was obtained and reviewed, and served as a sub- 2.8. Patents sequent basis for the risk assessment of this effort. The 90% exit speed appears to have shifted since the previous research, Various patents, dated from 1962 to the present, were iden- and per the current data, it appears that the threshold could tified pertaining to aircraft arrestor concepts. These patents now be higher than 70 knots (Chapter 5). are given in the annotated bibliography (Appendix A).