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27 by some third person...."326 The court rejected the de- Constitution.337 Second, under Section 3-102(a) of the partment's argument that the claim was barred by the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort defense of governmental immunity.327 Immunity Act,338 Predney v. The Village of Park Forest328 involved an [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Article, a local pub- 11-year-old boy who was severely and permanently in- lic entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to main- jured in a bicycle accident, allegedly caused by bushes tain its property in a reasonably safe condition for the use obstructing the view of an intersection.329 The court held in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom the entity that "[a] municipality's duty to keep [its] streets, side- intended and permitted to use the property in a manner walks, and parkways in a reasonably safe condition is in which and at such times as it was reasonably foresee- 339 not limited but extends to any part of portions immedi- able that it should be used.... ate and adjacent thereto."330 The court observed that The court held that the city was not liable, because under the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmen- Garcia was not an "intended and permitted user under tal Employee Tort Immunity Act, a public entity is li- § 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act."340 able "if after execution of [a] plan or design it appears In Lipper v. City of Chicago,341 the plaintiff argued from its use that it has created a condition that is not that "a bicyclist is...an intended user of this particular reasonably safe."331 It was "undisputed that the village sidewalk because one must use the sidewalk to reach owned the bicycle path up to the last 7 1/2 feet before the bicycle path on the other side of Lake Shore 342 the intersection, that 3.9 feet of the bushes extended Drive." The court held that an adult bicyclist was nei- over village property at the time of the accident," and ther an intended nor a permitted user of a sidewalk on that the village had several notices of the obstruction.332 which he struck a raised portion of the sidewalk sur- As part of the design the village "required the planting rounding a manhole cover.343 Thus, there is precedence of the bushes and even constructed a ramp for easier to the effect that a public entity may not be liable to an access from the bicycle path to the service driveway."333 injured cyclist for alleged negligence if the bicyclist was The court held that the village owed a duty of ordinary not an intended or permitted user of a sidewalk or care to the plaintiff even for an accident that occurred roadway at the time of the accident. on adjacent property.334 The majority view is that public entities' decisions to In sum, in some jurisdictions a public entity may be provide warning signs, traffic control devices, STOP held liable for conditions on shoulders and adjacent signs, speed limit signs, pavement markings, guard- areas that pose an unreasonable danger to bicyclists. rails, or barriers are policy-level decisions that are im- mune from liability. Some states' statutes specifically H. Requirement That Bicyclists Be Intended or exonerate public entities for failure to provide traffic Permitted Users signals, signs, markings, or similar controls or devices. A public entity may not be held liable for dangerous However, the courts have held a public entity liable for conditions if by statute the area where the bicyclist was an accident that was proximately caused by the public riding was not intended or permitted for the use of bicy- entity's failure to provide a traffic signal, sign, pave- clists. For example, in Garcia v. City of Chicago,335 a 27- ment markings, or other control or device as needed year-old plaintiff was injured while riding her bicycle on when the public entity had notice of a dangerous condi- a city sidewalk. She alleged that the city was negligent tion. After a public entity provides such safety features in the maintenance of the sidewalk because at one end or devices, it is generally held that the public entity has of the sidewalk there was a 6-in. drop-off in the pave- a duty to maintain them in good and serviceable condi- ment.336 The court held, first, that Section 9-52-020(b) of tion. the Municipal Code, which prohibited bicycle riding on Guidance sidewalks by persons over the age of 12 unless the Public entities have been held liable for the failure to sidewalk had been designated and marked as a bicycle maintain traffic control devices, for misleading pave- route, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the ment markings, for failure to replace warning signs, for defects in the pavement surface, and for obstructions in 326 a bikeway, as well as for hazards and obstacles in an Id. (citations omitted). 327 adjacent area. A public entity may be held liable for the Id. at 6. 328 violation of a mandatory provision of the MUTCD or 164 Ill. App. 3d 688, 518 N.E.2d 1243 (1987). 329 Id. at 690, 518 N.E.2d at 1244. 330 337 Id. at 697, 518 N.E.2d at 1249 (citation omitted). Id. at 20001, 204, 608 N.E.2d at 24041, 243. 331 338 Id. at 698, 518 N.E.2d at 1250 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ILL. REV. STAT. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3-102(a). 1985, c. 85, par. 3-103(a) (1985)). 339 240 Ill. App. 3d at 201, 608 N.E.2d at 241 (emphasis 332 Id. at 697, 518 N.E.2d at 1249. added). 333 340 Id. at 698, 518 N.E.2d at 1250. Id. at 204, 608 N.E.2d at 243. 334 341 Id. 233 Ill. App. 3d 834, 600 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 335 240 Ill. App. 3d 199, 608 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1992). 342 1992). Id. at 838, 600 N.E.2d at 21. 336 343 Id. at 200, 608 N.E.2d at 240. Id. at 836, 600 N.E.2d at 19.